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This dissertation is an Indigenous, decolonial, and autoethnographic account of the 
genealogical formation and function of Nativeness within biopolitical formations and 
racializing assemblages, as well as the visual, ontological, narrative, and affective 
imaginings of the northern bloc of settler colonialism (the United States and Canada). As 
an autoethnographic work it centres my own lived and embodied experiences to chart 
the corridors of settler-colonial power and knowledge production, in particular my 
experiences as a diasporic, urban and liminally enrolled Native person, and the very real, 
and at times overwhelming, affective burdens that come with such a positionality.  In 
doing so this work situates my journey within the structures of settler colonialism, and 
in particular against what the late Patrick Wolfe referred to as the “logic of elimination,” 
as well as what many scholars have identified and referred to as the Coloniality of Power 
and the Colonial Order of Things.  Further, it works to centre Indigenous resurgence, 
insurgence, decolonization, self-determination, and a politics of refusal.  In thinking 
through in particular the centering of practices of refusal, this work proposes and engages 
in a kind of methodological-pedagogical-praxiological movement of autoethnographic 
refusal, where the dissertation begins its first of two narrative movements by charting 
Indigenous damage narratives within frames of political ontology, biopolitics and 
racializing assemblages, visuality, and community loss and disruption, before moving 
towards actively no longer telling those stories.  The second narrative movement of this 
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dissertation moves then from telling of my own stories of damage under settler-colonial 
regimes of power/knowledge, towards theorizing about Native damage narratives, most 
especially why they are so readily consumed within digital, filmic, and academic settings 
and the economies of late capitalism/colonialism.  This is referred to within as the 
imaginarium of late capitalist/colonialist storytelling.  In doing so, it continues to ask 
fundamentally onto-existential questions about Natives through frames of Savageness 
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A Prolegomena on Language and Territory 
Before the serious work of this dissertation begins it is necessary, I believe to lay some 
conceptual groundwork, even before what may seem to be the primary conceptual 
groundwork that is to come in terms of illuminating my theoretical, methodological and 
research concerns. Primarily these words that I feel must come before all else have to do 
with two questions: language and land.  
Language has often been the site of much anti-colonial and decolonial theorizing, 
imagining and material work. Language shapes our world, our place(s) within it, the 
zones of intersection, antagonism, and contextualization, paths to liberation, and 
ultimately our perceptions of these things, and many more. Language then—and the 
choice to use or not use specific language, terminology, descriptors, grammatical 
constructs, turns of phrase, etc.—is something that provides grounding in, and 
demonstrates an orientation towards, specific sets of epistemological, ontological, 
methodological, pedagogical and praxiological questions and views of the world. More 
pressingly though, and perhaps some would say most vulgarly, language, and the choice 
to, or to not, deploy certain words, means of spelling and phrasing is eminently political 
in nature. 
The dissertation is, as the pages to come will nakedly demonstrate, not an exercise 
in mere dry sociological or more broadly social scientific investigation into a certain social 
issue. Rather, because of the very nature of the subject that it takes up and the 
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investigation that it follows, it should be understood, at its more basic level, to be an 
exercise in decolonial Native politics. This is not only because this dissertation roots itself 
in and towards a kind of decolonial and Indigenous epistemological and ontological 
framing, and the consequent methodological, pedagogical and praxiological 
commitments that arise from such an orientation, but because Native life, ensconced as it 
is within a global, continental and national terrain that seeks nothing short of its total 
elimination, cannot be anything but political. As Taiaiake Alfred deftly notes, “It has been 
said that being born Indian is being born into politics” (1995:1), and like Alfred, I believe 
this to be true. 
Thus, in the pages and chapters to follow I make an active choice—not only as both 
an Indigenous scholar and an activist, but as simply a Native trying to uncover his place 
within this world—to shape my deployment of language in such a way that it functions 
within a general activity of raising a decolonial political consciousness within Indigenous 
peoples and decentres the normative linguistic signifiers of modernity/coloniality, settler 
colonialism, capitalism and cisheteropatriarchy. To this end, I agree with the New 
Afrikan Independence Movement activist Sanyika Shakur when he notes that we can use: 
Certain spellings, particular words, phrases and slogans to distinguish, 
apply energy, weight and clarity to the ongoing and ever-increasing 
need for shaper, more critical, words of power to describe socio-
economic phenomena of national oppression” (2013:91).  
The decolonial Osage theologian George E. “Tink” Tinker likewise notes in his American 
Indian Liberation: A Theology of Sovereignty that this form of linguistic praxis: 
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Allows readers to avoid unnecessary normativizing or universalizing of 
the principal institutional religious quotient of the euro-west … It is 
important to my argumentation that people recognize the historical 
artificiality of modern regional and nation-state social constructions 
(2008:1). 
My uses of language follow in this wake.  Consequently, in this dissertation I make an 
active choice to not capitalize certain descriptive words and terms associated with the 
modern/colonial/capitalist order of things, such as christian, european, western/euro-
western, canadian, euromodern, and american.  Following Tinker, I also extend this to 
various geo-regional terms of delineation such as southwest, northeast or midwest when 
referring to political and geographical regions such as southwestern Ontario or the 
american midwest.  I have however decided to keep most proper nouns such as the names 
of countries, states and provinces capitalized.  
There are though two major exceptions to this general rule of thumb.  The first is 
my choice to de-capitalize the term ‘white’ when referring to settlers of european descent, 
again to de-emphasize their place as the normative subject, not only within the 
geopolitical sphere of this continent, but of the entire modern/colonial/capitalist world-
system.  The second is the capitalization of Native North American when referring to 
Indigenous peoples.  
Further, regarding my manner of addressing of the two English-speaking 
countries that occupy this continent currently, with their shared histories as imperial 
nations founded upon Fred Moten’s sociological catastrophe of settler colonialism and 
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transatlantic slave trade (2017), I do not believe it is a significant conceptual leap to treat 
them as a collectivity.  To that I would say that despite the formal international border in 
between them, flags, forms of bourgeois liberal democratic governance, and the various 
more minor settler nationalist aspirations to difference, from the perspective of the 
Native, it can be quite difficult to tell the two national-imperial-colonial blocs apart from 
one another.  To further this Native ethico-political statement, and to more deeply de-
emphasize and de-normativize their claims to exclusive or paramount sovereignty and 
territoriality, throughout this dissertation I refer to them using settler scholar Adam J. 
Barker’s vocabulary of the “northern bloc of settler colonialism” (2012:42), or more simply 
the northern bloc.  
When referring to the geographical terrain itself on which these colonial and 
decolonial contestations over sovereignty and territoriality play out, that is, when 
referring to the land itself, I simply call it Turtle Island.  While there are a number of 
problems that could be pointed out with this, most specifically the fact that there is no 
one single term from an Indigenous language that was used for the continent, and there 
never has been, in this case I find it is apt because it is the translation of Maehkaenah-
Menaehsaeh, a term from own largely unknown-to-self language of 
Oma ͞eqnomenēweqnaesen. Similarly, there is the cognate term Mishiike Minisi from our 
linguistically, culturally, and politically close Anishinaabe kinfolk.  There are similar 
cognate terms in the languages of other Algonkian-speaking peoples from the 
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northeastern woodlands of the continent, and within the unrelated languages of our 
culturally distinct co-habitants of the region, the various Iroquoian-speaking nations.  
Rather than juggle a number of these terms at any one time, Turtle Island will suffice for 
the purposes of this dissertation.  
I. Some Key Terms  
Additionally, it is best to also clarify that there are a number of terms that are used when 
referring to those peoples and nations that are Indigenous to Turtle Island within the 
following dissertation, both by myself and by the other authors, scholars, and theorists 
that I cite therein.  A non-comprehensive list and their rough meanings and usages, 
drawn from Kanienʼkehá꞉ka scholar Taiaiake Alfred (2009:23) is as follows: 
• Indian: A legal term still in use among many indigenous people in North America. 
• Native: A term used to refer to the 'racial' and cultural distinctiveness of 
individuals, and to distinguish indigenous communities from those of the 
mainstream society.  
• American Indian: Despite attempts to replace it with alternatives such as Native 
American, this term is in common use by Native peoples.  It is also a legal-political 
category in the United States.  Use of this term is also reflected in the chosen names 
of several important indigenous activist organizations such as the American 
Indian Movement and United American Indians of New England. 
• Aboriginal: A legal category in Canada that includes Indians, Métis, and Inuit. 
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• Indigenous: This term is used to imply a global context and to emphasize the 
supposed natural, tribal, and traditional characteristics of various peoples. 
As Alfred notes, all of these terms are appropriate in their given contexts and are used 
extensively by Native peoples themselves.  (Alfred 2009:23).  
For myself, however, usage tends to focus on three: Indian, Native, and 
Indigenous.  Perhaps as a product of my mother’s generation and those that came before 
her, many of whom still choose to refer to themselves as Indians, I myself quite often refer 
to myself as such, both within the pages of this dissertation, and in everyday life.  I also 
retain usage of Indian when speaking of specific organizations, pieces of legislation, and 
elements of governance that retain it in the name, such as the Bureau of Indian Affairs, 
the Indian Act, Indian Status, the Menominee Indian Tribe of Wisconsin, etc.  I also retain 
the usage of the old phrase at times that refers to “Indian Country,” though I take Indian 
Country to be inclusive of Native beyond just those called Indians. 
Indeed, Indian Country also speaks to another issue, which is that Native, and at 
times Indigenous, is the primary term used within this text, in part to move away from 
an implicit, and at times explicit, rendering of Nativeness as Indianness, and thus erasing 
Inuit, Métis, and other Indigenous peoples.  This is the product I believe of both an 
american-centric upbringing, despite not being raised in the United States, which tends 
to dissolve all Natives within its borders into Indianness, including both Inuit peoples in 
Alaska and the Kānaka Maoli and other Indigenous Polynesian, Micronesian, and 
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Melanesian peoples of the country’s Pacific territories, as well as a Indiancentric 
perspective that I believe is inculcated by Indians ourselves, outside of official settler State 
dogma, and which crosses the settler border.  I have listened to, and learned greatly, from 
Inuit friends and colleagues about the erasure of them, their lives, their communities, and 
their experiences within broader Native communities, organizations, events, and 
everything else.  It is my desire to push back against this erasure, as I feel it is my 
responsibility to do so as an Indian who tries to live their life in the spirit of reciprocity 
and good kinship with other Native peoples. 
Additionally, regarding the terms Indigenous and Native, while Alfred’s linguistic 
taxonomy above does differentiate between the two, my usage trends to treat them as 
interchangeable and thus I do not make a consistent choice to use one over the other in 
any given instance, though I do tend, as a matter of automatic writing tendencies, to 
favour Native.  And that is certainly part of the point.  In one of the chapters that will 
follow, I engage the arguments of Xicanx-Tzotzil scholar Nicolás Juárez around Native 
racialization, the question of visuality, and the idea that one can produce (and thus 
reproduce) a meaningful difference between the two concepts on the lines of race versus 
ethnicity.  As that chapter will show, I profoundly disagree with Juárez’s arguments, both 
their conclusions and what I see as his (mis)understanding of how Nativeness works 
under regimes of settler-colonial biopolitical governmentality.  Thus, for me, the words 
actually carry much of the same content. 
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Additionally, there is a further set of political discourses around the usage of the 
term Indigenous (or indigenous) that complicates my desire to deploy, and which is hinted 
at my Alfred’s decade-old taxonomy, which is that there is a global content to it.  While I 
consider it to be largely unintentional, a key fallout from this has been the loss of 
specificity in terms of being able to discuss and analyse the experience of people and 
nations who are Indigenous to Turtle Island in the transition from speaking of Native 
Studies to Indigenous Studies.  While these intellectual spaces on this continent were 
primarily fought for by Native North Americans, increasingly space within university 
departments and programmes, academic journals, and edited volumes, as well as within 
the myriad of enclaves that have been carved out of the terrain of various new and social 
medias, has been given over to the discussion of global Indigeneities. 
I have no political or ethical issue with the discussion of Indigeneities and 
indigenous peoples around the world, and actively support intercommunal and 
international communication, sharing and collaboration between our various peoples 
and nations.  That must be said upfront and openly so that I am quite clear on this issue.  
However I am concerned by the shifting usage of the term Indigenous towards a 
globalized usage within the colonized and westernized academy on this continent and 
what I see as the slow marginalization of Native North Americans in zones that we fought 
so long for, and more specifically the loss of a specific language for talking about our 
experience under the twin regimes of the northern bloc of settler colonialism.  
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Again, clarity of purpose needs to be made here: this is not a denial of other 
people’s indigeneity, a claim which I have myself seen often thrown out towards Native 
North Americans within various online milieus when the term Indigenous is used to refer 
to a particular Turtle Island context and situatedness.  What I am seeking is a language 
through which I can begin to talk about our particular shared (as in shared between our 
myriad nations and communities) experiences within the prison houses of nations that 
are Canada and the United States of America.  
In the past, I have tried to deploy various solutions to this issue.  In past I have 
used the Kanien’kéha phrase for indigenous/original people: Onkwehón:we.  However, 
this is a remnant of my older prior pan-Native conceptions of us as peoples, something 
which my politics have moved away from in the past several years.  While this usage still 
marks the URL of my personal blog (because, as a graduate student I cannot spare the 
money to pay for my own personal web domain) it is otherwise absent from my 
vocabulary now.  More recently I toyed with attempting a grammatical/case distinction 
between Indigenous and indigenous, with the former being used to signify the specific case 
of Turtle Island, and the former implying Alfred’s global context.  However, I have found 
this likewise to be clunky, and something which constantly needs to be defined in every 
new intellectual, social, and political context in which I may find myself.  Thus, I have 
also begun to drop its usage. 
For these reasons, and because, as with everything else, my language usage is an 
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ongoing project of development, throughout this dissertation all three terms—Indian, 
Native, and Indigenous—are made use of.  This dissertation reflects the complexity of my 
own life and personhood; everything is murky, nothing is clear, and failure is perhaps 
just around the corner, but more so is always something that can be learned from.  My 
speech and writing reflect this.  
An ultimate point to be made is to say that throughout the body of this dissertation 
I make a conscious and concerted effort to use autonyms and toponyms when referring 
to specific indigenous nations and places.  I do this out of recognition and respect for the 
struggles for self-determination and decolonization being waged right now within the 
confines of the northern bloc of settler colonialism by First Nations, Inuit, Métis, Kānaka 
Maoli and other Indigenous and colonized peoples.  For example, I use terms such as 
Anishinaabe(g), or more specific terms such as Ojibwe, Odawa, Potawatomie, and 
Omàmiwinini rather than older colonial terms like Chippewa to refer to that 
geographically spread out and cross-border formation of Indigenous peoples1.  Again, as 
always, there are exceptions.  The true name of my nation is Ka͞eyes-Mamāceqtawak; 
Menominee is what the Anishinaabeg referred to us as, however, while I do deploy use 
 
1 Briefly though, I do this within the best of my ability given that the shared language/dialect continuum of 
these peoples follows different conventions based on location and which specific nation one is from. See 
for example the shared autonym, which I render as Anishinaabe, can be represented as Neshnabé 
(Potawatomie), Nishnaabe (Odawa), Anishinabe (single vowel) and Anishinaabe (double vowel).  In my 
own writing I follow the conventions of the online University of Minnesota-based Ojibwe People’s Dictionary, 
and the print edition of A Concise Dictionary of Minnesota Ojibwe (1995), both of which use the double vowel 
system of spelling and is largely based on Minnesota Ojibwe dialects 
xxii 
 
of Ka͞eyes-Mamāceqtawak, simply because of my own life being raised to call myself 
Menominee it has not always been easy to discontinue use of that word.  Thus, as with 
other word usages, my practice here is inconsistent.  I have purposely left it this way in 
the body of this dissertation. 
Further, as a part of this linguistic effort, this dissertation also attempts to keep the 
orthography of each indigenous language as accurate as possible.  Further, when an 
Indigenous place name is given for the first time it will be defined and the most well-
known English name or names will be given in a footnote.  
II. On the Question of Territorial Acknowledgement 
During the autumn of 2016, in October, I attended a conference held at St. Paul’s 
University College, an affiliate of the University of Waterloo entitled Decolonizing 
Education/Integrating Knowledges.  The conference as part of a broader array of ‘Truth and 
Reconciliation Response Projects’ that had begun to take place across Canada over the 
course of the preceding year.  These “response projects” were a largely liberal 
institutional response to the release in the autumn of 2015 of the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission's Final Report on the residential school programme in Canada. 
While emerging from a largely liberal institutional context, and perhaps in-spite of those 
origins, the conference nevertheless saw some incredible keynote speakers, and a number 
of quite inspirational and informative Circle Workshops on diverse topics. 
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One of those circles which has stuck with me, and been the source of much 
reflection and meditation, was on the subject and practice of territorial acknowledgements 
in both the public and educational spheres.  In light of my dissertation writing slowly 
approaching the end of a long tunnel and having recently completed a term teaching a 
course on Contemporary Indigenous Issues in Canada, I have been reflecting upon them 
once again. 
The practice of territorial acknowledgement is, in my opinion, relatively self-
explanatory: it is the practice of prefacing one’s work, writings, talks etc. with a 
recognition of the land upon which one stands, and in particular of the original people 
from whom it was seized by the expansion of empire.  For example, on the syllabus of 
my course I placed the following at the top of the first page: 
We acknowledge that this course takes place upon the Dish With One 
Spoon Territory: the traditional lands of the Attiwonderon Nation, 
Anishinaabeg Three Fires Confederacy & Mississauga, and 
Rotinonshón:ni Six Nations Confederacy.  The University of Waterloo 
and St. Paul’s University College is situated within Block 2 of the 
Haldimand Tract, land promised to the Six Nations to the British Empire 
in 1784, which includes six miles on each side of the Grand River from 
mouth to source. 
However, my thoughts on, and relationship to, the practice are not uncomplicated.  It is 
some of these complications that I wish to briefly unpack here. 
I must admit that for much of the time I have lived in this region I did not engage 
in this practice at all.  Initially, this was because when I first relocated to southwest 
Ontario it was most common to see people only recognizing the theft of the Haldimand 
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Tract from the Rotinonshón:ni Six Nations Confederacy.  However, the original residents 
of this territory were Attiwonderon nation, and so my initial response during these early 
experiences with the practice, more often than not performed by white settlers, was that 
it appeared to me rather Rotinonshón:ni-centric.  This is not to say that I thought then, or 
believe now, that we should not recognize the peoples, territories and struggles of the 
Rotinonshón:ni, but rather that this quite narrow focus, again primarily enacted by 
settlers, buried the Attiwonderon and Anishinaabeg, and their own relationship to the 
land and territory. 
Related to this was the position held by me that is best summarized as: "this is all 
stolen Native land, and it should all be returned to us." However, in those experiences of 
what I can best label as a kind of Haldimand Tract exclusivity, what often I felt went 
unsaid was that the issue of stolen Indigenous land in this region was placed entirely 
within this restricted sense.  In my view, then and now, this narrowing of the plane of 
dispossession to exclusively the Haldimand Tract is easily a way for settlers to side-step 
the larger issue that, of course, all of southwest Ontario, the rest of Canada and indeed 
all the northern bloc are, and were, land stolen and seized from Indigenous nations by 
dint of dishonesty, betrayal and elimination, and that it is all in need of decolonization. 
However, as I noted already, my relationship to the practice today is complex.  This can 
be seen in my own inclusion of a territorial acknowledgement within the text of my 
course syllabus.  Part of this arose from my learning over the years more about our 
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peoples' traditional worldviews and how we related to one another as individuals and as 
distinct, if still at times closely related and allied, nations.  In learning ever more about 
the traditional and ancient relations between the closely related Ka ͞eyes-Mamāceqtawak 
and Anishinaabeg Niswi-Mishkodewin peoples, I found that for myself it was important 
for to acknowledge that I live in the territory of the latter.  The Menominee and 
Anishinaabeg are old friends and allies.  Situated as my nation has been since the 
beginning of memory on the western shores of Nanāweyah Kaeqcekam/Ininwewi-
Gichigami2, we also maintained old ties to the Iroquoian Peoples of the Rotinonshón:ni 
and Attiwonderon. 
Thus, for myself as a Menominee person, activist and scholar, my own practice of 
territorial acknowledgement is as much about the recognition of these ancient relations 
of friendship, kinship and alliance between our Menominee, Anishinaabeg, 
Rotinonshón:ni and Attiwonderon nations as much as it is about recognition of the 
relatively obvious fact that the land was seized through one means or another during 
expansion of white settler sovereign power. We must, and indeed are and have been, 
rebuilding and renewing these relations as we struggle together for decolonization, the 
resurgence of traditional culture and the return of our lands. 
 
2 Lake Michigan. 
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II.I Settlers & the Practice of Territorial Acknowledgement 
Complexity is the word I have used to describe my relationship to this praxis 
already, and, while I have moved my own stance on it due to growing relations with 
other Indigenous peoples and nations, on the other side of is the growing engagement in 
the practice by settlers.  As I mentioned before, it was largely through the skewed 
deployment of this practice by a white settler that I first encountered it.  For many years 
it was a niche practice of certain sectors of the radical anti-capitalist left—it was 
specifically through interaction with various Marxist and anarchist settlers that I first 
came to know it—it has however since grown beyond those confines.  Today it is an 
increasingly common sight to see major canadian universities placing a territorial 
acknowledgement on their homepages, for business to do so, and for individual class 
syllabuses, such as my own, to contain one somewhere in their body.  Even at this 
comparatively conservative and reactionary research institution, we have seen the 
university president delivering a territorial acknowledgement at the beginning of new 
building openings, and even at the start of convocations.  Often, however, in terms of 
opening these sorts of events and sessions, Indigenous students at the University of 
Waterloo have found themselves receiving the requests to give territorial 
acknowledgements, perhaps to be paired with some kind of welcome song. 
And this raises a further question, which is why we, as the Indigenous people, 
should have to recognize the territory in the first place?  What I mean by this is not a 
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question of whether we should be engaging in territorial acknowledgement, but rather 
why, in these institutional contexts where we find ourselves being asked to deliver them, 
rather than settlers learning to perform them on their own, do people think it is somehow an 
honour for us to recognize that our lands were stolen? In light of the general reconciliation 
programme of the university and the country-at-large, I cannot help but think that this is 
a drive not to reconcile settlers to the guilt of what was done to found their nation, but 
rather to reconcile Native peoples to continuing settler colonialism. 
And this is important for settler peoples to do—that is, if they truly do strive to be 
something more, and to engage us meaningfully in the process of decolonization.  I do 
not believe that as Indigenous peoples, scholars, students, activists or otherwise, that it is 
our responsibility to save white people, to educate them, or to otherwise do this for them.  
This was always the point: to give settlers the initial push, so that they can begin to do 
this practice for themselves, not ask Indigenous people or organizations to do it for them.  
I believe it is very much so the responsibility of settler peoples to acknowledge settler 
colonialism, acknowledge cultural destruction and to acknowledge theft of the land upon 
which they stand.  Rather than place the burden further upon our shoulders, it is for 
settlers to save themselves.  Part of this is to speak truth, and the act of territorial 
acknowledgement is an element of this. 
However, in this process of learning and unlearning, it is key to take leadership 
from Indigenous peoples on it.  As I noted above in discussing why I pulled away from 
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the practice when I first encountered it, it was in part due to the Rotinonshón:ni and 
Haldimand Tract specific nature of it at the time.  Again, this was not wrong per se: it was 
because of the tireless efforts of the brothers and sisters from the Rotinonshón:ni 
community in and around the Six Nations of the Grand River reserve in publicizing the 
history of struggle and theft regarding the Haldimand Tract that has put it in a prominent 
position. 
This should not have meant that the Rotinonshón:ni and Haldimand Tract were 
the only peoples, territories and struggles to be acknowledged though.  If the settlers who 
I first encountered writing and speaking territorial acknowledgements had taken the time 
to listen to the regional Native community, and more specifically to sit and take 
leadership from them, they would have known this.  This all would have become obvious 
to settlers seeking to acknowledge the territory if they had taken leadership instead of 
seeking to find their own way. 
This is important because while, as I say, the Rotinonshón:ni and Haldimand Tract 
specific nature of the territorial acknowledgement when I first arrived here was not bad 
outright, it was only a half-measure.  And in being a half-measure it effectively erased the 
presence of Anishinaabeg and Attiwonderon.  In doing this it actually perpetuated settler-
colonial epistemic violence against those nations. 
II.II The Becoming-Metaphor of Decolonization 
Even as the practice of territorial acknowledgement spreads throughout white civil 
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society and circles of everyday life, I feel that we must also always problematize it to some 
degree in light of ongoing settler colonialism and imperialism.  For example, what does 
it mean for the president of this university to acknowledge that our campus sits on the 
traditional territories of the Attiwonderon, Anishinaabeg and Rotinonshón:ni when this 
same university actively supports Israeli settler colonialism and which, through its 
massive STEM faculties, both reaps the benefits of, and trains the intellectual and practical 
foot soldiers for, the wholesale destruction of Native lands and resources? 
Out of the university arena, we might also ask what good is it for a yoga studio, a 
long critiqued Mecca of white cultural appropriation and the emptying-out of the ancient 
spiritual traditions of the peoples of South Asia, to place an acknowledgement on their 
website that their capitalist private enterprise is situated on stolen Indigenous land? It is 
difficult to foresee and experience these sorts of institutional practices and not see 
bulwarks of capitalism, settler colonialism, antiblackness, and cultural imperialism.  I 
look at them as they acknowledge the territory and I see a movement towards what Eve 
Tuck and K. Wayne Yang deftly labelled "settler innocence” (2012). 
At the individual level, the practice of territorial acknowledgement, in my 
experience, is also quite often coupled with the practice of what Barnor Hesse refers to as 
"white confessionalism" (2014).  This is the practice of individual settlers proclaiming 
their ignorance with regards to the processes and structures of settler colonialism, even 
as it and the benefits of it are all around them; even as they know Indigenous people used 
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to be more numerous; and even as "good whites" have written about and opposed the 
evils of their kings and countries since Bartolomé de las Casas, and then saying that they 
are sorry. While it is no doubt genuine on the part of some, by-in-large it has always come 
across to me as a practice that is deeply self-congratulatory.  The true cacophonous 
madness in this confessional practice for us as Indigenous peoples is that we—people 
who already bear the burden of having managed to survive five centuries of invasion, 
who carry the inherited trauma, pain and anger over a loss without name, and yet are 
people who continue to live, to thrive and to struggle for our freedoms against the 
overwhelming violence of multiple, converging vectors of death that are constantly 
arrayed against us still—are expected to shoulder these outpourings of settler tears and 
to reassure them that it is going to be ok. 
For myself, jaded I think by far too many years chafing within the institutions of 
colonialist-capitalist education, I admittedly cannot help but approach these issues with 
a bad faith epistemology.  To put it relatively simply, I think that settlers know the land 
is stolen, and that, existentially and phenomenologically, this knowledge compromises 
their sense of integrity, being, and property.  Thus, as Indigenous peoples, we are made 
to approach a significant mass of people who either already know, knowingly do not 
care, or who even directly oppose decolonization, and it is on that plane where the issue 
and discussion must start.  Acknowledgement of territory and confession of one’s 
colonial sins do not necessarily lead to an ethic or politic that positions decolonization as 
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justice.  And, as Native people, that is what is needed, not whiter confessionalism. 
Related to both practices of acknowledgement and confession is another practice, 
perhaps less common but increasingly witnessed in the conference and summit circuit, 
in which in the same breath of their acknowledgement or confession, settlers move to 
recognize themselves (and other settlers in attendance) as "guests on Native land."  
During the audience participation phase of the circle discussion at the 2016 St. Paul’s 
conference this point was raised in a question asking the panellists if they ever "welcomed 
people to the territory." Not to linger on this too long, but there is a point to be made 
about this practice and a distinction to be drawn.  Firstly, it is, I would argue that it is 
qualitatively different when Indigenous people and settlers do this.  Unlike the practice 
of territorial acknowledgement, I do not believe it is the place of settlers, unrequested, to 
acknowledge that they are "guests on Native land." Simply put, guests are invited, and 
one would need to significantly stretch the definition of invitation to include the history 
of settler colonialism and violent dispossession that it represents. 
II.III Acknowledgement, Decolonization & White Anxiety 
Decolonization is a fear deep at the heart of settler society, and this is manifested in the 
concurrent push back and resistance to the growing trend of territorial 
acknowledgement.  At this university, I can say that I know of at least one department 
with the Faculty of Arts that experienced quite a bit of staff and faculty push back against 
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the practice3.  This dread percolates up from the knowledge—settler confessions to the 
contrary notwithstanding—of what settler colonialism is, and what it continues to entail 
for Indigenous People.  
This fear though lives not just in the minds of the white capitalist, or the white 
imperial educator, or the white civil servant.  Rather this deep fear, in fact truly a form of 
existential dread, cuts a deep path clear across the entirety of white society.  This extends 
right into those sectors that most explicitly claim to oppose and resist the current 
dispensation of power relations in society: the radical anti-capitalist left. 
In all of my years of involvement within this particular political sector what has 
always struck me the most, but which also long since has lost its shock factor, regarding 
the position of settler anarchists, Marxists, and assorted other “progressives” in all of this 
cacophony is that, generally speaking, despite claims to represent or speak on behalf of 
the interests of, the most oppressed strata of canadian society, these are people who do 
no land return or other decolonization-oriented work at all. Related to that is the fact that 
they often have no, or minimal, connection to or relationship with local Indigenous 
communities, and overall do not understand "decolonization" as anything except an 
academic or social justice buzz word which has nothing to do with an ethics and politics 
of actual decolonization. 
 
3 I could say more, but I will not. This knowledge comes from knowing an Indigenous student in the 
department who had to be witness to the pushback. I do not have permission to share their story in such 
detail that it will reveal who they are. You will have to simply take it on faith that this did indeed happen. 
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Ongoing accumulation by dispossession is so deeply fundamental to the material 
basis, and attendant ideological outgrowths, of settler society that a call for even a small 
fraction of the bare minimum of decolonial justice—the return of what was taken—is 
interpreted as a clarion call for some kind of white genocide (and in this, the fear of white 
genocide, the circle between the white left and the white right becomes complete).  This 
deep anxiety informs a sizeable portion, if not an outright majority, of knee jerk First 
World responses to genuine anti-colonial/decolonial ethics, politics, and theory. 
This dissonance, between a seeming commitment to decolonization in words yet 
recoiling from it in reality, stems, in my experience, from not taking leadership from 
Indigenous communities.  It also stems from how the practices of acknowledgements and 
settler confession can themselves function as moves to settler innocence.  Both of these 
aim in fact at the continued reproduction of the material base of settler colonialism, 
through the defence of settler futurity, even if the ideology espoused is superficially more 
multicultural, anticapitalist or otherwise opposed to the conservative, reactionary 
mainstream of settler society. 
Against these white anxieties, I offer a different response than that which I often 
hear or read.  Instead of reconciliation, or rather against the liberal conception of it, and 
as my own take on what reconciliation must mean (in the literal sense of "to make right"), 
I say this: "yes of course, we do want our land back." The return of land is but a small 
fraction of the bare minimum of decolonial justice.  Our lands are at the very centre of 
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our beings.  Everything about us arises from the land: our languages, our cultures, our 
cosmologies, our ceremonies, our kindship structures, our spiritualties.  Everything.  
Reconciliation, decolonization, territorial acknowledgement, confession: none of them 
mean anything without the repatriation of our lands to our sovereign nations.  Further, it 
is not for a radical Indigenous decolonization movement to be responsible to notions of 
settler futurity.  With that said, I make the following declaration: 
I acknowledge that the writing for this dissertation was carried out on 
the Dish With One Spoon Territory: the traditional lands of the 
Attiwonderon, Anishinaabeg Three Fires Confederacy & Mississauga, 
and Rotinonshón:ni Six Nations Confederacy, within Block 2 of the 
Haldimand Tract, land promised to the Six Nations to the British Empire 
in 1784, which includes six miles on each side of the Grand River from 





Native Studies, putatively defined against the neoliberal university, is a 
discipline from which renegade knowledge is to be generated, one 
whose foundational object—the Native—shores up modes of intellectual 
production meant to depart from and, in this, attack the colonial 
episteme itself. In other words, theirs is a project, carried out in the name 
of social justice, that is by and for the Native. In the face of settler 
colonialism’s apocalyptic teleology, Native Studies is thus a discipline 
from which the future, a decolonial one, is to be rebelliously thought.   
– Billy-Ray Belcourt, Can the Other of Native Studies Speak? 
In that undercommons of the university one can see that it is not a matter 
of teaching versus research or even the beyond of teaching versus the 
individualization of research. To enter this space is to inhabit the 
ruptural and enraptured disclosure of the commons that fugitive 
enlightenment enacts, the criminal, matricidal, queer, in the cistern, on 
the stroll of the stolen life, the life stolen by enlightenment and stolen 
back, where the commons gives refuge, where the refuge gives 
commons.  
– Stefano Harney & Fred Moten, The Undercommons: Fugitive Planning & 
Black Study 
Fundamentally, this dissertation is a story. On one level, perhaps the most obvious one 
when peering at its surface, it is the story of me, of my life, or at least part of the story of 
me and my life.  Me and my Native life.  It is a story about my journey, my path, my trials 
and tribulations, my time in the deepest darkness within the prison house of settler 
colonialism, as well as also my survival and return from those depths, and the moments 
of introspection and joy, both personal and shared, which have followed.  Perhaps 
because of the fondness I have held since childhood for certain kinds of sci-fi and fantasy 
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fiction, I cannot help but think of the old Joseph Campbell theorization of the cyclical 
nature of stories, beginning with a call and the choice to answer that call, before 
journeying into the abyss and returning triumphant, ready to share what has been 
learned, before readying to start again (2008).  I am not so bold as to compare myself to 
the legendary heroes of old, but I think there is something emergent from that line of 
thinking that resonates deeply as I think here of the calendar rounds of many of the 
Nations of the Great Lakes, including my own, and the cyclical nature of time, and of 
birth, death, and rebirth, and the role of stories in helping us to remember that (Whyte 
2019).  
But, on another level, this is also a story that is about more than me, more than my 
story and my life.  It is also a story about what lies within, beyond, beneath, against, and 
after me.  It is a story that, at its most important root, asks the question of what it means 
to live a Native life under settler colonialism, under the blood-soaked flags and bright 
city lights of amerikkka and kanada, and all of their attendant regimes and violences.  It 
is about these things which afflict us, and our will to not only survive this lethal world, 
but to thrive, and, maybe, emerge into a new one.  Because of that it could never just be 
the story of me, even though the words, pages, and chapters that follow from here emerge 
from the forms that my own life has taken.  It is a Native story, not simply because I 
myself am a Native person, but because I must necessarily listen deeply for the voices of 
generations beyond me, stretching forwards and backwards in time.  As Joey Bada$$ raps 
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in his track “Land of the Free” (2017): 
Sometimes I speak and I feel like it ain't my words, 
Like I'm just a vessel channeling inside this universe, 
I feel my ancestors unrested inside of me. 
While this is, indeed obviously must be, my own words that you are reading, I carry with 
me the stories of countless generations before me, as well as those who walk with me 
now.  They and their voices, their stories, animate every word that I write, every 
terminological, stylistic, and structural choice.  It is also a story, I hope, that is not about 
what will be faced by the generations that come after me.  I hope that should some 
descendant seven generations from now pick up and read this dissertation it will have 
the appearance of nothing more than a nightmare dream to them, the story of a world 
that was.  Those dreams for the future also fill every page. 
As a story, this writing has a beginning.  In many ways this project has been a long 
time coming; the culmination of a life’s journey of sometimes self-interested, but 
increasingly, and with greater age, community-oriented searching and re-searching. 
However, as I have on numerous occasions now attempted to sit down at my computer, 
hands pressed firmly against my well-worn keyboard to begin to try and finally give form 
to this dissertation, I have found myself more often at a loss for words. I think to myself 
constantly “why is this so goddamn difficult, you know what you want to write?” Add 
to that other questions that come constantly racing towards me: What am I supposed to 
say? How am I supposed to say it? Is this even the right project, for me, and not only for 
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me but for my family, for my nation and for the wider community that is “Native North 
America?” Am I even going about this in a good way? 
So, I become lost at the very site of enunciation, at the place where I seek to make 
myself heard, and to be heard. I choke up and lose my thoughts. I find myself stricken 
with what feels at times almost like a kind of non-medical aphasia. At the heart of all of 
this is that this project has compelled me into a position of vulnerability and self-exposure 
that I have almost always fought against allowing myself to concede within the sphere of 
the public. It might be safer to say that this is because I am not always comfortable in this 
position, but the reality of it is that it is because I am not comfortable with it ever. Those 
decidedly non-scientific, yet socially and culturally relatively widespread, Meyers-Briggs 
personality type tests always peg me as one of the introverted types, most recently as an 
INFP, and while they may be gibberish, introversion bordering on anxiety and 
depression, if not fully over that line, has long been a hallmark of my personality. So, I 
always play things close to the chest and opening up about that which affects and afflicts 
me is never a task I relish or find amusing or a source of personal growth. Because of that 
I almost always try to keep it hidden away, even from those closest to me.  
With particular regard to this dissertation, this is because the specific ‘it’ in this 
instance, the ‘it’ which is the site of this research, is often a site of sadness, anger, 
confusion and loss. In many ways it marks an old and destabilizing wound at the very 
centre of my being; of who, and what, I am. It is a wound such that even in those instances 
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where I may find myself able to name it, as in the pages of this dissertation, as an 
assemblage of disjointed and disconnected parts—as a piece of family history, as thinking 
through certain colonial policies, as a personal experience, as a memory that bubbles to 
the surface—I also simultaneously find myself chronically at a loss to fully be able to 
articulate it. This is my anxious aphasia of opening up about myself in its most distilled 
form and experience. 
Because of this, I find myself in the process of this writing, of trying to speak 
through text, meditating on the words of my fellow Indigenous scholar Nicolás Juárez 
(Xicano-Tzotzil) on the disruption wrought upon the thinking of Indigenous writers by 
"the raw violence that defines Native American life" (2014). Juárez notes that for those of 
us who occupy this space there arises from this violence of never-ending genocide "a 
psychic burden that causes a sense of anxiety that must be constrained and managed in 
even the most radical Indigenist texts, forcing one to tease out the various moments in 
the theorization of Native American scholars in which the fires of their work overwhelm them" 
(2014). 
These fires-that-overwhelm have become all too familiar to me in both my 
academic work and in my experience of this thing we call everyday life. Indeed, if 
anything, it has been the case that this has only increased the further that I have perused 
this work down the proverbial rabbit hole. And much like Alice’s journey down, it is 
profoundly disorienting and dislocating. The more I have read, the more I have thought, 
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the more I have taught, the more I have contemplated the subject matter of this research, 
the warmer and nearer the flames have felt. Sometimes it seems as though if I were to 
reach out any further that I would become actually burned in the moment. 
This psycho-colonial anxious aphasia then raises a question: given this, the 
difficulty of figuring out how to speak, how does one begin to even name and articulate 
these feelings and experiences? To give name and shape to them? Most imminently 
perhaps what I can say is that this is what it is like to, in a self-reflexive and self-located 
manner, engage the question of Native life under what Fred Moten refers to as a “shared 
modernity founded upon the sociological catastrophe of the transatlantic slave trade and 
settler colonialism” (2017).  
Beyond my personal struggle to give voice to this colonially wounded experience, 
I have also dwelt much on what may be the incomprehensibility of all of this to the reader, 
in particular, the non-Indigenous reader.  In large degree, this is the product of the 
workings of my positionality as a diasporic, in-between Indigenous scholar inside the 
colonized, westernized academy.  There is a significant degree of distrust here from 
myself directed at these institutions and their career apparatchiks.  I find myself often 
asking if there is, or ever will be, a time and a place where it can be said that I have a 
genuine have faith in these institutions and their functionaries to such a degree that I can 
render myself vulnerable in such an intimate way before them?  The colonial education 
system did, after all, play a not-so-insignificant role in the inflicting of the collective 
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wounds and collective traumas that we, as Indigenous peoples, are now seeking to 
resolve and to heal from.  Is not that supposed to be, at least in part, the point of 
decolonization?  I ask myself this repeatedly.  So I wonder not only if my voice will be 
heard, but whether or not my voice will even be understood, or even if it is worth 
enunciating at all, lest I open up some of the most intimate parts of my being to the 
empirical, scientistic gaze of the colonized, westernized academy and my non-
Indigenous fellow scholars. This is something I think is aptly summed up by Indigenous 
theorists Eve Tuck and C. Ree when they say: 
In telling you all of this in this way, I am resigning myself and you to the 
idea that parts of my telling are confounding.  I care about you 
understanding, but I care more about concealing parts of myself from 
you.  I do not trust you very much.  You are not always aware of how 
you can be dangerous to me, and this makes me dangerous to you.  I am 
using my arm to determine the length of the gaze (2013:640). 
But here I am still, fingers to keyboard.  I feel the nervousness I have so often felt.  But I 
press on against the constant refrains the constant, internal refrains of “why even 
bother?” I continue, not because I necessarily am concerned with the legibility of my 
being and my enunciations within and to the westernized academy, but because I 
remember that while in an immediate sense this project is about me, about my life, it is 
also not just about me.  It is about we as Indigenous peoples and nations and our 
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survivance, resurgence and flourishing within, against and beyond4 this always-already 
post-apocalyptic psycho-geographical landscape that has been shaped by the sociological 
catastrophe of settler colonialism.  I remind myself constantly that this project is not just 
about a selfish or self-centred attempt to articulate my own experience of wounding at 
the hands of a particular world-building project, but to also think through and about the 
possibility of decolonial and healing Indigenous futurisms.  I remember that this struggle 
is not just my own, but one in which I am joined by and join into a chorus of Indigenous 
voices, inside and outside of the westernized academy, which swells ever greater, 
moment by moment, rebelliously writing and speaking against the apocalyptic teleology 
of settler colonialism, (post)modernity and late-capitalism. 
And the words come.  Finally, I say to myself “let’s do this.” 
I. Locating Myself in My Work 
So, I begin in earnest this writing, this process of storying and storytelling. And as an 
Indigenous scholar, I begin in all seriousness this story with the practice of locating 
 
4 The concept of the “within, against and beyond” (or “against-and-beyond”) is one that I take from 
anarchist scholar and historian Chris Dixon (2014). The within can be best summarized as the site of struggle 
within the structures of settler colonialism, capitalism, the westernized academy etc. Regarding the against 
and the beyond, for which Dixon draws on radical theorists John Holloway and Ashanti Alston, he notes 
“our ‘against’ is our active opposition to all forms of domination, and our ‘beyond’ is our work to build 
new social relations and forms of social organization through struggle” (2014, 8). For myself, as an 
Indigenous scholar and activist I take this idea of the against-and-beyond to be on the one hand our active 
theorizing of and struggle against the grammars of suffering of Red Life, which Juárez names clearing and 
civilization (2014), and the beyond to be the call to imagine decolonial Indigenous futures, ones that not just 
seeks to replicate an idea of before colonization but which seeks to call into being new forms of belonging, of 




myself within the context of this writing. I do this because, as Anishinaabe epistemologist, 
Kathleen Absolon states:  
The self is central to Indigenous re-search. The flower centre represents 
the self and the way Indigenous searchers include and situate themselves 
in their methodologies. This includes the re-searcher’s location, memory, 
motive and search for congruency. What we see revealed through 
Indigenous re-search is the re-searcher, the self. Within the self exists 
millennia of Indigenous ancestral knowledge, teachings and Spirit 
(2011:67). 
As an Indigenous scholar thinking within, against and beyond the colonized, westernized 
academy, I believe that it is essential to begin any research, any story, with/in a practice 
of reflexive and reflective self-location because “positionality, storying and re-storying 
ourselves comes first (Absolon 2011:13).  Not only because this is, at least in large part, 
my story, but because it is a story about Nativeness, I cannot be anything but a part of it.  
Externality is simply not a methodological or theoretical possibility with regards to this 
work, and so telling you my place in all of this should come before anything else. 
Against the dry, overwrought, modernist and euro-western assumptions of 
scientific and ethnographic practice that assume even the possibility of some kind of 
value-neutral objectivity, I believe sincerely that at best we can achieve a kind of general 
inter-subjectivity, and within that who we are, where we are, and who and where we 
come from is essential. The old modernist empiricism is, I believe, fundamentally a 
Eurocentric ego-politics of knowledge, which overcodes an essentially colonialist, 
imperialist and capitalist geopolitics and body-politics of knowledge. In the interests of 
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the methodological, pedagogical and praxiological commitments that I hold, it is essential 
that this euro-colonial grip on the place of knowledge be disrupted.  
So, I begin with my name. My birth certificate reads Rowland Keshena Robinson. 
This is the name I have come to think of in more recent years as my “white name” though 
I do not mean this in a negative way. It is a name that for me has become a bit of a gag, 
because it seems like almost too many men on my father’s side of the family have it: his 
brother, his father, one of his brother’s sons and of course myself. Keshena, my middle 
name, is my mother’s maiden name, the name of my Indigenous family. It is a name I 
have always been proud of, even as non-Indigenous people have often struggled with its, 
to me at least, seemingly easy pronunciation, because it is also the name of the largest 
settlement on our reservation and because it ties our family back to a leader of some 
import to our Nation in the mid-19th century. 
I also have an “Indian name.” It is Ena ͞emaehkiw, to which in my work as both a 
scholar and an activist I have come to append the second name Kesīqnaeh to. 
Ena͞emaehkiw was given to me in ceremony by an elder of my Nation back in the summer 
of 2011, when I was 25 years old, and so like many modern Indigenous persons such a 
name came to me relatively late in life. It has several interrelated meanings, but the one 
which I most often choose to express to others is “Thunderbird.” Kesīqnaeh, on the other 
hand, is a more correct rendering of Keshena, the latter of which is an anglicization. Its 
meaning is a little bit more complex, and consequently takes a little bit more time to 
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explain, but for the sake of brevity I will say that it also is a reference to the Thunderbird. 
I also am of the Menominee Nation, or more correctly the Ka ͞eyes-Mamāceqtawak5. This 
is the people of my mother Gay Robinson (née Keshena) and of her parents Jeannine and 
Gordon, and her siblings Ann, Kathy, Scott, Lee, Chris, Joe and Margaret, not to mention 
my many cousins and other relatives. We are small Algonkian-speaking nation originally 
from Wisconsin and the Upper Michigan Peninsula. Fortunately, we were able to escape 
the fate of relocation that befell many nations east of the Mississippi and currently 
maintain a small reservation in northern Wisconsin. We are closely related to, culturally, 
politically, and in ways of blood kinship, with the Anishinaabeg and other Algonkian-
speaking nations around the Great Lakes region. 
I am also a diasporic Menominee. My father is an Anglo-West Indian, in particular 
 
5 Ka ͞eyes-Mamāceqtawak is the name for my Nation in our own language, Oma ͞eqnomenēweqnaesen. The 
best translation of it into English, avoiding a potentially long linguistic digression, is “Ancient People.” 
Menominee on the other hand is the name by which were and are known to our close linguistic and cultural 
relatives the Anishinaabeg. It is a reference to wild rice, a principle staple food of both our communities, 
meaning “Wild Rice People” or “People of the Wild Rice. The root word in Anishinaabemowin is 
“manoomin”, while the cognate in Oma ͞eqnomenēweqnaesen is “manōmaeh.” I alternate between using 
both terms when referring to myself or my own thoughts, however for those references beyond myself I 
will defer to the name used by any given person or organization, such as in the full name of our Federally 
recognized tribe, the Menominee Indian Tribe of Wisconsin.  
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an Anglo-Bermudian6. Having met my father in only her mid-twenties while he was in 
Milwaukee on a business trip, my mother made the life-changing choice to move to 
Bermuda in the mid-1970s and married. It was on that comparatively tiny island in the 
sea that myself and my younger brother Dylan were born and raised. 
Spending my childhood so far away from the traditional territories of the 
Menominee, and without a significant replacement connection to my father’s on-island 
family (I have always known them, and we have perfectly cordial and friendly relations 
for the most part, but we have never been what I would consider particularly close), has 
left an indelible mark on my conception of self, in particular my sense of being 
Menominee. My brother and I were always told, from as young as I can recall, that we 
were Menominee Indians. However, outside of occasional visits to the island by mother’s 
parents or siblings, we only had access to family and the knowledge of what it means to 
be Menominee that comes with that during the summers of our childhoods, when we 
 
6 Depending on who you ask, Bermuda either is, or is not, West Indian. While there is a simplistic 
geophysical case to be made that it is not, because Bermuda lies much further out to sea in the Atlantic 
Ocean than the also-not-geographically West Indian Lucayan Archipelago. However, this belies Bermuda’s 
long cultural, political, kinship and economic ties to Caribbean, especially the former and current British 
West Indies. The split in opinion on Bermuda’s West Indianness, in my lived experience, is often fractured 
along Bermuda’s deep racial lines. While not a researched social scientific opinion, in my experience it is 
most often those of the island’s large white minority who most vigorously reject any notion that Bermuda 
is part of the Caribbean collectivity, which I think is rooted deeply in an endemic antiblackness and 
recalcitrant orientation towards the settler colonies of the northern bloc and towards the British imperial 
metropole, which still holds Bermuda in its grasp as a “Overseas Territory.” Because of this the same racial-
political fractures can be found regarding the question of whether or not Bermuda should seek 
independence or continue on in its current status as a British Overseas Territory.  However, in my mind, 
and in my heart, Bermuda is a West Indian nation, and that is how I refer to it. For perhaps the single best 
discussion of Bermuda and its history of colonial/racial relations, see Quito Swan’s Black Power in Bermuda: 
The Struggle for Decolonization (2010). 
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were often sent off to Wisconsin to spend most of the hot months of July and August with 
our grandparents. Often, we were joined by cousins, the children of our mother’s siblings 
in Milwaukee, who would make the trek north with us. I have vivid, though long past 
memories, of going to the annual pow wow on the reservation, travelling deep into the 
woods—covered head to toe to avoid ticks and always wary of the possible presence of 
snakes and bears—to pick blackberries and raspberries with family, and of going to the 
cemetery to see where other kin have been laid, including the older half-brother I never 
go to know in this world, Benny. It was during these years that I learned what for many 
years the only words in Oma ͞eqnomenēweqnaesen that I knew: “pōsōh; āneq nāp 
nēhtās?”7 
But those connections have become less and less consistent as time has pressed on. 
My grandfather passed away when I was still in my preteen years. Our regular summer 
journeys to the lands of upstate Wisconsin became less and less and less from then on. 
We made one more trip in our mid-teens, at our insistence. After that, it would be another 
five years or so, and only then it was on the occasion of the passing of my uncle Lee, who, 
after my grandfather, was probably the most important male Menominee figure in my 
life. Dylan and I were pallbearers; it was a surreal experience in hindsight. I haven’t been 
back since that time. It has been over ten years. This dearth has over the last decade left 
 
7 “Hello; how are you doing my friend.” Roughly. There is more than one phrase that could be translated 
into this, but this is the one I learned as a child. 
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me for much of my life with a deep sense of disconnectedness, though at no time have I 
ever ceased to identify as an Indigenous person, or as a Menominee in particular.  
Support in this regard came in an unforeseen way when I was unexpectedly given 
the opportunity to receive my Menominee name in May of 2011. This came about 
unexpectedly during a visit to Bermuda by one of my mother’s cousins. He was there on 
a trip sponsored by the Bermuda branch of Amnesty International to speak on the 
revitalization of Indigenous languages, and I found myself back home on break between 
the winter and spring terms of my master’s studies. He asked my mother and me if we 
had Menominee names, to which we responded that we did not. He asked if we wanted 
ones. I do not think I hesitated in accepting.  
Buttresses of my sense of self are also owed significantly to the urban Indigenous 
community of Kitchener-Waterloo, in particular the many Anishinaabeg relatives who 
call this city home, whether permanently or transitively. Because the Menominee and 
Anishinaabeg have ancient relations, and are very closely related in terms of culture, 
language, traditional worldviews, philosophies, stories, cosmologies etc., being able to 
connect with my Anishinaabeg relatives in that city helped me immensely in the securing 
of my own sense of Menomineeness. While it is not, and cannot be, a complete substitute, 
and nor do I wish it to be, at the very least when I am with them, I feel somewhat more 
secure in knowing that, in a way, it is the closest thing to being amongst my own nation 
without actually being there on their reservation.  
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However, there have been significant shocks to my sense of Menomineeness. In 
particular, as an adult I slowly learned more about the complicated relationship that not 
only I, but also my brother and most of my mother’s nieces and nephews also have with 
the formal system of enrollment within the nation has been enacted by the tribal 
government. What it boils down to is an issue of blood quantum: my mother is 31/64th 
Menominee, or slightly less than 50% blood quantum. The cut-off point for full 
enrollment in the Menominee Indian Tribe of Wisconsin is 25%. Since my father is white, 
that means that my brother and I receive only 31/128th Menominee blood. As a result, we, 
along with most of our first cousins, fall a mere 0.78% below the minimum for full 
enrollment. Instead we are enrolled as 1st Degree Menominee Descendants. While we are 
Menominee, this secondary status causes us to lose access to many things that tribal 
members of only 0.78% more blood are given. More than a secondary status, it is more 
akin, in the reckoning not only of myself, but also my mother and other family, to a kind 
of second-tier status or citizenship. I have come to often think it is a form of liminal tribal 
citizenship; in between the outside and the inside. I am treated as a Menominee at times, 
and not at other, of crucial, moments. 
This subjection by forces outside of the limits of my own body to a kind of 
biopolitical algorithm of both Federal and tribal governance that calculates the 
preciseness of my Nativeness has left me often with a paradoxical split in my identity. It 
disrupts my feeling of embodied Menomineeness, and Nativeness. It is here at this site that 
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I feel what Patricia Tinciento Clough means when she muses upon “the ways bodies are 
thought in relationship both to trauma and to technoscientific productions of bodily 
capacities beyond the human body’s organic-physiological constraints” (2007:4). This is, 
for me, the weight of colonial affect, the coloniality of my being, at its most raw and 
violent. In a way, these external biopolitical algorithms come to curate the official 
potential of my Menomineeness (Cheney-Lippold 2017:253). This has often forced upon 
me a questioning of my own innate sense of identity: I know that I am Menominee, this is 
what I was also told and came to know via my mother, her parents, our extended family 
and the rest of the Menominee community I have come to know, both on and off the 
reservation. I possess a Menominee name, and all of the attendant duties that come with 
its particular meaning. However, what does it mean to know that I am a Menominee 
when both the official tribal government, and consequently the settler-colonial state, 
reject that claim to membership and belonging? 
I cannot understate the weight that I have come to feel regarding this. The affective 
burden of this biopolitical liminalization of my Menominee citizenship is such that I can 
not only can I never live within my community, but I can never die within my 
community. I cannot be buried ever next to my family, next to my grandfather, aunts and 
uncles, or my brother. Access to tribal resources, for schooling, or for health, or anything 
else is of absolute minimal concern to me. Indeed, they do not interest me; while I and 
my family did make use of tribal health benefits, via my mother, during my childhood 
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for testing and treatment of hearing difficulties I was born with, I recognize that I have 
been blessed enough in life to not have to need financial support from my nation. But it 
does interest me, or rather haunts me, to know that when I pass, I can never be welcomed 
next to my kin as I am returned to dust.  
For myself, this affective burden ties most immediately into how affects are those 
pre-conscious, or in-excess-of-consciousness, automatic and autonomic responses which 
Patricia Ticineto Clough describes as driving “the augmentation or diminution of a 
body’s capacity to act, to engage, and to connect, such that autoaffection is linked to the 
self-feeling of being alive—that is, aliveness or vitality” (2007:2) and which Brian 
Massumi describes as “autonomous to the degree to which it escapes confinement in the 
particular body whose vitality, or potential for interaction, it is,” and “Formed, qualified, 
situated perceptions and cognitions fulfilling functions of actual connection or blockage” 
(2002:35). The tribal and settler-colonial forces, which are both before and beyond my 
embodied self, circumscribe the limits of my ability to feel alive in my Menomineeness, 
and instead drive me towards what often feels like a sense of desperate holding-on, 
clinging to the edge of an abyss of in-betweenness, and in-betweenness as a kind of 
ghostliness and spectral haunting.  
More specifically though I cannot help but think of Lauren Berlant’s notion of 
“cruel optimism,” in which on object of desire, in this case my desire for full-
embracement of my Menomineeness, is, or becomes, itself an obstacle to flourishing 
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(2011). The affective structure of my desire is not only “sticky,” to borrow Sara Ahmed’s 
line of thinking (2010a), in these sense that clings to me, and I to it, but is what ultimately 
weighs me down.  
While I hold no grudge against the formal, modern tribal government of the 
Menominee for this, as I know they are simply working the best that they can within a 
settler-colonial system that allows them only minimal autonomy and self-determination 
that otherwise seeks their elimination, it would be a lie to say that the way that this comes 
down upon me, upon my younger brother, and upon my cousins does not affect me in 
substantial ways. Perhaps more than anything else, beyond the formal arithmetic 
trapping of blood quantum fractions, this cuts most deeply into my sense of who and 
what I am when I say that I am a Menominee Indian. 
These algorithms consequently force me to eke out a Native existence at the 
margins between the biopolitical imperatives of the settler-colonial state, and my/our 
own autonomous, traditional and futurist modes and potentials of belonging. The State 
says I am not Indigenous, or at least not fully Indigenous, but the Indigenous community 
accepts me.  I exist in this liminal space, on the border between official Indigeneity and 
the outside-of-Indigeneity. In this space there is also resistance, a decolonial imperative 
to think through these structures of settler-colonial subjection and the limitation of our 
belonging, and consequently to think, and act, our way out of it, and into a decolonized, 
living and healing Indigenous future. It is from this terrain that the fundamental drive 
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for this project finds its emergence and its enunciation. 
II. Towards a Genealogy of Nativeness under Settler Colonialism 
So, what then is this project fundamentally about? Why write it? Why do this research? I 
can best begin to answer these questions by casting my own counter-gaze backwards and 
working towards the development of a genealogy of the regime of power/knowledge of 
what we may call the sign of Official Nativeness, referred to simply as Nativeness 
throughout the rest of this dissertation.  This is what I contend to be the first contribution 
of this dissertation, of three that I maintain that I make.  Specifically, what I contend here 
is not just the usual kind of genealogy of the Native, as a legal construct, an 
anthropological construct, or a literary construct, but rather a genealogy of the Native 
that cuts not only across these modes of historical and socio-political analysis, but also 
beyond them.  In particular, what I seek to demonstrate in the chapters that follow is how 
not only the Native is constructed through those modalities of settler-colonial state and 
civil society, but how those constructions bleed into others, and ultimately are necessary 
for settler society’s understanding of itself.  In particular, what I will set about showing 
is how these constructions of the Native both rely upon, and mutually re-inscribe and 
reinforce, discourses of Savagery, Wildness, and a radical outsideness with regards to 
settler cartography (both socially and geographically) and settler temporality, and the 
effect that this outsideness has when the Native and the settler encounter each other 
through performance, politics, and narrative.  
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The regime of settler power which provides the grounding for this kind of colonial 
knowledge production of the Native has its antecedents in the initial Colombian contact 
event, but really began to take its current shape following the separation of the american 
colonies for direct British rule, before becoming finalized in the form that we now 
recognize them today following the end of the period of frontier expansion, and with that 
the end of perhaps the most gratuitously violent manifestations of the eliminative logic 
of settler colonialism. With this end of the frontier, the territorial engulfment of 
Indigenous peoples by the twin English-speaking settler colonies of the northern bloc 
became complete. With this end of the frontier became the need to solidify the 
sovereignty of the settler nation-state, emergent as it was from the state of exception par 
excellence that was the frontier (Wolfe 2016), and to quiet the alternative and, more 
importantly, prior, sovereignties and territorialities of Native nations, north american 
settler colonialism set about in earnest to codify into law already existing discourses of 
Savagery, discovery and imperial cartography that had already been at the centre of this 
shared experience we call modernity: scientific rationalism, enlightenment liberalism and 
western humanism (Byrd 2011; Dussel 1995; Mignolo 2007; Quijano 2010; Wilderson III 
2010). Importantly, with the end of the frontier, “Indian relations” also lost their previous 
externality, with Native nations no longer beyond the formal borders of the settler 
empire, but now enclosed fully within them. What were once international relations were 
formally transferred to the realm of domestic administration and ensconced within the 
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imperial bureaucracy. Fundamentally at the heart of these post-frontier processes was the 
emergence and codification of a juridical, rhetorical and eminently biopolitical category 
of population governance that I call Official Nativeness, or just Nativeness.  
At the highest level of abstraction, this work concerns itself with an elucidation of 
a genealogy of the ontological and structural formations of Nativeness, and how they 
emerge from and are articulated by the structures and functioning of the settler-colonial 
state and civil society. My understanding of ontology here is specific to a kind of political 
ontology, and thus most closely cleaves to that which emerges from a Heideggerian 
philosophy of ontological difference (Saar 2012:79-83). On this Nicolás Juárez says the 
following: 
Just as Heidegger frames the difference in ontological position between 
Beings as differences in terms of constitution, disclosure, non-identity, 
displacement, and absence, the political ontology herein articulated 
conceives of the political ontological position of Beings as defined 
through how they differ in the political structures of culture, society, law, 
and philosophy (what might be called “the world”), what they attempt 
to disclose, what they can (and cannot) be within the world, and what 
capabilities and powers they have (and lack). This understanding thus 
sees that the difference between “Being” and “beings” is mirrored in the 
difference between the “political” and “politics.” Such a politically 
ontological framework clarifies the way in which we come to understand 
Red life and its modalities (2014). 
Essentially then this research is an investigation into the genealogy of the nature of my 
Native Being, or what it means for me, as a Native of liminal status, to try and find an 
existence within the coordinates of the world when the world is the realm of the shared 
modernity built upon the sociological catastrophe and onto-structural process of Native 
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(and Black) death. More specifically this research asks the question of what it means to 
attempt to articulate a sense of Nativeness in this contemporary post-frontier era, and to 
thus be subjected to these biopolitical systems of control and algorithmic identity 
configuration and re-configuration by the technologies of governance of the settler-
colonial state, as well as the broader libidinal, political, and sign economies of the euro-
west.  
This genealogy, I would contend, is also more than a Nietzschean-Foucauldian 
diachronic reading of the sign of Nativeness, and in fact requires that it be more. While 
much of importance can be, and is in fact readily, gleaned from this sort of genealogical 
mode of studying the historical development of a particular sign and its meaning, which 
parts have come to be hegemonic through discourse, and which modes have been 
suppressed or repressed, I pursue a kind of Saussurean synchronic reading, through the 
thought of figures like Jean Baudrillard (2006) and Jacques Derrida (2016). This considers 
not only the historical development of Nativeness as a sign coded and overcoded by the 
juridical, philosophical, academic and popular discourses of settler coloniality, but also 
its context in the present moment. Nativeness in this mode of thought can only be 
understood through its relationship to other signs such as settler, arrivant, Menominee, 
Anishinaabe, and others, signs which are tied together in a signifying chain. Nativeness 
must be taken to be only one non-linear, non-arborescent sign amongst others, connected 
rhizomatically within the code of settler coloniality.   
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The essential starting point of this analysis is to ask by what processes distinct 
Indigenous Nations—Ka͞eyes-Mamāceqtawak, Anishinabek, Meskwaki, Nēhilawē, 
Rotinonshón:ni, Dené, Wabanaki, Oceti Šakówiŋ, Niitsítapi, Kwakwaka’wakw and many 
others—have been, and still continuously are dissolved into an official administrative, 
judicially defined, category of Native in both Canada and the United States? Further, this 
research asks what are the seemingly discordant and antithetical, though ultimately 
complementary, roles played by the various apparatus, formal as well as informal, of the 
settler-colonial state and civil society, including academia, not only in providing the 
content of the discussion of Indigeneity, but also in defining its boundaries?  
This latter zone of investigation is of particularly crucial importance to me 
precisely because of my place and my role as an Indigenous researcher within the 
westernized academy. Given the autoethnographic and phenomenological contours of 
this work—examining the first-person encounter between my lived experiences and these 
technologies of settler-colonial governance and philosophical imagining, and the 
appearance and structures of those experiences—this dissertation then it oriented 
towards a series of onto-existential questions that both arose from and mutually re-
inform and reinforce the juridical and biopolitical production of the category of the 
Native.  
Here I take phenomenology in the same vein as the queer phenomenology of Sara 
Ahmed (2006), which while perhaps not properly phenomenological in a sense recognizable 
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within the dusty halls of euro-western philosophy departments, takes from 
phenomenology orientation towards an object, a desire towards something. For me this 
something is Nativeness, and so, following Ahmed, I believe that phenomenology offers 
me a potent, if not always foregrounded explicitly, resource “insofar as it emphasizes the 
importance of lived experience, the intentionality of consciousness, the significance of 
nearness or what is ready-to-hand, and the role of repeated and habitual actions in 
shaping bodies and worlds” (2006:2). With particular emphasis on lived and embodied 
experiences, this is why I speak of both autoethnographic and phenomenological 
contours to my work; I believe that the former necessarily, and naturally, gives rise to the 
latter. 
III. Coloniality & the Disruption of Imperial Social Science 
This work should be read then not only as a firstly as a contribution to the growing body 
of critical Indigenous scholarship and theoretical production which seeks to escape 
Native Studies historical ethnographic entrapment (Byrd 2011; Smith 2010), but also as 
an intervention into contemporary sociological and anthropological understandings of 
Nativeness.  In particular this work seeks to question, reveal, and disrupt the colonial 
regimes of power/knowledge which both call it forth into existence, as well as sustain, 
rearticulate, and deploy conventions and constructions of Nativeness as part of a broader 
set of settler-colonial regimes which aim to not only govern the remnants of conquered 
and genocided Indigenous nations, but which also are necessary for the ongoing onto-
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existential reassurance of the settler-colonial state and society itself.   
Tracing the euromodernist disciplines of sociology and anthropology back to the 
founding fathers (meant in the quite literal sense)—Marx, Weber, Durkheim, and 
others—one finds that they have long been marked by an extensive eurocentrism in their 
epistemological, theoretical, and methodological commitments and practices.  While I 
take up the particular question of Marx and Marxism in the following chapter, where I 
go into further depth about my own theoretical and methodological considerations, it is 
safe to say that this eurocentrism tends to mark all such paragons of euro-western social 
scientific thought.  In my thinking, and most importantly in my own personal experience, 
moving from a bachelor’s in anthropology, to a master’s in public issues anthropology, 
through to now a doctorate in sociology, there has always been a fundamental component 
of the scientistism that I have found remains at the heart of much of social scientific 
practise and theory within the westernized academy.  While this has been disrupted to a 
greater or lesser degree within these institutional disciplines (unfortunately, quite often, 
leaning towards the lesser degree in my own assessment) we could perhaps say that this 
still remains through a recalcitrant Cartesian-derived subject-object dualism, as well as 
the naturalization of a foundational ideology of possible value-neutrality found within 
the work and theories of disciplinary founding fathers such as Max Weber (2004).  
For myself, as a Native scholar, as a Menominee scholar, this has quite often been 
a cage, or a trap, against which I have had to struggle.  I find myself often reflecting on 
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the words of Brazilian philosopher and critical legal theorist Roberto Mangabeira Unger, 
when he wrote: 
Thus, the house of reason in which I was working proved to be a prison-
house of paradox whose rooms did not connect and whose passageways 
led nowhere … The premises of this vision of the world are few; they are 
tied together; and they are as powerful in their hold over the mind as 
they are unacknowledged and forgotten (1975:110) 
Escaping this house has been a journey, with many twists and turns.  Perhaps the most 
significant tool that has aided and abetted my escape has been the flourishing of 
decolonial theory, in particular the theorization of what Peruvian sociologist Aníbal 
Quijano referred to as coloniality, or the colonial matrix of power, and its unity with 
modernity within the compound concept of modernity/coloniality (2008; 2010).  Thinking 
of Rudi Visker’s study of Foucault’s genealogical methodology (1995), what an 
understanding of coloniality has given me in my work, both within and beyond the 
confines of this particular dissertation, is a recognition, and perhaps more keenly a mode 
of recognition, not only of the ordering systems of contemporary late capitalist, late 
colonialist, and late liberal, but of the very conditions of their possibility.  
Walter Mignolo writes that “Coloniality names the underlying logic of the 
foundation of the unfolding of Western civilization from the Renaissance to today of 
which historical colonialisms have been a constitutive, although downplayed, 
dimension” (2011:2).  Coloniality, for Mignolo and Quijano, is the “darker” and co-
constitutive side of modernity.  I believe that a fundamental question we must ask 
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ourselves here then is how this can begin to shift our thought on, and the place of, the 
social science disciplines such as sociology, anthropology, economics, political science, 
and history?  While history as a discipline has long existed, Immanuel Wallerstein traces 
the origins of sociology, economics, and political science to the period following the 
French Revolution of 1789, after which the “dominant liberal ideology” came to insist 
“that modernity was defined by the differentiation of three social spheres: the market, the 
state, and the civil society” (2007:6)8.  In essence, following Wallerstein, the core of the 
modern social sciences—to which anthropology would later come to be added after the 
major colonial powers of the world developed a need to have some degree of 
understanding (as inherently distorted as it would be expected to be) of the people under 
the ever-expanding imperial rule—find their origins in the fracturing of knowledges 
about the human and of human society into distinct institutional disciplines, each with 
their own methodologies and practices designed to “objectively” and “scientifically” 
study their given domains.  This is both a part of, and a result of, the modernization of 
 
8 Building on Wallerstein, as well as Quijano and Mignolo, Nelson Maldonado-Torres refers to this period 
in which the social sciences as we now recognize them emerged as the “second modernity” of the 
modern/colonial/capitalist world-system.  In his analysis the “first modernity,” which reigned from 
roughly 1450 through 1640, was one dominated by religion, specifically Christianity.  Following this period, 
and in particular following the american and French revolutions of the late 18th-Century, secularism and 
scientific outlooks came to slowly supplant religious document during the flourishing of the european 
enlightenment (2008).  A similar genealogy is also traced by the Jamaican theorist Sylvia Wynter in 
examining the emergence of Man, or what she more specifically refers to as the ethnoclass of western 
bourgeois Man, as the subject of the modern/colonial/capitalist world-system.  For Wynter, the 
development of Man can be broken into two temporal periods, Man1 and Man2.  Like Maldonado-Torres’s 
first and second modernities, Wynter’s Man1 and Man2 can be roughly distinguished by a religious 
character on the part of the former, and a secular, scientific, and rationalist latter (2003). 
28 
 
human self-knowledge, and thus the emergence of the disciplines, their theories, 
epistemologies, and practices, is ineluctably emergent from modernity, and thus 
modernity/coloniality.  In short, we can say that the basic condition for the arising of the 
modern social science disciplines is the extension of colonialism across the globe, the 
consolidation of power in the newly emergent nation-states of Europe and their social, 
political, and cultural kin in the major settler-colonial empires. 
For myself, working within a modernist, liberal, and quite thoroughly colonized 
academic institution, and specifically within the social sciences an analysis of coloniality 
helps to free my work from institutional and disciplinary confines.  It helps to reveal and 
lay bare the foundational conditions for not only the emergence of social sciences as they 
exist as disciplines in the contemporary era, but also the genealogies of their inner-most 
methodologies and epistemologies.  In working under, through, and beyond the 
coloniality of power, and the trap of modernity/coloniality, this allows me to not only 
contribute to the field of Native Studies, but to intervene in the fields of sociology and 
anthropology by way of a genealogical critique of their foundations and guiding 
concepts. 
Importantly, such a genealogy reveals the extent to which both sociology and 
anthropology—in attempting to study Natives as both domestically governed 
populations, as well as primitive, Wild, and Savage Others—has aided in not only the 
construction of modernist conceptions of the Native but have worked to maintain them. 
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Thus, a significant contribution of this work is not only an illumination of these social, 
political, philosophical, and cultural genealogies of the Native, but a disruption of them. 
IV. Refusal, Resurgence, & Indigenous Futurity 
However, it is not my desire for this research to be simply yet another enunciation of the 
grammars of suffering of Red Life, of what Eve Tuck and C. Ree refer to as our “damage 
narratives” (2013). As an Indigenous scholar, an activist and, most simply, as just an 
Indigenous person, ultimately this work seeks to overturn the kind of nihilistic defeatism 
that can easily emerge from research and theoretical production which seeks only the 
excavation of our pain and its modalities, and the consequent projection into the future 
of an Indigeneity, defined solely through these grammars. I do not want this writing to 
be solely the personal memoir of my journey through the archive of Indigenous suffering, 
disconnectedness and loss.  
If the genealogy I chart of the construction of Nativeness is the first of my major 
contributions in this work, and it can best be placed within the realm of theory and 
theoretical production, then I believe that this refusal to continue to speak of my own, as 
well as my immediate friends’ and kin’s, narratives of settler-colonial damage is the 
second major contribution of this work.  If my genealogy of Nativeness is best understood 
as a theoretical contribution, then perhaps this second contribution can best be 
understood as a methodological one.   
Methodologically, as is explained in greater detail in the first chapter, this 
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dissertation is grounded in an autoethnographic methodology, of using my own lived 
and embodied experiences of Nativeness, and specifically urban and diasporic 
Nativeness, towards the charting of my genealogy of Nativeness.  The first arch of this 
work follows my damage narrative, through my discussions of colonial ontology, the 
visuality of racializing assemblages, and the heartbreak that comes with communal loss 
and disruption.  However, at the mid-point of this dissertation, I refuse to continue that 
errant any further.  While narratives of Native damage continue throughout, simply 
because it is the nature of Nativeness to be damaged by settler coloniality, 
methodologically-speaking I refuse after that point to continue to centre them, and 
thereby continuing to make a spectacle of them for non-Indigenous eyes.  
Methodologically, as well as theoretically, this dissertation moves from one way of 
talking about damage narratives, to another way of talking about damage narratives.  The 
first is the way that comes with telling of my damage; the second comes through 
theorizing about that damage, and about the function that it carries out within the 
libidinal, political, and sign economies of settler coloniality. To borrow and modify a 
concept from Mohawk scholar Audra Simpson (2007) I propose then that 
methodologically this dissertation engaged in a practice of autoethnographic refusal. 
However, resisting this urge to continue to speak exclusively of my damage has 
been a constant trial throughout this process of research and writing. While I must always 
overcome my anxiety/aphasia that strikes me when I must open myself us for viewing 
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and reviewing, once that process has begun it can be more than easy to just rend that 
wound as wide open as can be done. This is a way of saying that once the process of 
telling you about the pain of my loss is begun, I find it difficult to stop telling. One may 
say that it is a paradoxical problem with oversharing, but really there is something more 
to it. For myself, and only speaking for myself and for my own experience, it can be easier 
to dwell upon the loss, to ruminate on it, then it is to engage in a strategy and praxis of 
finding my way. Perhaps this is the condition of my depression and anxiety, perhaps it is 
being in the affective wake of a colonialism that can make Native life unbearable, or 
perhaps it is the zone where those two things meet, co-mingle, reinforce and merge. 
Either way, this is how it can be; this is how this writing has often been. 
It is unhealthy. It is not really sustainable as a model either. Eventually one burns 
out, or so I imagine, and ultimately nothing would be gained. Thus, I think it is important 
to actively resist the urge to overshare my narrative of damage. This dissertation is also 
an exercise in that resistance.  
In this aspect I draw upon the debate within Queer Studies between José Carlos 
Muñoz (2019) and Lee Edelman (2004), between pessimism and utopian optimism, to 
seek and to develop ways in which this project can be taken up as a starting point from 
where I can begin to imagine new modalities Indigenous refusal of and resistance against 
the violences of the colonial state, and from that new Indigenous futurisms and new 
politics, ethics and modes of decoloniality and decolonizing action. Thus, this project is 
32 
 
two-fold: the illumination and examination of my journey through the regimes of 
ontological, existential, narrative and biopolitical formation and governance of Natives 
by the settler-colonial state, and also my journey through that “genocide machine”9 into 
a new realm of Indigenous healing experience. 
This second aspect to my writing must be necessarily understood as emerging 
from within the accelerating struggle for decolonization within the political, economic, 
cultural and philosophical terrains of the northern bloc. Of particular interest for myself 
as an scholar of critical indigenous studies, is how the insertion of decolonization and 
resurgent Indigenous sovereignty can begin to demarcate the boundaries of an 
intellectual, political and sociological arena in which the processes of the production of 
Natives through juridical, rhetorical and biopolitical acts of coding collides head-on with 
the refusal of Indigenous people to engage in them any longer. 
This dissertation can be read as a narrative arc telling the turn towards this second 
aspect; towards resisting of seeing us as only broken beings, and of telling that story to 
ourselves and to others. When I began to write initially, to reflect on my life experience, 
it was easy as I said above, once I had forced myself to overcome my initial anxious 
trepidation, it was easy to simply pour out onto the keyboard my woeful sense of loss 
and anger at a colonial order of things that makes me into a not-quite-Native who doesn’t 
 
9 I borrow the term "genocide machine" from the title of Robert Davis and Mark Zannis work The Genocide 
Machine in Canada: The Pacification of the North (1983). 
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quite belong yet does. As I wrote though, working through the first two chapters, 
eventually this kind of work became exhausting, and eventually came to almost cease 
altogether.  
I could not keep writing about my damage narrative anymore. And so, I decided 
to stop. Against the plans that had originally been laid out for this dissertation, I made an 
abrupt turn towards something else. I made an active decision to refuse to continue to 
open myself up like that any longer. I began then to ask why that was even what I had 
been doing up until that point, and I began to ask why it was that that kind of work, about 
Indigenous people, from an Indigenous person, seems to be so readily accepted within 
this colonized, westernized épistémè. 
While different from what I originally intended to set about to write in the second 
half of this dissertation, I believe that this is actually a much more pressing and important 
question to ask. In doing so, and in trying to formulate something of an answer to it, I 
choose to refuse to open myself up with scalpel-like precision over-and-over again. 
Though for some I imagine such a change in direction during the latter part of a writing 
and research project may warrant the necessity, or at least the desire, to start again, I leave 
the arch of the dissertation as is, exactly because it is all a microcosmic reflection of what 
ultimately emerged as the central theme of this writing: how is that we as Indigenous 
people are damaged and what form and function does that have within the wider socius 




Throughout this writing and storytelling my own personal journey through and beyond 
what I have called the genocide machine serves as the fundamental locus around which 
I analyse and theorize the onto-existential regimes of power and control which have 
shaped my own, as well as the broader, experience of what it means to be Indigenous 
within the (post)modern post-frontier era. However, my work also seeks to disrupt and 
undermine these machinations of the settler-colonial state.  Thus, my writing also serves 
as an injunction into the structures of Official Nativeness towards a goal of disrupting 
them and developing decolonial Indigenous futures and healing.  With that explicit goal 
in mind, this work is divided into a number of chapters that take up and investigate a 
number of distinct aspects of the settler-colonial assemblage.  
 However, before moving to an outline my chapters, I think it is also important to 
mark out a larger narrative contour and structure to this dissertation.  This is the splitting 
of the structure of this dissertation into two narrative arcs.  While not explicitly labelled 
as Part 1 and Part 2, effectively this work bears that kind of textual mark and break.  The 
first through fourth chapters form the first arc, while the fifth, sixth, seventh, and eighth 
the second.  Narratively, thinking back to Joseph Campbell (2008) and the calendrical 
round system of our Great Lakes Nations (Whyte 2019), the first part can be seen as a 
descent into the abyss of settler coloniality, into the realm of Native death.  This takes the 
form of testimonial storytelling about Native damage under the varied regimes of 
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settlement and colonial governance.  The second narrative arc begins after that, and 
marks, as I see it, my descent out of that colonial miasma, climbing towards something 
else.  This takes the form of theorizing about our damage narratives, rather than 
continuing to speak of them.  Throughout both arcs of this writing the locus of rotation 
for my storytelling remains my life, and my own personal lived and embodied 
experiences of Nativeness.  With that said, let me say something of the specific chapters 
to follow, and the individual elements of my story/ies that they tell. 
The first chapter, Decolonization, World Building, & Methodological Considerations, 
articulates and outlines the general theoretical and methodological course of this 
dissertation.  In this chapter, I outline this project as sitting at the intersections of a 
contemporary Black Studies-informed Indigenous Critical Theory and Native Studies, 
Decolonial Theory, variations of Marxism and Critical Theory, Settler Colonial Studies 
and poststructuralist descriptions of biopolitics, bare life, and racializing assemblages.  I 
explain in particular how this dissertation writing process, and my doctoral studies more 
generally, have necessitated a movement away from the kind of Marxist orthodoxy that 
I formally clung to as a method and theory for explaining the world.  While this has not 
involved a complete break with Marxism—and in this chapter I introduce the influence 
on this work of contemporary Marxist theorists of the postmodern condition Fredric 
Jameson and Mark Fisher—I explain my disavowal and evolution away from overly 
scientistic interpretations and towards a more open epistemological perspective that 
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rejects Cartesian dualism and the ego-politics of knowledge. In this chapter, I also outline 
my methodology—or methodological-pedagogical-praxiological concerns and 
orientations—as part of the trend and milieu outlined by Kaupapa Maori scholar Linda 
Tuhiwai Smith refers to as “decolonizing methodologies” (2012).  Finally, this chapter 
outlines not only this work’s formal organization around autoethnographic 
methodologies, but also why such a methodology was chosen as the best possible, as well 
as most personally fulfilling, as well as challenging, methodology for engaging the 
questions investigated and raised within the rest of the work.  
The second chapter, The Coloniality of (My/Our) Being, opens the ontological and 
existential stage for the rest of the dissertation.  Towards that end, I take up the question 
of the sub-ontological difference.  While political ontology in the post-Heideggerian sense is 
the difference between Being and beings, the sub-ontological difference is that which lies 
between Being and what is below it.  The sub-ontological difference is what transforms 
Native life into a form of bare life, able to be murdered and killed without being 
mournable.  The philosophical impact of this is two-fold: firstly, it is what allows the 
instantiation of the thinking Cartesian subject, the ethnoclass of western bourgeois Man, 
as a disguised particularism asserted as a liberal modernist universalism; secondly, 
ontologically it both emerges from and reinforces the eliminative regimes of settler 
colonialism.  Thinking along Derrdian lines, I argue then that if ontology, proper to such, 
is actually a hauntology—haunted by what is in the past, as well as what is yet to come—
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I argue that the normative subject of political ontology, the ego cogito, is haunted by that 
which had to be conquered and exterminated to render its place on the world stage. 
Bringing together the Fanonian insights of modern Decolonial theory with Indigenous 
critical theory, I argue that this creates a condition of Native life that wears down the 
subject into a zone of nonbeing, in which death of some kind lurks behind every corner.  
The third chapter, #NotYourNativeStereotype & the Question of White-Passing Natives 
extends the discussion from the second chapter on colonial ontology and the 
anthropological machinery of settler colonialism which renders Indigenous peoples as 
eliminable to further examine the workings of settler-colonial racializing juridical 
assemblages through engagement with the particular case of ongoing discourse in social 
media circles about the question of visuality and of white-passing with regards to 
Indigenous peoples.  This chapter sets out to trouble this discussion, which is often 
unstated to be a mechanistic transposing of U.S. racial theory of Black and white relations 
onto Indigenous peoples on both sides of the settler boundary, by more clearly 
establishing the biopolitical governmentality of Official Nativeness through racializing 
assemblages, which functions along different, in many ways opposing, logics than those 
of Black racialization in the United States. In particular, the discussion in this chapter is 
rooted in my own discussions via blog writing and Twitter correspondence with Nicolás 
Juárez, a fellow Indigenous critical scholar, and my responses to his positions.  In essence 
I argue that, because of the ways in which the logic of elimination fundamentally functions 
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at the macro-level, that is the level of the State, towards the biogenic and cultural 
elimination of Indigenous peoples through biopolitical regimes and racializing 
assemblages of the hyper-solubility of “Indian Blood”—as well as the ontological 
entanglement of the categories of white, settler and master—that is ultimately impossible 
to speak of Natives who possess a true ability to pass as white. Intersecting with this I 
also examine the non-visual means by which the colonial gaze may interpolate one as 
Indigenous absent direct or immediate visual confirmation of one as such.  From these 
points I argue that while it may be possible on the level of individual and personal 
interactions to momentarily avoid, or hide from, the murderous colonial gaze through 
outward appearance of white phenotypical features, that does not disguise one from the 
biopolitical algorithms of state violence, which are the ultimate arbiter of violence and 
power in society, and which seek to destroy Indigenous people in toto as nations. This 
makes the violence experienced by Indigenous individuals at the hands of individual 
white settlers and white functionaries of the settler-colonial State (namely the police) a 
horrifically violent experience that can leave one traumatized, if not outright dead, but 
also ultimately an experience of violence that is secondary to, or derivative of, the 
violence of the State.  Taken together I read these movements and functions within settler-
colonial racializing assemblages to affect a detachment of Nativeness from visuality as 
the principal signifier of importance in understanding the violence of the logic of 
elimination, though not completely displacing visuality as still important in 
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understanding of other instances of the experience of anti-Native violence. 
Examining all of this, in the fourth chapter, Community, Pretendians, & Heartbreak, 
which takes the form of an interlude between the first and second portions of this work, 
I take up and build upon the nature of Native life as a way of living where, following 
Belcourt, “death hangs in the air like a rumour” (2017a), and the affective burden that 
that has upon not only my own life but the lives of many, if not most, Native peoples 
within my friend and kinship circles.  I also discuss the necessity of community for 
alleviating this burden, of finding safe harbour amongst the storm.  But, against the need 
for community I also introduce the discussion of white/settler people falsely taking up 
Indigenous identity as “fake Natives” —including in the political sphere with Elizabeth 
Warren, the academic with Andrea Smith and Ward Churchill, and in my own personal 
lived experiences in Kitchener-Waterloo—and the implications that this growing social 
and colonial phenomenon heaves on top of disconnected and diasporic Indigenous 
people seeking to reconnect, as well as how making room for them within Native spaces 
can also profoundly disrupt them. 
The fifth chapter of this dissertation, The Problem of Telling Stories to Some People, or 
Why Do We Tell of Our Damage to Those Who Damaged Us? begins a shift in orientation 
towards the second narrative arc of this work, and the rise out of the abyss towards 
analyzing the question of why we tell our damage narratives. Originally here I meant to 
tell the story of my experiences with the approval process with the Menominee language 
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and culture commission and the subsequent failure to obtain approval for the original 
ethnographic project that was to be this dissertation. However, after many months of no 
movement on the writing of this chapter I reached an epiphany of sorts, which was that 
I cannot tell that story because to tell that story is to continue to tell the narrative of my 
damage, in particular, continues to tell that narrative, in a broad sense, to those who 
damaged me. Thus this chapter importantly is a turning away from the continued telling 
of damage narratives and begins the arc that consumes the remaining chapters of this 
dissertation, which is to begin to examine and then answer the question of why we as 
Indigenous peoples tell our damage narratives, and more so why those narratives are so 
readily consumed by the broader society of settler colonialism. This chapter ultimately is 
a practice of refusal. While the previous chapters of this text remain, marking out of the 
contours of my own abyss, and in their own way do tell part of the story of my damage 
as an Indigenous person, as does this introduction, this chapter forcefully asserts that I 
will no longer do so. 
The sixth, seventh, and eighth chapters of this dissertation then take up, extend 
and attempt to come to something of a theoretical answer to the questions raised in the 
fifth about the role that our damage narratives play in settler-colonial society. In that light 
the sixth chapter, Digital Worlds, Native Ghosts, & the Socio-Existential Suturing of Settler 
Society, is an examination of the constant drive by settler-colonial societies to foreclose 
Indigeneity, most especially the prior and alternative sovereignties and territorialities 
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that they represent, in order to existentially suture their own sense of self-legitimacy and 
psychological cohesion. I argue in this chapter that so long as the Native persists an 
unstable terrain is always-already being generated within the regime of the settler, and 
that because of that the State and civil society of the settler will always be at an 
ideological, ontological, symbolic and libidinal impasse with regards how to mediate and 
concretize its ongoing existence qua itself. To this end this chapter begins with a 
meditation on the recent trend in the United States and Canada to institute a form of what 
is now called Indigenous Peoples’ Day, and continues on as I build a brief discussion of 
representations of the Native within settler popular media, particularly within the world-
building of digital and filmic narrative representations. This discussion examines how 
representations of the frontier in video game presentations often lock the elimination of 
Indigenous peoples, and the loss of our territories, firmly into the realm of the past, 
unable to find recompense.  This chapter ends with a reassertion of Patrick Wolfe’s maxim 
that “invasion is a structure not an event” (2006:388), and that as much as one can argue 
that we have passed over the horizon from the modern into Fredric Jameson’s 
postmodern (1991) or Mark Fisher’s capitalist realism (2009) the regimes of power under 
which we live remain not only haunted, but animated by, settler colonialism. 
The seventh chapter, Settler Colonialism & the Incommensurable Cartography of the 
Native Savage, thematically continues this discussion through an explicit interrogation of 
the ontological formation of Nativeness within the juridical and philosophical imagining 
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of settler-colonial state and civil society.  Echoing the discussion from the second chapter, 
this discussion returns to the question of the ethnoclass of western bourgeois man and 
the Nativeness that haunts its temporal and spatial margins. Here I outline two ways that 
the Native is foreclosed from amalgamation within the world of Man: the Native as a 
being-out-of-time and as a being-in-the-Wild. Here I present how this spatiotemporal 
outcast status of the Native is always-already generated by the needs of the colonial order 
of things to instantiate and re-affirm itself. From this, I also directly engage with and 
criticize the well-known understanding of Indigenous sovereignty and the ontological 
placement of the Native within the colonial order of things by Afropessimist theorist 
Frank B. Wilderson, III. I demonstrate how both Wilderson’s earlier and more moderate 
position on the matter as well as his current and more extreme position fundamentally 
misunderstand Indigenous sovereignty and the ontology of Nativeness by mistaking the 
outward linguistic construct of those subjects for their substantive cores. I argue, against 
Wilderson, that (the loss of) sovereignty by Natives is in fact not a point of grammatical 
articulation with the world-building of the settler, because the “sovereignty” that the 
Native possesses is in fact of a radically different kind than the politico-governmental 
concept bearing the same name which defines the subjectivity and governmentality of 
the settler. Instead, I argue that the sovereignty of the Native is not so much one that is 
something possessed, but rather, is a form of categorical lack.   
The eighth and final chapter, Red Monsters: The Native-Outside & the Weird, takes 
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the previous two chapters on digital worlds, being-out-of-time and being-in-the-Wild to 
formulate an understanding of the consumption of Native damage narratives within 
what I call the imaginarium of late capitalist/colonialist storytelling. Here I draw together 
these concepts regarding the always-already abject status of Natives to push towards an 
understanding of the Native as a Weird being, working through the theorization of the 
Weird by Mark Fisher.  I counterpoise this directly to the general understanding of 
abjection as a concept related to the psychoanalytic unheimlich, something in which the 
familiar becomes strange, instead arguing that as Weird, rather than uncanny, the Native 
is a being that does not belong within the cartographic worlding of the settler.  I further 
examine the ways in which Native people can, through their own work and lived lives, 
actually function towards a reinforcement of a kind of Nativeness that is able to be tamed 
and made acceptable with the social, cultural, and political fields of the settler.  I look at 
this primarily through both my experiences teaching in the classroom during the winter 
of 2019, as well as through the varied material and social-cultural production that many 
Natives may engage in, such as pow wows or bead working.  I argue that this is a 
performance of Indigeneity which locks Nativeness within a conception of the past that 
in fact never really was; it is a simulacrum of Nativeness, a copy of something that never 
actually had an anchor in reality.  I also take up the issue of urban Indigeneity, and its 
general erasure within popular and theoretical conceptions of Nativeness and of Native 
experience, because of the grounding that the Native as a being-of-the-Wild, and as such 
44 
 
does not belong within the limits of the city, the boundaries of which are such that they 
delineate the world of nature from the world of Man. Together these two experiences of 
Nativeness, urban and acceptable performativity, reinforce the Native’s being-out-of-
time and being-in-the-Wild through their negative lack, and through that reinforce a 
genuine Nativeness, especially a Nativeness that exists decolonially for its own self, as a 
Weird being that does not belong. Finally, this chapter seeks to answer the question of 
the consumption of Native damage narratives within settler-colonial institutional and 
civil society, such as in this dissertation’s earlier pages, through the idea of the Weird.  I 
here follow Fisher closely in reading the Weird in a psychoanalytic register of jouissance 
in which the Native as Weird, through the telling of the damage narrative, is something 
that cannot be looked away from in the eyes of the settler.  However, unlike the limit 
experience in the thought of Georges Bataille and Michel Foucault, rather than being 
generative towards a breakdown of binaries and boundaries, the jouissance coloured 
encounter in the telling of Native damage narratives reinforces rather than liberates.  
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Chapter 1. Decolonization, World-Building, & Methodological 
Considerations 
There is a long and bumbled history of non-Indigenous peoples making 
moves to alleviate the impacts of colonization. The too-easy adoption of 
decolonizing discourse (making decolonization a metaphor) is just one 
part of that history and it taps into pre-existing tropes that get in the way 
of more meaningful potential alliances.  
– Eve Tuck & K. Wayne Yang, Decolonization is Not a Metaphor 
In carrying out this research project I draw from, situate myself against, and am 
profoundly indebted to three principal fields of research and theoretical production: 
Native Studies, Black Studies—specifically the constellation of differing theoretical 
approaches that the late Cedric Robinson called the Black Radical Tradition (1983) as the 
pioneering works of Black Feminists—and contemporary decolonial scholarship and 
theory, but in particular that branch of which has emerged from Latin American Studies 
and scholars such as Walter Mignolo, Aníbal Quijano, Nelson Maldonado-Torres and 
others.  In thinking through these mutually informative influences, I would say that the 
former, Native Studies, is my principal theoretical axis, and against which I place this 
dissertation’s contributions and interventions, while the latter two enter my work 
primarily through various and important critiques and points-of-meeting between 
Native Studies, Black Studies and contemporary decolonial critique 
These three traditions, especially in the past twenty or so years, have come to 
increasingly mutually influence each other through dialogue between scholars, citational 
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practices, collaborative writings, and theoretical cross-pollination and critique.  My 
dissertation, while emerging from a particular nexus of Native Studies, sociology, and 
anthropology, is also situated against, and indeed part of, this theoretical and scholastic 
entangling, blurring, and constructive inter-building.  Indeed, while this work seeks 
mainly to contribute to Native Studies, sociology, and anthropology through a genealogy 
and critique of Nativeness in the biopolitical, visual, narrative, and philosophical 
imaginings of settler coloniality, it would not have been possible without the tireless and 
incredibly insightful work of those within Black and Latin American Studies.  
With regards to Native Studies, I specifically take up what Chickasaw scholar Jodi 
A. Byrd refers to as indigenous critical theory, in her 2011 work Transit of Empire: 
Indigenous Critiques of Colonialism. Byrd attempts to give a broad outline of what is meant 
by the term, saying that: 
Indigenous critical theory could be said to exist in its best form when it 
centers itself within indigenous epistemologies and the specificities of 
the communities and cultures from which it emerges and then looks 
outward to engage European philosophical, legal, and cultural traditions 
in order to build upon all the allied tools available. Steeped in 
anticolonial consciousness that deconstructs and confronts the colonial 
logics of settler states carved out of and on top of indigenous usual and 
accustomed lands, indigenous critical theory has the potential in this 
mode to offer a transformative accountability (xxix-xxx). 
She continues: 
From this vantage, indigenous critical theory might, then, provide a 
diagnostic way of reading and interpreting the colonial logics that 
underpin cultural, intellectual, and political discourses. But it asks the 
settler, native, and the arrivant each acknowledge their own positions 
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within empire and then reconceptualize space and history to make 
visible what imperialism and its resultant settler colonialisms and 
diasporas have sought to obscure (xxx).  
For this project, the key tool provided by indigenous critical theory is its ability to 
illuminate the oftentimes previously undertheorized ontological, existential and 
structural orderings of Indigeneity within the coordinates of the libidinal, political, and 
sign economies of settler coloniality. In other words, the triangulation of Native life 
within the sum of interconnected systems of power and knowledge production that we 
may choose to call the world. It also allows us to do the thinking against-and-beyond the 
systems imposed by the settler-colonial state and civil society, including the westernized 
academy, and to dream of new futures and new politics. Theoretically and 
methodologically this is an explicit move against what Andrea Smith calls the 
“ethnographic entrapment” of Native Studies studying Natives (2010) and the 
subsequent quest for the visibility of the Native within a westernized concept of universal 
subjecthood.  
This move against ethnographic entrapment is essential in my own understanding 
of Indigeneity and the consequent theorization that this writing moves to produce as I do 
not seek as a primary goal legibility within the walls of the westernized academy, or, 
more broadly, adjusted within and into the modernist, post-enlightenment fold of the 
universal western subject, what Jamaican theorist Sylvia Wynter referred as the 
ethnoclass of bourgeois Man and its overrepresentation as the human (Wynter 2003). On 
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this question of the human, or more correctly of Man and his overrepresentation as the 
human, in my dreaming and theorizing of new potentialities for Indigenous existence, I 
think it is vital to think in terms of the against-and-beyond. Here I again follow Nicolas 
Juárez, who calls for both First Nations, Native American and Indigenous Studies, as well 
as Indigenous activists, to “relinquish their desire to be structurally adjusted into the 
human fold, a fold which will never solve or relieve our problems because our problems 
are the condition of possibility for that fold’s existence” (2014). Fred Moten put it perhaps 
most succinctly: “fuck the human” (2016)10. 
Whereas indigenous critical theory, as an indigenous critical scholar myself, enters 
this dissertation as a defining theoretical lens, contemporary Black radical theory and 
Black feminist theory enters itself at many levels. Most strongly my writing is indebted 
to the theoretical interventions and productions of Lewis R. Gordon, Fred Moten, and 
Alexander G. Weheliye, as well as Black Feminists Sylvia Wynter, Saidiya Hartman, and 
Hortense Spillers; scholars and theorists working in the mold of Frantz Fanon and the 
long Black Feminist tradition, and who critically engage the euro-western canon. They 
are especially essential with regards to the question of the human, and the human-as-
Man, as the supposed universal subject of the (post)modern épistémè, a notion which is 
central to many of my more abstract and ontological investigations. Methodologically 
 
10 From Moten in conversation with Saidiya Hartman, as part of The Black Outdoors: Humanities Futures after 
Property and Possession https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=t_tUZ6dybrc 
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speaking, my deployment of an autoethnographic approach is also deeply indebted to 
the work of Black Feminist theorist Tiffany Lethabo King. Finally, this work critically 
engages the theorizations of aspects of Nativeness within the area of critique and 
theorization known as Afropessimism, primarily through the writings of Jared Sexton on 
Native racialization and Frank B. Wilderson III’s theorization of Indigenous sovereignty 
and ontological placement in the world making project of the human (2010). 
The traces of decolonial theory can likewise be found across virtually every page 
of these writings.  Most obviously this comes through my deployment of concepts such 
as coloniality and modernity/coloniality.  As I discussed in the introduction, coming to 
terms with the coloniality of power, and of coloniality as the darker side of euro-western 
modernity, allows this dissertation to not only contribute to the discipline of Native 
Studies, but also to intervene in my “home disciplines” of sociology and anthropology, 
by revealing the genealogy of the conditions of possibility for these disciplines’ 
emergence with the modern, westernized, and colonized academy.  As thoroughly 
modernist disciplines, even if there have been greater or lesser attempts to shake off 
elements of their origins (such as in moves by some to question the scientificity of their 
methods, or to de-naturalize the Weberian notion of objectivity and value-neutrality), at 
their root the conditions of possibility for knowledge production within sociology and 
anthropology is the coloniality of power.  As Foucault (1980) and Said (1979) remind us, 
knowledge is inseparable from the dynamics of power which produce it.  With respect to 
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modernity, and the disciplines that it has given rise to, decolonial theory and the 
coloniality of power help to keep that recognition firmly in central focus.  
I came to decolonial theory perhaps most recently of these three major streams of 
thought.  I was introduced to it through the work of a friend and colleague, a religious 
studies doctoral candidate at Wilfrid Laurier University, and with whom I shared a panel 
at a 2017 conference on biopolitics.  What caught my attention at first was this colleague’s 
use of the concept of a modern/colonial/capitalist world-system.  The reasons for this was 
because for many years prior I had been under the influence, to one degree or another, of 
world-systems analysis and dependency theory (which, in many ways, world-systems 
analysis is a development of), being a student in many ways of Immanuel Wallerstein 
(1995), Samir Amin (1974), Giovanni Arrighi (1994), Arghiri Emmanuel (1972), and certain 
contemporary thinkers who have picked up and extended the lines of analysis first laid 
down by these theorists, in particular Zak Cope on the international stratification of 
labour between the Global North and Global South in the era of contemporary capitalism 
(2015).  Thus, because I was already quite familiar with at least the central theorists of 
world-systems analysis and their works, it was not much of a leap for myself to dive 
headlong into decolonial theory, especially as theorists of it such as Mignolo (2011), 
Quijano (2008; 2010) and Maldonado-Torres explicitly align their thinking on coloniality 
as both a critique, and extension of, earlier thinking about the world-system.  However, 
the place of decolonial theory within my thinking, and its relationship to world-system 
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analysis, also shines light on a fourth pillar of thought against which I situate myself: 
Marxism. 
1.1 Marxism, Coloniality, Man, & Euromodern Science 
For many years, my primary theoretical grounding could best be described as some kind 
of Marxism.  This was still very much so the case when I began the studies that led me to 
this point in my writings.  For much of that time, while often nominally loyal to some 
kind of Leninist/Maoist Marxism, in the sense of how it viewed the project of actual leftist 
organizing, the primary internal debate that I engaged in with myself with regards to this 
outlook was between a kind of Althusserianism and Gramscianism.  Ultimately, I did, 
and still do, take a number of key elements from both.  From the former, a kind of ‘soft 
Althusserianism’, as Peter D. Thomas refers to it, the hallmarks of which are “a suspicion 
of teleology, an attentiveness to the social and political processes of subject- and 
subjectivity-formation, a respect for the relative autonomy of diverse instances within the 
social totality” (2009:11). In particular, key elements that I continue to draw from 
Althusser’s work is long-running rejection of deterministic or fatalistic modes of analysis 
(often typified, in Marxist works and activism, as the assertion that “communism is 
inevitable”), which coalesce most clearly within the late-Althusser’s “aleatory 
materialism,” or “materialism of the encounter,” (2006) and an attentiveness to the 
working of ideology in the production and reproduction of capitalism, and, more 
essentially, the modern/colonial/capitalist world-system (2014). 
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From the latter I have long been attracted to, and taken up, Gramsci’s ‘absolute 
historicism,’ which entails the denial that any real or meaningful qualitative distinctions 
between different conceptions of the world—much less ideologies and philosophies—
can genuinely be made, and consequently flowing from that a deep suspicion, and 
ultimately a quite uncompromising rejection, of “scientistic” and “deterministic” 
versions of Marxism (2009:11). Other key elements of the kind of Gramscianism that 
Thomas describes, namely the study of subalternity and the form and functions of the 
microphysics of power, have also long been key elements of my outlook on the world 
(2009:11)11.  
However, while many of these outlooks remain close to my mind and heart, the 
principal place that they held for me began to change with my exposure to more recent 
critical and theoretical production from within the spheres of Native, Black, and 
Decolonial Studies.  Ultimately my exposure to these new frameworks slowly began to 
erode the relative Marxist orthodoxy that informed so much of my views and work. 
This has been the path for the last few years.  Nowadays my uses of Marxism are 
more in the direction of what I have taken up jokingly calling postmodern neo-Marxism; an 
 
11 I have often found myself cleaving closer to this kind of Gramscianism than to Althusserianism though, 
primarily because of my long-held suspicion of scientistic approaches to Marxism.  This is a key element 
of much of Marxism, which insists that the historical materialist methodology is a/the “science of history” 
and thus lays forward the claim that what it is doing analytically and theoretically is akin to science.  While 
I understand the Marxist drive/desire to be “scientific,” it has never been a concern that I have shared, 
primarily because I consider it to be an epistemological standpoint that is deeply wedded to the european 
Enlightenment, which as I discuss briefly above, is ultimately a colonial epistemology. 
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intentional appropriation of the wording of Canada’s currently most recognizable 
reactionary academic: Jordan Peterson.  This, for me, is a Marxism that not only naturally 
emerges from those Althusserian and Gramscian moments and engagements of mine in 
years past, but which is also critically informed by the work of the late Mark Fisher (2009) 
and Fredric Jameson (1991), in that it is concerned with the postmodern condition, what 
Fisher refers to as capitalist realism; does not recoil in horror, as so much of Marxism in 
my experience appears to, from the contributions of radical scholars outside the Marxist 
canon and who are most associated with what we might call postmodernism or 
poststructuralism, such as Jean Baudrillard, Michel Foucault, Gilles Deleuze, or Jacques 
Derrida; and which now adds to its list of suspicions the state of current Marxist 
futurisms, both in terms of the necromantic practice of summoning the ghosts of 
socialisms long dead (Robinson & Schram, forthcoming), and in the ongoing quest for 
universality. 
The very last of these points, the question of universality, also opens up a door 
onto what has become my primary issue with so most of Marxism, of almost any 
variant—Althusserian, Gramscian, Jamesonian, Fisherian, Leninist, Maoist etc.—which 
is quite often and quite simply that it is profoundly eurocentric.  What Marxism tends to 
miss in this regard—whether Althusserian, Gramscian, Jamesonian, Fisherian, Leninist, 
Maoist—is that this is a problem that Marxism is not really equipped to grapple with 
because, at the heart of things, Marxism, or at least orthodox Marxism, deeply holds to 
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the abstractly “progressive” powers and qualities of this thing that we call modernity 
precisely because it is a product of modernity, born at the necrotic heart of the colonial 
order of things. 
In this regard, I do not believe that there has been a meaningful shift away from 
eurocentrism, though certainly efforts have been made.  Indeed, in my experience outside 
of academia, in on the ground activist work, in interactions with leftists of a myriad of 
different Marxist tendencies (Marxism-Leninism, Trotskyism, Maoism, various “left-
communisms” etc.), the apparent default response amongst many to any attempted 
critique of eurocentrism within Marxism is to assume that those of us making the critique 
are saying that Marxism is a “white thing.” On the surface, this is quite obviously not the 
case, based purely on the historical record of 20th-Century revolutionary Marxist 
movements, nor do I think it is what anyone putting out a real analysis of the issue means 
to imply either.  Regardless, watching an endless parade of Twitter arguments, the fact 
that that is not what I or others are saying does little to stop Marxists, in particular 
Marxist-Leninists from parading out images of their favourite “Revolutionaries of 
Colour”: Hồ Chí Minh, Thomas Sankara, José María Sison, Huey P. Newton, Mao 
Zedong, Kim Il Sung etc. This, because no one who is really thinking through these issues 
is calling Marxism a white thing, does not actually do anything to diffuse the critique of 
eurocentrism.  In reality, what these two things are—the claim that people are saying 
Marxism is “white”, and the parade of images of ROC as a supposed counter-point—is 
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actually, simply put, an ideologically placed thought terminator designed to short-circuit 
critique. 
This, of course, is far from the only thought terminator used by many Marxist 
activists and theorists to diffuse attempts at critique.  A popular one, and one which I 
have had levelled at myself more than once over the years, is the proposition that critique 
of Marxism represents the work of some nefarious apparatus of the colonial-capitalist 
state, such as COINTELPRO12, the CIA, FBI, or, for those of us up here in Canada, the 
RCMP or CSIS. For example, as I write this a quite popular claim, bordering on 
conspiracy theory, amongst certain segments of the cyberspace left is the american CIA, 
via its Paris-based front organization the Congress for Cultural Freedom, had a hand in 
translating into the Anglophone world the writings of certain 
postmodern/poststructuralist theorists, such as Derrida and Foucault, in the hopes that 
this would coax the anti-capitalist and anti-imperialist rightwards and away from radical 
critique (Rockhill 2017).  While I cannot speak to the role that the CIA may actually have 
had in this, the assumption seems to be that other scholars, theorists, and, also, activists 
would not have reached a point of critiquing Marxist assumptions without the cynical 
 
12 COINTELPRO, short for Counter-Intelligence Program was a U.S. State project that targeted for political 
repression left-wing organizations and other movements deemed subversive which originated within the 
colonial and racial “minority” populations resident within the United States.  Targets including the 
Communist Party, elements of the american New Left and New Communist Movement, Martin Luther 
King Jr., Malcolm X and the Nation of Islam, the Black Panthers, American Indian Movement, and Young 
Lords (Churchill & Wall 2001). 
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guiding hand of the CIA.  This functions as a thought terminator by allowing those 
Marxists who choose to deploy it to simply point at a source of critique and yell “agent!”  
That said, working within the Marxist tradition, there have been a number of 
important attempts to think again and beyond eurocentrism.  I believe that amongst these 
various efforts, Robert Biel in his text Eurocentrism and the Communist Movement (2015) is 
absolutely correct when he says, speaking of Marxism, or what he thinks should be its 
“more neutral name” historical materialism, that: 
The reality is that it is embodied in a particular movement which 
originated and developed in a definite set of geographical and historical 
conditions.  These inevitably influenced, and imposed limitations upon, 
the concrete form in which the theory was first put forward (2015:4). 
Here Biel’s assessment of the geo-historical location and timing of Marxism’s birth, and 
the marks that it has left on its body of theory, cleaves quite closely to what the late Cedric 
J. Robinson much more expansively noted in his classic text Black Marxism: The Making of 
the Black Radical Tradition.  Speaking of what he identifies as Marxism’s “ominous 
limitations, Robinson says: 
However, it is still fair to say that at base, that is at its epistemological 
substratum, Marxism is a Western construction—a conceptualization of 
human affairs and historical development which is emergent from the 
historical experiences of European peoples mediated, in turn, through 
their civilization, their social orders, and their cultures.  Certainly its 
philosophical origins are indisputably Western.  But the same must be 
said of its analytical presumptions, its historical perspectives, its points 
of view.  This most natural consequence though has assumed a rather 
ominous significance since European Marxists have presumed more 
frequently than not that their project is identical with world-historical 
development.  Confounded it would seem by the cultural zeal which 
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accompanies ascendant civilizations, they have mistaken for universal 
verities the structures and social dynamics retrieved from their own 
distant and more immediate pasts.  Even more significantly, the deepest 
structures of ‘historical materialism’ … have tended to relieve European 
Marxists from the obligation of investigating the profound effects of 
culture and historical experience on their science.  The ordering ideas 
which have persisted in Western civilization … have little or no 
theoretical justification in Marxism for their existence (1983:2) 
However, even the best-case examples of contemporary Marxist attempts to confront 
their school of thought’s congenital eurocentrism, such as in Biel’s important work, I have 
issues with the accounting of the problem.  For example, Biel ultimately largely boils the 
endemic issue of eurocentrism in Marxism down to a question of its political economy 
(2015:171).  While in a sense I do agree that the political economy of most Marxists is 
somewhere between one hundred and one hundred fifty years out of date, the question 
of eurocentrism is not simply one that can be solved by the correct reading and 
application of dependency theory or world-systems analysis.  While certainly taking up 
that theoretical line—updated as it should be for the early 21st century, is important, and 
especially when paired with a serious concern for the question of imperialist parasitism—
the manner in which it is focused upon by Biel actually, in my opinion, obscures the other, 
often deeper ways that Marxism has been marked by a profound eurocentrism since its 
original formulations. 
Indeed, despite the recent efforts of the canadian Maoist philosopher Joshua 
Moufwad-Paul, working through the late Samir Amin, to portray Marxism as a 
“modernity critical of modernity,” and leaning heavily on the concluding pages of 
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Fanon’s The Wretched of the Earth in order to declare “the need to establish a new 
Enlightenment that will be free from the predations of Europe” I find little hope for this 
within the onto-epistemological framing of the Marxist project (2018). Indeed, elsewhere 
Moufwad-Paul falls back on old Marxist tropes I have no taste for in order to circumvent 
Black theorist Alexander G. Weheliye’s criticism of all theoretical traditions of european 
origin as “white European thinkers [who] are granted a carte blanche” (2014:6).  Namely, 
Moufwad-Paul consciously falls back on that old Marxist claim that “it is only the Marxist 
tendency that can account for and surmount this carte blanche, thus necessarily 
generating theoretical offspring critical of its erroneous aspects, because of what it is: a 
science” [emphasis original] (2019). 
As I have said already, I am critical of the claims to not only Marxism’s long-
running project of positioning itself as a science, as well as generally scientistic outlooks 
in general, a lingering remnant of my Gramscianism.  However, the claim to Marxism’s 
scientificity, made explicit in Moufwad-Paul’s body of work, brings into quite clear focus 
the problems of Marxism’s onto-epistemological eurocentrism.  Take for instance this 
paragraph, in which he quite boldly writes: 
Moreover, claims that there are other knowledges that have been 
excluded by the dominant scientific narrative does not prove that 
science-qua-science is incorrect––as the artefacts the latter produces 
immediately demonstrates.  At best such claims only demonstrate that 
the colonial-capitalist monopoly on scientific investigation has excluded 
just as much as it has appropriated and that it could stand to learn more 
from the research of others: we know this is correct since environmental 
scientists have discovered that there are indeed suppressed knowledges 
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of numerous Indigenous populations that prove the possibility of living 
sustainable lives. At worst, however, claims about excluded knowledge 
traditions can lead to unqualified endorsements of culturalist 
mystification.  Just because a truth claim is made by a colonized or 
formerly colonized population does not make it correct, no more than 
the various anti-scientific truth claims made by colonizing populations 
(i.e. Six Day Creationism, anti-vaccination, “chem-trails”, ethno-
nationalism, conservative conceptions of gender and sex, etc.), and thus 
it is not always wrong that science excludes some knowledges. Indeed, 
science necessarily has to exclude those truth claims that are proven 
wrong regardless of their origin.  This does not mean that scientific 
investigation, because of the influence of the ideological instance, might 
not wrongly exclude truths due to a scientist’s devotion to various social 
dogma, only that other times the exclusion is correct.  Only Christian 
fundamentalists would argue that we are not better off for the exclusion 
of Six Day Creationism from the discipline of biology (2019). 
In a single arch here Moufwad-Paul concedes that primitive Savages, such as Indigenous 
populations, may actually have some sort of useful knowledge about the world in the 
form of Traditional Ecological Knowledge, or TEK—a currently buzzworthy area of 
discussion within philosophy, the social sciences and environmental studies—yet, in a 
stunningly oblivious move demonstrating the deep eurochauvinist and racial-colonialist 
contours of his own Marxist “science”, simultaneously colours non-european traditional 
knowledges and epistemologies with the same brush of “culturalist mystification” as 
conservative christian supremacists seeking to overturn the current liberal-bourgeois 
secular order to replace it with their own.  In labelling traditional Indigenous 
knowledges, epistemologies, and methodologies “culturalist mystification” Moufwad-
Paul not just side-steps, but actively pushes to the side, the fact that “science,” as a 
“structured and systematic production of knowledge,” is, by most accounts, something 
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that “all societies and all groups, everywhere and anytime, are engaged in” although “not 
all of them are institutionalized to the same degree” (Reiter 2018:3). 
Moufwad-Paul’s characterization of non-european knowledges, epistemologies, 
and methodologies is, I think it is safe to argue, deeply problematic.  This is because, as 
Bernd Reiter notes, colonialism “erased many local scientific traditions by declassifying 
them as primitive and folklore and substituting what was perceived as Southern 
superstition with Northern science” (2018:3).  However, this is, as I have already noted, 
something which Moufwad-Paul appears to not even notice, much less concern himself 
with.  Indeed, in labelling traditional Indigenous knowledges, epistemologies, and 
methodologies “culturalist mystification” he commits the very same colonial error that 
Reitmer speaks of, saying:  
To some authors, the very power of colonialism rested on its ability to 
name and categorize the world according to its heuristic schemata and 
interest, thus inventing, and enforcing, such binaries as 
modern/traditional, progressive/backward, and civilized/primitive 
(2018:3). 
“Culturalist mystification” is a labelling of traditional Indigenous knowledges, 
epistemologies, and methodologies that can only arise from the imperial gaze of 
modernity/coloniality, and thus invests in, constructs, and reifies a colonial 
epistemological hierarchy and binary, and by extension implies other imperial 
hierarchies and binaries, and core-periphery like relationship (Escobar 2011; Lugones 
2007).  Given his philosophical commitment to epistemologically and methodologically 
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situating Marxism as a science, and demonstrated euro-colonial myopia, I suspect that 
even if these problems were presented to him, he would not be able to recognize that the 
knowledge production of euro-western science, much less that of Marxism’s supposedly 
scientific outlook and methodology, is made possible by the coloniality of 
power/knowledge (Dussel 2002; Quijano 2008).   
Moufwad-Paul’s line of thinking here is one which, as should be obvious, is deeply 
antagonistic with regards to any sense of epistemic plurality, or of co-extensive pluriversal 
knowledges (Reiter 2018; Harding 2018; Escobar 2018).  Moufwad-Paul’s Maoist Marxism 
appears quite strongly here to be a case-study in why Santiago Castro-Goméz answers 
with a provisional no regarding the possibility of epistemic plurality under the current 
colonial épistémè, saying: 
at least for the last 500 years, it has not been possible to recognize the 
epistemological plurality of the world.  On the contrary, a single way of 
knowing the world, the scientific-technical rationality of the Occident, 
has been postulated as the only valid episteme, that is to say the only 
episteme capable of generating real knowledge about nature, the 
economy, society, morality and people’s happiness.  All other ways of 
knowing the world have been relegated to the sphere of doxa, as if they 
were a part of modern science’s past, and are even considered an 
‘epistemological obstacle’ to attaining the certainty of knowledge 
(2010:282). 
And is this not indeed a quite precise summation of Moufwad-Paul’s assessment of 
Marxist scientificity, and indeed for the necessity of Marxist scientificity?  He makes this 
quite clear in his reply to Weheliye, that it is Marxism, and only Marxism, that is capable 
of providing a meaningful explanation of the world, and thus a meaningful impact on 
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the world, because it is a science.  Does not Moufwad-Paul make it clear that he views, from 
within the Marxist domain, Indigenous and non-european to be an epistemic obstacle to 
the flourishing of Marxist science?  What else could it be to label the subalternized, 
colonized, and genocided world-views of Indigenous peoples as “culturalist 
mystification” and paint them with the same brush as settler-colonial christian clerical 
fascists?  It does not seem, to myself at least, to stretch credulity by much to imagine that 
Moufwad-Paul—while not doubting what I believe to be he and other Marxist’s political 
commitment to what they believe to be a freer, more equal, and more just world—
maintains a fixed and rigid euromodern and euro-western methodological-epistemological-
axiological commitment that is rooted in a profound colonial-imperial arrogance.  And 
this is a kind of arrogance that can only be imagined from one who sits at the very heart 
of the modern/colonial/capitalist world-system.  It is an arrogance that allows one to 
believe that they stand at a kind of zero-point around which the earth rotates (Castro-
Gómez 2010; Grosfoguel 2013).  The truth of the matter is that European ontologies, 
epistemologies, academic and social research programmes, cosmologies and the like are 
only able to place themselves at the zero-point of contemporary human knowledge 
production and accumulation because they have conquered the world, and suffocated all 




Against this decolonial and postcolonial critique however, in their recent writings 
both Biel and Moufwad-Paul hinge much of their thought on this matter, on the assertion 
that as a theory, analytic, and methodology historical materialism, the Marxist science of 
history, is not only the best tool for the job, but indeed is the only one, and, not only that, 
it has already succeeded in that regard13.  This is, to put it mildly, debatable. 
To be even more specific, the position which Moufwad-Paul outlines here is 
profoundly epistemicidal, to borrow a concept from Ramón Grosfoguel (2013) and 
Boaventura de Sousa Santos (2018; 2014).  Turning back to Castro-Gómez’s comments on 
the scientific-technical rationality of the Occident, Moufwad-Paul’s thinking is also 
deeply tinged by what Fernando Coronil would call, drawing on already-existing 
discourse, Occidentalism (1996), and which, reflecting on Edward Said’s conception of 
Orientalism, with its focus on the euro-west’s deficiencies in representing the Othered 
“Orient” (1979), he describes as “the conceptions of the West animating those 
representations” (56). 
 
13 Moufwad-Paul at times is all over the place.  For example, in these writings, and on his personal blog 
works in which he argues against anything appended with the prefix “post” (postmodernism, 
postcolonialism, poststructuralism, post-Marxism etc.) he argues at length that a major problem with these 
schools of thought, in so far as the question of eurocentrism is concerned, is that they are often rooted, 
ultimately, in theorists more eurocentric than Marx. While it is no doubt the case that philosophers and 
theorists such as Nietzsche were deep eurochauvinists, an argument amounting to “well, those thinkers 
are more eurocentric” is not one that I find particularly convincing.  Additionally, this line of thinking from 
Moufwad-Paul is significant in its uncharitability towards Native, Black, Third World, migrant and other 
subaltern theorists, whom he seems to treat as oblivious to the eurocentrism of theorists and theories other 
than Marx.  This would seem to me to be a kind of white-saviourism in Marxist clothing, which is a 
particular flavour of eurocolonial racism.  I can assure Moufwad-Paul, as well as my readers, that we, and 
I include myself humbly here, do not need a white canadian Maoist philosopher to instruct us in what is 
and is not eurocentric. 
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While it may seem unfair here to single out a single canadian philosopher 
representing a specific strain of Marxism, in this case, Maoism, I focus briefly here on 
Moufwad-Paul precisely because he so well articulates in the contemporary 
philosophical and theoretical arenas the argument for Marxism’s claim to scientificity, 
and, by way of negative extension, also lays clear the problems of that position, again 
whether or not Moufwad-Paul necessarily recognizes them as problems14. Additionally, 
some of the pitfalls that lead Moufwad-Paul to the almost-funny-if-it-was-not-serious 
euro-colonial, and frankly racist, equivocation of christian fascist theology and the 
subalternized, genocided, and still colonized and suppressed cosmologies, ontologies, 
and epistemologies of Indigenous peoples have entrapped many a Marxist thinker 
attempting to cut themselves out of the net of endemic eurocentrism. This is not a 
particularly new argument for Marxists to make.  In the closing decades of the Cold War, 
the Cuban philosopher Roberto Fernández Retamar attempted to make a link between a 
kind of proto-post-Occidentalist thought and Marxism.  For Retamar capitalism was 
essentially the same as Occidental thought, and therefore Marxism, as a critique of 
capitalism, could not be anything other than post-Occidental (1986).  However, while the 
colonial genesis of capitalism has caused a global ontogenic overlapping of capitalism 
 
14 I must credit this insight here to a fellow Indigenous leftist, Lakota tweeter Hinskéhanska, with whom I 
have regular discussions on social media.  I had already been critical of the earlier 2018 piece by Moufwad-
Paul and the claim of Marxism as a “modernity critical of modernity,” but had not read the follow up article 
from this year. 
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and colonialism, hence my, and others’, use of the compound term “the 
modern/colonial/capitalist world-system”, I do not believe that this makes the two 
categories reducible to each other.  If they were, then class struggle and anti-
colonial/decolonial struggle would seem to be reducible to one another, but, as such 
contemporary Native thinkers such as George E. Tinker (2008) and Glen Coulthard (2014) 
I believe convincingly demonstrate, this would be an oversimplification of colonial 
relations as they exist, and one which ultimately leaves Natives by the wayside in the 
global quest for proletarian revolution and socialism. 
Thinking back again to Moufwad-Paul, while I am not necessarily opposed to the 
idea of a “modernity critical of modernity,” or Fanon’s call to build a new enlightenment, 
for myself, probably contrary to Moufwad-Paul, this is because I follow Lewis Gordon’s 
corrective of Enrique Dussel in that what we generally call modernity in a broad sense 
should more correctly be understood as euromodernity, because modernity is not 
something strictly owned by Europeans (2013). This is the crux of my issue with not only 
Moufwad-Paul, but with Marxism in general: it is not that it is, or even can ever claim to 
be, just or simply a “modernity critical of modernity,” but that we must also be precisely 
clear about that which we speak, and in this case we can only regard Marxism as a 
product of euromodernity that attempts an internal critique of euromodernity.  In this 
vein, as far as we can genuinely consider Marxism to be an actual critique of modernity, 
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then it must be said to be, much like its oft ideological foe postmodernism, a eurocentric 
critique of euromodernity (Grosfoguel 2008). 
This is a trap that Marxism—despite all of the insight that it may contain about the 
exploitation of wage labour by capital, imperialism, class struggle, the state etc.—
fundamentally cannot escape because of the eurocentric corruption in its roots, which 
ultimately causes it to mistake a european vision for a “scientific” one, and one with an 
unqualified universal applicability which should supplant all other epistemological 
systems. This is one of the ultimate traps of Marxism: the notion of universality.  Abstract 
universals as they are, with the global designs that they proffer, especially when rooted 
in something birthed at the heart of the modern/colonial/capitalist world-system, are 
inherently epistemically western and colonial (Mignolo 2012).  This is a trap set by the 
fact that that this thing we call modernity is indelibly, ineluctably, and inescapably linked 
with the colonial order of things.  It was out of needing to understand this trap, out of the 
context of the Latin American engagement with dependency theory and world-systems 
analysis, that the late Peruvian sociologist Aníbal Quijano coined the concept of the 
coloniality of power, often shortened to just coloniality, sometimes also referred to as the 
colonial matrix of power, and linked it to the compound concept of modernity/coloniality 
in order to describe this twinned relationship (2010; 2008). 
Coloniality is different from colonialism.  Colonialism, in a broad sense, setting 
aside the specifics of settler colonialism, denotes the political and economic relationship 
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wherein the sovereignty of a nation or a people rests on the power of another 
nation.  Coloniality, rather, refers to long-standing patterns of power that emerged as a 
result of colonialism, and thus, coloniality survives colonialism, being maintained alive 
in books, in the criteria for academic performance, in cultural patterns, in common sense, 
in the self-image of peoples, in aspirations of self etc.  Coloniality, understood in this way, 
is constitutive of modernity, which, broadly construed, are those pillars and interrelated 
spheres that define culture, labour, intersubjective relations, and knowledge 
production/epistemology and ontological questions and concepts such as the nature of 
the human and the naturalization of life and the permanent regeneration of the living 
(e.g. the invention of the concept of “nature” etc.) well beyond the strict limits of colonial 
administrations (Maldonado-Torres 2010; Mignolo & Walsh 2018). 
Related to this is the concept of the decolonial and decoloniality.  In my interactions 
on social media platforms with Marxists and other leftists over the past months and years, 
what I suspect to be an attentiveness to the verbiage, but not the content, of current Native 
critique by many Marxists has given rise to a seeming neologism, decolonialism, and a 
conflation within that between two related by different concepts: decolonization and 
decoloniality. In essence, decolonization is and always has been tied to the question of 
land and power.  As Glen Coulthard notes in his Red Skin White Masks (2014) both Native 
oppression and resistance to that oppression are informed by, and through, the question 
of land.  Decoloniality on the other hand, while inherently tied to the materiality of 
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decolonization is about those patterns of power and epistemological/ontological 
elements that originated from colonialism and modernity, but which can persist, and very 
much so have persisted, beyond colonialism.  In short decoloniality is the end of 
coloniality, which implies the end of modernity as well, or, to be more correct, 
euromodernity. 
Likewise, a decolonial critique of modernity/coloniality is a critique from the 
position of subalternized and silenced knowledges, rather than Marxism or 
postmodernism’s eurocentric critique of euromodernity (Mignolo 2012).  These are the 
very same knowledges which Moufwad-Paul’s eurocentric ideological stance regarding 
the scientificity of the Marxist worldview relegate, at best, to possible mere addendums 
to western science’s body of knowledge, and at worst superstitious artefacts of a by-gone 
era that must now be rejected on the grounds of being “culturalist mystification” of the 
same kind and content as colonial and deeply anti-Indigenous conservative Christianity, 
to be replaced by the more correctly “scientific” Marxist epistemology and methodology 
of historical materialism. 
Thinking through the decolonization/decoloniality distinction in this way it 
becomes possible to see that the first instance, that is, land and power, can be taken up 
without actually uprooting the second, those patterns of power that form 
modernity/coloniality.  In fact, I would argue that a basic cursory look of the history of 
Marxist revolutions around the world in the 20th century, from China to Cuba to Viet 
69 
 
Nam, demonstrates that this has actually been the general pattern with previous 
decolonization movements.  While it is perhaps possible to recapitulate this within a 
more traditionally Marxist theorization of the base-superstructure relationship, because 
of the deeply rooted epistemological, ontological and cosmological commitments within 
Marxism to a european geopolitics and body-politics of knowledge, there are elements of 
modernity/coloniality that escape the sight of Marxism often when considering the 
ideological dimensions of capitalism that will be struggled against both before and after 
the formal end of the capitalist world-economy, once the march towards communism is 
begun. 
Indeed, in many ways because of these deeply held, and often unquestioned 
conceptions within at least mainstream and orthodox conceptions of Marxism, such as 
the conception of human-as-Man, of nature and of the human-nature relationship, it is 
possible for Marxism to actually deepen the commitment to modernity/coloniality within 
a given situation, even as it may work to struggle against others because of the perceived 
universality of Marxism. In fact, because of at least orthodox Marxism’s open and 
enthusiastic commitment to many of the core tenants of euromodernity, and hence its 
lurching fear of ‘postmodernism’ (itself a Eurocentric critique of euromodernity), a more 
cynical reading would see this kind of deeper westernization to be an almost inevitable. 
Marxism is thus, within this kind of understanding, a thoroughly modernist 
analytic and political project, and is thus tied up with many of the epistemological and 
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ontological dimensions of coloniality.  Marxism, like postmodernism and post-
structuralism are, as Grosfoguel notes, “epistemological projects that are caught within 
the western canon, reproducing within its domains of thought and practice a particular 
form of coloniality of power/knowledge” (2008).  This includes in many ways a 
recapitulation of liberal-bourgeois notions of the human and humanism, a problem with 
which I grapple significantly in this dissertation [you can catch a few glimpses of this 
aspect of my work in some previous posts I have made, which also were clips of my 
dissertation writings].  For Marx, and for the Marxist tradition that followed, this liberal-
bourgeois humanist tendency is perhaps most clearly subsumed up within what Tiffany 
Lethabo King identifies as a Lockean formulation that links labour with land, and labour 
with property, and eventually labour with the ability to claim status as a proper human 
subject (2019:23).  This analytic has been the site of deep challenge and critique from 
within both Black and Native Studies. 
The encounter between Marxist theory and Black and Native Studies is one that 
destabilizes the former by way of a structural violence that both prefaces the 
labourcentric analytics of Marxism, as well as exceeds its margins of theorizability and 
incorporation.  From within Black Studies, Saidiya Hartman, for example, theorizes the 
fungibility of Blackness and of the enslaved Black person as a challenge to the 
labourcentric theoretical analytic of Marxism, which has historically, and currently, 
tended to reduce this ongoing structural mechanic and lived experience to mere alienated 
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labour, if an extreme case of such.  Pushing beyond these limitations, she proposes 
racialization, accumulation, and domination as the analytics best suited for 
understanding the development and position of Black subjectivity, rather than pure 
labour (2003).   Similarly, emerging from Native Studies, Glen Coulthard, in his attempt 
to think through and with the Marxist analytic, necessarily pushes beyond the Lockean 
labourcentrism of Marxism in order to find grounding on which to orient both 
discussions of Native oppression and colonization, and question of Indigenous liberation.  
He notes in Red Skin White Masks: Rejecting the Colonial Politics of Recognition, “the history 
and experience of dispossession, not proletarianization, has been the dominant 
background structure shaping the character of the historical relationship between 
Indigenous peoples and the Canadian state” (2014:13).  Indeed, the relationship between 
Indigenous people and the processes of proletarianization, or rather the lack thereof (in 
so far as the cognition of the settler state and society views it), is paradigmatic of the 
Native as the Savage, and as part of the Wild, an ontological status that I explore later in 
this dissertation. 
What is ultimately at stake here concerning Marxism as a particular kind of liberal-
bourgeois, euromodern, and labourcentric humanism, is that the violences of conquest, 
genocide, and enslavement escape the ability of its grammars and registers to make a full 
accounting of them.  If Marxism is to be made applicable to the violent sufferings 
experienced by genocided and enslaved peoples, it must be stretched so much that it will 
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perhaps become unrecognizable to those theorists who take up and proclaim the myriad 
Marxist schools of thought.  This, of course, reflects Fanon’s old, if perhaps quite 
understated, prescription that “a Marxist analysis should always be slightly stretched 
when it comes to addressing the colonial issue” (2004:5). 
To a considerable extent this problem of Marx, and Marxism’s, liberal-bourgeois 
humanist tendencies in theory-analytics and methodological-pedagogical-praxiological 
commitments extends even to those sub-formations that have attempted to openly 
expunge this kind of allegiance from the Marxist canon.  One can here think of the 
Spinozist Marxism of Louis Althusser, and the many students and theorists that he 
cultivated or influenced, including Jacques Rancière, Alain Badiou, Antonio Negri, and 
Étienne Balibar.  Indeed, here we can even group those outside of Marxism, or at least its 
mainstreamed manifestations (including Althusserian), but who were aligned in some 
manner with Althusser’s anti-humanist impulses.  The chief theorists that come to mind 
in this regard are Michel Foucault and Gilles Deleuze15, as well as the latter’s occasional 
partner in writing and theory, Félix Guattari.   
Curiously, or perhaps not (if you are as cynical of the world of Man as I am) it is 
something to note that the natal and myopic eurocentrism of the broad Marxist tradition 
 
15 Both Deleuze (1988) and Althusser (2016a), besides being contemporaries, and though not always in 
theoretical agreement, were notable for their shared commitment to the philosophy of Baruch Spinoza, 
against the general historical trend of Hegelianism within Marxist thought, and much of the rest of 
continental philosophy. For Althusser, Spinoza is a major source of his reading of Marxism in an anti-
humanist direction.  Influenced deeply by both Althusser and Deleuze, Negri is today notable as a public, 
non-humanist, Spinozist Marxist (2013; 2020) as is Althusser’s former student Balibar (2008). 
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prevented those Marxist, as well as poststructuralist, postmodernist and post-Marxist, 
theorists looking to sketch a way out of the humanist impasse from seeing that such onto-
epistemic worldviews already existed in the world, but who’s genealogies of such were, 
and are, submerged under centuries of colonial domination, genocide, and enslavement. 
As Tiffany King says: 
Genealogies have a way of remembering the “anti-humanist” traditions 
of Native/Indigenous people’s that the West’s form of violent 
Enlightenment humanism wiped out through genocide.  The only reason 
that we experience European postmodern/poststructuralist anti-
humanist impulses like those found within Deleuzian thought as novel 
and as an epistemic revolution is because Indigenous and Native 
people’s cosmologies and epistemologies that did not recognize 
boundaries between nature/culture or the human and the western 
sensuous world were wiped out and had to be remade by the West 
(2016). 
Today the proclamation of these sorts of epistemic non-revelations confused for 
revolutions of thought are still being produced within the confines of the westernized, 
colonized academy.  As such, because our genealogies of thought have never been quite 
as dead as western anthropologists and philosophers may have believed, Black and 
Native Studies have often met the arrival of these still-newer iterations within western 
thought with scepticism.  Consider for example the now quite vogueish anti-
anthropocentric frame-work provided by Graham Harman’s object-oriented ontology 
project (2011; 2018)—as well as the his fellow-travellers within the broader contemporary 
movement of speculative realism, such as Ray Brassier (2007), Iain Hamilton Grant (2006) 
and Quentin Meillassoux (2008), all of whom seek, in one way or another, to overturn 
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post-Kantian anthropocentrism—whose arrival on the academic and theoretical scene 
both Jodi Byrd and Kim Tallbear critique as Johnny-come-lately-ish and Columbusing in 
their approach to issues of the human, because they are anything but new to Indigenous 
worldviews (Byrd 2018:602; TallBear 2015:234). 
Thinking again of both Cedric Robinson and Louis Althusser’s critiques of certain 
tendencies within Marxism, there is one ultimate point worth noting, and that is my 
already stated suspicion of teleology, a key feature which marked the thought of both, 
and which has also deeply influenced my own thinking vis-à-vis Marxism.  In his late 
work, following his psychiatric hospitalization after the murder of his wife Hélène 
Rytmann, Althusser wrote of a materialism of the encounter, “of the aleatory and the 
contingency,” and that:  
this materialism is opposed, as a wholly different mode of thought, to 
the various materialisms on record, including that widely ascribed to 
Marx, Engels and Lenin, which, like every other materialism in the 
rationalist tradition, is a materialism of necessity and teleology, that is to 
say, a transformed, disguised form of idealism (2006:167-168). 
Pessimist horror writer and theorist Steven Craig Hickman writes that Althusser’s late-
philosophical anti-teleological musings invite us to dive deep into a ”multimodal 
materialist analysis of relationships of power,” in which the emergence of phenomena 
such as colonialism/coloniality, modernity, and capitalism arise contingently, rather than 
as fated, destined outcomes of earlier social phases of human history, traced along 
universal and unilinear evolutionary mappings, and that, within such an aleatory 
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materialism, "it is important to recognize their diverse temporalities by examining their 
more enduring structures and operations as well as their vulnerability to ruptures and 
transformation – all the while acknowledging that they have no predestined, necessary, 
or predictable trajectory" (2012). Such a multimodal analysis of the heterogeneous and 
overdetermined nature of social development (thinking here also of the younger 
Althusser’s work (2005)), in which change, movement, revolution, and emergence are not 
reducible to a single set of dialectical contradictions (such as that in orthodox Marxist 
class analysis of the relations and forces of production), has always been, and will likely 
remain, an essential line that cuts across my thought and work. 
While Althusser tackled the problem of Marxist teleology from the perspective of 
western philosophy, Robinson instead rooted himself in an anthropological investigation 
of Marxism and Marxist thought.  Robinson links the Marxist inversion of the Hegelian 
dialectic of the world Geist into the dialectic of history (historical materialism) with a shift 
away from seeing time as non-linear and cyclical, to linear, and notes that there are 
christian religious and prophetic dimensions to this shift which are secularized and 
subsequently re-articulated within Marxism.  In his An Anthropology of Marxism he notes: 
This peculiarity is barely disguised in the Western eschatological 
ordering of history.  Modern Western civilization derives from its 
cultural predecessor, Judeo-Christianity, a notion of secular history 
which is not merely linear but encompasses moral drama as well.  The 
narratives of providential history are sufficiently familiar to most of us 
as to not require repeating … Even secular historical conceptions like 
historical materialism reflect the ‘good news’ presumption of the Judeo-
Christian gospel: the end of human history fulfills a promise of 
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deliverance, the messianic myth.  When Marx and Engels maintained in 
The Communist Manifesto that human history has been the record of 
class struggle and then proffer the socialist society as one without classes, 
it is implied that history will then come to an end.  Socialist society—a 
social order which displays no classes, no class struggle and therefore no 
history—reflects a kind of apocalyptic messianism (2001:6-7). 
In the linear historical dialectic of orthodox Marxism, the coming socialist/communist 
society takes the place of the new heaven and new earth promised in the christian book 
of revelation, and the mythologically borderless proletariat the place of the return of 
Christ.  Indeed, given how this is linked to the shift in western thought (long before the 
rise of euromodernity) from cyclical temporality to linear readings of time and history, it 
should lead us to question what Biel has to say about historical materialism when he 
claims: 
In that sense [historical materialism as the application of dialectics to the 
development of history], although the approach was discovered by 
Marx, we could say it had an existence independent of its origins in time 
and place and could well have been worked out under a different set of 
circumstances (2015:4) 
While perhaps in a sense correct, especially as Marx, and Hegel before him, was far from 
the first person in human history to develop and deploy a dialectical perception of the 
world—though, thinking through King, one has to again consider how this is, in fact, an 
epistemological non-revelation when confronted with the genocidal and epistemicidal 
annihilation of many such dialectical worldviews with the coming of the 
modern/colonial/capitalist world-system—one has to seriously wonder whether 
historical materialism as it is broadly understood by most Marxists would have actually 
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arisen in such circumstances which may have evinced a profoundly different perception 
of time, such as those embedded within the epistemological and cosmological 
conceptions of many of our diverse Native nations in the northern bloc. There is also a 
sense here, within mainstream Marxism, of a universal or general time at work within 
the historical dialectic, even within the linear sense, which is something that has been 
deeply troubled recently by theorists as diverse as Mark Rifkin (2017), José Rabasa (2010) 
and Kyle Powyss Whyte (2019).    
However, all of this has not meant that I have rejected Marxism in a full sense, or 
if not Marxism per se, then perhaps certain critiques and analytics emergent from within 
the Marxist paradigm.  Rather it means that I do not hold that the paragons of the euro-
western philosophical and social scientific canons—from the founding fathers of Marx, 
Weber, Durkheim, and Freud, through Bourdieu, Baudrillard, Derrida, Foucault, Latour, 
Deleuze, Lacan, Althusser, up to and including Fisher and Jameson—hold within their 
various theoretical corpuses all the tools that are necessary for challenging the order of 
things of the modern/colonial/capitalist world-system (Harding 2008; Connell 2007).  
However, and perhaps this is my own artefact of thought, I still maintain that they 
include many useful tools.  Indeed, my writing in this dissertation makes regular 
references to the Gramscian concepts of civil society and hegemony, the Althusserian line 
of thought regarding ideology, and, especially towards its latter chapters, is deeply 
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informed by the thought of Mark Fisher, and to a lesser extent by Fredric Jameson.  My 
bibliography is replete with references to these thinkers and their works.  
That said, I would refer now to my relationship with Marxism as complicated, or 
in a state of revision, which seeks to combine, perhaps unevenly and certainly with jerks 
and stops, on the one hand what I see as a kind of postmodern neo-Marxism (an appraisal 
by labelling that I am sure would drive most Marxists I know into a fit) and on the other 
with a decolonial, Native, and Black Studies informed critical theory perspective which 
is mindful of the relationship between modernity (and ultimately postmodernity, and the 
posthuman, if such a thing is actually meaningfully different from modernity in a 
qualitative fashion) and coloniality, and is suspicious of the scientistic quest for universal 
laws of human development and pathways into the future. I sometimes jokingly refer to 
this project as one of decolonial indigenous postmodern neo-Marxism.  A mouthful for sure, 
but no worse than the endless strings of hyphens seen throughout the history of the 
Marxist project.  What is important here in all of this is that, to follow King’s prescription, 
any loyalty on my part to Marxist theories, methods, and analytics is properly 
prioritized—which is to say made subordinate to, and consequently in a state of constant 
scrutiny from—commitments with and within Native, Black and Decolonial Studies 
(2019:68).  Thus, while Marxism is not dismissed from my political and theoretical 
commitments, what role it does play is refracted and modified by the decolonial and the 
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abolitionist.  This is where I, suffering to make a decolonial corrective to Marxism, make 
my point of departure. 
1.2 Settler Colonial Studies & the Settler-Colonial Modality of Power 
In seeking to correct these many insufficiencies of my Marxism, I must turn to tendencies 
and lines of inquiry that lie outside of the orthodox.  As with the fields of Indigenous 
critical and decolonial theory more broadly, this ongoing complication, and thus 
consequently this research and its theoretical orientation, is also informed by and deeply 
indebted to the development over the previous two decades of the field of Settler Colonial 
Studies. In particular I draw much insight and direction from the work of the late 
australian historian and anthropologist Patrick Wolfe, in particular his elaboration of the 
central eliminative logic of settler colonialism (2006). The logic of elimination is, for 
Wolfe, one of the central axes differentiating settler colonialism from the more commonly 
theorized metropolitan colonialism of the european, north american and Japanese 
colonial and neocolonial powers. It is the fundamental drive to not only dispossess 
Indigenous peoples of their traditional lands and sovereignties, but to eliminate them as 
well, through various overlapping, and at times seemingly contradictory, means, ranging 
from the physical violence of the frontier to the cultural and biological assimilation of 
Indigenous peoples into the mainstream settler society. In short, it is, as Wolfe describes, 
the “organizing principle of settler-colonial society” (2008:103). 
This understanding, that settler colonialism is a modality of domination distinct 
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from other colonial and imperial projects seeks not to exploit the labour of Native 
peoples, but to render them extinct in toto, is taken by myself as perhaps the most 
fundamental understanding of our current society within the pages of this dissertation. 
From it flows virtually all of the other ideas that are either deployed are developed within 
what follows. And likewise, without it in hand, this dissertation would make little, if any, 
coherent sense. 
In particular, it is this final aspect, as it concerns the processes of the 
biopoliticalization of Indigenous people in both the United States and in Australia, a 
process which he refers to as a “trace of history” (2016), that I draw significant analytic 
and theoretical influence. Most especially, Wolfe illuminates the connection, within the 
logic of elimination, of the content of Native biopolitical-being as “maximally soluble” 
(2016), in which Nativeness decreases through the generations and increasing levels 
miscegenation. This is incredibly important to my critique of the current political 
discourse around the question of racial passing within Indigenous and settler-colonial 
spaces, as I believe an understanding of the racialization of Indigeneity as something 
inherently dilutable deeply troubles much of this cotemporary discussion, which I 
discuss in Chapters 2 and 3. 
Beyond Wolfe I also draw broadly upon the work of Iyko Day, who situates 
indigenous elimination alongside the critique of antiblackness in the formation of settler 
colonial critique (2015; 2016), as well as the racialization of other colonized subjects and 
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immigrant peoples. My understanding of Wolfe’s formulation of the logic of elimination 
also dovetails as well with Kiera Ladner's discussion of the political genocide of 
Indigenous peoples via legislation and what she calls “slow-moving poison” (2014). the 
path-breaking analysis of U.S. blood quantum policy as ‘statistical extermination’ in the 
work of M. Annette Jaimes (1992), and J. Kēhaulani Kauanui’s examination of the 
discursively cognate case of the colonization and biopoliticalization of the indigenous 
Polynesian people of Hawaiʻi (2008; 2018). 
The latter chapters of this dissertation also concern themselves deeply with the 
turn that Wolfe inaugurated in this 1998 work Settler Colonialism and the Transformation of 
Anthropology regarding the colonial imaginary of terra nullius—empty land—and the 
assemblage of social, cultural, ontological, economic and libidinal infrastructures that 
have been constructed around it in order to push further under the proverbial rug the 
simple fact that the land was not empty. These include the many narratives that are 
employed and deployed to render the Native as something outside of the fold of the 
human, such as those of the Wild, and of Native Wildness, which either dissolve Natives 
into the land entirely, or, seemingly in contradiction, remove Natives from the land and 
rendering their prior stewardship as act of nature itself, if not outright divine providence; 
and the bizarre juridical, philosophical and cultural conjunction which renders Native 
temporality as something outside of the standardized, universalized, colonized, universal 
time stream of the settler. 
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However, an additional word must be said about both the deployment of Settler 
Colonial Studies within this writing and the place of this dissertation within Settler 
Colonial Studies, and this is this: the advancement of a white-dominated field of Settler 
Colonial Studies has often acted as a kind of disciplinary, academic, and theoretical 
colonization of the space of Native Studies, as well as in many instances Black Studies 
also. Thus, to raise the question of Settler Colonial Studies, for all of its potent theoretical 
insights over the past two to three decades, is to also summon the spectre of Native 
Studies and Native theoretical production.  
The hybrid Marxian-Foucauldian theorizing of Patrick Wolfe, as the preeminent 
scholar and writer in the field, both before and since his passing in 2016, is for many the 
leaping off point in coming to an understanding of settler colonialism as a “distinct social, 
cultural and historical formation with ongoing political effects” (Edmonds & Carey 2013). 
I know this not only from my years working as a Native academic, studying, reading, 
writing, but also in my experience as a course instructor. When I taught in the University 
of Waterloo’s Indigenous Studies programme during the Winter 2019 term, the first 
reading I assigned my class was Wolfe’s often quoted and cited, but increasingly not 
actually read, seminal 2006 essay “Settler Colonialism and the Elimination of the Native” 
(2006). I did this because I felt it was vital for my students to have a grounding in settler 
colonialism, what it is, how it functions, how it continues to overcode the everyday 
politics of a settler-colonial configuration such as Canada before we dove into the subject 
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of contemporary Indigenous issues in Canada.  
There is a certain potency within Wolfe’s work, as evidenced by this very 
dissertation, and I myself hold Wolfe in significant regard. His work has permanently 
functioned to shift my own understandings, to bring ideas that were blurred or just out 
of grasp into focus and into reach. I also believe that he was a genuine ally of Indigenous 
peoples, our plight, and our struggle for decolonization. As Seneca scholar Mishuana 
Goeman wrote of him following his passing he: 
Engaged our field [Native Studies] in a respectful and nuanced manner, 
far beyond many scholars of this settler stature that perceive 
Indians/Natives/Indigenous as objects of study. His work became a place 
to engage Indigenous studies concerns in relations to settler colonial 
studies that at times leaves out indigenous epistemologies and 
ontologies, as well as our own political framings (2016). 
However, as respectful as Wolfe may have been towards Native Studies, as much of an 
ally as he may have been towards Native scholars and Native theorists, this has not 
stopped, as Tiffany King notes, the uncomfortable fact that “his work,” and the work of 
Settler Colonial Studies more broadly, “has been used in ways that often end up 
consolidating settler colonial studies as a White field that displaces Native and 
Indigenous Studies” (2019:65).  Again to return to my own experiences, when interacting 
with scholars, students, professors and the like from outside of Native Studies (whether 
that means outside of a specific Native Studies programme, or those in positions such as 
myself who attempt to carry out Native Studies-informed research and writing 
programmes within other departments and disciplinary fields) there is often a confusion 
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between where Settler Colonial Studies ends and Native Studies begins. It is certainly the 
case that many Native Studies scholars today take much from Settler Colonial Studies, 
especially the work of Wolfe—to list off the names of scholars who do would be simply 
too long of a list here, and an exercise in citational masturbation—and sometimes the 
distinction between the two is obvious, such as in the case of the old ethnographic and 
ethnohistorical work that continues in many ways to dominate Native Studies, but when 
it comes to the point of actually theorizing the present now breakdown often ensues. I 
recall during my early doctoral studies at the University of Waterloo, a university with 
something of a dearth in not only direct Indigenous scholarship, but also Indigenously 
informed scholarship, that when I assigned readings for both of my comprehensive 
exams, the second of which specifically was to deal with the questions of current Native 
issues and struggles, that there was a confusion between Settler Colonial Studies and 
Native Studies. This was also indicated to me during the comprehensive exams 
themselves when during the first examination, if I recall correctly, I was asked questions 
about Settler Colonial Studies as a field. Knowing my fellow scholars in my department 
as I do, I only assume good intentions on the part of my examination committee members, 
but I remember remarking to myself at the same time that I felt that others in our 
department did not know the difference between these two fields.  
Because of this, there has been some degree of pushback against the displacing 
wave of Settler Colonial Studies by those writing, thinking, and theorizing from within 
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Native Studies. Notable here is Lenape scholar Joanne Barker, who since 2011 on her blog 
has sustained numerous criticisms of Settler Colonial Studies and its relationship to 
Native Studies, while also at the same time carrying out open dialogue with those within 
the former, namely Wolfe and Mark Rifkin. In my own opinion, Barker somewhat 
overstates her case that the idea of settler colonialism does not truly reflect “the current 
structure of social formation of the U.S.” (2011).  She also takes issue with what she 
considers to be the more friendly, less violent, less horror-inducing meanings of 
settlement as to reconcile and to make friends and states her preference for holding onto 
“harsher” terms such as “imperialism” and “colonialism,” saying that:  
it is important and necessary to secure indigenous self-determination 
and decolonization [by holding] onto the “empire” in our 
understanding, describing, and strategizing ways of empowerment and 
revolution (2011).  
I believe that the source of my disagreement with Barker is likely the result of how I 
myself was introduced to the notion of the “settler.” I first came to the subject not through 
Settler Colonial Studies, or even through Native Studies, but through the proto-Third 
Worldist anti-colonial Marxist “movement literature” of J. Sakai (2014; 2017) and allied 
authors such as Butch Lee (2015; 2017), E. Tani and Kaé Sera (1985), and the Bottomfish 
Blues Collective (2014). While these authors generally do not actually theorize the 
phenomena of settler colonialism—instead providing something more of a critical labour 
history of the white working class in the United States, particularly in the case of Sakai’s 
seminal, if somewhat heretical work in Settlers: The Mythology of the White Proletariat from 
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Mayflower to Modern (2014)—for myself, my exposure to them prior to my exposure to 
contemporary Settler Colonial Studies and Native Studies has coloured my thinking such 
that the concepts of “settlers” and “settlement” have never possessed a positive set of 
possible connotations; rather they have always to me implied violence, parasitism, 
invasion, genocide, enslavement and a structural relationship to those violences that 
materially benefits the dominant white settler population.  Indeed, to Barker’s call to hold 
onto the “empire” as necessary for Native decolonization and revolutionary struggles, I 
would offer Sakai’s statement that 
The key to understanding Amerika is to see that it was a chain of European 
settler colonies that expanded into a settler empire. To go back and 
understand the lives and consciousness of the early English settlers is to 
see the embryo of today’s Amerikan Empire. This is the larger picture 
that allows us to finally relate the class conflicts of settler Euro-
Amerikans to the world struggle (2014) [emphasis mine]. 
I also do not agree with Barker, perhaps naively I readily admit, that settler colonialism 
as an analytic is pathologically far too rigid and inflexible and does not allow for 
contingency and malleability (2017a).  However, where I strongly stand with Barker, 
despite these disagreements, is in seeing the tendency within Settler Colonial Studies to 
seek negotiation, reconciliation, and reformation with settler states, rather than 
decolonization and abolition (2017a).  While a politics and praxis of decolonization has 
increasingly come to the fore within Native Studies and allied fields of inquiry, and my 
centring of such is detailed later within this chapter, notable luminaries in the field of 
Settler Colonial Studies, particularly Wolfe’s fellow white australian Lorenzo Veracini, 
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reject calls of reparations, rematriations, and returns as not only undesirable, but actually 
some kind of perverted and inverted reenactment of the original dispossessive and 
eliminative violence of the settler-colonial project (Veracini 2011). Here not only does 
Settler Colonial Studies move Native Studies to the side as a site for understanding the 
formations of american, canadian, australian and other settler-colonial formations, but 
the reconciliatory drive of Settler Colonial Studies smothers and displaces the decolonial 
imaginaries of Native Studies. On this King, who operates at the intersections of Black and 
Native Studies, quite harshly, and I believe correctly, notes: 
The field of White settler colonial studies has yet to truly reckon with the 
ways that it erases Indigenous knowledge and forms of Indigenous 
politics of decolonization that require the end of U.S. and Canadian 
nation-states as well as the end of Whiteness and the version of the 
human that sustain them. The prominence of Settler colonial studies 
itself as a key analytical turn in the social sciences and humanities 
performs a form of genocidal violence as it displaces Indigenous and 
Native studies (2019:66-67).   
Echoing both Barker and King, Jeff Corntassel, Corey Snelgrove, and Rita Kaur Dhamoon 
likewise diagnose the situation, writing: 
Our overall conclusion is that without centering Indigenous peoples’ 
articulations, without deploying a relational approach to settler colonial 
power, and without paying attention to the conditions and contingencies 
of settler colonialism, studies of settler colonialism and practices of 
solidarity run the risk of reifying (and possibly replicating) settler 
colonial as well as other modes of domination (2014:4). 
This is something that cannot be ignored, and it is for this reason, given my own reliance 
upon many of Wolfe’s insights, that I raise here the spectre of Native Studies smothering 
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by Settler Colonial Studies. As a Native scholar myself, I do not wish to enact the 
displacement of my own field by a white-dominated one. More so, I wish to honour the 
way in which Wolfe himself, against how he has often been deployed by others, and 
against the scholarship of others within his own field, worked to be an ally of Native 
Studies and Native scholarship. It is in this spirit of reciprocal kinship that I critically 
deploy Wolfe’s analytics, properly prioritized to borrow King’s phrasing, within this 
writing. 
1.3 Racializing Assemblages, Bare Life & the Colonial Order of Things 
Additionally, these discussions of Native Studies, Black Studies, Marxism, and Settler 
Colonial Studies also necessarily open up onto another theoretical terrain from which this 
work draws, and against which this work is deeply situated: biopower and biopolitics. 
More specifically, this work draws critically from present discourse and research on 
biopolitics and biopower, especially those which have sought to extend the paradigm 
beyond the initial pioneering work of Foucault (2003; 2009; 2010), and in particular that 
of perhaps his most significant contemporary interlocutor in Giorgio Agamben (2003; 
2017a; 2017b; 2017c), and to examine their usefulness as an analytic of the processes and 
structures of global power, namely post-Fordist neoliberal capitalism, imperialism, 
racism, borders, and settler colonialism, with a particular emphasis laid upon the final, 
but with a layered approach that ultimately brings into consideration all of these various 
modalities of domination and the structural relations to violence which they represent.  
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Eugene Thacker describes three contemporary philosophical-theoretical modes of 
engagement with the concept of “life”: the affective-phenomenological (life as time), the 
biopolitical (life as form), and the politico-theological (life is spirit) (2010:xiii).  This work 
largely dispenses with the third of Thacker’s approaches (the politico-theological), and 
by its very nature as an autoethnographic work tends towards the first (the affective-
phenomenological), however engagement with the second, the biopolitical, in particular 
via Agamben’s formulation of the notion of the Homo sacer and bare life (2017a), is a 
thread that runs throughout this dissertation.  Agamben situates his own philosophico-
theoretical work as an effect to correct, or to complete, the Foucauldian analytics of 
biopower and sovereign power (2017a:11), a project in which he reads Foucault with and 
against Carl Schmitt’s notion of the sovereign nomos and state of exception (2006), Walter 
Benjamin’s Theses on the Philosophy of History (2019), and Hannah Arendt’s investigation 
of those rendered into a position of statelessness in her work in The Origins of 
Totalitarianism (2001).  
Tracing the origins of the figure of Homo sacer through ancient Roman law, through 
the Germanic and Anglo-Saxon juridical orders, Agamben situates bare life against the 
old Aristotelian metaphysical notions of zoē (raw biological or natural life) and bíos 
(qualified life, in particular, full human existence).  Though often confused in 
misreadings of Agamben with zoē, bare life is, in fact, raw life that has been naturalized—
politicized—into the sphere of the political. Bare life is a form-of-life in which life is 
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stripped down to its bare minimum, most animal, qualities, and such is life which then 
excludable from the sphere of the political and of civil society (2017a; 2017c).  Cast out of 
the political sphere, and thus rendered into an embodied exceptional state, bare life 
stands outside of the juridical order, the figure of the Homo sacer, bare life, is that which 
“may be killed and yet not sacrificed” (2017a:10) or, put another way, “killed by anyone 
without committing homicide” (87). Here we get at the true distinction between bare life 
and zoē, and in that the ultimate deployment of bare life within the body of this work; 
bare life, according to Agamben, is “not simple natural life, but life exposed to death” 
(2017a:74).  Additionally, of great import, is the role that bare life plays within Agamben’s 
discussion of the state of exception and the sovereign nomos (2017b), for it is the 
primordial juridical irregularity that allows the sovereign to declare the rule of law.  
Indeed, it is Agamben’s assertion that “The fundamental activity of sovereign power is 
the production of bare life” (2017a:148). 
Reading Agamben, Brian Massumi deftly describes bare life as “life radically 
emptied, dequalified, in implosive indifference, held eventlessly in suspension. Death in 
life: potential stillborn” (2015:44).  My own deployment of the notion of bare life within 
this writing is a reading of bare life through Jodi Byrd (2011) and Judith Butler (2003; 
2009; 2016) that takes up the question of when is life grievable? In my writing, I posit that 
the Native, broadly conceived, is cast into a state of bare life by the technologies of settler-




This though, as with my deployment and uses of Marxism and Settler Colonial 
Studies, raises its own spectres.  Here, as with Marxism, any use of Agambenian notions 
must be properly situated within the colonial order of things16.  Indeed, while not 
completely unacknowledged within his literary oeuvre, the legacies of conquest, 
colonialism, and imperialism are howling present absences within Agamben’s work. As 
David Atkinson notes: 
For all his admirable and clear-eyed engagements with totalitarianism 
and its biopolitical interventions, and for all his persistent efforts to 
address ‘the camp’ and the haunting presence of the Holocaust in 
twentieth-century European thinking, it is curious that Giorgio 
Agamben largely elides colonial contexts in his writing. This is all the 
more perplexing as the applications of surveillance, oppression and, in 
extremis, violence directed at those with differently racialized bodies 
characterise totalitarianisms and their camps, but also many colonial 
regimes at various times and places. Indeed, colonial contexts surely 
produced the sites and occasions where the conceptual frames of bare 
life and states of exception that Agamben explores were planned, 
articulated and realised most starkly (2012:155). 
Patrick Wolfe, speaking of the irregular violence of the settler-colonial frontier, is blunter, 
noting that Agamben’s “scrupulous eurocentrism” prevents him from being able to see 
the colonial commonplace antecedents of the production of bare life and the state of 
exception that he examines (2013a). 
The problem with Agamben is two-fold, with both issues relating back to his 
 
16 I borrow this phrase from Ann Laura Stoler in her own colonial reading of Foucault (1995). 
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“scrupulous eurocentrism.” The first, and perhaps more sensitive of the two, is the 
manner in which for Agamben the Nazi concentration camp is the archetype of the 
production of bare life and the actualization of the state of exception within the épistémè 
of modernity.  To be very clear I am not here challenging Agamben’s description of the 
camps or attempting to engage in what Byrd refers to as the discourses and problematics 
of competing genocides which attempt to pit, variously, “the slavery and lynching of 
African Americans against the removals and massacres of American Indians against the 
death camps in Germany” (2007:329).  Rather, here I follow Weheliye in: 
questioning the projection of the death camps onto an exceptional 
ontological screen (both as an end point and as a site of origin) rather 
than emphasizing their constitutive relationality in the modern world as 
well as the resultant displacement of racial slavery, colonialism, and 
indigenous genocide as nomoi of modern politics (2014:36). 
The question here then is not that of the camps themselves, and the sheer industrialized 
and modernist horror of the Shoah and the Pharrajimos, but rather how Agamben’s 
“scrupulous eurocentrism” obviates the relationality between those events instigated by 
the Nazi regime and its various allies, and separates them from coloniality and the 
colonial order of things, in particular the exceptional state of colonial violence, whether 
against Black and Native people in the northern bloc of settler colonialism (Weheliye 
2014; Churchill 1997; Wolfe 2006, Gilroy 2000), north and southwest African people in 
Germany and Italy’s former colonial possessions (Weheliye 2014; Atkinson 2012), the 
genocide of Filipino people committed by the United States following its seizure of that 
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archipelago by the United States (Rodríguez 2010) and many more instances of colonial 
violence too numerous to list.  Speaking of Indigenous peoples’ experiences under the 
regimes of State power of the U.S. and Canada, and in particular her home community 
of Kanehsatà:ke, Kanienʼkehá꞉ka anthropologist and political theorist Audra Simpson 
harshly castigates Agamben for eliding this relationality, saying that his: 
Legally sanctioned no-holds-barred space of “exception” has alluring 
conceptual attributes when accounting for times of crisis, but is simply 
not surprising or, perhaps, innovating when considering the case of 
Indigeneity and settler colonialism. As well, one does not have to dwell 
exclusively in the horror of a concentration camp to find life stripped 
bare to cadastral form, ready only for death in a biopolitical account of 
sovereignty (2014:153-154). 
Euro-modern society has always been, to borrow a phrase from Thacker, a collection or 
series of necrologies (2011). This is not to engage in a comparison of suffering, or an 
attempt to bring the crimes of the Nazi regime into dialogue, but rather to suggest, to 
again follow Weheliye, how “the concentration camp, the colonial outpost, and slave 
plantation suggest three of many relay points in the weave of modern politics, which are 
neither exceptional nor comparable, but simply relational” (2014:37).  Certainly, part of 
this is what I have argued in other writings (2017a) is the violence of fascism being in 
many ways a return home to the imperial metropole of violence that has been carried out, 
experimented with, and perhaps even perfected, in the colonies, the frontiers, and the 
slave plantations, however, the more that one begins to dwell on the question of 
antecedents the more one can become lost, I believe, in the exploration of how it is 
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exceptional states all the way down so to say.  The point here then, to think again of 
Simpson, Wolfe and Weheliye’s admonishment of Agamben, is how these sites of colonial 
violence, alongside the Nazi camp, rather than any single one of them in exclusivity, all 
represent different facets of what Weheliye calls “the genocidal shackles of Man” (2014:4). 
The second, perhaps less controversial, but no less important, issue with 
Agamben’s philosophico-theoretical framework is his description of a quasi-ontological 
sphere, to borrow from Weheliye, in which zoē, natural life, is politicized into bare life 
which he refers to throughout his work as a “zone of indistinction.” Key here is 
Agamben’s departure from Foucault, whose project he is seeking to extend, correct, or 
complete, in that for him this zone of indistinction is one in which the signs by which 
humans are divided—race, religion, nationality, sex, gender etc.—are eradicated.  
Agamben himself states directly that: 
What characterizes modern politics is not so much the inclusion of zoē in 
the polis—which is, in itself, absolutely ancient—nor simply the fact that 
life as such becomes a principal object of the projections and calculations 
of State power.  Instead the decisive fact is that, together with the process 
by which the exception everywhere becomes the rule, the realm of bare 
life—which is originally situated at the margins of the political order—
gradually begins to coincide with the political realm, and exclusion and 
inclusion, outside and inside, bios and zoē, right and fact, enter into a zone 
of irreducible indistinction (2017a:11). 
What ghost here haunts the margins of Agamben’s theorization is the question of why 
some peoples, some bodies, find themselves more likely to be exposed to violence, to 
have structural and ontological relationship to violence than others under signs and 
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regimes of post-Fordist neoliberal capitalism, imperialism, racism, borders, 
cisheteropatriarchy, and settler colonialism, as well as the assemblage of debility-
disability-capacity that Jasbir Puar identifies (2017a). This fact of the political world, of 
the world as it is, seems to stand in stark contrast with how Agamben views bare life and 
the zone of indistinction.  
What is of course obviating here by Agamben is that capitalism, imperialism, 
racism, borders, cisheteropatriarchy, debility, and settler colonialism, as stated above, are 
signs that are placed above structural relationships to violence, and which represent 
really-existing material relations between people, to return for a moment to an older 
Marxist analytic. Thinking still also of Byrd and Butler, I cannot help but find myself in 
agreement with Weheliye regarding these Agambenian theorizations when he states, 
matter of factly, that: 
Bare life and biopolitics discourse not only misconstrues how 
profoundly race and racism [and here I might also add our other isms: 
capitalism, imperialism, settler colonialism, etc.] shape the modern idea 
of the human, it also overlooks or perfunctorily writes off theorizations 
of race, subjection, and humanity found in black and ethnic studies, 
allowing bare life and biopolitics discourse to imagine an indivisible 
biological substance anterior to racialization. 
Much as Agamben sees his project at the completion, or the correction, of Foucauldian 
analytics, I contend, with perhaps much less self-aggrandizement, that, if bare life and 
biopolitics, are to be of any meaningful use to this project that they must also be further 
corrected. Chiefly here is, following Byrd, Butler, and Weheliye, sorting through the 
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question of why some bodies are more proximal to violence, and thus more likely to be 
cast into the zone of bare life, than are others.  
Working in and through coloniality and the colonial order of things I believe that 
aid in this matter can be found in assemblage theory, in particular how it has been 
deployed in recent years within Black, Critical Ethnic, and Queer Studies.  Drawing on 
the conceptual took box of Deleuze and Guattari, in particular the second volume in their 
Capitalism and Schizophrenia series, A Thousand Plateaus (1987), Manuel DeLanda posits 
assemblages as an approach to social ontology in which the basic ontological status of 
various social beings is not stable, but process-oriented and process-based, relational, and 
contingent (2006; 2016).  While I am not as concerned with the philosophical issue of 
ontological realism as DeLanda is, nor do I wish to raise up additional european and 
white theorists as the solution to the problems within the work of another, I do think 
there is something within a deployment of assemblage theory that can help further flesh 
out this work.  In particular, I am interested in Jasbir Puar’s descriptions of what 
assemblages do (which she points against the definitional question of what an 
assemblage is), one of the points of which for her is that “categories—race, gender, 
sexuality—are considered events, actions, and encounters, between bodies, rather than 
simply entities and attributes of subjects” (2012:58). 
From here, the way that I think of assemblages work in the background of this 
dissertation follow what Weheliye, drawing from the Black Feminist theoretical work of 
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Hortense Spillers and Sylvia Wynter, calls “racializing assemblages.” Thinking of 
assemblages as contingent processes, Weheliye describes how they construe “race not as 
a biological or cultural classification but as a set of sociopolitical processes that discipline 
humanity in full humans, not-quite-humans, and nonhumans” (2014:4).  This, quite 
importantly, disrupts not only the proposition that race can, or should be, treated as any 
kind of fixed ontology—though we may still discuss ontologies related to race, or, I 
believe more correctly, political projects to create ontologies of race and racialized 
peoples, and indeed, as discussed earlier in this work explicitly engages the question of 
the ontological—but the notion of racializing assemblages also functions as a critical 
intervention against the prevalent view amongst critical social scholars and theorists that 
race, racialization, and racism are generally solely problems of ideology (again, not to 
dismiss the importance of ideology).  Not just ideology, and not just ontology, but also 
networks of bodies, desires, forces, velocities, institutions, interests, intensities that 
ultimately benefit some, those who are raised up into the category of fully human, and 
cast others, those disqualified from full humanity and rendered either not-quite-human 
or nonhuman (Weheliye 12; 26), into the zone of bare life in which violence can be 
wrought on bodies with impunity or left simply to wither and die within (post)modernist 
political economies of slow death and letting die (Berlant 2007; Byrd 2011).  “Thus,” 
Weheliye notes, “rather than entering a clearing zone of indistinction, we are thrown into 
the vortex of hierarchal indicators” (40), disrupting the deracinating tendencies of 
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eurocentric theories of bare life and biopolitics. 
With particular regard to settler colonialism and the situation we as Indigenous 
peoples face, I also believe that the concept of racializing assemblages, as a network of 
various sites and processes, also provides a line of intervention into the at times 
confusing, and at other times deeply frustrating, discussion of racial Nativeness as a 
fundamentally visual qualification, which is the topic taken up in the third chapter of this 
dissertation. While for Weheliye “racializing assemblages translate the lacerations left on 
the captive body by apparatuses of political violence to a domain rooted in the visual 
truth-value accorded to quasi-biological distinctions between different human 
groupings” (40), for Indigenous peoples subject to the technologies of settler 
governmentality, racializing assemblages are part of how Wolfe identifies that the settler-
colonial logic of elimination plays out through a myriad of seemingly divergent and 
contradictory processes (2006; 2016).  As I discuss in more depth in Chapter 3, part of the 
post-frontier biogenic extension of frontier homicide (Wolfe 2016) is the supremely 
biopolitical way in which Nativeness is racialized through the juridical apparatuses of 
both nation-states within the northern bloc such that it is hyper-soluble. That is: 
Nativeness will always eventually become invisiblized in any process of racial 
miscegenation. Within the tripartite social ontology of the northern bloc settler colonies, 
with its hegemonic ideologies of white supremacy and antiblackness, Lewis Gordon 
notes that “Indians mixed with blacks are simply black and those mixed with whites are 
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simply ‘less colored’” (1995a:96).  I argue, ultimately, that what happens within the 
racializing assemblages of settler colonialism, especially as Nativeness is primarily, 
though not solely, a juridically defined category of governance, is a detachment of 
Nativeness from visuality as the principal signifier of importance, while not displacing 
visuality as still important for my understanding of the experience of anti-Native 
violence. 
The discussion of racializing assemblages and biopolitics as they relate to Native 
people within the northern bloc, also cleaves closely to the work of Scott Lauria 
Morgensen (2011) who, in combining an analysis of biopower with Wolfean insights on 
the settler-colonial logic of elimination, points to how the drive to eliminate Indigenous 
peoples is strongly manifested within the principal aspect of biopower: the power to cause 
life to flourish.. Again further taken up in Chapter 3, this functions through the 
biopoliticized nature of Nativeness as hypersoluble, in which miscegenation and the 
bringing forth of new life functions to bring about the slow statistical annihilation of 
Indigenous peoples, not as Native Nations constituted amongst themselves, but as 
juridically coded categories of population governance within the high-resolution 
algorithmic regimes of the modern settler-colonial State and societies of control.   
In this regard, my thinking could perhaps be thought to occupy a conceptual space 
not entirely congruent with, but ultimately parallel and complementary to, Achile 
Mbembe (2019), Roberto Esposito (2008), Judith Butler (2003; 2009; 2016) and Jasbir Puar 
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(2017a; 2017b), all of whom point to the notion that there is a flipside to biopolitics, which 
Mbembe calls necropolitics, in which power is also defined via the ability to deal out 
unmournable, ungrievable death.  Not against those important theorizations, I argue that 
this is indicative of a different paradigm of power unique to the biopoliticalization of 
Indigenous peoples under settler colonial domination17. Again, following Morgensen, as 
well as Jaimes, Ladner, Wolfe and others, this is because it is in the function of biopower 
itself to let life flourish that in this instance—linked within the logic of elimination and 
the racialized hypersolubility of Nativeness—it works to cause what may be considered 
a mass Indigenous death, or extinction. I consider this additionally further distinct from 
Puar (2007), Agamben (2000) and Esposito’s (2011) claims that, in the current juncture, 
the power to let life flourish and to deal out death have become muddled and harder to 
tease apart. 
1.4 Decolonization as Methodological Praxis 
Before answering the question of what direct methodological techniques and tools have 
been central to this research, it is necessary to briefly discuss the overarching 
 
17 I argue that this be situated alongside of, rather than against, the concept of necropolitics because, I 
believe, there are most clearly necropolitical aspects to what I would argue is the bare life of Red life in 
modern North America.  In particular both of these aspects, biopower and necropower, are folded within 
what Nicolás Juárez identifies as the grammars of suffering of Indigenous peoples: clearing and civilization 
(2014). The necropolitical aspects are also included within Wolfe’s logic of elimination (2006). Fruitful 
examinations of the creation of Native death-worlds have also been carried out not only by Juarez, who 
draws on the theoretical insights of Afropessimist theorist Frank B. Wilderson, III (2010), but also Billy-Ray 
Belcourt (2017a) who links it with the work on economies of abandonment by anthropologist Elizabeth A. 
Povinelli (2011) as well as that of Judith Butler and Athena Athanasiou on dispossession (2013).  
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methodological concerns that will have guided me over the course of this research. In 
particular and linked strongly and directly to my theoretical orientation within 
indigenous critical theory, I chose to root myself in what Kaupapa Maori scholar Linda 
Tuhiwai Smith refers to as “decolonizing methodologies” (2012). In opening her work 
Decolonizing Methodologies: Research and Indigenous Peoples Smith lays out the charges 
against traditional social scientific research techniques by Indigenous peoples: 
From the vantage point of the colonized, a position from which I write, 
and choose to privilege, the term ‘research’ is inextricably linked to 
European imperialism and colonialism. The word itself, ‘research’, is 
probably one of the dirtiest words in the world’s vocabulary. When 
mentioned in many indigenous contexts, it stirs up silence, it conjures up 
bad memories, it raises a smile that is knowing and distrustful…It is a 
history that still offends the deepest sense of our humanity...It galls us 
that Western researchers and intellectuals can assume to know all that it 
is possible to know of us, on the basis of their brief encounters with some 
of us. It appals us that the West can desire, extract and claim ownership 
of our ways of knowing, our imagery, the things we create and produce, 
and then simultaneously reject the people who created and developed 
those ideas and seek to deny them further opportunities to be creators of 
their own culture and own nations. It angers us when practices linked to 
the last century, and the centuries before that, are still employed to deny 
the validity of indigenous peoples’ claim to existence, to land and 
territories, to the right of self-determination, to the survival of our 
languages and forms of cultural knowledge, to our natural resources and 
systems of living within our environments (1). 
Decolonizing methodology, however, is more than just an awareness of the failures of 
traditional western methods of investigation. Drawing on, though also moving beyond, 
established social scientific methods of participant action research, Smith’s decolonizing 
methodologies place firmly at the centre of research the values and priorities of 
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Indigenous peoples and communities, allowing them to frame the research, its 
instruments and its analysis. Decolonizing methodology, including as I have taken them 
up in this research, are driven by desires for Indigenous resurgence, refusal and 
resistance. Decolonizing methodology is an explicitly political orientation to research, 
and it is firmly anticolonial/decolonial. As Smith observed, if research could play a role 
in subjecting Indigenous peoples to empire, then it can help us on our road to liberation 
and resurgence as well (2012), a methodological concern which I deeply share.  
In this regard, and here returning to my older Gramscian concerns, I hold no 
illusions to scientistic modes of social investigation, most particularly the notion of value-
neutrality, and thus make clear that this work has an explicit political-ethical framing to 
it. My writing here must be necessarily understood then as ultimately seeking to advance 
a programme for the generation of decolonial Indigenous futurities and attendant goals 
of goals resurgence and decolonization. In this I am also always reminded of the words 
of the Black radical theorist Frank B. Wilderson III when he notes: 
What are to make of a world that responds to the most lucid enunciation 
of ethics with violence?  What are the foundational questions of the 
ethico-political?  Why are these questions so scandalous that they are 
rarely posed politically, intellectually, and cinematically—unless they 
are posed obliquely and unconsciously, as if by accident?  Give Turtle 
Island back to the ‘Savage.’ Give life itself back to the Slave.  Two simple 
sentences, fourteen simple words, and the structure of U.S. (and perhaps 
global) antagonisms would be dismantled.  An ‘ethical modernity’ 
would no longer sound like an oxymoron (2010:2-3). 
Ultimately then my methodology—or more fully my conjoined methodological-
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pedagogical-praxiological concerns—in this work then has been one of both unmaking 
the world around me, as well as to dream of new ways of being. In my opinion that is the 
ultimate expression of decolonizing methodologies. 
1.4.1 Articulation & Dialectical Framework 
Alongside the explicit political-ethical framework of Smith’s decolonizing methodology, 
my methodological and analytical perspective also draws on the concept of articulation, 
developed by sociologist Stuart Hall (1985; 1986a; 1986b), anthropologist James Clifford 
(2001; 2003) and Marxist philosopher Louis Althusser in his contributions to Reading 
Capital, written alongside a number of his students (2016b).  For my own work, particular 
attention is paid to deployment of articulation by Kim TallBear in her research on DNA 
and blood politics in the United States (2013) and Alexander Weheliye’s discussion of 
racializing assemblages (2014).  Althusser describes the concept, traced back to Marx’s 
notion of Gliederung, saying: 
the structure of the whole is articulated as the structure of an organic 
hierarchized whole. The co-existence of limbs and their relations in the 
whole is governed by the order of a dominant structure which introduces 
a specific order into the articulation (Gliederung) of the limbs and their 
relations (2016b:245). 
Building upon Althusser and his students, Hall elaborates upon the concept further, 
describing articulation as “the necessity of thinking unity and difference; difference in 




The essential contribution of the concept of articulation to my research is two-fold.  
The first is that it seeks to complicate, following TallBear, “overly dichotomous views of 
phenomena as either essentially determined or overly constructed or invented, thereby 
implying a lack of ‘realness’” (2013:13).  The second is that it seeks to unsettle the overly 
eurocentric development of the notion of assemblage within the work of white european 
philosophers such as Deleuze and Guattari (1987) and Manuel DeLanda (2006; 2016), 
which, as critiqued by Gayatri Spivak, is one in which “desire, power and subjectivity” 
are often not thought of in relationality to one another, leading, dangerously I would 
contend, towards an inability of “articulating a theory of interests” (1988:273).  Here I 
read Weheliye in holding that a notion of articulation, in particular as found in Hall, 
“emphasizes relational connectivity in much the same way as the Deluezo-Guattarian 
notion of assemblages while still retaining some of the political traction called for by 
Spivak and Hall” (2014:48-49).  Bringing both articulation and assemblage together 
Weheliye asserts productively that: 
a robust fusion of articulation and assemblage accents the productive 
ingredients of power, ideology, and so on. Articulated assemblages such 
as racialization materialize as sets of complex relations of articulations 
that constitute an open articulating principle---territorializing and 
deterritorializing, interested and asubjective—structured in political, 
economic, social, racial, and heteropatriarchal dominance (2014:49). 
In terms of the everyday lived experience of Indigeneity, the importance of this 
dynamism is that it is “a sign of being alive, another key claim that indigenous peoples 
constantly make. They have survived. They are still here” (TallBear 2013:13). Here 
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articulation helps to keep in focus the fact that traditional Indigenous modalities of self-
conception, while labelled “traditional,” are not stagnant, but rather fluid and living; or 
rather—given a cynicism of mine regarding the practice and thought around “tradition” 
explored in this dissertation’s final chapter—should be fluid and living. This then aids in 
the disruption of the settler-colonial imaginary, which locks Indigenous peoples and 
Indigeneity into the past at best, or fully out of time at worst; as a pure anachronism. It 
also helps us think through the ways in which “tradition” may not always work for some 
Indigenous people18 as well as how it must be thought that Indigenous futurisms are not 
just a reclamation of some notion of a pre-colonial past, but a living, dreaming, dynamic 
process of bringing new politics, new ethics and potentially even new modes of 
Indigenous existence into being. 
In the work of Hall and Clifford, articulation represents cultural transformation, 
placing dynamism at the centre of cultural practice and cultural production. Articulation 
is also important for this work, especially insofar as it concerns the collision between my 
lived experiences of Indigeneity with the settler-colonial nation-state’s production of 
Official Nativeness, because it keeps as a central focus power. As far as this research is 
concerned, it allows for an analytical focus on the power of the dynamic, and occasionally 
 
18 Speaking from the perspective of two-spirit and queer Indigeneity, as well as the liminal space between 
Queer Studies and Indigenous Studies, this discussion on how “tradition” just does not work for some 




discordant and antithetical, social processes which structure the lived experience of being 
Native under biopolitical, ontological and libidinal regimes of settler colonialism through 
the production of Nativeness. Taken together, both aspects of articulation keep in focus 
the dialectical tension that exists between Official Nativeness and the everyday lived 
experience of Indigeneity, a tension which lies at the heart of this research.  
1.5 Autoethnography & the Giving of an Account of Oneself 
As I have already talked about, the choice to engage in writing on the subjects outlined 
previously was both a simple one and incredibly difficult.  This is the paradox of my 
colonized anxious aphasia within, and with regards to, the westernized academy.  
Beyond the contradictions of my own nervousness in exposing myself to a colonial, 
academic gaze, it has also been difficult because autoethnographic writings was, at the 
time, something I found myself unfamiliar with, while also being aware of its existence 
and deployment as a methodology by many other scholars, and as such have had to do 
much to learn-while-doing. It was also easy though because as I began to reflect on the 
project more, the better I could see that it would be most insightful and meaningful, 
academically, and personally, to engage the subject matter of this research through an 
examination of my own life’s journey through the in-between spaces of contemporary 
Indigeneity. 
Most immediately the choice to engage this project autoethnographically was 
given flight by the failure of previously planned ethnographic fieldwork.  This project 
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was originally conceived of in part as a project that would have seen me engage several 
Indigenous communities in both the United States and Canada on the questions of what 
Nativeness, identity and community belonging mean to them.  I had intended this work 
as a way of investigating how, if at all, the everyday thoughts and experiences of 
Indigenous peoples clashed and articulated with the biopolitical foundations of 
Nativeness as conceived by the settler-colonial state.  However, for a variety of reasons, 
that original conception of the project did not pan out.  The two communities I had 
attempted to engage in the canadian side of the settler boundary line simply never 
returned my initial attempts at requesting to do research in their communities.  I cannot 
speak to why this was the case, but it nevertheless shut down those avenues of 
investigation.  However, the failure—in some ways a getting lost in a bureaucratic 
maze—to gain permission to carry out ethnographic fieldwork within my own 
community in the use not only put the final stop to that mode of investigation, it provided 
a significant personal push for my ultimate turn towards the autoethnographic and the 
general re-orientation of this project in a significantly different direction in terms of 
content. 
Firstly, this was because the process of seeking approval from the Menominee 
Indian Tribe of Wisconsin for my intended ethnographic fieldwork provided me with 
significant, albeit unanticipated, autoethnographic ‘data.’  This is because not only the 
process itself, but the fact that I had to subject myself to it and be subjected by it under 
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tribal legislation directly grows from and speaks to my own embodied lived experience 
as an urban, diasporic and, most imminently, a semi-enrolled Indigenous person.  Simply 
put, if I, with my 31/128th blood quantum, did not occupy the sort of liminal space 
between a fully enrolled member and someone fully outside of the Nation—which is how 
I have come to view my official tribal status as a 1st Degree Descendent—tribal legislation 
indicates that I would have been able to carry out the project without permission from 
the tribal government ever having to have been requested or required. This would, of 
course, have presented a contradiction with the ethics approval process of the University 
of Waterloo, which itself, for work with Indigenous communities, requires approval from 
the community to be studied in order to approve the work on its side of the equation.  
While that is a bridge that ultimately did not have to be crossed, the contradiction there 
is perhaps due to the fact that universities, including the University of Waterloo, despite 
formal commitments to so-called ‘indigenization’ processes and programmes are unable 
to reckon with the notion that Indigenous students may wish to carry out work on their 
own communities, and that that might require a modification of the ethics process in 
those kinds of instances. However, while that might be an interesting point for debate, 
and perhaps ones that canadian universities should undertake, especially as Indigenous 
students do exist, even if only as an exceedingly small statistical group at institutions 
such as this one. 
That said, it was thus in the very process of attempting to carry out the work for 
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this project as originally intended, on Indigenous perspectives on Indigeneity and 
communal belonging, that I became entangled yet again in a biopolitical algorithm 
functioning as a kind of identity interrogation programme.  As I have noted previously, this 
has of course been a major facet of my life experience as I have sought to navigate this in-
between space—not quite a full Menominee in the eyes of the tribal government, but not 
rejected by my family and other members of the community either.  
Undergoing this quite unexpected experience, and the significant blocks that it 
created to the original formulation of this dissertation, necessitated a radical 
reconceptualization of the entire project.  Ultimately it would result in a near-total 
shifting of the content away from a more legalistic examination of identity, towards more 
onto-existential, and ultimately somewhat esoteric, concerns, but in the most immediate 
moment it provided what was really a need, but also a desire, to undertake it in an 
autoethnographic fashion.  While this dissertation now perhaps bears little formal 
resemblance to its original conception, I believe it does retain, and thus builds upon, the 
desires and goals that were already present in its previous iterations.   
Now, more than in its prior forms, this work seeks to, in some form or another, 
interrogate my own lived experience, and to then centre that lived-experience in an 
attempt to make wider analysis and provide sociological and political theorizing.  Here I 
take significant and direct inspiration from the work of Audra Simpson (2014) who 
combined original ethnographic work amongst her home community, the Mohawks of 
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Kahnawá:ke, with the production of Indigenous political theory in her work Mohawk 
Interruptus: Political Life Across the Borders of Settler States.  But perhaps even more so I take 
direct inspiration from Lewis Gordon, who argues that too much of theory work and 
theory production by non-white, colonized, and subalternized peoples takes the form of 
deploying theories created by people—usually men, usually cishet, usually white—at the 
centre of the modern/colonial/capitalist world-system to explain our lives as non-white, 
colonized, and subalternized peoples (2018).  To recall my discussion of the 
insufficiencies of the Marxist theorization that was once central to my worldview, I 
believe that Gordon and I arch towards the same point: it is not that the theories that 
make up the standard euro-western canon of philosophy, social and cultural theory does 
not contain useful, or even powerful tools, but that those tools, because of the geopolitics 
of their formulation often fall short in their ability to explain our lives, our situations, and 
our struggles to find ourselves out of them into  new future.  So rather, Gordon enjoins 
us to use our lived experiences to create, and elaborate, theories to explain those 
experiences.  So rather than using white theory to explain our non-white lives, we use our 
non-white lives experiences to create non-white theory, and then, should we wish to, we 
put our non-white theorizations into conversation with white ones (2018).  It is my hope 
that that is what this dissertation ultimately is able to accomplish.  
Additionally, my failure of the process to obtain the approval of the Tribal 
government to carry out work on our reservation is also not my only experience with the 
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already deeply personal subject matter of my research that I have subsequently had and 
which I believe gives powerful weight to the autoethnographic methodology of this 
writing. The autoethnographic content of this writings reflects on these other experiences 
as well. 
Most particularly I have a long history of involvement in Indigenous activist work 
and involvement in Indigenous community centres locally in Kitchener-Waterloo, both 
on the campus of the University of Waterloo and in the broader community.  Even within 
these spaces, I have always had to find ways to navigate the in-between spaces and have 
had a multitude of experiences to reflect upon.  Additionally, once this writing work was 
begun in earnest, I was also given the opportunity to teach by this university’s affiliate St. 
Paul’s University College in its new Indigenous Studies minor programme, specifically a 
course on Contemporary Issues in Indigenous Communities in Canada.  Both my 
community and activist involvement, as well as my more recent teaching experiences in 
an Indigenous-driven environment, provide other sources of ‘data’ for reflection.  
These events have provided me with powerful and recent life events that I have 
been able to reflect upon and theorize from via the mode of autoethnographic 
engagement.  Subsequently, while this writing has been difficult, in large part because of 
the way it forces me to open my vulnerability up to the gaze of others as I have said 
already, it has also been immensely fulfilling at times in a way that goes far beyond the 
mere requirements for a research project within the westernized university.  Following 
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this, I came to approach the subject matter of this writing similar to the work of 
contemporary radical Black scholar Tiffany Lethabo King.  In King’s dissertation In the 
Clearing: Black Female Bodies, Space and Settler Colonial Landscapes where she uses tools of 
autobiography, autoethnography and critical ethnography to reflect on her involvement 
with INCITE: Women of Color Against Violence (2013:180-181).  
I believe that this has given me significant space for autoethnographic reflection 
on the onto-existential and phenomenological dimensions of living an Indigenous under 
regimes of settler state created and recognized Indigeneity, with its ultimately basal 
logics of elimination, as well as, on the other hand, the imagining of decolonial 
Indigenous futures and modes of critique.  Importantly I think autoethnography quite 
powerfully has allowed me to engage the general Indigenous epistemic centring of 
storytelling (Doerfler, Sinclair & Stark 2013).  The importance of centring stories as both 
Indigenous epistemology and methodology is made by Margaret Kovach when she notes: 
Stories remind us who we are and our belonging.  Stories hold within 
them knowledges, while simultaneously signifying relationships.  In oral 
tradition, stories can never be decontextualized from the teller.  They are 
active agents within a relational world, pivotal in gaining insight into a 
phenomenon … they tie us with our past and provide a basis for 
continuity with future generations (2009:95).  
Here I believe I make this dissertation’s third and final contribution, this one aimed 
mostly at the discipline of sociology.  Here I mean precisely the practice of 
autoethnography, but more specifically, as autoethnography is already a known 
methodology within sociology, as well as anthropology (though perhaps more so the 
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latter), what I mean here is specifically the kind of Indigenized usage of autoethnography 
that works to centre methodologies of storytelling of the kind described by Kovach, 
Doerfler, Sinclair & Stark.  This is a contribution, and a methodological intervention, 
aimed much more so at the discipline of sociology, and to a lesser extent at anthropology, 
than it is at Native Studies, because, as should be reasonably apparent, within the latter 
of these three fields, autoethnographic, autobiographic, and storytelling methodologies 
have already found an acceptable niche, and indeed are well supported.  Thus, this final 
contribution that I make, to be somewhat bold, is to aid in the making of space within 
sociology for storytelling as an acceptable methodology.  This is part of my wider 
commitment to making Indigenous and decolonizing methodologies in general 
acceptable within this oh so colonized, westernized discipline for the study of peoples.  
Indeed, it is because of this centring of personal narrative and personal placement 
within ethnographic work, that I believe that my work in this writing has been able to 
engage decolonizing methodologies even more critically (Smith 2012) than traditional 
models of ethnographic research and engagement would have allowed for.  Indeed, given 
the very nature of autoethnography, and also of phenomenology, as not only raw first-
person accounts (such as it may be within strictly autobiographical work; though I do 
admit at times the borders between what is strictly autobiographical, and what is strictly 
autoethnographic, can become blurred and even begin to break down) but accounts of 
lived-in and embodied experiences, as well as the structures and appearances of 
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experience, I believe that the very nature of those frame-works transform them into 
frame-works of storytelling. In this, the decolonizing, autoethnographic, and 
phenomenological contours of my work blur, motion, and melt together. 
Autoethnography has allowed me to also much more strongly insert my writing 
and theorizing as a part into the wider sociological and political project of working 
towards the construction of “epistemic space for scholars to discuss indigenous processes 
of identity formation that challenge imperial discourses” (Nájera, Castellanos and 
Aldama 2012:1). In this sense I agree with King when she notes that autoethnography is: 
[A]n agile method that can subvert the power relations that brought the 
practice into formation and continue to plague it.  Autoethnography 
should also prove to be a helpful companion in my attempts to unmap 
and re-write geographies based on Cartesian dualisms and imperial 
subject positions that seek to discipline land, bodies, time, and space 
(2013:181). 
In addition, autoethnographic methodology has allowed me to broaden further the 
theoretical packaging of this work.  Moreover, I think that autoethnographic and 
storytelling-oriented methodology has allowed me to connect even more so with the 
work of Latin American & Xicanx decolonial thinkers such as Walter Mignolo (2012) and 
Gloria Anzaldúa (2012).  In particular, I believe that autoethnography opens spaces for 
me to engage in what both Anzaldúa and Mignolo refer to as border thinking.  Like how 
Anzaldúa placed herself and her lived-experience at the cross-roads of three traditions–
Nahuatl, Spanish- and Anglo-American (2012)–working through border thinking via 
autoethnography has allowed me the ability to situate myself at the spaces-in-between 
115 
 
Native North America, Anglo-America, and, also, the urban diasporic West Indian 
community.  For Mignolo—who combines the border thinking of Anzaldúa with the 
gnosis of V. Y. Mudimbe (1988) to formulate the idea of border gnosis (2012:12-14)—this 
kind of thinking allows for the formation of a “locus of enunciation where different ways 
of knowing and individual and collective expressions mingle” (1993:130).  In fact, I would 
argue, autoethnography intersects deeply with the post-Anzaldúa turn within in 
Chicana/o Studies and its decolonizing interrogations of mestizaje, (re-)indigenization, 
border thinking, and the decolonial imaginary, a body of literature that has long deeply 
influenced my own journeys through, and interrogations of, the liminal space of 
diasporic, urban, and mixed Indigeneity.  
Furthermore, and I believe quite importantly, King, drawing on Spry (2006), notes 
that autoethnographic methodology “emphasizes the way that the body is privileged as 
a site of knowledge production.  As the locus of knowledge production, the body becomes 
a way to orient oneself to culture, research, the un/knowing self, and other people” 
(2013:184).  This resonates deeply with the ideas of decolonial Boricua scholar Ramón 
Grosfoguel, in particular, his elevation of both the geopolitics of knowledge and the body-
politics of knowledge over the ego-politics of knowledge, the latter of which he situates within 
a privileged position in the global epistemic hierarchy of the modern/colonial/capitalist 
world-system.  Echoing in turn back to King, for Grosfoguel this represents a break with 
the “subject-object dichotomy of Cartesian epistemology” (2016:28), the formation of 
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which is essential to the ontological condition of settler-colonial (post)modernity.  
Ultimately, I believe it is within this undoing, or at the very least the complication, of the 
subject-object dichotomy discussed by King and Grosfoguel that Indigenous 
epistemologies—situated as they are within notions of stories and storytelling—can find 
a zone of emergence.  With this ultimately being a central concern of my writing, this is 
one of the key reasons for why I ultimately chose to pursue this project as a fully 
autoethnographic undertaking, rather than autoethnography being only one part, or part 
of a constellation of other methodological undertakings. 
Additionally, the centring of this work on autoethnographic techniques has still 
allowed for room for its combination with more traditional ethnographic methodologies.  
Towards this end, I have built upon long-running in-family conversations to carry out a 
small series of unstructured, conversational, and ongoing, multi-part conversations with 
family members on the questions that I directly explored in my own lived experience.  
While these conversations may not be always presented in the form of direct quotations, 
they have more often than not directly and deeply informed the approach I have taken in 
this writing.  
In particular, these conversations have been with my mother and my brother.  The 
choice of limiting the interviews to these particular family members was based both on 
personal closeness, as well as often shared life experiences.  In particular my brother 
shares in occupying the same liminal spaces as I: urban, diasporic, raised-off-continent 
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but now living back on Turtle Island, and semi-enrolled.  For my mother, the experience 
in her life has been similar, yet also importantly different, having been born an Urban 
Native in Milwaukee, who then made the life choice to move to the West Indies, where 
she has spent the majority of her life.  A crucial difference is my mother’s status as a fully 
enrolled member of our community, which is not shared by my brother and me.  
However, my brother and I would also not be who we are as Menominee without the 
experience of life with our mother.  
I believe that these conversations have contributed important methodological, 
epistemological, axiological and praxiological interventions into my work which is 
otherwise fully autoethnographic.  This is because while more individualist 
autoethnographic methodology would have allowed for me to deeply delve into my own 
experiences as author-researcher, this would necessarily have had to have been 
accompanied by the recognition that such a work is fundamentally rooted only in my 
own limited perspective.  The incorporation of perspectives other than my own into the 
work via conversations with family members simultaneously expands the narratives and 
perspectives brought to bear, while not fundamentally displacing the methodological 
and theoretical centring of my own life experience.  While not quite the same as what 
Heewon Chang, Faith Wambura Ngunjiri, and Kathy-Ann C. Hernandez describe as 
collaborative autoethnography, which for them implies multiple author-researchers, I do 
believe that it has been able to accomplish many of the same goals (2013).  
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Also, deeply important here is that while I may centre my own experiences, 
specifically my everyday lived experiences of being a liminal Native under regimes of 
settler colonialism, I am, as a human being, and all that that entails, ultimately an 
assemblage of social relations.  I do not exist in a vacuum.  While I may be a unique 
individual in so far as such a thing is broadly construed within theory and methodology, 
I am who I am precisely because of the context in which I came to be, and the network of 
kinship and social relations in which I have been embedded now and at various points in 
my life. As such, to know myself is to recognize that within me are at times imperceptible 
touches left by those webs that I have touched.  This includes not only direct family and 
friends, but the entire totality of the current settler-colonial socius.  Indigeneity, diaspora, 
liminality are all ultimately social and relational concepts.  They cannot be understood 
outside of their opposite binary poles: settler, citizen and full enrolled or statused.  As 
Judith Butler notes in Violence, Mourning, Politics: 
I find that my very formation implicates the other in me, that my own 
foreignness to myself is, paradoxically, the source of my ethical 
connection to others.  I am not fully known to myself, because part of 
what I am is the enigmatic traces of others.  In this sense, I cannot know 
myself perfectly or know my “difference” from others in an irreducible 
way (2003:32-33). 
This brings to the fore the ultimate incoherence of attempting to give an account of oneself 
absent of also grounding the I within a broader web of social, political, familial, cultural, 
economic, ontological, existential, libidinal, and affective relations.  Though this is not to 
say, as Butler elsewhere points out in her text that implies an existence as “a split subject, 
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or a subject whose access to itself is forever opaque, incapable of self-grounding” 
(2005:64).  Rather: 
The purpose here is not to celebrate a certain notion of incoherence, but 
only to point out that our “incoherence” establishes the way in which we 
are constituted in relationality: implicated, beholden, derived, sustains 
by a social work that is beyond us and before us (2005:64).  
To return to King and Grosfoguel, contained within this is a fundamental rejection of the 
old Cartesian dualism of subject-object, and ultimately therein ego-politics of knowledge 
of modernity/coloniality.  To reach back also to Moten and Wynter, and the notion of 
Man as the overrepresentation of the human subject, this methodological-pedagogical-
praxiological recognition of the incoherence of subjectivity absent the social is a sense a 
kind of death of the subject, or at least of that particular subject which has for so long now 
been a particularism masquerading as an undifferentiated universalism.  
Finally, I believe that the combination of autoethnographic techniques with 
unstructured, conversational interviews situated within decolonizing methodologies and 
critical ethnographic frameworks has deepened this research’s already stated 
commitment to the Indigenous epistemic centring of storytelling telling.  The creation of 
space within both this research and within the westernized academy for the elaboration 
of Indigenous epistemic perspectives takes place not just through the telling of my own 
story, but in the weaving together of narratives from across the generations of my family 
of our own similar yet different life-journeys.  While this writing always fundamentally 
centres on the narrative of my own lived experience, this combining of my story with the 
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stories of my close family members as our stories has been more fully able to answer the 
question of what it means to live a liminal, diasporic and urban Native life under late 
settler-colonial regimes that lies at the heart of this work. 
1.6 A Word on Complex Personhood & Low Theory 
To begin to close this discussion of theory and my methodological-pedagogical-
praxiological concerns in writing this dissertation I want to return briefly in time to when 
this project was in its earliest phases of gestation, during the proposal phase, and more 
specifically my oral defence of the proposal. To tell the story rather briefly, as the minutia 
are unimportant here, it required two defences, not because of a failure upon a first 
attempt, but because of the deep shift that the work had to undertake upon the movement 
away from a strict ethnographic and structuralist project, necessitated by the failure of 
my own community to approve of the project. Thus, there was a defence of the original 
proposal, and then another one in defence of a shorter proposal to shift the work in an 
autoethnographic direction. 
That, however, has already been recounted and is not what is important here.  
What is though is that during both defences, by different committee members, I was 
asked the question of what exactly I intend to prove in the course of my work.  While my 
answer both times was worded differently, the essence of both can perhaps be best 
summarized as “that things are complicated.” I sometimes, in a half-joking manner, say 
that I am less concerned with proving something than I am with being able to write, say 
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and, ultimately, theorize something interesting.  However here this is for myself and my 
writing no simple playful jest, but an important methodological-pedagogical-
praxiological, perhaps even axiological, as well as theoretical point that I want to tease 
out. 
This simple statement, that things are complicated, is something that while prima 
facie correct, to the point of almost being trivially true, it is also one that is no doubt at 
odds with the more epistemologically scientistic and methodologically empirical corners 
of the social sciences and humanities, and with strongly represented contingents within 
sociology specifically.  Yet there is a precedent for this within the sociological literature 
as it exists.  Patricia Williams in her autobiographical reflection on the intersection of race, 
gender, and class states quite simply that “that life is complicated is a fact of great analytic 
importance” (1991 10).  She continues, speaking specifically of the law, saying: 
Law too often seeks to avoid this truth by making up its own breed of 
narrower, simpler, but hypnotically powerful rhetorical truths. 
Acknowledging, challenging, playing with these as rhetorical gestures 
is, it seems to me, necessary for any conception of justice. Such 
acknowledgment complicates the supposed purity of gender, race, voice, 
boundary; it allows us to acknowledge the utility of such categorizations 
for certain purposes and the necessity of their breakdown on other 
occasions. It complicates definitions in its shift, in its room for the 
possibility of creatively mated taxonomies and their wildly 
unpredictable offspring. 
 
I think, though, that one of the most important results of 
reconceptualizing from 'objective truth' to rhetorical event will be a more 
nuanced sense of legal and social responsibility. This will be so because 
much of what is spoken in so-called objective, unmediated voices is in 
fact mired in hidden subjectivities and unexamined claims that make 
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property of others beyond the self, all the while denying such 
connections (10-11). 
Beyond the law, though I believe that the implications of this for a sociological 
examination of life, my life, is profound.  Speaking from directly within the milieu of 
sociology, and drawing on Williams, Avery F. Gordon notes: 
That life is complicated may seem a banal expression of the obvious, but 
it is nonetheless a profound theoretical statement—perhaps the most 
important theoretical statement of our time.  Yet despite the best 
intentions of sociologists and other social analysts, this theoretical 
statement has not been grasped in its widest significance (2008:3). 
She says elsewhere on this point, elaborating: 
That life is complicated is a theoretical statement that guides efforts to 
treat race, class, and gender dynamics and consciousness as more dense 
and delicate than those categorical terms often imply.  It is a theoretical 
statement that might guide a critique of privately purchased rights, of 
various forms of blindness and sanctioned denial; that might guide an 
attempt to drive a wedge into lives and visions of freedom ruled by the 
nexus of market exchange.  It is a theoretical statement that invites us to 
see with portentous clarity into the heart and soul of [northern bloc] life 
and culture, to track events, stories anonymous and history-making 
actions to their density, to the point where we might catch of a glimpse 
of what Patricia Williams calls “the vast networking of our society” and 
imagine otherwise. You could say that this a folk theoretical statement.  
We need to know where we live in order to imagine living elsewhere.  
We need to imagine living elsewhere before we can live there (5). 
And indeed, it is a kind of folk theoretical statement that borders on the banally obvious, 
but I believe that is essential to state upfront in order to make my ultimate purpose in the 
pages of this dissertation clear.  Returning to my elucidation of my cynicism and mistrust 
towards epistemologically and methodologically scientistic sociological endeavours, 
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rooted in my recalcitrant attachment to a kind of decolonially and postmodernly infused 
Gramscianism, I am not setting about in the pages and chapters to come to “prove” some 
basic sociological, anthropological and historical statement about Nativeness that can be 
reduced to a pithy statement of “Nativeness is…”. In essence what I set about to do in 
these pages is to show the complexity of Nativeness as it has been manifested in my own 
life path, something which cannot be reduced to a mere statement of “Nativeness is….”  
This is central to Gordon’s deployment of the statement that life is complicated, and in 
particular with what she identifies as the second of two dimensions to the statement: 
what she calls complex personhood.  Complex personhood, for Gordon, functions to remind 
us: 
That even those of us who live in the most dire circumstances [NB: 
which, under conditions of settler-colonial domination, I believe that 
Native people are a qualifying population] possess a complex and 
oftentimes contradictory humanity and subjectivity that is never 
adequately glimpsed by viewing them as victims or, on the other hand, 
superhuman agents (2008:4).   
As I have worked towards this writing one question that I have rolled over and over again 
in my mind is a lyric from the British post-metalcore band the Architects: “Am I just a 
victim drifting in the raging sea?” (2018 “Damnation”).  And indeed, am I?  In some 
senses yes, or at least life as an Native under the biopolitical, ontological, cultural, and 
governmental domination of a foreign settler-colonial force which seems to only be 
content with my disappearance can certainly feel so.  But I am also not.  My life is not 
solely coded and overcoded by the machinations of genocide and elimination.  I survive, 
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and while it may be a struggle at times, I try my best to also thrive.  I think this is 
important not only for my readers to remember, but also to constantly remind myself, to 
not become lost in only the miasma, discomfort, and pain of Red Life.  
Gordon perhaps most fully of complex personhood says it: 
Means that all people (albeit in specific forms whose specificity is 
sometimes everything) remember and forget, are beset by contradiction, 
and recognize and misrecognize themselves and others.  Complex 
personhood means that people suffer graciously and selfishly too, get 
stuck in the symptoms of their troubles, and also transform themselves.  
Complex personhood means that even those called “Other” are never 
never that.  Complex personhood means that the stories people tell about 
themselves, about their troubles, about their social worlds, and about 
their society’s problems are entangled and weave between what is 
immediately available as a story and what their imaginations are 
reaching toward.  … Complex personhood means that even those who 
haunt our dominant institutions and their systems of value are haunted 
too by things they sometimes have names for and sometimes do not.  At 
the very least, complex personhood is about conferring the respect on 
others that comes from presuming that life and people’s lives are 
simultaneously straightforward and full of enormously subtle meaning 
(2008:4-5). 
I could not think of a better summation of my life, and the autoethnographic and 
theoretical investigation of my life and its movement through systems of domination to 
thoughts of liberation.  My life exists on the border, in the intestacies and in-between 
spaces, moving in and out of past-present-future, remembrance and forgetfulness, 
enunciation and aphasia, the colonial and the decolonial, structures of domination and 
dreams of liberation.  It is, in a word, complex. 
My usage here of a kind of sociological folk epistemology and theory also dovetails 
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not only with an Indigenous decolonizing methodological concern for storytelling, as 
emphasized in the above quote from Gordon, but also with what queer theorist Jack 
Halberstam calls, in turn borrowing from Stuart Hall, calls low theory, a form of theorizing 
about the world that seeks to locate and to dwell in those very in-between spaces that 
animate Gordon’s notion of complex personhood, and which are so important to my 
conception of this project (2011:2). Low theory is, for Halberstam, a kind of “theoretical 
knowledge that works at many levels at once, as precisely one of these mode of 
transmissions that revels in the detours, twists, and turns through knowing and 
confusion, and that seeks not to explain, but to involve” (15).  For myself, as I consider 
the arch of this dissertation, while on many levels it may seem to examine 
autoethnographically my life and my experiences towards theoretical abstraction at the 
highest planes, a kind of high theory production par excellence, the very fact that it also 
abjures what some might consider more rigorously scientific, empirical or even 
materialist explanations of the condition of Nativeness under settler colonialism, and to 
draw the reader in, to involve them, in the twists, turns, detours, hills and valleys of the 
map of my Native life, places at the very least on the boundaries between high and low 
theory.  
Halberstam says again, “we might consider the utility of getting lost over finding 
our way, and so we should conjure a Benjaminian stroll or a situationist derive, an 
ambulatory journey through the unplanned, the unexpected, the improvised, and the 
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surprising” (15-16).  In many ways, the project of authoring this dissertation has been an 
exercise of putting into praxis what Halberstam says here.  Not only has this project 
undergone a sea change in its shift from traditional ethnography to autoethnographic 
theoretical production, but even after that point the shift from chapter to chapter also 
charts a course through a narrative terrain without a map, as much as a chapter map may 
have been provided in the introduction.  Most starkly is the shift this dissertation 
undergoes roughly one-third of the way in, when I reject the telling of further damage 
narratives, and instead move towards examining and theorizing the placement and role 
of Native damage narratives within settler-colonial popular and civil society.  Much of 
what comes after that bridging point is exactly a wandering, at times feeling improvised 
on-the-go even, trek through an unexpected and unplanned personal and theoretical 
terrain.  
Returning to the question of my methodological-pedagogical-praxiological 
concerns, I would say that ultimately theory and technique are inseparable.  Theory 
informs technique and, I believe, the technique that one employs foregrounds the kind of 
theoretical production that a work is capable of.  In this, my writing’s rootedness in 
decolonizing autoethnographic methodology is not only deeply wedded to a kind of 
decolonial postmodern neo-Marxism informed by contemporary indigenous critical theory 
and settler-colonial critique, as well as radical Black and decolonial theory, that rejects 
the euromodern privileging of scientific and empirical research, but is also deeply 
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intertwined with the complex personhood of Gordon and the low theory of Halberstam. 
I do not believe that an autoethnographic examination of my life, and of Nativeness, with 
an eye towards some kind of theoretical production regarding the former could be 
methodologically and theoretically embroiled with anything other than these 
constellations.  
I may not prove anything for certain, but I will involve you.  I may not 
epistemologically orient myself towards science and the empirical, but I will tell you 
story.  I may not methodologically base myself in the general, but I will show you the 
particular that is myself.  And perhaps, through all of that, I can come to something that 
might be called a theoretical production of some aspect of what it means to be a Native. 
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Chapter 2. The Coloniality of (My/Our) Being
I came into the world imbued with the will to find a meaning in things, 
my spirit filled with the desire to attain to the source of the world, and 
then I found that I was an object in the midst of other objects.  
– Frantz Fanon, Black Skin White Masks 
Nekuanahkwat mesek kōnēwew yōhpeh.  It is grey outside, and snow is beginning to whip 
past my window as I sit down to try and write this chapter.  That is what nekuanahkwat 
mesek kōnēwew yōhpeh means in Oma͞eqnomenēweqnaesen, the Menominee language.  
Or at least that is what I think it means: I have been trying for several years now to 
reinforce my skills in Oma͞eqnomenēweqnaesen by trying to incorporate it into the 
mundane aspects of my everyday life, such as when I look outside today and see the 
weather.  Lacking immediate access to Menominee language resources, which are almost 
entirely located on our reservation in northern Wisconsin and in some other select 
locations in that state, I have to make do with the online dictionary given to me by a 
cousin several years ago, and have to construct several sentences such as the one above 
to the best of my ability. 
It weighs on me often, this fact that I do not have regular, or rigorous tools for 
learning my language (in the sense of being tools for learning a language, rather than just 
the vocabulary that makes up one portion of what a language is).  To state otherwise 
would be to tell a lie, and while perhaps in the course of a hypothetical version of this 
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project, which I have stated previously is both an exercise in opening myself up to the 
gaze, as well as simultaneously guarding myself against the gaze, it might be ethically 
justifiable to tell a lie, in order to shield myself, I can assure the reader that here there are 
no lies contained within. It weighs on me because so much of who we are is bundled up 
in questions of language and language usage.  I encounter this across many points of 
intersection in the graph of my lifeline.  
As my cousins Lisa Wakau and Lauren Wakau-Villagomez recall in their book 
Teaching Native America Across the Curriculum: A Critical Inquiry (2009) there was a time in 
the not so distant past of Menominee history when many of our people spoke not only 
Oma͞eqnomenēweqnaesen but also Anishinaabemowin, the language of our Ojibwe, 
Pottawatomi, Odawa, Algonquin and Mississauga kin, allies and co-habitants. So, in 
effect, due to the forces of settler colonialism that drove the generation of nema͞ehsoh and 
nōhkomaeh19, as well as the generations before them, into boarding schools, as well as 
the machinations of global capitalism combined with personal romantic choices that saw 
my mother make her adult life on the shores of Bermuda, I have lost not only one 
language, Oma͞eqnomenēweqnaesen, but in fact two, as I do not speak 
Anishinaabemowin either. I am not the only Menominee though who faces that, and so I 
count my blessings that I at least have access to an online dictionary, and through the 
 
19 “My grandfather” and “my grandmother” respectively (Mn). 
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connections I have built with Anishinaabe residents of southern Ontario I have been able 
to piece together elements of that language as well. 
But I still do not speak them.  At best I can look out my window and through a 
loosely pieced together sentence I can perhaps give an approximation of a description of 
the weather.  Or I know enough that when I see certain animals, I can greet them with 
the name for them in our language.  But that is not speaking a language, any more than 
binge-watching a PBS series on dark energy or string theory gives me the ability to speak 
the mathematical language of quantum mechanics and astrophysics.  As it stands now, 
my best efforts amount to rote memorization, not true understanding.  
Not understanding of the language, itself, or understanding of what lies behind 
the doorways that true Menominee language would open up to me.  For example, my 
inability to speak my language(s) makes participation in ceremony at best difficult.  I can, 
and have, sat in a sweat lodge conducted by an Anishinaabe elder, and I can feel the 
content, the meaning, of the words spoken in the Ojibwe dialect as much as I can feel the 
heat radiated by the grandfather and grandmother stones.  But there is a horizon to my 
understanding of ceremony that I am locked out of now in my life.  
And that I think is the real loss in the loss of my language before I was even born.  
As I discussed in this dissertation’s prolegomena on language and territory, so much of 
who we are, what makes us Menominee, or Anishinaabe, or any other kind of Native is 
tied up in our language.  In the web of words, semantic structures, and syntax one can 
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find the entirety of the cosmological-ontological-epistemological complex that we might 
call the Menominee worldview.  I am not a linguist, and I do not pretend to be, so I am 
not here attempting to make an argument for the Sapir–Whorf hypothesis, that language 
itself structures worldview and cognition, but what I am trying to say, I think, is that how 
we see ourselves, how we see our place in this world, how we see our human and other-
than-human relations, how we come to know the world around us, is deeply informed 
by our language. 
Language then, I wager, is intertwined with basic ontological questions.  Who am 
I?  What am I?  And thus, the loss of language has bearing on those same questions.  In 
other words, the loss of my language then is something that weighs on me not only 
psychologically, in the sense of distress caused by diaspora and dislocation, of the 
anxiety-induced aphasia of trying to present myself to a world that probably will never 
understand, but in fact weighs on my actual Being.  
Regardless, it is another typical day during the Winter of 2018’s last gasp in this 
particular part of southwestern Ontario that I have come to slowly call home, a piece of 
territory between the shores of Naadowewi-Gichigami, Niigani-Gichigami and 
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Waabishkiigoo-Gichigami20.  Despite warming for several weeks, this day has forced me 
to turn on my heater and put an extra layer on under my sweatshirt.  This is nothing like 
the winter days I knew growing up in Bermuda.  There, in the land of my father, during 
this time of the year it rains constantly, but it remains comparatively warm thanks to the 
currents that pass the island, flowing north from the Gulf of Mexico.  As such, snow is 
unheard of there, and to most of us who spent our winters entirely on that small island, 
it carried almost a mythic quality, seen only in movies, videogames, and television shows, 
and blared from speakers during Christmas, when the seasonal musical classics produced 
in the United States are imported.  
The locals of the city in which I live, canadian settlers mostly, remark that I must 
be mad when I tell those around me that I enjoy days like this.  I am asked always, 
especially by those I have only just met, “Why on Earth would you move here, and trade 
warmth and sun for this?” I automatically assume it would be hard for them to 
 
20 Lakes Michigan, Ontario and Erie respectively. These are the names for these bodies of water in the 
language of my Anishinaabe cousins. It’s been a general practice of mine these past few years to fill in the 
gaps of my knowledge of Menominee terminology with Anishinaabe ones. I think of this as a many-fold 
daily act of decoloniality. For one, this is because, as I am told by members of my family, until the 
generation of my grandparents, many Menominee were fluent in not only in Oma ͞eqnomenēweqnaesen but 
also Anishinaabemowin, which is closely related. So, I feel that by learning bits of pieces of 
Anishinaabemowin, even as I put my primary focus on reclaiming Oma ͞eqnomenēweqnaesen, I am 
connecting to the practices of my ancestors, and with a dream looking forward to how I want my children 
and my grandchildren to also be.  Also, I live on the joint lands of the Anishinaabeg and the Rotinonshón:ni, 
what is called Gdoo-Naaganinaa in Anishinaabemowin, The Dish with One Spoon.  So, in using terms from 
the Anishinaabe language I show respect to my relatives on whose territory I live as a guest and 
acknowledge the names that have been used to mark place here since time immemorial.  This switching 
back and forth between Oma ͞eqnomenēweqnaesen and Anishinaabemowin, and even Kanienʼkehá꞉ka (the 
Mohawk language) when appropriate is my practice throughout the writing of this dissertation. 
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understand my true feelings, so I generally remark that when it is cold out you can just 
keep piling on more and more clothes until you are warm, but when it is hot you can only 
take so many clothes off before you are breaking some law. People laugh, and they say 
something like “yes, you’re right” or “I guess that’s true.” That, or I play the role of spoiler 
and pass on the meteorological knowledge that, contrary to north american dreams of 
year-round sunshine and beaches, it does rain for most of the winter in Bermuda.  
However the question is dealt with the subject invariably passes as quickly as it arises, 
and our conversations move on to topics more pressing or interesting than the wintry 
weather outside of my windows.  
But the true reason that I enjoy days like this, to such an extent that I will almost 
always go and stand on my porch when I begin to see those first few flakes of snow 
beginning to drift down from kēsek21 is because in a strange kind of way seeing those 
flakes and feeling the cool temperature reinforces my feeling of connection to this place 
and the sense of home that I have slowly begun to feel over my off-and-on decade and a 
half of residence in this city. These falling flakes of frozen water root me in this territory, 
on the shores of these lakes, in my ancestry and our ancient relations to those nations on 
whose land I am a gracious guest.  This is exactly because it is not like the cool-but-not-
 
21 “The sky” (Mn). 
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frozen, always raining winters that lash Bermuda, but it is exactly like the winters in 
Oma͞eqnomenēw-ahkīheh22. 
I feel connected because I know that on these cold wintery days in southwestern 
Ontario that the weather here is much the same as it is in northern Wisconsin and the 
upper Michigan peninsula, just on the other side of the Nayaano-Nibiimaang 
Gichigamiin23.  Indeed, every time I have spoken to my grandmother this winter much of 
our conversations have revolved around the question of the weather.  She often tells me 
about how cold it is there, and she tells me almost every time how much snow has fallen, 
and how it has begun to build up everywhere in the small town of Shawano, just south 
of the Menominee Reservation in which she lives.  This winter cold is one of my many 
anchors in my constant transit back-and-forth between Oma͞eqnomenēw-ahkīheh and 
Gdoo-Naaganinaa.  When I feel this cold, when I walk through the forests that continue 
to survive despite the constant encroachment of ongoing settlement and the colonial 
drive to tame the Wild land, when I see these lakes and rivers and think about how my 
Menominee ancestors most certainly used to transit them themselves by way of canoe in 
order to come here to visit relatives, to trade and to continue our old political 
arrangements with the Anishinaabeg and the Rotinonshón:ni, and how their shores once 
teemed with manōmaeh24, the very grain from which our most well-known name derives, 
 
22 “The land/country of the Menominee” (Mn). 
23 “The Great Lakes (The Five Freshwater Seas)” (A). 
24 “Wild rice” (Mn).  Also, manoomin (A). 
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I feel that I am home, even if Gdoo-Naaganinaa is not quite Oma͞eqnomenēw-ahkīheh. I 
am grateful to my Anishinaabe relatives and the Rotinonshón:ni for allowing me to be a 
guest in this territory, and by way of that, to help me find myself in a world that seeks to 
induce and reinforce only feelings of disconnection and alienation from who, and what, 
we are. 
2.1 Being Native 
These snowy thoughts of home, of making home, of what it means to belong home has also 
brought me to a line of thought on which I often find myself dwelling: what does it mean 
to be Native?  Is it possible to even speak of some kind of authentic Indigenous experience 
or lifestyle?  And if so, how much of this is rooted in gaze and the world-building project 
of the colonizer, without whom the category of Native would not even exist.  I come to 
these kinds of places because throughout my own life I have often wondered if I look 
“Native enough,” if I sound Native enough if I carry myself Native enough.  Essentially 
the question that unites all of these other questions is whether or not I fit in when in the 
company of other Natives.  This is a question which has always inevitably impacted my 
ability to feel comfortable or not comfortable when in the company of other Natives.  In 
other words, when trying to make home do, I actually feel like I belong?  Growing up in 
Bermuda, where many people do not know exactly what a Native person looks like, 
sounds like, dresses like etc., and where racialization functions firmly within the 
coordinates of a Black-white binary, it was not common for me to be recognized for what 
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I thought myself to be.  It was however simultaneously common for people to remark 
that I looked Mexican, a Venezuelan or some sort of Latinx person more generally25.  In 
terms of physiological appearance—especially under the influence of the sun in the hot 
Bermudian summers—my skin, as well as that of my younger brother, is a healthy shade 
of brown.  
I am always brown, sun-drenched, or not.  But this brownness in Bermuda has led 
many times to a racial misrecognition as Latinx, rather than Native American or First 
Nations.  Indeed, even in Kitchener-Waterloo, I have not always been able to escape this 
misracialization of myself.  
A quick story: I cook a lot.  My mother is a gourmet chef of some skill and 
recognition in Bermuda, and I probably on some level inherited those skills, but I have 
spent most of my adult life trying to hone and perfect those skills on my own.  I have 
been hired to do welcome dinners for the Waterloo Indigenous Student Centre, as well 
as many other unpaid lunches for them.  I do not inflate my own ego all that often, at 
 
25 Given that most of the population of Mexico is of mixed Indigenous and european, mostly Spanish, 
descent, during my early 20s I came to a degree of peace with often being mistaken as such during my 
childhood. I came to figure that Bermudians saw in me the same thing that they saw in many Mexicans 
and other Latinx peoples, which is an Indigenous american background, though they perhaps did not know 
this then or now. I recognize now, in my early 30s, that this is not an unproblematic view, which skews or 
smothers the contradictions between Natives of Latin America and the Indigenous-descended mestizo 
majority of many of those countries. I’ve learned and been corrected through online interactions about 
overly simplistic and unknowingly mestizo nationalist-tinged views that tend to collapse these two 
categories in problematic and oppressive ways, but I would be lying if I said that in the past that they did 
not bring me a degree of comfort. Untangling the comfort that these ideas brought to me as a diasporic 
Native north american youth and young adult, with what I see now as something that is far more complex 
than I had previously realized that been a personal, political and theoretical journey. 
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least in the open, in front of others, but it is a skill I not only cherish but one that I am 
generally recognized for, alongside being a heady critical theorist (at least amongst my 
friends and kin).  Most recently being recognized through an interview with an article 
about myself and my culinary journey in the local Grand Magazine the winter of 2019.  
When I cook, I focus a lot on four diverse kinds of cuisine: West Indian, Native, 
East Asian, and Latin American.  This is not a dissertation chapter on my culinary 
adventures though, so the point is this: West Indian, Native and Latin American cuisines 
have a significant degree of ingredient overlap.  Because of this, and because of the 
difficulty of finding many necessary ingredients in the major settler capitalist grocery 
chains in this country, such as Zehr’s or Sobey’s, I have developed a regular habit of 
frequenting this city’s Latinx and West Indian grocers.  The deeper point beyond that, 
and which connects back to my broader point, is that when I frequent these kinds of 
stores, most especially the local Latinx ones, I am often misrecognized as a Latinx person 
by the owners, staff, and other customers present.  At one particular store, owned by a 
family of Salvadoreños, I have been asked many times if I am Mexican, Salvadoran and 
some other Latinx nationality.  I have been told point-blank that the question has been 
asked because, like my youth in Bermuda, I am told that I look like I am Mexican or some 
other Latinx people, and in those occasions I have had to correct the person by telling 
them that I am actually a Native American or First Nations person.  
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If it has not come in the form of a direct question about a mistaken Latinx ethnicity 
or nationality, I am often greeted in Spanish, or Spanish is otherwise assumed as my 
mother tongue.  Recently, I took a close friend, themselves an Anishinaabe person, to go 
shopping at one of these local Kitchener-Waterloo grocers and afterword they remarked 
that they had noticed that the people running the cash register when we checked out 
greeted me in Spanish and seemed to assume that I was a Latinx person. Ultimately, I 
have had many wonderful conversations with these people, about the secrets of Latinx 
cuisine, or about the connections between it and Indigenous cooking generally, especially 
in the central ingredients of corn, beans and squash that are so central to all of us.  But 
they are conversations have always been prompted by having to correct a racial 
misrecognition of my Native North American self as Latinx by members of the local 
Latinx community. 
I am telling this story about cooking and grocery shopping for a reason.  I am not 
internally blinded to the fact that I have experienced this particular kind of racial 
misrecognition many times in my life, from Bermuda to Kitchener-Waterloo.  While I 
have never been offended by it, what this has often resulted in my taking actions to 
appear more Native.  
For example, for most of my adult life I have made a conscious effort to grow my 
hair long and at times have braided it.  Since about the age of 20, I have only cut my hair 
twice, both to mark significant life-changing events and an attempt to engage in self-
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renewal and self-growth.  For myself, this was, at least in the beginning, less of a 
pushback against the imposition of western thoughts around beauty and what men and 
women should look like, and more of an intentional taking on the stereotype of 
Indigenous men with long braided hair.  While one may argue that perhaps those two 
feelings are two sides of the same coin, I would argue that it is important to consider to 
which end the emphasis is placed in my own complex life praxis. 
My younger brother, who lives in New Hampshire, also grows his hair long.  His 
reasons are much the same as my own.  I asked him while writing this dissertation, 
during a conversation on Facebook, “why do you grow your hair long?  Is it because it’s 
a Native thing, or just cuz?” He told me “I grow it now because it is a Native thing and it 
helps me to look it, I try and braid it as much as possible” [emphasis mine].  He adds further, 
that now he found reasons within our culture to grow and keep his hair long, beyond the 
drive to enforce a visual tell of his Indigeneity.  On this, he said “I read that some tribes 
believe in powers in long hair.  Some believe they represent living or passed on loved 
ones.” I also asked him if he thought that he looked Native, to which he said “I guess I 
look Native.  I get people asking me often if I am an Indian or whatever.” 
Of course, not all modern Native men grow their hair long or braid it.  We come 
in all different varieties and styles.  In my own life, I have been just as likely to meet 
Native men with short haircuts, or even a fully shaved head.  It is all beautiful.  I do not 
judge, because I am not that kind of person, that kind of Native.  I do not shame people 
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who make a personal, individual aesthetic choice regarding how they wish to groom or 
adorn their bodies.  We are all on our own personal journey through this post-apocalyptic 
landscape of coloniality/modernity.  For myself, and for my brother, growing our hair 
long and braiding it is part of ours. 
I have often found this interesting though, thinking through the journeys of my 
younger brother and me.  My brother and I look quite a lot alike, the main difference 
being that I am a bigger person than he, and often grow my facial hair out in a more 
noticeable fashion.  But the fact that we are brothers is instantly recognizable to most 
people.  We, I think, look far more like each other than either of us looks like our older, 
and fully white, half-brother, though there is a general resemblance to our father’s side 
of the family that the three of us share and which is often caught, and commented upon, 
by others, especially in Bermuda.  While there is often also no doubt that we are the sons 
of our white Bermudian father, the Menominee genetics of our mother’s lineage are 
strong, or so I assume.  But I find this interesting because in New England, where he now 
lives, my brother tells me that he is often asked if he is Native by his co-workers and the 
other majority-white denizens of his region, though he is also often mistaken for Latinx 
as well.  However, while I do not know his Bermuda experience, it has been the case for 
myself that in both Bermuda and Canada that I am regularly mistaken for Latinx.  
My mother’s experience is of course quite different from either of ours in its own 
regard.  Her experience of racialized (mis)recognition has moved back and forth between 
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Nativeness to ambiguity depending on the context of time and place.  She has always 
related to me that on her travels to Latin America—to Brazil, Peru, Argentina, Chile, 
etc.—she has often met other Indigenous peoples, from those regions, who have 
recognized in her Nativeness and have at first tried to converse with her in their own 
languages.  However, she also has related to me, as I have spoken to her during this 
writing, that when she has been elsewhere, including Bermuda, she has most often 
encountered confusion about “what she is.” She has never been misrecognized as white, 
but nor has she ever related to me an experience similar to my own of being 
misrecognized as Latinx.  She tells me that in Bermuda, when she first arrived in the 
1970s, she was met with significant confusion about what she was.  To my honest 
surprise, she told me that she was often asked if she was a light-skinned Black person by 
members of the Black community on the island.  Likewise, at the yachting club that my 
father has been a member of for some decades, the bartender used to ask my father about 
his “Chinese girlfriend.” Other times she often has been met with comments and 
questions of “I know you are not white, Black or Asian, but what are you?” At the same 
time as she is able to encounter Native peoples in Latin America and be mistaken as 
Quechua, Mapuche or some other, she has told me that when she looks at pictures of her 
and her siblings, that she thinks she looks less than Native than most of them.  
Taken together though, this divergence in our experiences—myself, my brother, 
and our mother—leads me to speculate that the stereotype of what a Native person looks 
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like is not transnational, transregional, or even transhistorical.  Of course, this to me is 
something that is obviously the case, to the extent that its truth is, or rather, I would argue, 
should be, a matter that is trivial26.  As my mother, who to me, and in her own sense of 
self-recognition, looks like an Indian, said “no shit, not all Indians look alike, nor ever 
did.  It’s a long way from Alaska to Tierra del Fuego.”  
Perhaps it is also all of this snowy whiteness that currently surrounds me as I begin 
to piece this chapter together, being evocative of the whiteness of settler coloniality that 
also surrounds me, but it also hard to displace the discussion of my own wanderings 
through the visualized racial dimension of Nativeness within the imaginarium of late 
capitalist/colonialist storytelling from the question the basic question of what it means to 
be Native. Setting aside the question of visuality however, at least until the next chapter, 
and relating back to what I said earlier about the matter of language, language loss and 
world-building/world-making, what I want to take up in the rest of this chapter, and by 
way of doing that set the stage for many of the other discussions to come in the following 
pages, is what it means to be Native within the ontological and existential mappings of 
settler coloniality, and in particular within the imaginarium of late capitalist/colonialist 
storytelling. 
 
26 A more in-depth development of this discussion topic, and its relationship to other problems of theory 




2.2 The Problem of Being 
In the previous chapter, I outlined how this work is rooted strongly in investigating and 
theorizing questions related to the ontological and structural formations of Indigeneity 
and Indigenous being.  This particular line of questioning regarding ontology, again as 
outlined previously in the preceding chapter, necessarily is one partially rooted in the 
political ontology developed in and from the work of the German existentialist and 
phenomenologist27 Martin Heidegger. The fundamental ontology Heidegger sketches in 
his magnum opus work Being and Time (2008) is a fundamental reference point for the 
conception of being that this chapter, and this broader work in general, builds upon. 
However, more importantly, the work in both this chapter and those to come takes the 
form of a necessary critique of Heideggerian ontology. And this is an important caveat to 
make. Discussions of ontology have become, if not all-pervasive, then at the very least 
widely influential in many fields of contemporary critical theory. Perhaps the most 
 
27 I describe Heidegger and his work here with these two broad stroke labels, however I do so not unaware 
that, as the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy notes, that “his thinking should be identified as part of 
such philosophical movements only with extreme care and qualification” (2011). For the sake of brevity, 
and as this is not a purely philosophical work seeking to analyze the contributions of Heidegger, I will use 
these labels. Relatedly, I find it often unfashionable amongst certain sectors of left-wing academia to cite 
Heidegger, or to draw from his work, because of his quite well known and established relationship with 
the German variant of fascism of the 1920s, 30s and 40s, national socialism. This is view is also often likewise 
taken with regards to the German jurist Carl Schmitt, whose work on the concept of sovereignty, especially 
as it has been interpreted and expanded upon by the Italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben, has become 
quite essential to many (post)modern conceptions of the State and Law. I however am less concerned with 
adherence to left-wing orthodoxy, as described in this dissertations first chapter, and find more interest in 
engaging with and drawing from any range of ideas that can be useful in some way in analyzing and 
theorizing about the state of Nativeness under regimes of settler colonialism, and thus find myself less 
likely to object to or reject potentially meaningful ideas, theories, analyses and philosophies because of the 
political allegiances of their long deceased founders or creators. 
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established field with an ongoing theoretical production that is widely and deeply rooted 
in the question of the ontological is contemporary Black Studies. A brief survey here can 
point to the works of scholars and theorists as diverse as Frank B. Wilderson, III in his 
Red, White & Black: Cinema and the Structure of U.S. Antagonisms (2010), as well as Calvin 
L. Warren’s Ontological Terror: Blackness, Nihilism, and Emancipation (2018), Jared Sexton’s 
numerous books and articles (2008; 2011; 2016), Christina Sharpe’s In the Wake: On 
Blackness and Being (2016) and David Marriot’s Whither Fanon?: Studies in the Blackness of 
Being (2018)28. Within Native Studies, however, essentially ontological investigations of 
Nativeness have also produced important works, such as Jodi A. Byrd’s The Transit of 
Empire: Indigenous Critiques of Colonialism. 
Many of these works have deeply influential upon me, seen not only in the 
recounting of my theoretical-methodological orientation and development in the 
previous chapter, but also in the way in which almost every page of this dissertation 
veritably seethes with their influences. However, and this is perhaps the result of cross-
 
28 There are key internal distinctions to be made here however.  In particular, Wilderson and Sexton are the 
two central theorists of the tendency that has come to be known as Afropessimism, a stream of thought in 
which they are variously joined by fellow-travellers such as Warren.  However, Afropessimism, in 
particular as formulated by Wilderson, has been challenged as being structured such that it absorbs into 
itself other modes of thought and theorization that may be related to it, even if remotely, including those 
sources that Wilderson claims as inspiration.  For example, in his various works Wilderson lists as 
Afropessimists not only himself and Sexton, but also Saidiya Hartman, Hortense Spillers, Lewis Gordon, 
Frantz Fanon, Joy James, David Marriot, James Baldwin, and Assata Shakur.  Some of those included in 
Wilderson’s various listings have been expressively critical, such as Lewis Gordon who challenges many 
of the basic assumptions of Wilderson (2018) and David Marriot, who has critiqued what he considers to 
be Wilderson’s “ontological absolutism” (2014).  Beyond that, Afropessimism is not without critique (see 
for example Greg Thomas’s 2018 essay “Afro-Blue Notes: The Death of Afro-Pessimism (2.0)?”), and is a 
quite internally heterogeneous. 
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cutting theoretical and political influences, I am also careful with my own use of the 
concept of ontology, especially with regards to how it is deployed here in these pages, 
both in this particular chapter and beyond. My concern here is perhaps best described by 
the Martinican revolutionary, psychiatrist and psychoanalyst Frantz Fanon, who notes in 
his text Black Skin White Masks (a text which has had profound influence on the growing 
stream of ontological investigations) that:  
In the Weltanschauung [worldview] of a colonized people there is an 
impurity, a flaw that outlaws any ontological explanation. Someone may 
object that this is the case with every individual, but such an objection 
merely conceals a basic problem. Ontology—once it is finally admitted 
as leaving existence by the wayside—does not permit us to understand 
the being of the black man. For not only must the black man be black; he 
must be black in relation to the white man (1967:109-110). 
What does this mean for us in developing an ontological investigation of the settler 
colonized Native of Turtle Island? Essentially, while not rejecting that there are aspects 
of the lives of colonized peoples that survived the sociological catastrophe of 
colonization, Fanon here is saying that there is a profound impact on colonized people, 
by colonialism, that causes those peoples, Natives included, to resist classical ontological 
descriptions (Gordon 1995b:10). The Jewish Jamaican afro-existentialist Lewis Gordon, 
critiquing Jean-Paul Sartre’s description of antisemitism, wherein the Jew is made in the 
gaze of the anti-Semite, says: 
The situation of people of color is different. Although Jews may have 
existed before anti-Jews, it is not clear whether “blacks,” “Indians,” or 
“Orientals” existed as those identities before racist conceptions of these 
people were designated by such terms. … In brief, it is possible that no 
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African, nor Native Australian, nor Native American, nor Asian had any 
reason to think of himself as black, red, or yellow until Europeans found 
it necessary to define him as such. This power of defining required 
specific conditions that were external to those people themselves 
(1995b:28) [emphasis mine]. 
He adds: “it is this aspect of the black condition that compelled Fanon to declare, as we 
have seen, that there is nothing ontological about antiblack racism” (1995:28). To this, 
drawing from Gordon above, we can also add anti-Native racism as something that has 
no ontological grounding. What is at stake here is that the condition of Nativeness if you 
will, is not a condition that is given rise to by the internal social development dynamics 
of Native societies. Rather, in agreement with Anishinaabe scholar Gerald Vizenor, the 
Native is something that comes into historical existence only at the contact event. 
Thinking this way, there are no Natives if we rewind the stream of time back to a point 
before 1492. The Native is an invention of the european colonial matrix of power. 
Nativeness is not ontogenic; it is what Gordon (2006) and Sylvia Wynter (2001) would 
call sociogenic. In Vizenor’s Native appropriations of Baudrillardian postmodernism, the 
Native is a simulation (1994).  It is relational; Natives only exist by dint of the relationship 
with the european conqueror. To create something of a neologism here in an attempt to 
be even more specific about the social, cultural, political and philosophical origin of the 
Native, we might say that it is coloniogenic. 
Unlike Gordon however, and unlike Fanon, I do not believe that this necessitates 
a jettisoning of ontology as a category of thought and analysis. It does, however, open a 
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door to a modified understanding of the concept, and especially how it comes to be and 
continues to function in a world dominated by white imperial power, settler colonialism 
and a parasitic capitalist world-system that requires the oppression, elimination and 
exploitation of most of the world’s colonized peoples.   
That said, understanding the Heideggerian basis for contemporary discussions of 
being and ontology though remains essential, and in this regard, I agree with Latinx 
decolonial philosopher Nelson Maldonado-Torres when he says of Heidegger and his 
work on ontology and the conceptualization of being: 
I do not think that Heidegger’s conception of ontology and the primacy 
that he gives to the question of being necessarily provide the best basis 
for the understanding of coloniality or decolonization, but his analyses 
of being-in-the-world serve as a starting point to understanding some 
key elements of existential thought, a tradition that has made important 
insights into the lived experience of colonized and racialized peoples. 
Returning to Heidegger can provide new clues about how to articulate a 
discourse on the colonial aspects of world making and lived experience 
(2010:103). 
Having said that, to better understand the arguments made in this chapter, and the 
critiques of Heideggerian ontology that they build upon, I believe that it is also necessary 
to first give a brief overview of the conception of being as it is found in the philosophical 
œuvre of Heidegger.  
2.3 The Question of Political Ontology  
In traditional Heideggerian political ontology centrality is placed on what is referred to 
as the ontological difference.  That is, the distinction between Being and being (Sein and 
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Seiendem), which he defines through concepts and terms of constitution, disclosure, non-
identity, displacement and absence (Saar 2012:79). From this, Heidegger also sought to 
move away from the use of the term Man to refer to the human being, believing that it, 
and all other known concepts, were marked by the traces of metaphysics and 
epistemologically-centred philosophy. Thus, he takes up the term Dasein, itself a 
transfiguration of Husserl’s transcendental consciousness (1970), which means simply 
“being there,” and is a fundamentally social and open entity (2008). Dasein is the both 
Heidegger’s principal object of study, as well as his point of departure, a first step of sorts 
towards uncovering an existential analytic of everyday being.  He notes: 
whenever an ontology takes for its theme entities whose character of 
Being is other than that of Dasein, it has its own foundation and 
motivation in Dasein's own ontical structure, in which a pre-ontological 
understanding of Being is comprised as a definite characteristic… 
Therefore fundamental ontology, from which alone all other ontologies 
can take their rise, must be sought in the existential analytic of Dasein. 
(2008:33–34) 
Maldonado-Torres summarizes this by saying that “For Heidegger, fundamental 
ontology needs to elucidate the meaning of ‘being there’ and through that, articulate 
ideas about Being itself” (2010:104).  
What is most relevant though, in terms of the critical analysis to follow, is that, for 
Dasein, “authenticity can only be achieved by resoluteness, and that resoluteness can 
only emerge in an encounter with the possibility which is inescapably one’s own, that is, 
death” (Maldonado-Torres 2010: 104). For Heidegger death is the individualizing 
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moment par excellence precisely because in death one can never be replaced via another 
and in large part this is because, phenomenologically speaking, we radically lack access 
to the death of others, to the loss of being that takes place when one dies: 
The greater the phenomenal appropriateness with which we take the no-
longer-Dasein of the deceased, the more plainly is it shown that in such 
Being-with the dead, the authentic Being-come-to-an-end of the 
deceased is precisely the sort of thing which we do not experience. Death 
does indeed reveal itself as a loss, but a loss such as is experienced by 
those who remain. In suffering this loss, however, we have no way of 
access to the loss-of-Being as such which the dying man ‘suffers’. The 
dying of Others is not something which we experience in a genuine 
sense; at most we are always just ‘there alongside’ (2008:282) 
Thus, again as Maldonado-Torres notes, “[t]he anticipation of the death and the 
accompanying anxiety allow the subject to detach herself from the They, to determine her 
ownmost possibilities, and to resolutely define her own project of ek-sistence29” 
(2010:104).  
The confrontation with death for Dasein as the channel for authenticity can also, 
for Heidegger, take place on the collective/national level, though here he posits the 
necessity of a leader-character: a fuhrer. This is the source of Heidegger’s often, and 
rightly, critiqued relationship with the national-socialist state that arose in Germany in 
the 1930s and its fuhrer. Here, on the collective/national level, and in the name of the 
fuhrer, war takes the central position as the pathway to the confrontation with death. War 
 
29 It is worth noting, for those perhaps unfamiliar with Heidegger’s thought, that the writing of “ek-
sistence” is not a misspelling on Maldonado-Torres’s part, or Heidegger’s.  Rather, it is part of the latter’s 
attentativeness to etymological considerations, in which “existence is understood … as standing out 
(Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 2011) 
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and the possibility of dying for the collective national body, driven by the leadership of 
the fuhrer, becomes the link between collective and individual authenticity. 
However, there is an essential component missing within the Heideggerian tracing 
of the concept of being: colonialism, or more properly coloniality. This absent presence of 
coloniality within the Heideggerian genealogy of ontology and being forms the basis of 
the critique that this chapter mobilizes. 
2.3.1 Anti-Cartesian Excavations & the Sub-Ontological Difference 
Heideggerian political ontology emerged in large degree as a critical response to the 
subjective-epistemological tendencies that had come to find themselves firmly cemented 
within the thought of european modernity, which can trace their roots to the works of 17th-
century French philosopher René Descartes. Whereas much of the euro-western and 
euromodern philosophical and critical canon of thought placed emphasis upon the 
Cartesian formulation of the ego cogito, ‘Cogito, ergo sum’, ‘I think, therefore I am’, for 
Heidegger this was based on a forgetfulness. For him, the fundamental element was not 
the aspect of the cogito, but rather ‘I am’, and thus within his programme of opposing 
epistemology (‘I think’) with ontology (‘I am), the emphasis was shifted from the former 
onto the latter.  Further, Heidegger writes that in Descartes’s presentation of the world it 
is “with its skin off” (2008:132), meaning that, according to him, Descartes presents the 
world as an assemblage of present-at-hand entities, which can be encountered as, and by, 
subjects, through raw sense data.  Against this Heidegger positions his own existential 
151 
 
analytic in which Dasein's epistemic contact with the world-writ-large is mediated by 
what he calls “value-predicates,” which are context-dependent meanings.  A Derridian-
Baudrillardian reading of Heidegger’s critique of Descartes might say that Daesein’s 
epistemic meeting with, and navigation through, the world is mediated through signs, 
forces of signification, which contain within themselves both a signifier and a signified 
(Derrida 1978; Baudrillard 2006).  Heidegger lays out his challenge to Cartesian thought, 
saying: 
What we ‘first’ hear is never noises or complexes of sounds, but the 
creaking waggon, the motor-cycle. We hear the column on the march, the 
north wind, the woodpecker tapping, the fire crackling… It requires a 
very artificial and complicated frame of mind to ‘hear’ a ‘pure noise’. The 
fact that motor-cycles and waggons are what we proximally hear is the 
phenomenal evidence that in every case Dasein, as Being-in-the-world, 
already dwells alongside what is ready-to-hand within-the-world; it 
certainly does not dwell proximally alongside ‘sensations’; nor would it 
first have to give shape to the swirl of sensations to provide a 
springboard from which the subject leaps off and finally arrives at a 
‘world’. Dasein, as essentially understanding, is proximally alongside 
what is understood. (2008:207) 
However, within all of Heidegger’s critique of Cartesian thought, there is a very crucial 
axis missing from this historical development in philosophical emphasis, from 
epistemologically-centred to ontologically-centred. Thinking through Gordon and 
Fanon’s critique of ontological emphasis, what is missing here in the Heideggerian 
account of euro-western philosophy is, of course, the relationship between modernist 
european metaphysics and the colonial matrix of power (coloniality). 
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This is essential to consider and to re-incorporate into our philosophical 
anthropology, because decoloniality, and the push towards a decolonial critique and 
corrective, as outlined in the previous chapter, is as much a critique of modernity as it is 
one of coloniality. This is certainly because the two concepts are so deeply intertwined 
that they are often necessarily rendered as a conjoined and twinned concept: 
modernity/coloniality. In the case of the world-system, capitalism is also often added to 
the equation, rendering it the modern/colonial/capitalist world-system. However, while 
agreeing with much of the thrust of decolonial critique I also agree with Gordon when he 
appends the ‘European’ to modernity, rendering it as euromodernity, saying “I write 
European modernity to bring into question the presumption of modernity’s only being 
European. Understood as a relational phenomenon, modernity could be read in terms of 
what human beings in a given region consider to be the future direction of humanity” 
(2013:68). Following Gordon, ‘Europe’ is also understood by me including not only the 
geographical context of the european continent, but also the settler colonies of the former 
British Empire, including Canada and the United States (1995b:6-7). The world of Europe 
then is the world of coloniality, and thus the world of modernity, understood as 
euromodernity. This includes the northern bloc, and all other settler colonies founded 
upon european imperial expansion. 
Taking a step away from Heidegger’s myopically eurocentric account of 
philosophical anthropology and its historical development, coloniality is the silent, yet 
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very real, and very present partner in the process. The two are ineluctably linked. 
Coloniality is the hidden, deeply powerful, motive force that pushed forward the 
development of Cartesian philosophy, and thus subsequently the Heideggerian and post-
Heideggerian development of the concept of being and of political ontology. This is a gap 
in the history of western/european philosophy that has been illuminated perhaps most 
significantly in the work of the Argentine-Mexican philosopher of liberation and 
liberation theologian Enrique Dussel.  
Regarding the cogito, in his critical dialogues with the canadian political 
philosopher Charles Taylor and the German pragmatist Karl-Otto Apel, Dussel makes a 
critical intervention in the historical understanding of european/western philosophy by 
placing the Cartesian development within its proper historical context. He notes that the 
various elements of european modernity arose “from a continuous dialectic of impact 
and counter-impact, effect and counter-effect, between modern Europe and its periphery, 
even in that which we could call the constitution of modern subjectivity” (1996:133). The 
essence of modern subjectivity of course being, as discussed above, the notion of the ego 
cogito. In placing the Cartesian movement within european modernity within a context 
of the imperial/colonial conquest of the Americas, the enslavement of people from the 
African continent and the general european assault upon the rest of the world which 




The ego conquiro becomes the essential stage upon which Descartes was able to 
develop his philosophy. Again, Dussel notes: 
The ego cogito also already betrays a relation to a proto-history, of the 
16th century, that is expressed in the ontology of Descartes but does not 
emerge from nothing. The ego conquiro (I conquer), as a practical self, 
antedates it … The “barbarian” was the obligatory context for all 
reflection on subjectivity, reason, the cogito (1996:33). 
According to Dussel, the ego cogito can only arise from within a context in which one 
thinks of themselves as the centre of the world, precisely because they have in fact already 
conquered the world (2014). To the intense degree to which the coloniality of power 
distorts this relationship—between colonialism and modernity—it obscures the actual 
nature of the Cartesian perspective itself, and all others that would come to follow it, from 
the Kantian Rational-I to Heidegger’s political ontology. This is why Colombian 
decolonial philosopher Santiago Castro-Gómez (2010) describes Cartesian philosophy as 
operating from a kind of “zero point epistemology”: that is, Cartesian and post-Cartesian 
philosophy is a point-of-view that does not see itself as a point-of-view. I am also 
reminded here, thinking of the zero-point epistemology as a naturalization of Cartesian 
philosophy, of the work of members of the neo-Lacanian Ljubljana School of 
Psychoanalysis on the distinction between the Real and reality, as it relates to the 
overarching ideology of society as a reality principle. In particular, Alenka Zupančič notes 
that: 
The important thing to point out here is that the reality principle is not 
some kind of natural way associated with how things are … The reality 
principle itself is ideologically mediated; one could even claim that it 
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constitutes the highest form of ideology, the ideology that presents itself 
as empirical fact or (biological, economic…) necessity (and that we tend 
to perceive as non-ideological). It is precisely here that should be most 
alert to the functioning of ideology (2003:77).  
While the concerns of the Lacanian Marxists of the Ljubljana School mostly relate to the 
relationship of capitalism to the Real, this kind of thinking is, I believe, easily transferable 
to what I have already written, allowing us to speak of the relationship between (settler) 
colonialism and the Real, of the reality principle of (settler) coloniality.  Either way, this 
of course remains a fundamental component of the scientistism that remains at the heart 
of much of social scientific practise and theory within the westernized academy, with its 
Cartesian-derived subject-object dualism and the naturalization of a foundational 
ideology of possible value-neutrality found within the work and theories of disciplinary 
founding fathers such as Max Weber (2004). The “hubris of the zero point” (Mignolo 
2011:22) is quintessential eurocentrism. 
Pushing this analysis even further and tying it explicitly to the notion of 
epistemicide—the death of subaltern knowledge systems, in particular their murder as a 
condition of european expansion and colonial genocide—put forth by Portuguese 
theorist Boaventura de Sousa Santos (2014:92), Boricua sociologist Ramón Grosfoguel 
introduces the concept of the ego extermino (‘I exterminate’). The ego extermino, founded 
on genocide and concurrent epistemicide, is what gives rise to a fundamentally 
epistemically racialized and racist ego cogito of Descartes. For Grosfoguel, “[t]he ego 
extermino is the socio-historical structural condition that makes possible the link of the ego 
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conquiro with the ego cogito” (2013:77). Following Dussel, Grosfoguel places the emergence 
of the ego extermino and ego conquiro in what he refers to as the four 
genocides/epistemicides of the long 16th century: 1) against Muslims and Jews in the 
Catholic Reconquista of Iberia, 2) against the Indigenous peoples of the Americas 
following the Colombian contact event, 3) against African people via the trans-Atlantic 
slave trade and 4) against Indo-European women accused of witchcraft (2013:77). 
2.4 Sub-Ontological Difference: The Haunting of Political Ontology 
Returning to a previous point, if we can place, and indeed must, place the Cartesian 
movement in euromodernist philosophical anthropology within its correct context as a 
movement whose condition of possibility was the sociological catastrophe of settler 
colonialism and the trans-Atlantic slave trade, then we consequently must do the same 
for Heideggerian ontology, emergent as it is as a critique, or perhaps more correctly, a 
change in emphasis, of the ego cogito. Taking up this direction of thought we return to 
the line of inquiry regarding Heidegger and being within the work of Maldonado-Torres.  
What Maldonado-Torres sets out to question in his critique of Heideggerian 
philosophy of Being is that, if coloniality is the underside of the Cartesian articulation of 
the ego cogito, in the form of the ego conquiro (and we can add to this, via Grosfoguel, 
the ego extermino), then what is the underside of the ontology of Heidegger (2010)? He 
responds that this is the sub-ontological difference. Drawing upon the work of French-
Lithuanian Jewish philosopher Emmanuel Levinas, himself a strident critic of Heidegger 
157 
 
(1979; 1981), Maldonado-Torres proposes the sub-ontological difference as an extension of 
the concept of colonial difference put forth by Argentine decolonial scholar Walter D. 
Mignolo (2002). Mignolo’s colonial difference is epistemological in nature—the 
coloniality of knowledge, or colonial epistemological difference, as an extension of the 
coloniality of power—Maldonado-Torres borrows the concept to generate an ontological 
concept, the coloniality of being (2010).  
For Maldonado-Torres, while the ontological difference found within Heidegger 
and post-Heideggerian political ontology, is the difference between Being and being, the 
sub-ontological difference, or the colonial ontological difference, is the “difference between 
Being and what lies below Being or that which is negatively marked as dispensable as 
well as a target of rape and murder” (2010:108)30. It is the sub-ontological difference which 
is primarily legitimized and naturalized through racializing assemblages, and which 
marks certain populations and peoples as disposable, enslaveable and the subjects of 
genocide; cast into the zone of bare life to follow Agamben’s parlance. 
In developing the sub-ontological difference, Maldonado-Torres also requires a 
new subject, because as has already been demonstrated, the coming into being of the 
 
30 Again, turning to Levinas and his efforts to phenomenologically explore what lies beyond Being (1981), 
Maldonado-Torres also proposes a trans-ontological difference.  This is the “difference between Being and 
what is beyond Being; or Being and exteriority” (2010:107). While both the trans-ontological difference and 
the sub-ontological difference are essential within Maldonado-Torres’s wider decolonial critique of 
Heideggerian philosophy, I am not concerned within this work with the former simply because it does not 
have a central role in my examination and elucidation of racializing assemblages and the marking of certain 
populations of people as either eliminable or exploitable.  
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Dasein, with its search for its own authenticity in the anticipation of and confrontation 
with its own mortality, is a being that can only be when built upon a pedestal of 
sociological catastrophe for colonized and enslaved peoples. Here Maldonado-Torres 
introduces the concept of the damné (2010:108). Drawing from Fanon, Maldonado-Torres 
describes the damné as a being that “confronts the reality of its finitude as a day to day 
adventure” (2010:109). 
For the damné, which the colonized, racialized multitudes of the Third World and, 
I would add, those encircled and entrapped within the territorialities of the northern bloc, 
Australasian and Israeli settler colonies, the thought of the european Dasein and its 
finding of authenticity in the particular instance of its anticipation and confrontation with 
death is thus an absurdity. It is absurd precisely because for the colonized, racialized 
damné death is omnipresent; a permanent marker of what constitutes its life-world in 
what Lewis Gordon refers to as the zone of non-being (2007). Fanon himself describes the 
life (or perhaps, non-life) of the damné most clearly when he says that for the colonized 
life is not a flowering of their essential qualities and ability to live life, but rather a 
permanent struggle against death that has become a day-to-day affair (1965). He notes 
that: 
This ever-menacing death is experienced as endemic famine, 
unemployment, a high death rate, an inferiority complex and the absence 
of any hope for the future. All this gnawing at the existence of the 




This is the coloniality of being. This is the essential characteristic of the sub-ontological 
difference, which becomes legitimized and naturalized within the 
modern/colonial/capitalist world-system primarily through the various and differing 
regimes of racialization, which leave Indigenous and Black peoples as those who 
primarily suffer the consequences of being beings who are inherently killable and 
disposable. The convergence between the sub-ontological difference and Italian 
biopolitical theorist Giorgio Agamben’s figure of the Homo sacer (1998) as that person who 
can be killed without being murdered should be clear31.  
2.4.1 Colonial Hauntology: Being & its Ghosts 
This can also be thought through a different, but complementary register: hauntology. 
Derived from the work of Jacques Derrida in his work Specters of Marx: The State of the 
Debt, the Work of Mourning and the New International, hauntology refers to the way in which 
what we encounter in the world as being are never actually fully present; the present 
moment is always hopelessly entangled with both the past and the future, wrapped up 
in absence (2006). Because of this, the present moment can only be made sense of by 
placing it in the context of what has both already been, and what is to come. Being, the 
category of ontological analysis, is never fully present in and of itself; it is haunted, 
 
31 Indeed, as we have placed both Cartesian and Heideggerian philosophical developments within the 
context of a world-system founded on sociological catastrophe for non-european peoples, I would suggest 
that the same should also be done with Agamben. Refer to the previous chapter, in the sub-section entitled 
“Racializing Assemblages, Sovereignty and the Colonial Order of Things” for a more in-depth analysis. 
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carrying with it always spectres of past and future, just outside the margins of what is 
visible in any given moment. 
Mark Fisher, speaking on the concept, tells us that “haunting is the state proper to 
being as such” (2013:44). And indeed, western philosophical anthropology and notions 
of being, whether we call that being Dasein, Man, ego cogito or the Rational-I are deeply 
haunted. But, perhaps more keenly, haunting is relational; the living-dead and dead-
living are inexorably linked together in a symbolic chain of meaning in which one can 
only be made sense of with regards to the other. Like musical notes in a melody. These 
ghosts are also very real. They are everywhere, often just beyond sight, but many times, 
especially as the situation seemingly etching forward towards a sea change in the global 
arrangement of power, they stand ready to burst back in upon the pages of history, if 
they have not already begun to do so. 
Past, present, and also future, begin to merge, their entanglement deepening as we 
excavate more and more. Avery Gordon says:  
Haunting raises specters, and it alters the experience of being in time, the 
way we separate the past, the present, and the future. These specters or 
ghosts appear when the trouble they represent and symptomize is no 
longer being contained or repressed or blocked from view (2008:xvi) 
It is not just a matter that the state of eurowestern being is haunted by a repressed past, 
or some imagined absence. Weaving together and between the postmodern, the Marxist 
and the decolonial, if the ego cogito is given to rise through its precursor of the ego 
conquiro/ego extermino, then we can say that the subject of Heidegger’s ontological 
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difference, the so-called Dasein, or what Foucault might call Man, and which Sylvia 
Wynter more correctly calls the ethnoclass of western bourgeois Man, is haunted by the 
non-beings who have been cast down by the colonial matrix of power in the realm of the 
sub-ontological difference. The question of the difference between Being and beings can 
only be made sense of in consideration of the terrain that lies below the entire edifice: 
colonialism; Red and Black death, and the spectral hauntings that they call forth, made 
manifest in this world by the lived lives of those not only oppressed, eliminated and 
exploited by the machinery of a global modern/colonial/capitalist world-system, but who 
persist, who resist, and who survive. Being, Dasein, Man, is only able to takes its place as 
the normative subject of western humanism, as a european particularism disguised as a 
neutral universalism, relationally through the ghosts of the damné, entire peoples made 
spectral by the war-against-all that has been waged by parasitic colonial-imperial power 
for the past five centuries. 
The being of Man, of its ability to be being-in-the-World, requires its ghosts for its 
ontological coherence, just as the regime of settler-colonial governmentality requires as 
its materialist basis Native land and Black bodies. The relational dimension of this 
haunted nature of the ontology of western world-making is also why, to return to Gordon 
and Fanon, it is difficult to speak of a Native, or an African, or an Oriental prior to that 
moment in time in which Europe stretched itself forth and land claim to the rest of the 
globe. The ontology of the Native only exists under regimes of settler-colonial and global 
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power that require its existence as a negative pole against which to define what it is not. 
This is the Native as Jodi Byrd’s Indian Errant, of Nativeness as linguistic, grammatical 
and ontological category upon which the northern bloc of settler colonialism brings itself 
forth and instantiates its ongoing existence in the world (2011:xxxv). 
If hauntology is the true nature of ontology, of being’s permanent entanglement 
with the past, with ghostly presence, and with what it is not, and the ontological 
difference carries with it always the spectral beings of the sub-ontological difference then, 
perhaps we can say that what it is that unites them is a kind of colonial hauntological 
difference. Colonial ontology is by its very nature, not only by the nature of ontology 
broadly, must be hauntological. It must be a colonial hauntology. To think again about 
something, I said nearer to the beginning of the chapter, about my concerns with the 
explosion of ontological investigations, this is ultimately what I am grasping at: ontology 
is never simply ontology. Carried within ontology is all manner of things. It carries 
relationally with it the ghosts of the past and of the past-in-the-present. But more so, those 
ghosts are not merely conjured by the exercise of abstract and metaphysical euromodern 
philosophical anthropology, but are material in their existence, both in the sense that they 
represent real beings with real lives, but also in that the that the colonial matrix of power 
that is the ironwork superstructure for western ontological mappings represents a really 
existing material relationship between peoples in this world: colonialism. Too often I feel 
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when I read the broad swathe of modern critical theory literature that the usage of the 
concept of ontology is such that it obfuscates this fundamentally materialist relationship.  
I will freely admit that perhaps this is the lingering habits of my own prior Marxist 
orthodoxy—my own personal spectres of Marx—with its over-attachment to modes and 
means of historical and dialectical materialism. But I do believe that this is an important 
matter. The ego conquiro/ego extermino that provides the bridge from coloniality to 
Cartesian thought during the birth of the euromodern épistémè is not merely an abstract 
philosophical or critical theoretical proposition. The sociological catastrophe of settler 
colonialism and the trans-Atlantic slave trade impacted real lives, and continues to 
impact real lives right now, on the hypersurface of the present. It is the real death of 
Indigenous and African peoples, the real theft of their lands and bodies, that provides the 
basis for all manner of euromodern philosophical, scientific and political musings about 
the state of the “human” and its relationship to the world.  It is also this very real casting 
out of Native and Black subjects from the ontological space of full human existence and 
experience and into the zone of the exception that is necessary for the promulgation of 
the sovereign juridical order of the settler/master. 
The relationality of the ontological and sub-ontological differences, united as they 
may be within a colonial hauntological difference, also breaks in many ways the hold of 
ontology on theoretical production. This is precisely because material relations in the 
world are inherently contingent, shifting, never fixed. This contingency and relationality 
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is the essence of my use of the concept of racializing assemblages.  In a word, reaching 
back to my older Gramscianism, this should be read as the absolute historicism of these 
categories. Racialization, which is one of the chief modalities of the sub-ontological 
difference, and that which concerns me most when discussing the ways in which the 
shifting of colonized peoples into the terrain below and outside Man takes place, is not 
static. Race does not fall from the sky readymade, by forces outside of human agency, 
human action, upon the world. And indeed, there is one of my chief disputes which much 
of current ontological thinking, which, like Michael Dillon’s critique of Agamben’s 
ontologization of Law (2005), is disturbed by a lingering ahistoricity. As the late Patrick 
Wolfe noted in his work Traces of History: Elementary Structures of Race: 
Race, it cannot be stressed strongly enough, is a process, not an ontology, 
its varying modalities so many dialectical symptoms of the ever-shifting 
hegemonic balance between those with a will to colonise and those with 
a will to be free, severally racialised in relation to each other (2016:18). 
Because “race is not a static ontology,” but an “ongoing, ever-shifting contest” (Wolfe 
2016:27) what we can perhaps say then is that there is a dynamic project, functioning 
through racializing assemblages, to make an ontology about the world. And as an inverse, 
such a system of world-making can also be unmade. Such ontological projects of world-
making can be fought, can be resisted, and can be persisted against. And this is precisely 
the history of the world. Colonized peoples have never been passive subjects of a 
euromodern history of the world. We have always been active. Always defended our 
lands, bodies and nations. 
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Thinking through these burdens and relations that ontology carries from the plane 
of the real—of the actual material-colonial relations that give rise to the euromodern 
ability to even think of the ego cogito, Rational-I, Man, or Dasein—of the relationality that 
is generally hidden within political ontology, haunting its margins, I think of the political-
philosophical project of Judith Butler in grounding the notions of precariousness and 
precarity. For Butler, precariousness, is an embodied and existential state that configures 
life, the ontology of which is only able to be grasped at within its social and political 
contexts (2004; 2009). As Isabel Lorey notes in her State of Insecurity: Government of the 
Precarious regarding such an ontology: 
These conditions [the social and political] enable historically specific 
modes of being, making it possible for bodies to survive in a certain way, 
which would not be viable without their being embedded in social, 
political and legal circumstances (2015:18). 
Importantly though for us, for my work, it is also the case, as Butler (2003; 2009; 2016) 
and Lorey (2015) describe, it is also these conditions that render some life targetable, 
murderable, ungrievable, that put some life in danger. It is these conditions which both 
allow some life to flourish, as in the general contours of (post-)Foucauldian biopolitics 
and push other life into the realm of the colonial hauntological difference. 
It is a dialectical enmeshment of ontological formulation and material 
circumstances and conditions through the processes of racializing and other assemblages. 
To think perhaps in those older Marxists ways, which I always believe that I had shed, 
yet constantly find myself returning to, this can perhaps be said to be the same dialectic 
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as that between the base and superstructure. Specifically, finding myself revisiting the 
vein of a particular Maoist-Althusserian structural dialectic (Mao 2001; Althusser 2005), 
it is a relationship where the base does not crudely and unidirectionally code and 
determine the superstructure, but where the two are mutually formative and informative 
upon one another. 
This relationality is, as I have attempted to describe, precisely what I feel is lost in 
so much current theorizing around the concept of political ontology, though I make no 
assertations as to intentionality. At heart it is dialectical in its formation, that is, to speak 
of political ontology it is these things, with the material, social and political worlds. 
Thinking of ontology in a vacuum, or, also a dangerous proposition, as if it is the 
ontological that primarily is coded and overcoded upon the plane of the Real, ultimately 
obscures the central importance of the material and renders it interminably spectral. This 
is why, following Gordon, I speak of a project to render an anti-Native world, rather than 
a world that is always-already anti-Native. Thinking of the ontological in such a way, by 
which I mean non-relationally, non-dialectically, as not-an-assemblage, I contend also 
risks shifting racialization and the biopolitics of settler coloniality into some sort of 
hyperreal space of simulation, rupturing the symbolic chain, and making discussion of 
materiality moot by making unclear the difference between the ontological, the ontic, the 
symbolic, and the material.  
The ontological world-building project of euromodernity, of the world of the 
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ethnoclass of western bourgeois Man, in his overrepresentation as the human, is 
coloniality and the colonial order of things. Nothing more. Nothing less. The purpose of 
anticolonial, decolonial, abolitionist, and even communist and communizing, resistance 
is not to defeat an ontology, but to turn back and overturn a project of ontological 
generation specifically the material, social, and political conditions that shift my life, 
Native life, the life of all colonized, racialized, and othered peoples, into a zone of 
ungrievable bare life, able to be exploited, eliminated and accumulated. The point has 
always been to change the world. 
All of this is to say that this is what I carry out when I speak of ontology. I continue 
to find usefulness in discussing ontological formation, because I think there is something 
to be found at analysis and theoretical production abstracted to the highest level, but I do 
not believe that ontology functions alone in the world. So, when I speak of ontology, I 
mean all of these things. I mean the sub-ontological difference and how the ontology of 
Being, of Cartesian thought, requires the production of a terrain below it. I mean 
hauntology, how both the terrain below ontology, as well as those who inhabit that 
terrain, are made ghostly, and haunt the margins of ontology, allowing the latter to 
instantiate and make meaning of itself in the symbolic chain of signifiers. I mean how this 
is also contingent, subject to shift and change, to the dialectic, never rigidly fixed or 
permanent. And I mean how this is material, relating to real relationships in a real-world, 
perhaps hidden at times behind a colonial parallax gap, but nevertheless actually there, 
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structuring relations, society, culture, politics and the world. When I speak of ontology, 
here and throughout the dissertation, I speak of it with the weight of all of these things 
on top, below, beside and within it. 
2.5 Ontology & Anti-Native World-Making 
Bringing this understanding back home though to the lands of the Anishinaabe, 
Menominee and Rotinonshón:ni, I cannot help but hear the echoes of Ward Churchill’s 
insightful description of the multiple, converging vectors of the death that are constantly 
arrayed against Indigenous peoples by the twin state apparatuses of the northern bloc of 
settler colonialism (1997). I also cannot help but also reflect on the Driftpile Cree scholar 
Billy-Ray Belcourt when he says that, for the Indigenous, the structural nature of settler 
colonialism:  
Absents the possibility of making life unhinged by the rote of premature 
death … a colonial ethos bent on disappearing Indians from the future, 
a rut whose chronic episodes of biopolitical tragedy are somehow still 
bearable by those who endure them. The goal is not to be better at life, 
but simply to keep at it, even if ‘it’ taxes and eschews happiness without 
becoming too conspicuous (2017a:2). 
He adds: “misery circumscribes the body’s potentialities. If misery is a part of slow 
death’s arsenal, it hangs ‘in the air like a rumor,’ then there is no easy way out. Existence 
is what taxes” (2017a:2). Jodi Byrd describes the genocidal conditions of Indigeneity 
similarly, describing the states under which we continue to try and make life as 
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“unlivable, ungrievable conditions within state-sponsored economies of slow death and 
letting” (2011:38). 
As I said above, relating to the contingent and materialist project of making an 
ontology of the world, as Natives we live in a world, or at least a world-system, in which 
the project is to make a fundamentally anti-Native world, a world in which we are 
subjected to death both slow and fast from all angles. In my thinking regarding this, that 
the project of coloniality/modernity is to make an anti-Native world, I am following the 
logic of Lewis Gordon in his disagreements with the emergent theorization(s) of 
Afropessimism, in which he asserts that the project of antiblack racism is the making of 
an antiblack world, and emphasizes the opposition of this view to those of the various 
Afropessimists who speak of the world as antiblack. He has outlined these differences in a 
number of public talks, but perhaps most recently in an interview with Jared Ball on his 
internet radio programme and podcast IMixWhatILike on the episode Afropessimism, 
Africana Philosophy and Theory (2018). The essential element for me here is that the project 
of the world, to make it anti-Native or antiblack, has never actually been fully complete, 
as I said above. It is a contingent process, not a fixed, permanent, ready-made reality. It 
is a dialectical process of world-becoming, subject to push and pull. However, unlike the 
teleological tendencies of much of Marxism, and the Hegelianism which preceded and 
infuses it, which view the world, and our myriad human societies, as on a path to 
somewhere, I reject that there is any such path that can be spoken of. There is no path, no 
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particular present or future horizon, precisely because of the contingent and dialectical 
nature of the world and the project to bring it into being. There is a project to make an 
ontology in which the world is anti-Native and antiblack to be certain. White supremacy, 
imperial white power, that continues to subject our communities, persons and bodies to 
violence from all angles continues to show us the hegemonic status of such a project. 
However, it is not fixed, not already-made, so long as the dialectic between push and pull 
continues. It cannot fully be precisely because colonized, racialized and oppressed people 
have always pushed back and resisted. 
Our racialization, our place within the sub-ontological difference, both emerges 
from that in the most basic material way, and also, in a dialectical fashion, reinforces it. 
For us, for Natives, in particular here in the northern bloc of settler colonialism, we are 
forced to even more specifically contend with how these machinations of genocide and 
disappearance function through regimes of hypersolubility. This is the technique of 
biopolitical settler-colonial governance in which Nativeness is defined juridically by the 
colonial state as something which is both quantifiable, through an imaginary around the 
notion of Native Blood, and is eminently dilutable. Mixture between Nativeness and 
anything else within the governance regimes of the United States and Canada results in 




What does this mean for us as a people? What does it mean for us as we continue 
our trek through this post-apocalyptic, postmodern tragedy of the world? In particular, 
what does it mean when people speak of people who are otherwise Natives but are 




Chapter 3. #NotYourNativeStereotype & the Question of 
White-Passing Natives 
The capacity to eliminate populations, geographies, ecologies, and ways 
of life remains the epochal potential at the heart of global racial 
modernity and its long historical present.  
– Dylan Rodríguez, Inhabiting the Impasse: Racial/Racial-Colonial Power, 
Genocide Poetics, and the Logic of Evisceration 
In the previous chapter, I noted how it was quite difficult to displace the discussion of 
my own (mis)adventures through the visualized racial dimension of Nativeness within 
the imaginarium of late capitalist/colonialist storytelling from what it means to be Native.  
In that chapter I considered it mostly through the logic of ontological thinking, and the 
problems and complications that come with path and mode of analysis, while still 
attempting to preserve some kind of meaningfully useful core.  However, the question of 
the visualized modality of Native racialization also opens discussion for yet another, 
equally, if not more so, pressing discussion, and one which I believe has more immediate 
impact for how myself and others navigate the world.  Returning to the metaphor of snow 
and snowy whiteness that I used in the previous discussion, this new, or rather not new, 
just another, complication is the possibility of being able to speak of Indigenous people 
who are supposedly “white-passing” or “white-coded,” and of the possibility of 
Indigenous access to whiteness generally. While informal social media discussions have 
seen much focus on the question of otherwise racialized people be(com)ing “white-
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passing” I want to ask what this would mean for our understanding of settler colonialism 
and the particular manifestations of coloniality and the racializing assemblages 
associated with it.  Towards that end, I want to take the discussions that have veritably 
erupted on social media and other new media and internet technology platforms on this 
topic as an essential leaping off point.  
While I recognize that Twitter and other contemporary social media platforms 
may not be thought of as within the traditional realm where academic discussion emerges 
and commences, for many Indigenous scholars today—many of whom are connected to 
each other, and to non-academic Indigenous people from all walks of life, within the 
informal, broad grouping of #NativeTwitter—it is a site (as both a descriptive of locals 
within cyberspace, as well as in the offline world) of often intense working out of ideas 
regarding theory, analysis and methodology as we all attempt to navigate our way 
through the everyday lived experience of being Indigenous within the bounds of a 
genocidal settler state. Or at least that was how I felt when I first began to write this 
chapter. I wanted very much so to treat the discussions launched on the platform as 
highly generative. And in some ways, I still do. Much of this chapter takes the form of 
my response to those discussions happening in cyberspace. However, my perspective on 
the capacity for being generative of social media debate and discussions has become 
decidedly more cynical as my relationship to social media has continued to age forward 
in time since the original setting out to write this chapter. 
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To be quite blunt about it, against the tendencies of both my own rather verbose 
writing, as well as the trends across the social sciences and humanities in general: I 
disagree with the state of most online discourse of this issue, in so far as I have been able 
to encounter as much of it as I can within the algorithmic logics of Facebook and Twitter. 
Indeed, from my own admittedly limited perspective the cyclical discourse on the subject 
of so-called “white-passing” or “white-coded” Natives has become so horizontally 
violent and toxic that I have found myself on more than one occasion recusing myself 
from further participation in the discussion.  At the cost of my own internet social capital 
and parasocial relationships, I have found myself forced to unfollow on the Twitter 
platform major names within the wide circle of what we call #NativeTwitter, in order to 
reduce the amount of virulent horizontal toxicity that I am exposed to simply through 
checking my news feed on the website. This has even gone so far as to see me deactivate 
my profile on more than one occasion, though I have always returned.  
This itself—my seemingly endless cycle of declaring my desire to quit social 
media, following through with such a declaration, and then my eventual return—is itself 
worthy to consider, if only briefly, when thinking of the possible generative qualities of 
discussions taking place increasingly on the plane of cyberspace.  There is a frenetic, 
almost panicked, temporal quality to cyberspace interactions.  For myself, there emerges 
a serious anxiety that is induced by the kind of hyperfast temporal turnover within online 
discussions.  It is maddening, to say the least.  But it is not just the crisis of temporality 
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wrought by increasing enmeshment with cyberspace, with the internet-of-things, and 
with a burgeoning post-humanist First World; it is also the expectation that not only is 
one always connected, but also that one is always engaging in those connections.  This is 
something that Mark Fisher discusses as a cybertime crisis (2017), the anxious malaise that 
seems to follow inevitably from this.  
Fisher talks of the time before the internet—which I recall, having been a child 
when there was still no regular home internet connectivity in Bermuda, and long before 
broadband was the standard—in which while you may receive a letter, a bill or some 
other communication, through the mail, through telegram, or some other means, most 
never found themselves in a position in which we incessantly followed around the mail 
delivery person, constantly checking to see if they had something for you (2017). This has 
all profoundly changed.  Email seems like almost Neolithic technology at this current 
juncture.  Facebook too, as Fisher puts it, has become almost a gentile variety of social 
media.  
To think of Fisher’s example of following around the mail delivery truck, 
constantly checking to see if there is a letter for you, this is, I feel, precisely what digital 
interactions have developed into.  It is, some ways I think, a manic, temporal crisis of the 
self.  I know for myself, and I am sure I am not alone, checking my social media, text 
messages, emails and other forms of always-on communication has completely 
penetrated my day-to-day cycle.  It is the first I think I do when I wake up in the morning.  
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I do not have an alarm next to my bed that needs to be switched off, but I do have a 
phone, which I am compelled to roll over immediately and check.  It reminds me of that 
post-Fordist adage that you can check out, but you can never leave (Fleming and Spicer 
2004).  And part of it is work-related indeed: email is the principal means by which I 
communicate with my fellow students, colleagues, professors, and advisors, as well as 
other scholars with whom I have been able to develop a relationship.  
However, it is also more than work: as I said, there is not just a panicked 
temporality with which discussion turns over digitally; there is also a constant, frantic 
drive to engage those conversations that are being had in cyberspace.  As an Indigenous 
person, when I found myself first caught in the gravitational pull of the singularity that 
is the Twitter-Sphere, I found myself nudged into interacting with the sub-orbital social 
grouping that people call #NativeTwitter.  And for a time, it was quite good.  I also 
branched out and began to interact with the wide web of leftist activists and academics 
also present on the platform.  However, what became slowly apparent to myself, as well 
as to other Natives on Twitter whom I have been able to speak with, is that so much of 
not only #NativeTwitter, but of many of the various sub-Twitter-Spheres, and indeed of 
the totality of Twitter itself, is a race to accrue social capital. The more followers one has, 
the more likes and reshares they can get, and the greater the response they can generate, 
whether positive or negative, all of which ultimately feeds back on itself as exposure 
breeds more followers.  Put simply, this is an exercise in accruing social capital on the 
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Twitter platform in the purest Bourdieusian sense (Bourdieu 1977; 1986).  Speculating 
based purely off of interpersonal conversations over the years, I believe that this is, at 
least in part, but certainly not the whole of, the source of much what I identified above as 
the kind of toxic horizontal violence that takes place within these various Twitter 
communities, #NativeTwitter being far from an exception.  Along this line of thought, the 
more outrageous a statement someone can fit into a single, or string of, one hundred 
forty-character tweets, the greater the response to them, and thus the greater their gain 
of social capital.  
Of course, as I said, this is purely speculation on my part.  I have carried out no 
empirical or ethnographic research on it, nor do I intend to.  But it is something that 
deeply interests me when I consider the possibilities of new medias as a source of 
discourse outside of traditional academic avenues.  It is also interesting in that in many 
ways these frantic cyberspace-time interactions seem to be a contact point in which 
traditional capital accumulation, and the accumulation of social capital seem to break 
down.  It has become a running gag between me and a handful of others that almost 
everyone in our digital circles now seems to have a link to their Patreon or GoFundMe 
sites on their social media pages.  But the real side of this is that it is though who have 
been able to accrue the most social capital on these platforms who have the largest pool 
from which to pull potential Patreon or GoFundMe supporters.  And in some ways, at 
least for those who have managed to climb to the top of the heap in their respective social 
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media ecologies, there is an implicit expectation that we will follow them, and eventually 
that we will transform that social media fellowship into monetary support.  
So, the idea that one can clock out, but never actually leave I believe applies here 
as well.  It is the beginning of a total ontological breakdown between real and social 
capital.  And this is I think the inevitable result of the world in which we find ourselves 
today.  The pressure to always be online, always checking one’s messages, always 
engaging is the post-Fordist postmodern transformation of our means of communication 
and ultimate penetration and monetization of that by the forces of capital.  I think here of 
Jodi Dean’s idea of communicative capitalism (2009); it is one of the logical telos of the 
neoliberal techno-Empire regime of world power rendered in 4K and 7.1 surround sound, 
dialled directly into our phones, never escapable.  It is also the deep state of economic 
precarity that this current iteration of the world-system has induced in the lives of many 
of us.  Thus, not only must we always be online and engaging, we must also always be 
hustling, always looking to be entrepreneurial.  A hyper-capitalist nightmare if there ever 
was one. 
So, it is much more than a need to wake up first thing in the morning and check 
the news or check emails that can be set aside and responded to later.  No, it is rather 
quite the case that one finds themselves always struck by a sense of “oh shit, what did I 
miss while I was [necessarily] asleep?  I have to engage this discussion right away!” There 
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is a deep trough of woe in also realizing that one has missed out with regards to the latest 
online discourse. 
It is this frenetic digital madness, induced in and by this age of capitalist realism 
and techno-tele-phonic permanent interconnectivity that drives so many of us to remain 
connected through the internet and new medias, even if our better judgement is perhaps 
telling us otherwise.  And this is where I think a lot of the real madness of online 
discussion emerges from, from these loci where temporality and necessary engagement 
meet and become hopelessly intermixed with one another.  For myself, it is a source of 
constant anxiety.  I hate checking my email, such that I can at times actually forget to 
check it.  But more so, I have come to quite honestly despise that I am never not able to 
be contacted by people.  Text, email, instant message, tweets.  There is always something, 
someway, somehow that I find someone digitally shouting in my ear through the 
internet.  Quite often I long for the time, which was not all that long ago, when I had a 
simple clamshell cell phone with no internet connectivity, no Twitter, no Instagram, only 
a simple Facebook account 
I am not a hermit though.  There are some friends, colleagues, relatives etc who I 
genuinely love, genuinely enjoy speaking with, and that is perhaps a positive pull to 
remain on social media.  These are people whom my own anxieties, depression, 
introversion and general aversions have perhaps engendered my personality (in the little 
sense I mean that I believe it is a kind of masculinist response that I struggle to shed) in 
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such a way that it is difficult me to tell them this. So, I do not want those communications 
to cease.  This is all to say that I am not here attempting to paint a picture of myself some 
kind of simplistic anti-communication Luddite.  Rather, I can try to speak of, in my own 
life, the push-pull // negative-positive dynamics of my own permanent, digital 
interconnectivity. 
But is there something positive, something perhaps meaningful that can be fished 
from under the storm tide of this communicative capitalist miasma?  In this chapter, I will 
take up the issues raised within a small wedge of a particular Twitter sub-sphere: 
#NativeTwitter.  Specifically, my goal is to engage the discussion around so-called 
“white-passing” or “white-coded” Natives, and to question whether it is possible to talk 
in any kind of theoretically and analytically meaningful way about people cognized as 
Indigenous by the settler-colonial state be(com)ing coded as white.  This is a particularly 
important topic, not necessarily even because of my own life experiences with 
misracialization, or the experiences of my mother and brother in navigating the 
racialization of Native peoples, under contemporary regimes of settler coloniality, but 
because, reflecting back on the idea of the accruement of social capital, and of the 
monetized, capitalized toxicity and horizontal violences of new media platforms, this is 
perhaps one of the most poisonous topics that seems itself, like some kind of angry 
revenant, never quite seems to die, always rearing its head again and again and again.  
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It is a discourse that always seems to have two heavily inflated poles to it.  The 
first are those so-called “white-passing” Natives who seem to take as a serious personal 
slight any critique of the social privilege that may hold vis-à-vis other Natives, as well as 
other colonized and racialized peoples, by dint of their unchosen phenotype.  The other 
pole is what can best be crudely summarized as “fuck white-passing Natives.” There is 
of course also a spectrum that runs between these poles.  I myself find myself outside of 
them almost as a default position.  But it would not be a reflection of reality, or at least 
reality as I have been able to experience it through my own life, that these are the two 
major poles of the discourse, at the very least because they are the poles whose actors are 
able to generate the greatest amount of digital noise through tweets, status updates, blog 
posts and memes. They are also two positions with which I disagree profoundly.  In fact, 
I would venture as far as to say that I believe both poles of this discourse generally miss 
the point of settler colonialism and the structures and means of Native racialization, and 
instead substitute them with superficially extremely distinct positions but which 
ultimately are reducible to simply two distinct forms of bourgeois liberal individualism.  
It is for this reason that I find this discussion such a pressing one.  I believe that 
this extreme distortion of the actual structures of Indigenous oppression risk missing the 
point by such a degree as to render incapable and ineffectual any attempt to actually 
theorize said oppression, much less open the doorway to imagining ways out of our 
current impasse.  In this discussion, I bring together discussions on the sub-ontological 
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difference and racialization from decolonial theory with the structural governance 
techniques of settler-colonial biopolitics to come to a critique of the concept of “passing” 
as, insofar as the attempt is made to think of certain contemporary Indigenous North 
Americans in this regard. 
3.1 In the Wake of #NotYourNativeStereotype 
During the late summer of 2017, during the month of August on the Twitter social media 
platform, in response to the resuscitation of the hashtag #NotYourNativeStereotype32, 
Tzotzil-Xicano Indigenous scholar Nicolás Juárez launched a discussion regarding the 
role of the visual field with regards to the racial interpellation of Native subjects, the 
experience of racial discrimination and oppression by Indigenous peoples, and the 
relationship between Indigeneity and Nativeness as racial category33. The discussion 
rapidly grew, becoming quite long and spanned the platform, crossing over and between 
 
32 The use of the “#NotYourNativeStereotype” hashtag was itself in response to a flourishing of social media 
anti-Nativeness following the controversy over so-called “Chocolate Pocahontas.” What emerged was an 
attempt to resolve a troublesome dialectic between Black north american and West Indian appropriation of 
Nativeness (in particular as a fashion aesthetic), as well as Native gatekeeping of Indigeneity which 
recapitulated colonial antiblackness (up to and including, excluding, making invisible, or simply making 
difficult active presence, people of mixed Black and Native descent from our communities). For an excellent 
critique of both sides of this broad issue, though not using this incident as its leaping off point, see Black 
Anishinaabe scholar Kyle T. Mays excellent work in Hip Hop Beats, Indigenous Rhymes: Modernity and Hip 
Hop in Indigenous North America (2018). 
33 Nicolás Juárez, accessed August 12, 2017, https://twitter.com/niJuárez/status/896404701587152896 
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several Twitter users, including myself34.  I myself had also participated in previous 
iterations of the #NotYourNativeStereotype movement within #NativeTwitter (calling it 
a movement perhaps is a stretch, but I cannot think of a better word to describe it.  
Perhaps this should be grounds to consider a new language and vocabulary to describe 
such digital social media exclusive, or near-exclusive, grassroots collections of people in 
collective motion).  
My participation prior to the August 2017 revival of the hashtag involved nothing 
more than sharing recently taken pictures of myself to the platform.  This had been the 
bulk of its earlier thrusts.  It was a demonstration that Native peoples lead a variety of 
lives, participate in a variety of subcultures, have a variety of habits and hobbies, live in 
a variety of locals, and look a variety of ways.  It was, at its core I believe, a pushing back 
against a transhistorical, transnational colonial stereotype of Nativeness that in fact never 
really was.  A pushing back against a certain simulacrum of the Native if you will.  What 
we were trying to do was to show that Natives, or Native people more broadly, are living 
beings who exist in a present now, rather than an imaginary past from which we step out 
via time travel and temporal displacement. 
 
34 Ena ͞emaehkiw Keshena accessed April 25, 2018, 
https://twitter.com/Enaemaehkiw/status/896508613019095041.  Also present in the discussion was Black 
american decolonial sociologist William Jamal Richardson, who’s contributions are found in the comments 
and replies to Juárez’s original post, rather than on his own page.  While this chapter builds primarily on 
my own critique of Juárez’s perspective, I also wish to highlight the contributions of Richardson to the 
discussion.  Finally, this chapter largely builds on and recreates the content of a blog post I wrote during 
the discussion, which outlines my basic positions on the issue, entitled “What Makes the Red Man Red?: 
Comments on Indianness, Racial-Being & Visual Schema” (Robinson 2017). 
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However, alluding back to what I wrote above about the fractious way that these 
discussions often end up developing within social media discourse, this time the 
movement of #NotYourNativeStereotype brought forth the discussion of Nativeness as a 
racial-visual category, codified, and thus rendered identifiable, within a particular 
schema.  This was the leaping off point involving myself and Juárez.  
Rooting his argument in the work of Peruvian sociologist and theorist of 
coloniality Aníbal Quijano.  Juárez argues: 
They [racial formations such as white, Black, Native and Asian] really 
only come into being following the colonization of the Americas.  It will 
be the Spanish casta system which solidifies them.  Before this, race is 
really locally determined and often tied to nationality.  However, skin 
color and phenotype will determine race after.  Race, tied to the visual 
field, becomes the marker of a group of people’s social location in the 
world and their “purpose” in the world order35. 
I think that much of what Juárez says is quite deserving of dissection and discussion.  
However, I want to premise this by saying also that I think this subject is already 
complicated exactly because, as I will argue in the words that follow, Indigeneity cannot, 
nor should, be mapped in a one-to-one fashion onto the status of the “racialized” Native 
within the visual field.  While not dismissing as unimportant the role of visual schema in 
the racial regimes forced upon Indigenous people by settler coloniality, what I do want 
to do here is to bring together these discussions of racialization within the particular 
context of the governance techniques of the northern bloc of settler colonialism.  Further, 
 
35 Nicolás Juárez, accessed August 12, 2017, https://twitter.com/niJuárez/status/896404701587152896 
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I also want to draw special attention to how these technologies develop and play out in 
a fundamentally biopolitical fashion, including as what Isabel Lorey describes as a socio-
theoretical concept and political-economic framework she calls biopolitical 
governmentality.  
Here I take quite seriously the insights of the late settler-colonial theorist and 
anthropologist Patrick Wolfe regarding the logic of elimination within settler colonialism, 
and most especially the hypersolubility of Nativeness as a category of racialized northern 
bloc politics and society.  All people who are Indigenous to the northern bloc of settler 
colonialism have encountered what I mean by this, because all must live our lives 
navigating the hypersoluble, eminently biopolitical governance and control of 
Nativeness through either the american regime of blood quantum, or the canadian regime 
of Indian Status laid out in the legalistic framework of the Indian Act. But I also believe 
that virtually every Indigenous person living within the geographical and political 
borders of the northern bloc, whether they are Indigenous to the northern bloc or not, 
have also encountered this outside of the official channels of the colonial state codification 
of Nativeness.  In fact, I would venture so far as to say that it is a near certainty that 
virtually every Indigenous person has encountered this.  I am here talking about the 
question that we are often faced with: “how Indigenous are you?” Perhaps this is 
sometimes worded in such a way that it demands specific percentages of Native racial 
quotient: “what per cent Native are you?” Sometimes, if an individual does not, for one 
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reason or another, meet an expected, simulated stereotype of what a Native supposedly 
is meant to look like, such a question is also prefaced with an exclamation of credulity: 
“really?  You are Native?  How much?” 
We have all encountered this, I think.  Whether from the apparatus of the colonial 
state, or from the everyday settler who helps to reinforce these structures in such a way 
that they are often, from an Indigenous perspective, difficult to differentiate from the 
colonial state itself (Wolfe 2016:41).  Whether it is a question or statement, dripping with 
contemptuous credulity, or from a place of honest interest.  This notion of hypersolubility 
lies at the heart of the history and ongoing racialization of Indigenous peoples in 
Occupied Turtle Island, and our structural position within the political and affective 
economies of slow death and letting die. 
Further, combining a critique of the governance techniques of Official Nativeness 
within the juridical and philosophical imaginations of the northern bloc of settler 
colonialism with the insight that said imaginations work through the hypersolubility of 
Nativeness also takes this writing in the direction of a complication of the rhetoric, both 
academic and popular, of the concept of the ability for a member of an otherwise 
racialized community to perform whiteness, in other words, for them to be “white-
passing” or “white-coded.” By “white-passing,” “white-coded,” and related rhetoric of 
“white-appearing” and “light-skinned,” I am referring to the supposed ability of mixed-
blood Indigenous peoples whose visual phenotypical characteristics (skin, eye and hair 
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colour) cleave much closer to the standard of what is accepted as “white” than they do to 
cultural and societal perceptions of stereotypical, simulated Nativeness, or at least is 
much closer to whiteness than they are to Nativeness. This claimed proximity to 
whiteness is assumed to shield those individuals from some, if not all, of the worst aspects 
of settler racism and colonial violence, thus allowing them some form of escape not 
afforded to those who appear visually to be more Native within the visual schematic 
imaginarium of late capitalism/late colonialism. 
3.1.1 Looking Native // Navigating Race 
Returning to my discussion from the previous chapter, I would also like to preface the 
words that will follow by saying that I am someone who sometimes, but not always, can 
code as Native within the eyes of different people.  As I recounted previously, stripped 
of other visual characteristics such as dress and style and length of hair, I often am racially 
misrecognized as Latinx.  When my mode of usual dress, and my hair are considered, the 
likelihood of my being seen as Native, both by non-Natives as well as other Natives, tends 
to increase.  Likewise, my younger brother, depending on context, can either be seen as 
Native, or, like myself, can be asked if he is Latinx.  The shared experience between 
myself, my brother, and our mother is that we are never coded as being white.  This is 
something which I am strongly inclined to suspect is regionally and temporally situated, 
as I argued before.  In other words, what precisely a Native person is supposed to look 
like in the eyes of non-Natives varies both from place to place, as well as from time to 
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time.  Regardless, I have brown skin and long dark hair, who often presents as dressed 
like the stereotype of a modern urban Native (woodland camouflage jacket, pro-Native 
iron-on patches, etc.).  As such, from my own lived experienced I know the anxiety of 
seeing a group of young white settlers with their heads shaved bearing down upon me 
on the sidewalk.  I know that that anxiety emerges from my appearance in the context of 
living in a city in Canada about which one of the first things I learned from friends I made, 
was that it has a problem with incident rates for hate crimes.  In these moments of racial, 
mental, and physical anxiety I cross the street almost always.  
Beyond my experiences in Kitchener-Waterloo, I learned from an early age that in 
Shawano, Wisconsin, which is the white settlement nearest to my reservation, it is much 
the same.  Though perhaps this added anxiety that I still feel in my body from my times 
spent there as a young child tells me that it is possibly worse, especially given the 
location’s status as a “border town.”  
Shawano is the place where my white Anglo-Bermudian father, in a story he and 
my mother have related to me many times over the years, first became aware of anti-
Native racism in the United States.  He is a white Bermudian.  Though he is from a 
wealthy Bermudian family, the mixture of Robinsons and Greys, he grew up poor, raised 
by a single parent, because family disputes and complications had cut off his particular 
family enclave from the rest of their accumulated wealth.  However, despite growing up 
poor, he still carried with him significant social and cultural capital in Bermuda because 
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he is white.  He may have been disenfranchised by long-gone Bermudian voting laws 
that tied voting to property ownership, but he was never the primary target of that 
disenfranchisement; that legalized colonial crime fell squarely with the goal of 
eliminating or limiting the voting power of the island’s Black majority.  He may have 
grown up poor, but because of the social and cultural capital of whiteness in a Bermudian 
society that is still deeply mired in antiblackness and racial problems twenty-one years 
after the final end of white minority rule, he was able to attend the premier British-style 
private white boy’s school on the island, Saltus Grammar School. In fact, my younger 
brother and I, who attended Warwick Academy, the oldest continuously operating 
English-language school in the Americas, are the only children, raised in Bermuda, from 
our father’s branch of the Robinson family who did not attend Saltus, especially after 
1992 when the school became fully co-educational.  
So, my father carries this social and cultural capital with him.  It is no doubt what 
allowed him, with perhaps some weight attached to his family name (and the family 
names of our close kin: Grey and Gosling36) as if some kind of capitalist Jungian 
archetype, to become how my mother describes him: a self-made man, from poor white 
boy to taking mail-in RCA electronics courses and working at ZBM radio station, to 
 
36 As in Gosling’s Black Seal Rum.  Readily available in LCBO’s across the Province of Ontario, and one of 
the most highly regarded rums in the world.  A staple of almost all Bermudian liquor cabinets and kitchens, 
added to fish chowder, rum cakes, any number of cocktails, or just drunk straight.  My family produces it 
and has for well over a century. 
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working for IBM selling analogue machine calculators and computers and receiving 
specialized marketing training, to transforming that specialized training through direct 
training under the Gallo family about wine, to owning his own wine and spirit company, 
to working as the Director of Wine one of the two largest wine, beer and spirit companies 
in Bermuda, working to rival the company of our cousins. He did all of these things, and 
in so many ways I would never have gotten to where I am without him.  And he may 
have grown up poor.  He may have grown up disenfranchised.  He may have had to pull 
himself up by his bootstraps in a capitalist fairy-tale come to life.  He may have done all 
of these things, faced all of those trials, but he did so with one overwhelming advantage 
at his side: he is also white in a deeply antiblack society.  I can never discount the 
profound advantage that that granted him, no matter his other hardships. 
My father is also not a racist.  I do not think that he has a racist bone anywhere in 
his body.  Indeed, I think that he would find the idea truly abhorrent.  He has always 
been for me the exception that puts to lie the old phase of someone or something “being 
a product of their time.” He is was born in 1938.  But his experience with race was shaped 
in the deepest of ways by the Bermudian context.  While Bermuda’s racial geography has 
nuance, including Portuguese people being white or non-white depending on context, 
and the presence of the people of St. David’s Island on the far east end of the island, many 
of whom are from old mixed-race families combining the bloodlines of enslaved Blacks, 
Irish indentured servants and also Natives from the northeastern seaboard, pressed into 
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colonial bondage in the wake of Metacom's War, its broad outlines have always been 
shaped by the dichotomy between Black and white. Setting aside the distant kin of the 
northeastern Algonkians on St. David’s Island, my father had really no prior experience 
with people Indigenous to Turtle Island, much less the colonialism and racism that they 
face, prior to beginning his relationship with my mother.  
However, it was during one incident in particular, when my brother and I were 
young children when our family was in Shawano, and we went into an antique store in 
town, and my father began talking to the clerk about how we were from Bermuda.  
According to my mother, this allowed the clerk the social space to be able to “go off” on 
a racist rant about “those Indians” and in particular “those uppity Indians with their 
casino.” The clerk was, of course, speaking of my people, the people of my father’s 
children, and of his wife, the Menominee.  For my father, someone for whom, as I said, 
their only bona fide experience with racial tensions up to that period in his life was the 
white-Black racial issues that have so deeply scared Bermudian society and politics, this 
came to him as an early and significant shock.  In this moment he learned that anti-Native 
racism in the United States is very real, and that it is very much an issue.  I believe very 
much so that this shocked him profoundly.  
Beyond casting a light onto the real-world truth about anti-Native racism to my 
Anglo-Bermudian father, Shawano, for my mother, has also been a site in which the 
contingent, mutable nature of Native racialization has also been demonstrated to me.  
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About a year onwards from my father’s experience in the antique store we were back 
again in Shawano, this time because one of my uncles was getting married.  In this story, 
my mother decided to step into a bar to have a few drinks.  Upon entering she was 
immediately identified as Native, in particular, again, as “one of those Indians” but the 
white settler patrons of the establishment.  She was told, in no uncertain terms, that this 
place was not for her.  However, in a moment of deft social gymnastics, she replied back 
these racist Shawano patrons that she was from Bermuda.  Needing to verify the identity 
of this woman, who they saw instantly as “one of those Indians,” they demanded proof 
from her.  Probably quite luckily for her, in her wallet was her Bermudian driver’s licence.  
She pulled it out to show them that she was indeed from Bermuda.  While this was not 
an open refutation from her that she was an Indian, it is quite likely the case that these 
racists from Small Town USA, lacked any relevant knowledge about Bermuda beyond 
the infamous oceanic triangle that bears its name.  Because they likely did not know that 
Bermuda is a country with a Black majority (from my experiences, Shawano is as 
antiblack as it is anti-Native.  This is likely a surprise to no one), or that an Indian could 
make their way to, and eventually their life in, Bermuda this, I would contend, produced 
a moment of both confusion and confirmation between my mother and the patrons of the 
bar.  
A short-circuiting of the machinery of american racialization is what I believe 
happened in that moment.  This calmed down the racial animosity the other patrons had 
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for her in particular, but again, as with my father’s story above, allowed the white patrons 
to feel that they then had the space within which to engage in anti-Native racism. 
I have always known about these stories.  As such the lessons from them have 
been ones that I have always carried with me.  
However, especially as I have grown older, I have also become acutely aware that 
many of my relatives who may fall into a category of “white-appearing” would also have 
to be careful when navigating the space of the border town.  While it is certainly not the 
same kind of caution that my relatives and other Menominee who appear “more Native,” 
in that simulated and stereotypical kind of way, that is, within the visual field, it is still 
there, and any of them has to be permanently mindful of that.  Shawano is not a 
welcoming, or probably even truly safe place for Natives, especially in this era of creeping 
fascism, which is really just already existing settler colonialism with the dials pushes 
firmly towards eleven (Robinson 2017).  
This is for one simple reason: there are other things that can give away the Native 
racial status of a person beyond simply being identified as such within the visual field.  
Names are a good example of this.  Within our community, many families have been able 
to retain their traditional Menominee names, though of course they have often been 
transformed somewhat to fit within the western paradigm of a family name, and to 
accommodate european and euro-settler difficulty with the pronunciation of 
Oma͞eqnomenēweqnaesen.  For example, many us, including my family, carry 
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Menominee names such as Keshena, Waukechon, Awanohopay, Muqsahkwat, 
Nahwahquaw, O’Kimosh, Pyatskowit, Waukau, Waupoose, Besaw and others. 
For relatives of mine who carry one of these names, if they were to make the trek 
into this border town—which they often do as our reservation lacks certain essential 
amenities such as a grocery store—and put down a piece of I.D., a credit card or 
something else that reads an obviously Menominee name, whether it is with the police, 
the clerk at the antique store, the bartender, the gas station attendant etc., they will be 
immediately identified as Native, and even more so as a Menominee, or as my mother 
put it, “one of those Indians.” This is immediate identification of one as Native absent 
visual confirmation of a person being such within the settler-colonial visual schema of 
race.  And the possibility of experiencing anti-Native racism in that spatial and temporal 
location for these relatives is just as much as my mother when she walks into a bar in that 
town and is visually identified as Native.  
And this is the case of names that are immediately identifiable as having their 
origin in a Native language.  In our community in Wisconsin, names such as Corn or Deer 
also fit into the category of being coded as Native, even though we may think of them as 
words that are commonly found and used in everyday english speech of the northern 
bloc settler population.  
Moving back this way, back to southern Ontario, in this story, I have heard similar 
tales from Native people here describing their lived experiences.  During my time here I 
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have come to know well several members of the Six Nations of the Grand River 
community, and one friend, in particular, has related to me how throughout her life her 
family name has been one that is easily identifiable as Indigenous: Smoke.  When I asked 
her about this during lunch one day, she told me that settlers in the region are even often 
able to specifically place her community affiliation with Six Nations simply because of 
the name Smoke.  Smoke, Deer, Corn, these are all words of everyday use in the language 
of the everyday settler.  Quite the case, they are not even of any Indigenous etymology, 
ultimately rooted as they are in Germanic and Romance languages, and further into the 
past than that, proto-Indo-European.  Yet these words, when applied as names, in 
temporal and spatial locals immediately connote that their bearer is of Native north 
american background.  There is a reason for this of course.  There is a lot history of 
Indigenous names being translated into settler languages, here primarily english, and 
through time those translations shortening to a single word.  One can think of the great 
Hunkpapa Lakota resistance leader Tȟatȟáŋka Íyotake, who is best known by the settler 
approximation of that name: Sitting Bull.  My family was lucky to retain our actual 
Menominee name, Keshena, yet it could have just as easily happened to us.  Keshena 
roughly translates, so I am told, to Bird-Traveling-Swiftly-Over-Water, and if our name 
had been translated into an approximation and then, through time, been shortened it 
could have just as easily been that my mother’s family would now be known by a name 
such as Bird, Swift or Water. 
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Such that it is that these names, even though they might be superficially thought 
of as words from the modern dialectics of english, they are ultimately rooted in our 
original Indigenous names.  And so, in a sense, they still do carry the weight of those 
words that have been lost to colonization.  Experience would seem to show that for the 
settler, especially the settler who is in regular proximity or contact with Natives, this fact 
is not lost upon them either.  Thus, these names begin to function as an alternative, non-
visual, means of identity interpellation.  Not a visual hailing, but a hailing of the name.  
Further, it not even strictly family names; increasingly Natives, Menominee, and 
others, are reclaiming traditional “First names” against centuries of imposed euro-
christian ones.  While they are often not given names on a birth certificate, many Native 
people in my own circle of friends of over the years have received so-called “Spirit 
Names,” “Indian Names” or “Ceremonial Names” and have chosen increasingly to use 
them as a chosen name by which to be identified in everyday life.  This is the case in my 
own life.  As described previously, to many close friends, colleagues and family members 
who have known me from the time before 2011, I am called, and answer to, the european 
name of Rowland, but on social media, and increasingly since 2014 in the public sphere, 
I have made a conscious choice to answer to my Menominee name of Ena͞emaehkiw. This 
is now the name by which many people exclusively identify me.  This is, most certainly I 
think, less common than identification via family name, but it is yet another avenue that 
exists in the world, and it is one that I believe will only grow as more and more 
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Indigenous peoples shrug off the identifiers that have been imposed upon us, and begin 
to take up the mantle of our original names. 
Additionally, there are also other factors other than having skin the tone of fertile 
soil or buffalo leather that can quickly identify one as Native within the visual field.  
These factors are quite important in areas where Natives, even prior to contact event, did 
not meet the stereotype in the popular settler imaginary of a Native who, or where there 
is a long history of hybridity (forced and unforced).  These include things like the 
stereotypical facial features of epicanthic eye-folds and high cheekbones.  Again, turning 
to my own lived experience, I have many cousins, aunts, and uncles who, for example, 
are much fairer skinned than I but who look far more like Natives in terms of these kinds 
of facial features.  They are just as much as I am—based on my skin colour, hair 
length/colour and mode of dress—instantly coded and identified as Native by these 
phenotypic features. 
However, these sorts of other physical factors have also led to the interesting 
experience of what can only be described as a kind of racial misidentification, and this 
leads into the problematic of passing, which is that what an Indigenous north american 
person is supposed to look like is not, and I would argue likely never has been. The idea 
of “what a Native person is supposed to look like” is I think pure simulacra; a simulated 
image of something without any actual grounding in reality, that reflects no true content.  
More to the fact, that it is a simulacrum, the image of this has never been consistent across 
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time and space.  Again, thinking of my own family, in particular my mother’s late brother 
Lee, when I see them in picture or look back on the many times, we have been together, 
to me they look very much so like what my mental image of what a Native is supposed 
to be is.  I also believe that they look very much so what an “obvious Native” is, in terms 
of appearance, walking the streets of a canadian city such as Saskatoon, which I had the 
opportunity to visit during the writing of this chapter, and from which I have gotten to 
know, to lesser or greater degrees, several Native people. However, despite this, to me, 
obvious racial-visuality as Natives, my uncle, and to a lesser extent his son, are often mis-
racialized in Milwaukee as East Asians.  In fact, my Uncle Lee would often be hailed on 
the bus with a “hey, Chinaman” call.  I recently asked my mother about this and she 
related to me that “Lee was always known as the little Chinese boy.” Alex, his son, used 
to mock this on the social media website Instagram by having the name 
“Slanty_Eyes_Keshena.” Even my mother, as I talked about last chapter, often found 
herself in Bermuda misidentified as my father’s “Chinese girlfriend.” 
This for me has always raised the question of whether that would carry over to a 
context such as here in Southern Ontario, a place where I believe my uncle and cousin 
look very much so like the Natives I interact with on a daily basis, and also where the 
community of various East Asian peoples and nationalities is heavily represented. Would 
people still have called my uncle “Chinaman” here?  Or would he have been seen him 
and his son as Indigenous people?  Unfortunately, with his passing over a decade ago it 
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would not be possible to test this hypothesis, so I am left with only speculation, but a 
speculation that is informed by the entirety of my collected lived experience and the 
stories and anecdotes passed on and down by my relatives and friends.  
3.2 Power, Violence, & Racialization 
And this brings me to what I ultimately want to discuss here, which is the notion of racial 
passing, specifically the ability to pass as white within any or all social, cultural, and 
political contexts.  However I think that in order to do so we have to detach ourselves 
somewhat the individual quotidian experience of being visually identified as a member 
of some sort of so-called “Red Race” within the microphysics of power and the violence 
that that of course absolutely brings from the macro-structural power that defines one as 
legally being Native within a myriad of zones of contestation, and the violence that 
weighs so heavily down on our peoples and nations from that level. These are particular 
experiences that only those who are juridically coded as Native—that is to say, they are 
legally Native—by the occupational settler states of the northern bloc must endure, and 
not our southern relatives who may well be Indigenous, or even called Indios/Indians in 
their countries of origin, who are resident north of the U.S.-Mexican boundary line, such 
as Nicolás Juárez. It is important to make this distinction because, as I will argue, 
ultimately the arbiter of Nativeness, and thus who is coded and legally defined as a 
Native, is the governance technologies of settler coloniality within the northern bloc.  
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To be quite clear, this is not in any way a denial of the Indigeneity from relatives 
to the south.  I would never imply that, nor would I ever attempt to, or seek to, remove 
that from them.  They are as dear to me as my relatives from the United States and 
Canada, and my liberation and the liberation of all Indigenous people in the northern 
bloc must be understood, I passionately believe, as a single continent-spanning struggle 
from Baffin Island to Tierra del Fuego.  But the fact that one may be Native in Mexico, 
Venezuela, Dominica, Peru, Brazil or anywhere does not become transferred when one is 
a resident of the northern bloc.  What I think I am trying to say here is that they may be 
Natives, but they do not transform into the Natives who are the targets of U.S. and 
Canadian eliminative violence when the border is crossed.  The logics of settler-colonial 
elimination within the northern bloc, especially in this post-frontier era of biopolitical 
governance and control, are not applied to them, though they may be just as exposed to 
the violence of racist settlers in a direct and very personal way as any other non-white 
racialized and colonized people within these artificial-yet-real borders. 
Returning to the discussion though, it is precisely because of this difference 
between the micro- and macro-physics of power within the functioning of the settler state 
apparatus and its attendant civil society that I would argue, following Wolfe (2016) that 
the hypersoluble and inherently unstable nature of Native racial-content functions 
ultimately as a biogenic extension of frontier homicide within the racial, juridical and 
philosophical imaginings of settler power. Consequently, I would not go as far as Juárez 
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(2016) as to say that with regards to White Natives (to use a term I strongly disagree with 
but derived from Juárez’s discussions) the technologies of genocide view the project as 
complete.  This is because, via biopolitical governance technologies such as blood 
quantum in the United States, and the tiered and regulated system of Indian Status within 
the Indian Act in Canada, the state is still producing juridically-coded Indians, and 
therefore, I would argue, individuals who are racially-coded as Natives within the macro-
structures of settler sovereign power, even if they do not have to bear the experience of 
visual interpellation as Native due to various phenotypic expressions, such as the already 
discussed skin-colour or stereotypically Native fascial features. Given these people’s 
ability to continue to produce Native children within the legal field, the juridical 
technologies of genocide continue to be constantly arrayed against them. 
And here there is an additional point to be made: if we follow, and I do, the 
thinking of Frank B. Wilderson, III, that the ultimate idiom of power is violence (2010) 
then we have to ask who or what is the ultimate arbiter of violence within the northern 
bloc of settler colonialism?  I argue that quite simply the ultimate arbiter of violence is the 
sovereign power of the settler-colonial state.  While I would agree with Wolfe (2016) that, 
from the perspective of the Indigenous, it is often difficult to tell the difference between 
the settler state itself and the individual or even community of settlers whom have often 
functioned as the former’s principal means of expansion, ultimately the core of settler 
power lies within the relative autonomy of the state.  
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This renders the expressions of everyday street-level racism and violence by 
individual settlers still important to understand, but ultimately not the issue of greatest 
importance when it comes to investigating and theorizing the nature and raison d'être of 
settler-colonial violence.  Again, this is not an attempt to belittle or to dismiss the violence 
of the street-level encounter with a racist police officer, a racist security guard, or just an 
everyday racist settler.  I would never dismiss that.  I could never dismiss that.  Too many 
people I know and love have been victims of such violence.  Horrible violence.  I have 
seen how it has impacted their lives, and in turn how it has impacted everyone close to 
them, including myself.  Even from my own experience, I know that unease of feeling 
that such violence is about to befall you.  This is why I cross the street in downtown 
Kitchener.  But as horrifying as that violence is, it is not, so I argue, the inner violence of 
the settler-colonial logic of elimination.  Rather it is an outward manifestation of social, 
political, cultural, and yes, even ontological, structures that are rooted in the deeper 
violences that define settler colonialism proper to such: the elimination of Indigenous peoples 
as peoples.  
Thus, it becomes even more important to recognize and be clear that those people 
who possess Indian Status, regardless of their phenotypic expression, are, in the eyes of 
the colonial state of the northern bloc, absolutely coded as part of the so-called “Native 
race.” It must also be likewise noted that this is separate from, though not entirely 
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unrelated to, belonging to anyone given specific First Nations, Native American, Métis 
or Inuit community.  
What is at the core of this issue is how discussions such as these—the issue, or 
rather even the possibility of, existing, and living, as “white-passing” Indigenous 
persons—occludes the question of the existence of people who, despite being readily 
phenotypically identified as Natives within the visual field (due to skin tone, hair 
colour/length/style, facial features etc.) are not juridically coded as Natives by the 
governance technologies of the colonial state in the northern bloc. These are people and 
lived experiences that are far more common than I believe the current discourse within 
the Indigenous community, both offline and online, gives credence to.  Further, they are 
persons, communities and lived-experiences which find the roots of their existence 
precisely because the technologies of elimination function along the lines of a 
hypersoluble and unstable Native racial-content. 
In excavating this I feel that it is also necessary to set aside the question of these 
people’s Indigeneity.  In my own conscious everyday social, political, familial, and 
personal relations and actions I accept their Indigeneity.  This is something which for me 
extends beyond not just non-Status and unenrolled Indians to include our relatives who 
are citizens of Nations that possess only state-level recognition and those who lack 
recognition because they never surrendered, as well as to our many, if not most, of our 
Genízaro, southern & Caribbean Native, Afro-indigenous, Freedmen and decolonizing 
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Mestizo/Mestiço family. I feel that it is important to bracket this question, while also 
recognizing and noting my own personal feelings on it, because I do not believe it is 
relevant to the broader discussion that I am making here. 
3.2.1 Native Biopolitics: It is in the Blood 
Looking at the specific question of non-Status Indians in Canada the reasons that these 
people exist within the kind of racial-limbo that they do ultimately traces back to colonial-
state arbitration of Nativeness within this country and how that has been ever more 
deeply coded by regimes of biopolitical control.  For example, as discussed extensively 
by Mohawk scholar Audra Simpson in her book Mohawk Interruptus: Political Life Across 
the Borders of Settler States, prior to the passing of Bill C-31 in 1985, a Status Indian woman 
who married any person lacking Indian Status lost theirs (2014).  While C-31 did end what 
was a euro-patriarchal preference within the Indian Act’s provisions of Status 
inheritance, the effects of the pre-C-31 era, and other, still existing legal constructs such 
as the so-called “Double Grandmother Rule” have continued to function by moving 
people out of the racial category of Native and merging them irrevocably into the settler 
mainstream, to borrow the phrasing of Wolfe (2013a). In this way, following Scott Lauria 
Morgensen, “Settler colonialism is exemplary of the processes of biopower” (2011:52), 
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and further that “Adjudicating life for Indigenous people defines settler law’s extension 
of elimination” (62)37. 
 
Figure 1: U.S. Bureau of Indian Affairs Blood Quantum Chart. Source: Caught in the Crossfire of Blood Quantum 
and Fallacious Reasoning, Chelsea Vowel (2012). 
 
37 I feel it should be pointed out here that this discussion of the Indian Act, and the inheritance of Indian 
Status, within Canada applies only to those who are juridically recognized under the Indian Act as Indians, 
and not to Natives broadly conceived and inclusive of the Inuit, Métis and other Indigenous peoples.  In 
this country much confusion tends to follow the fact legal fact that Supreme Court of Canada cases in 1939 
and 2016 respectively ruled that Inuit and later Metis and non-Status Indians were “Indians.”  These cases 
though did not deal with Indian Status under the Indian Act, but rather whether or not they were “Indians” 
with regards to s. 91(24) of the Constitution Act, 1867, and thus were to answer the question of whether or 
not they were the responsibility of the federal or provincial governments (Indians, defined as such, being 
the responsibility of the federal government).  Thus contrary to what many in Canada have come to believe, 
these rulings, the 2016 Daniels case in particular, did not create new Status Indians (Vowel 2016:28). In the 
United States however both Indians and the Kānaka Maoli are governed under the discursively cognate 
logics of blood quantum (Kauanui 2008).  Regardless, I take these juridical racializing assemblages of 
Official Nativeness to be paradigmatic of settler-colonial thinking regarding Natives regardless of whether 
they come under the Indian Act or are governed by blood quantum, because the logics of them have become 
deeply embedded in popular cultural thinking of Nativeness and what it means to be Native. 
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Today in Canada this primarily takes place through the still existing procedures 
of the Indian Act, which, like blood quantum in the United States, functions via constructs 
of a hypersoluble and unstable Native racial-content.  In a, perhaps simplistic, 
breakdown, within the legal structures of Canada there are essentially two types of 
Indian Status: 6(1) and 6(2).  For individuals possessing one or the other of these Status 
categories, both of them represent the possession of full Indian Status in terms of state 
cognition.  From the standpoint of technical legal thinking in Canada, there is no such 
thing as being “half-Indian” or possessing some form of half-status.  But there is a 
difference between these two categories of Indian Status though.  Where this essential 
difference between them lies is in their ability to continue producing Indian children 
within a given reproductive context. 
And I say a given reproductive context here, rather than familial, or kin, or 
parental pairing, or any other way I could phrase it, not to sound like a dry high school 
or Freshman biology textbook, as if to point out the purely mechanical aspect of human 
sexual reproduction, but rather to make the point that this is an eminently biopolitical 
process. It is the control of reproduction, of the ability to reproduce one’s colonized 
people, through the bearing of children.  It is control over perhaps not of the mechanism 
of a particular group of people’s sexual reproduction, but certainly of the outcome.  It is 
the exercise of biopower, pure and simple.  And here we can see the fundamental unity 
of racialization and the control of human sexuality (Wolfe 2016:28-29). 
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Under the current algorithmic configurations of canadian Native law as governed 
by the Indian Act, a person possessing 6(1) Indian Status is the child of two Status Indians, 
while a 6(2) is the child of a 6(1) Status Indian and an individual not possessing Status.  
This is the key difference between these two kinds of Indian Status in Canada.  While a 
6(2) Indian is not a “half-Indian,” as both 6(1) and 6(2) represent “full Status,” in child-
producing pairings between people a person possessing 6(1) Status will always produce 
another Indian.  This is the case whether they have a child with a person possessing 6(1) 
or 6(2) status, or even someone who has no Status all together.  However, the situation is 
quite different for individuals with 6(2) Indian Status.  While a 6(2) within certain 
parental pairings will produce a Status Indian, namely if the other parent is a person with 
either  6(1) or 6(2) Status Indian, both of which will produce a child possessing 6(1) Status, 
in any kind of pairing with a person not possessing Status, their child(ren) will not be an 
Indian within the legal cognition of the canadian settler-colonial state. Figure 2 gives a 
visual breakdown of possible parental pairings and the status outcomes of their children 




Figure 2: Chart of Canadian Indian Status Inheritance. Not seen here is the combination of a 6(2) parent with another 
6(2), which produces a child holding 6(1) Indian Status. Source: Got Status? Indian Status in Canada, Sort of 
Explained, Chelsea Vowel (2011) 
This is what I believe to be the essential trick of colonial canadian law, which is 
that in the pure production of Status Indian children, the fact that a pairing of a 6(2) with 
a non-Status person creates a non-Indian child.  The salient element here is that persons 
who are non-Indians in this regards includes many who may be racialized as Indians by 
the myriad of other means already discussed within this chapter—including the visual 
schema that Juárez would like to reduce Indianness into—but who for reasons of the 
Indian Act, past and present, are not in possession of either 6(1) or 6(2) Status.  
For example, the child of a person possessing 6(2) Status and a person who lacks 
Status because of the Double Grandmother Rule or whose mother married a non-Status 
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person prior to 1985, will produce a non-Status child.  This is something I actually 
consider when thinking about the future course of my life here in Canada.  I am 
Menominee, a Nation from south of the Medicine Line.  While the United States 
recognizes the Jay Treaty, meaning that Status Indians from Canada can cross the border, 
seek work, obtain citizenship and can even go through the motions to be recognized by 
the U.S. state as an Indian under certain conditions (meaning, if they can prove blood 
quantum above a certain degree), Canada’s Supreme Court has ruled that this country 
does not inherit Britain’s obligations stemming from the treaty (Standing Senate 
Committee on Aboriginal People 2016). Consequently, I do not have, and can never have, 
recognition as an Indian within the legal web of the canadian state.  Thus, if I were to 
have a child with an Indian of 6(2) status our child would be juridically coded as non-
Indian, no matter their phenotypic expression38. 
The point I am arguing here is that, contra Juárez, within the racial, juridical and 
philosophical imaginings of the northern bloc of settler colonialism the technologies of 
the logic of elimination actually consider the project of removal to be more complete with 
regards to those individuals who, while they may more easily be visually identifiable as 
a stereotypical Native, yet lack official State recognition as Native, than it does with 
 
38 The situation would be similar on the other side of the border: if I would to have a child with a Status 
Indian from Canada, they would have to be able to account for their blood quantum from the canadian side 
in order to be recognized as an Indian in the United States.  However, as this is, in my experience, not 
something that many canadian Indians account for, because they do not have to, it would be a difficult, 
though not impossible task. 
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regards to those people who may not quite fit the experience of easy visual interpellation 
as Native but who continue to possess official recognition from the settler-colonial State 
as Native. This is important.  And this is why I argue it is essential not only to consider 
the micro-physics of settler-colonial racial power and how they may or may not be 
deployed during an everyday street-level encounter, but also, and more importantly, the 
overarching structures of settler sovereign power that covers the entirety of the State and 
civil society. 
In fact, this also speaks in a direct way to part of the root of what I see as Juárez’s 
misunderstanding: his thinking around racialization, and Native racialization in 
particular, takes its cues in large part from a Latin American context, seen in his reliance 
upon Quijano.  While that array of scholars and theorists if profoundly helpful, to the 
degree that much of my own analysis is indebted deeply to the thinking around 
coloniality put forward by Quijano and others, it is a mistake to mechanistically transpose 
Quijano or other’s thinking on racialization in one context onto another.  This is for the 
simple fact that the structures, functions, and underlying logic of the colonial matrix of 
power in Latin America are different from the settler coloniality of the northern bloc, even 
as they share much in common.  This is Wolfe’s fundamental point in referring to race(s) 
and racialization as a trace of colonial history; differing regimes of racialization and racial 
production are projections of distinct colonial experiences (2016).  Simply put, the 
northern bloc as a totality exist as a settler-colonial regime, whereas it is the case in Latin 
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America that certain countries, or even different regions within countries, may manifest 
elements, if not a full-on project, of settler-colonial elimination and replacement, in other 
national and sub-national zones the regime is closer to forms of internal colonialism 
(Casanova 1965). Therefore, it would be folly to assume that the theorization of 
racialization found in the work of a Peruvian scholar such as Quijano could be easily 
drawn upon in order to understand the mechanics and manifestations of Native 
racialization in Canada or the United States and can only lead to all manner of 
mistheorization and misunderstanding.  
What is at stake here in this argument is the need for a fundamentally materialist 
analysis of settler colonialism and its modes of racialization as they exist currently in the 
northern bloc of settler colonialism.  What is the role of racialization?  What kind of set of 
material relations between peoples does it emerge from?  What role does it play?  As 
above, I believe strongly along the lines of the Wolfe (2016b) that race, racialization, and 
racism are traces of colonial history.  The fact that differential regimes of racialization 
exist, such as between peoples of Indigenous and African descent within the northern 
bloc—to say nothing of the differences between the northern bloc and Latin America—is 
representative of the differential colonial regimes faced by these two groups of peoples, 
one centred around elimination to facilitate the theft of land and the need to silence the 
continued existence of alternative and prior sovereign territorialities, and the other 
around the accumulability as physical human capital and labour exploitation (Wolfe 
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2016). That is, the differential racialization of Indigenous and African people, while 
emanating from the same source—the structurally and ontologically overlapped 
northern settler-colonial slave estates—reflects differential sets of material relations 
between those peoples and that source. 
3.3 Again on the Problems of Ontology 
This is something that I believe is lost in approaches to these issues that increasingly base 
themselves in a turn to the ontological as a method of investigation and theorization, as I 
attempted to outline and argue in the previous chapter.  These kinds of arguments and 
analysis, such as those exhibited by at least some of the principal theorists of 
Afropessimism, namely Frank Wilderson, III (2010) and Jared Sexton (2008), can often 
begin to drift into the territory of a philosophical transcendental idealism in which the 
proverbial goalposts for analysis can be continuously moved in order to fit whatever 
socio-political and philosophical paradigm is being elaborated. It is not to devalue the 
role and the insights of political ontology in these matters, though as I have already 
discussed I feel that it is important that we consider strongly the problematizing of the 
concepts and categories of political ontology (including political ontology itself) put 
forwards by Maldonado-Torres, Gordon and others. For Maldonado-Torres, his 
elaboration of the concept of race and racialization as sub-ontological difference 
converges with Wolfe’s concept of the trace of history, in placing emphasis upon the 
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materiality of the relations from which the ideology of race emerged39.  Indeed, the 
concept of race is ideology par excellence40, though following Weheliye I caution that race is 
not only ideology, but a racializing assemblage that brings together networks of ideology, 
bodies, desires, forces, velocities, institutions, interests, intensities towards the 
differentiation of the biological species of humanity into full humanness, Man, and not-
 
39 My usage of the concept of ideology here is explicitly Marxist in fashion.  While all Marxist thinking on 
ideology in some way traces itself to Marx’s own two texts that provide, in perhaps divergent fashions, 
treatments on the subject—The German Ideology (1988) and Capital Vol. 1 (1977)—my particular thinking on 
ideology references the line of thought that emanates from French Marxist philosopher Louis Althusser, 
primarily in his work On the Reproduction of Capital: Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses (2014), and has 
been continued into today by perhaps his best known interlocutor, Slavoj Žižek, who reads Althusser in 
combination with Lacanian psychoanalysis in The Plague of Fantasies (2009a) and The Sublime Object of 
Ideology (2009b). Following this tradition of thinking, I treat ideology as something which obfuscates actual 
material relations between peoples.  In this regard, the ideas of race and racialization, and more importantly 
the networked workings of racializing assemblages, occlude the material relations of settler colonialism, 
slavery, exploitation, and other forms of colonial domination.  Beyond Althusser’s direct work on the topic 
of ideology and their deployment within a hybrid Lacanian analysis by Žižek, my particular thinking on 
race as the ideological mask of colonialism is indebted also to Patrick Wolfe who, as Ben Silverstein 
memorialized him, “insisted on thinking about race as one element of the Althusserian totality, an 
overdetermined level of social formation,” and who brought, contra the theoretical sectarianism of many 
latter-day Marxists, “poststructuralist rigor to bear on materialist approaches to ideology” (2016:319). 
40 I believe that an argument can be made that the concept of ontology, at the very least in its deployment 
as political ontology, is also a primary example ideology.  I mean this in that while it may make explicit 
reference to material social relations as the source for the supposed ontological state of the world that it is 
attempting to illuminate, as in the case of the work of many Afropessimists or Juárez’s Redness Studies, I 
believe it ultimately actually obfuscates said material social relations by elevating the superstructural to the 
level of the ontological. Following Lewis Gordon (2018) I consider this move to be an ontological leap which 
assumes, incorrectly, an ontologically complete social world.  Importantly this ignores that the social world, 
the world of human activity, is not ontologically complete precisely because the world is always in motion 
and because colonized people have always resisted attempts to make the world truly anti-Indigenous or 
antiblack.  Assuming, as some theorists like Jared Sexton (2011) argue we should, that it is easier to assume 
the world is ontologically complete leads to a myriad of problems.  Hence its ideological function.  
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quite-humans and non-humans, and which benefit the former (2014)41.  Regardless, what 
is key is that we unsettle the way which treating race “as ontological is to recapitulate 
colonizing thought, and to take colonial ideology as truth” (Kauanui 2017:258). 
Thus, while I find the work of Juárez in elaborating what he calls Redness Studies 
(2014) to be extremely interesting and valuable, and further have gleaned significant 
insight from other Indigenous scholars whom I read as being deeply rooted in this kind 
of ontological turn, I believe that the same problems are present within their work. Thus, 
I believe that the foundational place of material relationships between peoples and the 
structures of power that mediate them is occluded in these kinds of political ontological 
approaches.   
 
41 I make this caution, because there is a certain tendency with Marxism—primarily Gramscian, 
Althusserian, and various post-Marxist varieties—and Marxist-inflected Critical Whiteness Studies to 
understand the problem of white supremacy, and from that white working-class racism, as merely problems 
of ideology, hegemony, or false-consciousness.  As Zak Cope notes, these theories, including how they are 
deployed within broadly lauded works—such as Ted Allen’s two-volume work on the “invention of the 
white race” (2012a; 2012b) or David Roediger’s analysis of the “wages of whiteness” (2007)—“typically 
understand working-class racism as … inculcated by a cynical ruling class determined to sow division 
amongst an otherwise unified proletariat or the product of socio-epistemic myopia precluding accurate 
identification of ‘the enemy’” (2015:50).  I agree with Cope that anti-racist attempts to focus on the 
hegemony and ideological state apparatuses of white supremacy has a certain pragmatic usefulness in 
disrobing settler state claims to liberal multiculturalism, postcolonialism, and racial inclusion, they 
ultimately fail because they rely on a priori and idealist onto-epistemic and methodological assumptions, 
such that “Racism, for example, is simply presumed to conflict with the real interests of all workers and, 
thereby, to be a set of ideas disconnected from material circumstances” (50). Not only in this chapter have 
I strived to demonstrated the deep materiality of the preconditions for the emergence of the sub-ontological 
difference, of racializing assemblages, and, consequently, whiteness as the hegemonic ontological space at 
the top of euromodern hierarchies, but I also believe, following certain strands of contemporary Marxist 
political economy, that the benefits afforded to those granted whiteness, or full humanness, are not just 
petty racial benefits, but serious and profound.  In the economic sphere this is seen in the mass 
embourgeoisement of white society, even in the chaos of post-Fordist neoliberalism and the death of the 




As alluded to earlier, I believe we must ask what the ultimate raison d’être for the 
deployment of the technologies of settler-colonial genocide within the northern bloc is?  
In answering this question, I think we have to understand the technologies of genocide 
to be fundamentally technologies of Native removal.  Here it is impossible to escape the 
insights of the late Patrick Wolfe (2016), as well as Indigenous scholars such as Glen 
Coulthard (2014), Audra Simpson (2014), and J. Kēhaulani Kauanui (2008) with regards 
to the central eliminative logic of settler colonialism. Building upon their lines of 
historical, sociological, and anthropological investigation I would argue that Natives are 
removed to make the land ripe for settlement, which under settler-colonial rubrics is the ultimate 
goal of the colonial programme.  Ultimately, we can say that Natives are removed because 
the settler wants the land. 
However, beyond this basal drive, there are two reasons why the eliminative logic 
continues to drive the settler-colonial project following the closure of the frontier period 
and the final territorial engulfment of Indigenous Nations towards the end of the 19th 
century.  Firstly, and most obviously, there remains Native land that the settler complex 
wants access to, whether it be for mining and the fracking of resources that lie directly 
underneath Indian Country, or to build pipelines that cross traditional Native land.  The 
reasons are myriad.  While some scholars, such as Ward Churchill (2003) point to the fact 
that the continuing rump Native landholdings do allow for, in some ways, even greater 
exploitation given how the juridical constructs of Native land allow for resource 
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extraction projects to be carried out, and their leftovers and results to be ignored, in ways 
that would be legally inconceivable on non-Native held land, I would argue that this only 
delays the eliminative logic of removal, rather than permanently forestalls it. This is 
especially so in the case where Native self-determination runs counter to these projects 
in a particularly sharp manner.  This was the reason that the Menominee Indian Tribe of 
Wisconsin and the Klamath of Oregon were targeted to be the proverbial guinea pigs for 
the U.S. government policy of termination in the 1950s through to the 1970s. 
The second is perhaps less obvious.  Here I am referring to how the technologies 
of elimination continue to be driven forward because the settler-colonial project requires 
the quieting of the alternative and, more importantly, prior, sovereignties and 
territorialities of Indigenous Nations.  This is because the continued existence of Natives 
and Native Nations produces a constant existential crisis regarding the legitimacy of 
settler-colonial sovereign power.  Therefore removal continues apace not only because 
settler colonialism requires Native land as the material basis of its existence, but also 
because it needs Native removal as part of an ongoing project of substantiating its own 
legitimacy, even within its own juridical and philosophical imaginary.  
Thus, for both of these reasons, the technologies of genocide will continue to be 
implemented until such a time that there are no more Natives being produced by the 
juridical machinery of the settler-colonial State.  It is precisely because of this structural 
factor that hypersolubility and instability are the very heart of the nature of Native racial-
217 
 
content, and the decreasing juridical Nativeness that it brings through the generations 
and increasing levels of hybridity. 
3.3.1 Conquest & the Structural Triangulation of White/Settler/Master 
Returning to the question of ontology though, and of the differing colonial regimes and 
their resultant racializations, there is also another brief point that I think is worth raising, 
which is that at the centre of this is the question of whiteness, or, as I prefer, white 
supremacy, and even more aptly, white power. I believe, and I have had this discussion 
with other scholars, as well as just everyday people, that this centrality is lost, or 
displaced, sometimes actively and intentionally, by these kinds of theorizations of race 
that are now being produced.  The problem is ultimately a problem of whiteness, and the 
ability to gain proximity to whiteness. 
Simply put, as I alluded to earlier, it is the case that within the political, economic, 
juridical (and every other "-al" and "-ic": libidinal, ontological, symbolic, epistemological, 
ideological, philosophical, sociological, historical, etc.) terrain of the northern bloc of 
settler colonialism, where the settler colony is fully co-extensive with the antiblack slave 
estate, that the ontological & structural positions of the Settler and the Master are 
effectively one and the same, notwithstanding the fact that they may have been at 
different spatiotemporal instances different individuals. In essence, because the settler 
colony and the slave estate (or whatever a better terminology would be to describe this 
congenitally merged entity) requires as its base ingredients both Native elimination and 
218 
 
Black/African enslavement.  Thus, because these two things are completely coterminous 
in their construction, the categories of the settler and master become structurally the 
same.  Attaching that to critical race theory and critical whiteness studies in the vein of 
David Roediger (2017; 2007), J. Sakai (2014) and Steve Martinot (2010), those categories 
are also key to delineating the boundaries of what we now recognize as whiteness.  
Thinking through this, what amounts to a structural entanglement, and what it means 
for any kind of social ontology of race within the northern bloc, I believe that what this 
amounts to is a conjoined entity I refer to as the "white/settler/master" instead of just 
"white" or "settler." 
This is relevant and important to my thinking here now, on the racialization of 
Native north americans and the possibility of being “white-passing,” because I would 
argue that structurally speaking, the triangulation of the settler, the master and the white 
means that it is impossible to speak at a structural level of white-passing Natives, because 
to say that would to effectively mean that you are talking about Natives who are Settlers. 
Which within the borders of the northern bloc of settler colonialism would be, to be 
completely honest, total nonsense, and quite obviously so.  The same applies to any of 
the racially taxonomic ways people try to think and talk about this, such as "white-
adjacent" or the even worse, in my opinion, "white Native." 
Essentially the triangulation of the white/settler/master bars, at a structural level, 
any real possibility of white-passing.  This certainly should have an impact on the 
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language we use to talk about these topics.  Because, going back to the fact there is an 
intense violence in the street-level encounter with a racist settler when you “look Native,” 
I do not believe that we can really talk about being "white-passing" or "white-adjacent" 
and have such a terminology carry any kind of meaning beyond the individual street-
level into the actual structures of the settler/master State and its civil society.  
Additionally, though this is also outside the bounds of my dissertation work, and 
perhaps even somewhat controversial given the state that “the discourse,” as it is often 
jokingly referred to as online, often finds itself in, I think this understanding of settler-
colonial social ontology also has implications for how we talk about Native and Black co-
entanglement in each other’s oppressions.  Chiefly, because of the triangulation of the 
white/settler/master, and the locking out of Natives from the category of white/settler, 
then Natives can never really be masters, even as they be implicated in enslavement and 
antiblack racism, and likewise because of the locking out of Black/African people from 
the category of white/master, then they can never actually be settlers etc. The latter of 
these I believe are incredibly important in combatting the antiblackness that is often a 
very real, and profoundly serious, problem within many Native communities, and which 
often includes (but is not exclusive to) the mistaken belief that Black people are settlers.  
It is not to liquidate the fact that we, as colonized peoples, are in fact imbricated in each 
other’s oppression, but I think it brings back home that these facts are ultimately played 
out on a political, spatial, and temporal cartography which is coded and overcoded by 
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assemblages of whiteness.  Again, this is a point which I think is lost in a lot of current 
theorization, which in attempting to de-centre white people (which is good and should 
be done) ultimately displaces whiteness as an important modality of power within the 
northern bloc from the actual ordering structures of society. 
3.4 Returning & Closing Out 
I will close off this chapter though by returning briefly to the question of the identification 
of one as racially Native within the visual field.  In the context of what canadian scholars 
Robert Davis and Mark Zannis aptly labelled “the genocide machine” (1973) those who, 
even as they may be visually coded as Native, lack Native status in the northern bloc of 
settler colonialism are individuals who, I would argue, are already removed.  They are 
already cleared.  They, more than individuals who may appear less readily identifiable 
as Native within some sort of settler visual racial schema yet possess Indian Status, have 
already been subjected to, and come out the other side of, the genocide machine.  Thus, 
as far as the structural logic of the settler-colonial State are concerned, the biogenic 
extensions of frontier homicide have already run their course.  They are not Natives, even 
if they fulfil every conceivable visual stereotype of what a Native is supposed to look like.  
The person is a non-Native, and subsequently not subjected to the same converging 




To be clear, speaking as someone who, at a bare minimum, presents as non-White 
in virtually all contexts, but who lacks Status in Canada, and who knows to cross the 
street at times, I am in no way here dismissing the micro-level experiences of racism and 
violence that come with racial identification as a Native within the visual field. These 
violences are very real, and they cause a significant degree of harm and trauma for those 
who have to constantly fear a street-level encounter with a racist settler.  However, if 
anything, this chapter is a cautioning about the drawing of equivalences between that 
particular kind of precisely targeted violence, up to and including homicidal violence, 
upon a certain kind of Indigenous body whose identity is interpolated by a visual hailing 
under a visual sign, with settler colonialism proper to such as violence which seeks to 
eliminate Native peoples in toto.  In this, I agree with Wolfe that “the confinement of 
eliminatory discourse to the frontier,” which is how I essentially view this reduction to 
the visual, as a kind of frontier artefact, “limits the equivalence between genocide and 
settler colonialism to the settler-colonial strategy in which that equivalence is most 
straightforwardly manifest” (2008:105).  Further, I believe, as I think I have shown in this 
chapter, that Wolfe is correct again when he adds that “this inhibits—possibly even 
precludes—investigation of the relationship between genocide and other eliminatory 
strategies” (105).  
Wolfe names just a few of these other strategies, some of which I have discussed 
here, while others will be taken up on the chapters to come, including, “officially 
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encouraged miscegenation, the breaking down of native title into alienable individual 
freeholds, native citizenship, child abduction, religious conversion, and a whole range of 
cognate biocultural assimilations” (103).  Importantly, this is contra non-Indigenous 
theorists who have attempted to tackle Indigenous racialization without taking into 
account the specificities of settler-colonial modalities of domination and elimination, such 
as Jared Sexton, who, following this distorted path, is led into making the frankly 
outrageous assertion that Native miscegenation with whites is a signposting for racial 
affirmation and progress (2008:200-202). Sexton in this line of thinking also commits the 
same essential error that Juárez does early in his discussion, which is to seemingly ignore 
the distinction between a Luso-Hispanic model of colonialism and coloniality, with the 
settler colonialism of the anglo northern bloc.  Indeed, Sexton leans heavily on the notion 
of mestizaje/mestiçagem from that modally distinct colonial experience, going as far as 
to describe it as the affirmation of libidinal desire and sexual contact between Natives 
and Europeans on the eastern seaboard (202).  
There are many things that can be said here, not least of which is that the 
mestizaje/mestiçagem paradigm is not really applicable to the northern bloc, not even in 
the specific confines of Canada, where, rather than leading to proximity with whiteness, 
the cognate (linguistically that is) process of métissage lead to the ethnogenesis of a post-
contact Indigenous group on the Plains with the Métis. What Sexton misses, in his quest 
to displace white supremacy, as a traditionally conceived hegemonic modality of power, 
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with a multiracial/intermixed antiblackness, is that miscegenation vis-à-vis Natives, 
which must consider the biopolitically governed hypersoluble nature of racialized 
Nativeness, actually affects elimination, as noted by Wolfe (2006; 2008; 2016), Morgensen 
(2011) and others.  What Sexton misconstrues as racial affirmation for Nativeness through 
an assumed proximity to whiteness, supposedly through access to the sign of whiteness, 
is actually annihilation and engulfment under the sign of whiteness.   
Speaking of Native access to the sign of whiteness under the legal regimes and 
racializing assemblages of the northern bloc, Alexander Weheliye notes aptly that 
accessing this sign necessarily comes at the cost of one’s Nativeness, and that extending 
this supposed privilege to Indigenous people did not, and indeed has not, prevented 
either of the settler-colonial nation-states of the northern bloc from instituting and 
carrying out all manner of genocidal policies (2014:78).  Indeed, as he and many others 
have noted, this access to whiteness for Indigenous subjects coming at the cost of the 
death of the Native—whether physically, culturally, politically, or symbolically—
through different modalities of eliminative violence is perhaps best summed up in the 
oft-cited organizing motto of the american boarding schools and canadian residential 
schools for Native children: “kill the Indian, save the man.”  Indeed, Man here is an apt 
choice of words, considering Man’s placement as the hegemonic form of human existence 
under universalized ethos of euro-western liberal-bourgeois humanism, and Weheliye, 
drawing on Wynter and Spillers, refers to the as the “genocidal shackles of Man” (2014:4).  
224 
 
Arguing against the perspective of Sexton, and more broadly Critical Race Theory 
which has often elided how racializing assemblages have been applied to Indigeneity, J. 
Kēhaulani Kauanui quite apply notes: 
By failing to consider how the racialization of indigenous peoples, 
especially through the use of blood quantum classification, in particular 
follows … a “genocidal logic,” rather than simply a logic of 
subordination or discrimination, critical race theory fails to consider how 
whiteness constitutes a project of disappearance for Native peoples 
rather than signifying privilege (2008:10-11). 
Indeed, as she continues to argue: 
Mixed racial family histories have been routinely evoked to disqualify 
Natives who don’t measure up for entitlements and benefits; thus this 
“inauthentic” status of Natives is both a desired outcome of assimilation 
and also a condition of dispossession (2008:11). 
Indeed, even the contestably Indigenous Andrea Smith, herself a major target of critique 
for Sexton (2016), directly criticizes Sexton for simply not understanding, or disregarding, 
the fact that the United States and, I would argue, the northern bloc as a generality, is 
governed by a sign regime of white supremacy under not only logics of antiblackness, 
but also Indigenous genocide. She notes, regarding his move to displace direct white 
supremacy by a regime of multiracialism/multiculturalism, that “with an expanded 
notion of the logic of settler colonialism, his analysis could resonate with indigenous 
critiques of mestizaje, whereby the primitive indigenous subject always disappears into 
the more complex, evolved mestizo subject (2012:73).  Bluntly, she notes that this is a 
result of an analysis where “Native genocide is relegated to the past so that the givenness 
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of settler colonialism today can be presumed” (72) and in this presumption of the 
genocide and elimination of Native peoples as a basic precondition for the establishment 
of settler society, these analyses can only “misread the logics of anti-indigenous racism” 
(72).  Reading Smith, Kauanui, and Weheliye together with Wolfe, and against Sexton 
and Juarez, we can see that the pale promise of Native access to whiteness is not, in fact, 
racial affirmation, or even something that is genuinely possible as such access requires 
the death of the Nativeness proper to such, but rather is an example of what Denise 
Ferreira da Silva refers to as racial engulfment into the white self-determining subject 
(2007). 
I believe that part of the theoretical problem here is a continuous recourse, to 
borrow a term from the toolbox of Deleuze and Guattari, to arborescent modes of 
thinking that insist on verticality, totalization, and binaristic dualism, rather than 
horizontality, connection, and relationality (1987).  To think back to my discussion of 
Agamben’s “scrupulous eurocentrism” in his theorization of the concentration camp as 
the Axis Mundi of modernity, I do not think there is, or can be, and thus do not attempt 
to establish, a reducibility in racializing assemblages in the northern bloc of settler 
colonialism to some originary act of racialization from which all others flow, being 
Nativeness or Blackness.  Thinking of the frontier, the plantation, and the camp (whether 
Nazi, the prison industrial complex, or today’s immigrant detention centres), none of 
them are reducible to any of the others, nor commensurable with one another, but they 
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are relational.  Rhizomatically they are all mutually constitutive of the sign regime of 
whiteness, of the ethnoclass of western bourgeois Man, instituted through the declaration 
of the sovereign exception, and as Weheliye says, “different properties of the same 
racializing juridical assemblage” function to “differently produce both black and native 
subjects as aberrations from Man and thus not-quite-human” and anoint “those 
individualized subjects who are deemed deserving with bodies even while this 
assemblage continually enlists new and/or different groups to exclude, banish, or 
exterminate from the world of Man” (2014:79).  
Further, while miscegenation for Natives affects the biogenic extension of frontier 
homicide through dilutable racial content in the racializing juridical assemblage of settler 
colonialism, its positive dimensions (as Wolfe always reminds us there are both negative 
and positive dimensions, in a non-ethical use of those words, to settler colonialism) 
allows the white/settler/master to absorb and claim the accoutrements of Indigeneity, up 
to and including claim over the land through genetic hypodescent (Leroux 2019; Gaudry 
& Leroux 2017; Morgensen 2011).  Combined with the assumed total annihilation of 
Indigenous peoples, this element of the logic of elimination allows settlers to believe that 
they have “become the rightful inheritors of all that was indigenous—land, resources, 
indigenous spirituality, or culture” (Smith 2006:68) 
For the Native, under settler-colonial regimes of biopolitical governmentality, 
there is only something to be lost through miscegenation.  Though this is not a moral 
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judgement on my part against Natives who choose to engage in racially intermixed sexual 
and romantic relations—I am in no way opposed to people finding love, companionship, 
or even just sex where they can, especially at this stage of gig-ified, precarious, and 
anxious depression inducing late capitalism/colonialism, and, plus, sometimes there is 
just no accounting for who you fall in love with—it is a statement about the machinery 
through which elimination continues following the formal end of the frontier and its most 
insidiously violent forms. Indeed, the recognition of this machinery by Natives often 
affects a perceived need to “marry Native”, a pressure which is most specifically exerted 
upon Indigenous women (Charleyboy 2014). 
At the same time as all of this, exclusion and alienation from our home 
communities that often comes with a lack of Status are also very real, and very violent 
experiences.  This is also an aspect of the Urban-Reserve/Reservation divide that is a very 
real problem in Indian Country, but which is not the focus of this chapter.  However, as 
a non-Status Indian, I have a much lower chance of my children being taken from me by 
a canadian settler-colonial State which in its cognitions labels a parent’s possession of 
Indian Status as a threat to child welfare.  I do not, cannot even, live on a reservation or 
reserve where the water is undrinkable, toxins fill the air, birth ratios are skewed due to 
environmental poisons seeping into the very DNA of the community, homes are literally 
physically unstable, essential services are lacking in the extreme, and children as young 
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as 9 years old are taking their own lives because to be born Native is to be born into a life 
quite often defined by misery, alienation and hopelessness (Belcourt 2017a). 
For those who do possess formal settler-colonial State recognition as Native, which 
means they are racialized as Native within the juridical machine of the colonial State, 
these are daily existential fears.  “Will I die today?” “Will the air be breathable today?” 
“Will my children be taken from me today?” “Will the water not be flammable today?” 
“Will someone I love take their own life today?” These violences are real, they are 
crushing, and they are genocidal in their ultimate action and direction.  They are what 
transforms Red Life into bare life and make the Native incapable of being grieved.  They 




Chapter 4. Interlude: Community, Pretendians, & Heartbreak 
Happiness in other people makes me suspicious. 
Happiness in myself makes me apprehensive.  
– Eugene Thacker, Infinite Resignation 
I don’t much like the word community, I am not even sure I like the thing 
… If by community one implies, as is often the case, a harmonious group, 
consensus, and fundamental agreement beneath phenomena of discord 
or war, then I don’t believe in it very much … There is doubtless this 
irrepressible desire for a “community” to form but also to know its 
limit—and for its limit to be its opening.  One it thinks it has understood, 
taken in, interpreted, kept the text, then something of this latter, 
something in it that is altogether other escapes or resists the community, 
it appeals for another community, it does not let itself be totally 
interiorized I the memory of a present community.  The experience of 
mourning and promise that institutes that community but also forbids it 
from collecting itself, this experience stores in itself the reserve of another 
community that will sign, otherwise, completely other contracts.  
– Jacques Derrida, Points … Interviews, 1974-1994 
My Nativeness, my Menomineeness, is complicated.  That is very much the point of my 
writing, and why I follow so closely Avery Gordon’s assertion that “life is complicated” 
is a statement of great theoretical and analytical import (2008).  More than anything I 
hope that this is the lesson, the message, and “point of my research” that I am conveying, 
have conveyed, and continue to convey.  I grew up in Bermuda; you know this by now.  
I was only able to spend time with my Native family, on my/our Rez, and around our 
culture during the summers of my childhood and pre-teen years; you know this by now.  
I have not travelled back to the Rez in over a decade, and the last time was a time of 
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family tragedy; you know this by now.  I consider myself both Menominee, because of 
how I was raised and who I was raised by, as well as diasporic, reconnecting, and 
liminally enrolled with a kind of half-status that is complicated to explain to outsiders, 
especially non-Natives, and non-Menominee, again because of how, and where, I was 
raised.  you know this by now also.  
4.1 Native Affects 
Being Native is not always easy.  The unfinished projects of conquest, genocide, and 
settlement circumscribe and delimit the potentiality of Native life.  They are arrayed as 
such to make a world where the basic ontological condition is that Natives must cease to 
exist.  At times, speaking for myself, but also speaking of what I know to be experience 
of many, it is a project of world-creation such that the fires of what we experience daily 
can overwhelm us, and where there seems to be at times no real reason to get out of bed 
in the morning.  Depressive, anxious, post-traumatic stress and obsessive-compulsive 
disorders seem to be the watch-words for many a Native’s mental health, where youth 
suicide epidemics leave so many at a such a loss for words that any attempt to enunciate 
cannot seem to do anything other than understate and underwhelm.  
Sometimes the only way that seems to work to keep one making forward progress 
through the muck and mud is to try and joke about it.  A kind of morbid and dark Native 
humour.  Here is one that I posted to Facebook regarding my own struggles with 




A. Depression & anxiety as diagnosable, medicalizable, and 
chemically, as well as psychotherapeutically, treatable 
conditions? 
B. The weight of professional pressures, creative anxiety, political 
hopelessness, and intellectual blockage that seem to be bed-
fellows of finishing highly personal academic work? 
C. The sense of "feeling bad" which constitutes the affective 
condition of a post-Fordist, neoliberal capitalist realism the 
colonizes all aspects of everyday life, even slowly degrading our 
ability to sleep, and which is seemingly set on racing over the 
anthropocene cliff towards climatic catastrophe and the memetic 
transmission of cancelled futures? 
D. Trying to live life as an Native in the midst of a world-building 
project of conquest and settler colonialism that seeks the total 
cessation of Native life, peoplehood, territoriality, and 
worldviews—where death hangs in the air like a persistent 
rumour—in sign, political, and libidinal economies of slow death 
and letting die? 
E. All of the Above?42 
(The answer is E, “All of the Above) 
Ann Cvetkovich writes: 
for many of us (and “us” that includes a range of social positions and 
identities in need of specification), everyday life produces feelings of 
despair and anxiety, sometimes extreme, sometimes throbbing along at 
a low level, and hence barely discernible from just the way things are, 
feelings that get internalized and named, for better or for worse, as 
depression.  It is customary, within our [NB: euro-western] therapeutic 
culture, to attribute these feelings to bad things that happened to us 
when we were children, to primal scenes that have not yet been fully 
remembered or articulated or worked through.  It’s also common to 
explain them as the result of a biochemical disorder, a genetic mishap for 
which we shouldn’t blame ourselves.  I tend to see such master narratives 
as problematic displacements that cast a social problem as a personal 
 
42 I am making allusions here not only to Ann Cvetkovich’s work in Depression: A Public Feeling (2012), 
Mark Fisher’s Ghosts of My Life: Writings on Depression, Hauntology and Lost Futures, and Jonathan 
Crary's 24/7: Late Capitalism and the Ends of Sleep (2014), all works that are not always the easiest to read, 
but which have influenced my thinking on these questions. 
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problem in one case and as a medical problem in the other, but moving 
to an even larger master narrative of depression as socially produced 
often provides little specific illumination and even less comfort because 
it’s an analysis that frequently admits of no solution.  Saying capitalism 
(or colonialism or racism) is the problem does not help me get out of bed 
in the morning (2012:14-15). 
I agree with her much in content, though perhaps less in feeling.  I agree very much so 
with Cvetkovich that there is something larger at play in terms of depression, my 
depression, than just a mere biochemical or personal problem.  Indeed, what she 
describes as the problematic master narratives in that regard find much confluence with 
Mark Fisher’s “privatization of stress” that has taken root firmly under the current 
regimes of neoliberal and capitalist realist globalization (2009:19).  I further agree with 
Cvetkovich that moving the frame of analysis up the structural ladder towards 
capitalism, colonialism, racism (and, I am quite sure, we can here add others things such 
as sexism, homophobia, transphobia and all of their possible permutations and crossings-
over such as misogynoir and transmisogyny) does not help to provide a reason to get out 
of bed in the morning when one is suffering. However I do believe that it can lead us 
down a path of uncovering a deeper affective functioning within our current society, 
following Fisher’s line of thought that “The ‘mental health plague’ in capitalist [NB: and, 
we should add here for our specificity: settler-colonial societies] would suggest that, 
instead of being the only system that works, capitalism is inherently dysfunctional, and 
that the cost of it appearing to work is very high” (2009:19).  This is not an answer to why 
one should get out of bed in the morning, or even a motivation that one should, but I do 
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believe that this thinking helps to pierce the veil around the Real that is the current 
arrangement of capitalist and colonial realism.  If our day-to-day sadness is not to lead 
down a road to future personal happiness, then perhaps it can at least lead us towards 
that point. 
To return to my joke though, maybe that is a little too morbid for a dissertation, 
but I am far from the only Native person on social media who shares jokes like that.  
Indeed, I only post like that on exceedingly rare occasions.  As I have said before it is 
difficult to split myself open in front of others.  Some combination of settler coloniality 
and cisheteropatriarchy always tell me that others do not care, and that I would also be 
overly melodramatic to even broach the subject.  Twinned demons to have on one’s 
shoulders for sure.  However, perhaps luckily for me, others, with far higher subscriber 
and follower counts, post materials such as that nearly daily and I am able to find 
something vicariously through them, through reshares, likes, and comments.   
I spoke once before about the affective burden that afflicts Native life, and we find 
it here again.  It is all so visceral, and it is omnipresent.  Like a knot in the stomach, a 
weakness in the legs, a lump in the throat.  What even is a life that bears such a weight?  
Where the last thought before sleep and the first after waking is often “what is even the 
fucking point?”  One does not have to live within or be from Belcourt’s site of bio-social 
and biopolitical catastrophe and perpetual mourning that is the Rez in order to feel this 
way either (2017).  For many Natives, this is the basic affective preconditioning of living 
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a Red life under the regimes and technologies of settler coloniality.  Perhaps here the 
problem is one of an expectation of happiness itself, or more precisely what we imagine 
happiness to be.  Thinking through Sara Ahmed, and also back to the first epigraph for 
this chapter from Eugene Thacker, I certainly believe that there is a kind of colonial 
melancholia, or a colonial pessimism, that is part of the affective working of being Native 
under these colonial relations of power and knowledge.  While it may come across as 
morose, and perhaps it is, I echo Ahmed in believing, at least insofar as these conditions 
of life are concerned, that the promise of happiness (and, to echo her in the form of a 
question, cannot the civilizing-colonizing mission itself be reinterpreted and re-described 
as a kind of happiness mission (2010b:125) not just for the colonizer, but in some twisted, 
horrifying way for the colonized also?) can become: 
a technology of self-production, which can intensify bad feelings by 
keeping them on hold.  Or, if someone feels bad and encounters 
somebody being cheerful, it can feel like a pressure and can even be 
painful: as if that person is trying to ‘jolly you up.’ … Happiness is 
precarious and even perverted because it does not reside within objects 
or subjects (as a form of positive residence) but is a matter of how things 
make an impression (2010b:43-44). 
And goddamnit does living a colonized life more often than not make a bad impression.  
Trapped in the dialectic between hope and hopelessness, it is a struggle to not become 
complacent (Duggan & Muñoz 2010).  However, there is a point in telling that bad joke, 
and of talking briefly, again, about the struggles of myself and countless other Indigenous 
peoples, and that is because there is something that many of us turn to for support, help, 
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and just a simple feeling of not being alone.  We turn, or at least attempt to turn if it is 
available to us, to our Native communities. 
But what happens when we cannot?  What happens when our relations to our 
community/ies are frayed and fractured in such a way that our continuing ability to 
access them is damaged?  What happens when that fraying and fracturing is not because 
of us, or even because of our community/ies as some inherent condition of their existence, 
but because of the micro-physical intrusions of settler coloniality into our innermost and 
most intimate spaces?  
4.2 Community and the Parasitic “Insider” 
This is the real point here, that is not always easy, and not for the reasons that may seem 
most obvious to most, such as lack of proximity to a community, be it urban or rural, or 
the perhaps exceedingly small size of a community that might be present.  Rather, the 
complication that I want to speak of here is also the final wrinkle in the first arch of this 
story that is this dissertation.  What I want to dwell on is the not new, but seemingly 
growing, or at least growing in attention, phenomenon of what I and many other 
Indigenous people have for some time called Pretendians, as well as the related, and very 
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often overlapping, phenomenon of Fétis43.  This not-new phenomenon is, to put it perhaps 
overly simply, is the practice of settler individuals (and sometimes others, but primarily 
settlers) putting forth a false Indigenous identity, and placing themselves out in front of 
the world as Indigenous people, and sometimes even attempting to assert themselves in 
some way as a kind of voice of their supposed peoples.   
Quite often this seems to be a cynical ploy towards some kind of anti-Indigenous 
political programme, as Darryl Leroux and others have demonstrated quite convincingly 
and handily regarding the explosion of groups in eastern Ontario, Québec, the Maritimes 
and parts of New England (2019) where quite often the absolutely astronomical growth 
in new claimants of Indigeneity can be clearly traced back to white supremacist, anti-
Native, political projects in opposition to Aboriginal and Treaty rights.  The assumption 
of Indigenous identity, through the growth of the so-called “Eastern Métis” movement, 
is clearly, at least in terms of its foundational leadership and organizational nature, 
antagonistic at a fundamental level towards Indigenous peoples and livelihoods.  It is a 
deeply duplicitous move.  What we are seeing now though in eastern Ontario, Québec, 
the Maritimes, and parts of New England is hardly new.  For example, during the 
 
43 Portmanteaus of “Pretend” and “Indian” and “Fake” and Métis, respectively.  Pretendian, as a descriptive 
term, has been around most of my life, to the extent that I am not sure that placing its origin on the timeline 
is readily possible.  Fétis on the other hand appears much more recent, being used as shorthand in 
discussions around the issue of so-called “Eastern Métis” and others who have appropriated Métis in the 
wake of the Powley and Daniels decisions in the Canadian Supreme Court.  If there is a term to describe 
whites/settlers who falsely claim to be Inuit, and I know of at least one local Kitchener-Waterloo person 
who my Inuit friends are suspicious of, I do not know it.  
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allotment era in Oklahoma, when the collective landholdings of the Cherokee, Choctaw, 
and other nations that had been death-marched to the former “Indian Territory,” were 
forcibly broken up and privatized through the intervention of the U.S. settler-colonial 
State, many settlers engaged in deceit, claiming kinship to these nations in order to access 
the land (Debo 1973; Stremlau 2011).  Over time many of these lies became forgotten as 
such, transformed into mythological family histories about supposed distant Native 
ancestors.  But they remain lies just the same, lies that harm Indigenous peoples, and lies 
that only a settler could tell. 
These myths can cling though, stuck to people before they are even conceived.  
They are born with them, raised with them, and for some, they can become a very core 
aspect of who they are.  I make no claims to people of this sort being any kind of 
meaningful strata within the Pretendian milieu; I am probably far too cynical and jaded 
for that.  However, much as I want to, I also cannot believe, because of this, that it is the 
case for all people that when they engage in Pretendian performance that they are 
intentionally setting out to harm Indigenous people.  George Tinker (2004), Vine Deloria 
Jr. (1988), Stephen Pearson (2013), and Eve Tuck and K. Wayne Yang (2012) have all 
shown and discussed the fact that rumours of distant Indigenous ancestry are pervasive 
within settler society as family and community mythologies.  While overall these 
mythologies converge with one of the positive dimensions of Wolfe’s logic of elimination, 
in the self-indigenization of the settler, and quite often function as what Tuck and Yang refer 
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to as “moves to settler innocence” (2012), at the level of the individual, I do not believe 
that it can be helped in some ways if one is raised to believe certain mythologies of place 
and origin.  The hope, obviously, is that eventually they may come to realize the falseness 
of their beliefs, and additionally the impact that these false beliefs have on actually-
existing Indigenous peoples, but I find it hard to make an initial ethical judgement in 
those kinds of cases.  
Regardless, as I said, there is an affect, intended or not, malicious, or not, on 
Indigenous communities.  And again, this is not something new, and neither is it all that 
uncommon if one knows where to look, knows the people to speak to, or the websites to 
follow.  For those of us in academia with a foot in, or knowledge of, Native & Indigenous 
Studies, at least two major controversies come to my mind immediately.  The first one I 
came to know was Ward Churchill, the now blackballed scholar who, still, claims 
Cherokee descent and a kinship relationship with the United Keetoowah Band of the 
Cherokee Nation on the reverse cover of all his published books.  Churchill is the author 
of many books on a wide range of topics from the mechanics of genocide, to ongoing 
Indigenous resistance.  He has been a high-level member of the American Indian 
Movement’s Colorado cell, and regularly finds himself listed on essential left-wing 
reading lists.  While I have certainly taken a lot from Churchill over the years, and indeed 
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my shelf contains almost every book he has written44, I have also been aware of the 
controversy surrounding his identity for almost as long.  For much of my awareness of 
it, I did not want to believe, because his work was so key to my formative years as a 
political Native, so I simply compartmentalized it for a long time, unwilling to face it.   
More recently, we have also witnessed the downfall of the formally well-
recognized and well-respected scholar and Indigenous feminist author Andrea Smith, 
whose work on the interrelations between sexual violence and the genocide of 
Indigenous peoples was for so long absolutely essential reading for many an aspiring 
Indigenous scholar, or grassroots activist in the trenches of decolonial resistance (Smith 
2010; 2015)45.  Like Churchill, Smith also claimed Cherokee descent, and also like him, 
controversies surrounding her Nativeness also dogged her for many years, though, at 
least in my experience, it was never as near the surface of discussions around and about 
 
44 A glancing look at this dissertation’s bibliography will quickly show that I actually cite several. I, I will 
admit, always feel ambivalent now about citing Churchill these days.  There were times that I would have 
done it without hesitation, but those days are long since passed.  Now I only retain my personal set of 
Churchill’s books (without having added any of his newer collections and newer editions of old titles) only 
really for reference purposes.  Churchill’s work, I maintain, remains potent, at least insofar as his various 
historiographies of genocide and settler colonialism are concerned.  He always has had a way with words, 
and of viscerally placing one alongside the dead and injured victims of U.S. and canadian colonialism, and 
so, for those reasons, and those reasons alone, references to his various works continue to find their way 
into my writing.  Perhaps one day this will change; perhaps it should. 
45 My continued referencing of Smith’s work follows similar contours, and evinces similar anxieties, as my 
uses of Churchill’s work, as noted in the previous footnote. 
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her as it was for Churchill46.  I had heard the whispers because I knew people who knew 
or worked with Smith, though I myself never did.  Still, the apparent truth of her non-
Indigenous ancestry eventually caught up with Smith during the spring and summer of 
2015, leading to the rapid dissemination of the hashtag #AndreaSmithIsNotCherokee on 
social media platforms, and the circulation of an open letter by a number of prominent 
Indigenous women, queer and feminist scholars addressing the matter (2015). 
Beyond the walls of the Ivory Tower, these kinds of controversies have broken 
into, or been birthed entirely into the mainstream.  One can think of the controversy that 
erupted over the acclaimed (I wish I could add “formerly” to that) canadian author 
Joseph Boyden, whose account of his Indigenous ancestry has—unlike Smith and 
Churchill, who always stuck to a claim of Cherokee descent—shifted many times to many 
different nations over the years (Barrera 2016) . The revelations about Boyden I can say 
 
46 This is, of course, strictly speaking from my own experiential perspective. Given my association for many 
years with a kind of haunted Marxist-Leninist activism, I was always aware of, and at various junctures 
rather supportive of, the American Indian Movement (AIM).  AIM split in the early 1990s into two 
competing factions, the American Indian Movement—Grand Governing Council, and the Confederation of 
Autonomous Chapters of the American Indian Movement.  Churchill, along with other major figures such 
as the late Russel Means and Osage theologian George Tinker were associated with “Autonomous AIM” 
and due to the extreme bad-blood that existed between the two claimants to the AIM name and legacy, the 
AIM—GGC made their suspicions of Churchill’s of Nativeness explicit.  For clarity though, AIM—GGC 
also has a long-standing bad-jacketing campaign against Churchill, by which I mean (using left-wing 
activist jargon) that more than believing, and making said beliefs well-known, that Churchill is non-Native, 
they believe him to actually be a government agent (AIM—GGC website n.d.).  I consider this secondary 
claim to be much more spurious however, and consider it be a hold-over and manifestation of what I 
personally consider to be the worst elements of First World and northern bloc “micro-Leninism” (the 
tendency of very small left-wing organizations to believe that they are, and promote themselves as such, 
the vanguard organization which will usher in revolution).  Regardless of such, this is why I was aware for 
much longer of the questions regarding Churchill.  Perhaps if I had been more directly involved in 
Indigenous feminist activism or attentive to its associated scholarship then the suspicions regarding Smith 
would have reached me sooner.  
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from my own conversations, have really hurt Indigenous people, because he presented 
himself through his bestselling writings as a voice of the Indigenous experience in 
Canada, while all the while he lied about his connection to Indigenous people.  
Politically, south of the border, it is also impossible I feel to have not heard or read 
of the debacle that has been Democratic Senator, and 2020 Presidential hopeful, Elizabeth 
Warren’s claim that she is Cherokee47.  It is probably not necessary to recount that entire 
story, including President Trump’s blitheringly racist act of calling her Pocahontas while 
speaking in front of a group of surviving World War II Native code-talkers (Merica 2017).  
Showing her own reactive tendencies, Warren, rather than responding in a heartfelt and 
meaningful way to concerns from Indigenous peoples in the United States, went as far as 
to take a DNA test to prove her Indigeneity (Johnson 2018), a postmodern settler-colonial 
practice if ever there was one, and which Indigenous scholars such as Kim TallBear have 
 
47 While Churchill claims a connection to a genuine Cherokee community in the form of the United 
Keetoowah Band of Cherokee Indians, and both Smith and Warren claim a kind of generic Cherokee 
identity, it is worth noting the scale of the problem in the United States in terms of actual organized 
groupings claiming some kind of Cherokee-ness.  By my own last count, which is admittedly not carried 
out in any kind of manner other than in casual passing, there are over two hundred groups in that country 
making claims to being Cherokee, quite often organizing in states far from either the traditional Cherokee 
territories of the american southeast, or Oklahoma, the terminal point of the Trail of Tears.  There are, for 
example, organizations such as the “Cherokees of California”, the “Cherokee Tuscarora Nation of Turtle 
Island” in Washington, D.C., the “Cherokee Nation of New Jersey”, and the “The Cherokee Delaware Tribe 
of the Northwest” in Oregon, amongst many others. Some states, such as Arkansas and Missouri contain 
well over a dozen such groups.  While the Cherokee are the most overrepresented Indigenous nation whose 
identity is stolen and taken up by settler groups, there are, in addition to those ones, on the order of twenty-
five groups claiming to be Lenape, seventeen Shawnee and twenty Anishinaabe.   I sometimes count myself 
lucky that, unlike my fellow Algonkian kin those nations, there are no organizations falsely claiming a 
Menominee identity.   
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been harshly critical of (2013).  That the controversy around her, at least within Indian 
Country, has not died down would be to put it somewhat minimally. 
Finally, here in Canada, especially from Ontario eastward, there has been the 
rising issue of the Fétis.  I will not go into extreme depth here, in part because scholars 
far more involved in the scene, knowledgeable of it, and thus equipped to speak on it, 
have already put in the work to do so, such as Darryl Leroux (2018) and Adam Gaudry 
(2017), and also because a full accounting of the problem is well beyond the bounds of 
this dissertation.  However, to summarize it, the Fétis issue involves the complexities 
introduced to Nativeness in Canada via the presence of the Métis people of the Prairies 
and northwestern Canada.  Linguistically, the French term métis is a cognate of the 
Spanish word mestizo, which throughout most of Latin America indicates a person or 
community of mixed Indigenous and european ancestry.  In much of French-speaking 
Canada this meaning of métis as purely relating to the racial mixture of Indigenous and 
european has been mixed up, likely with some degree of intent, with the idea of the Métis 
as a distinct Indigenous people who emerged out an original admixture of european and 
Native on the Plains, but which underwent a process of ethnogenesis, birthing a new 
national Indigenous community with strong ties to their Native kin (Leroux 2018; Gaudry 
& Leroux 2017; Andersen 2014; Vowel 2016). Politically, socially, and culturally though, 
what we have seen in recent decades is an explosive growth in groups in eastern Ontario, 
Québec and the Maritimes who, through an abuse of Supreme Court of Canada decisions 
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such as Powley and Daniels, are now claiming an Indigenous identity, challenging for 
their supposed rights in the judicial system (though, as of this writing, failing each and 
every time), and, probably most importantly, acting as a disruptive force with regards to 
the assertion of actual treaty and constitutional rights of Native nations in those regions. 
As Leroux recounts it, having spent hundreds of hours combing through archives, this is 
because many of these groups were founded on just such a basis, namely the failure to 
oppose treaty and constitutional rights on the basis of white rights, thus turning to an 
imagined Indigenous ancestry in order to attempt to find a better footing. More so, of 
these “Eastern Métis” as Leroux recounts, many of these organizations rely on small 
numbers of “root ancestors,” primarily women, in order to make these claims—ancestors, 
often upwards of four centuries ago, who their members claim descent from—however, 
as he has shown, in many cases these supposed root ancestors are verifiably not 
Indigenous (2018). 
It is a mess.  But that is not necessarily why I mention the issues of the Pretendian 
and the Fétis in this discussion around Native racialization.  Not only have other scholars 
already done it in far greater depth than I could possibly imagine myself being capable 
of doing, but others, such as Patrick Wolfe (2006) and Eve Tuck (2012) have also 
demonstrated how these moves towards race-shifting and self-indigenization are entirely 
the outgrowth of the structures and ideology of settler colonialism.  No, the reason I bring 
it up rather is because, like so much of my dissertation, the confrontation with the 
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phenomenon is something that I have had to contend within my own life.  To be more 
specific, in my experiences it is linked back with the affective condition of Nativeness 
under settler-colonial regimes, and more particularly with the ways in which Indigenous 
people often try and escape these conditions: through community.  
And in this, in my experiences, I have recently come to a breaking point.  This past 
Winter 2019 term, while preparing the final writings of this dissertation and working on 
my first teaching experience, I decided I had finally had enough of the issue as it exists 
locally in Kitchener-Waterloo.  It was not that I had suddenly become aware of the issue, 
because I had known about it, and been suspicious of certain individuals and their claims 
to Indigeneity for some time.  Years in a few cases.  However, something simply broke 
inside me, and I decided to break my silence on feelings that I had been harbouring for 
quite some time.   
What pushed me past that point though was not obviously associated with the 
presence of within our community, in various positions of prominence, of Pretendians.  
Rather it was a failure to be able to take part in ceremony.  During the Winter term, my 
nekōqsemaw48 and I had intended to attend a sweat lodge ceremony, along with other 
members of the University of Waterloo’s campus Indigenous student population.  
However, because our relationship with the community was already in a strained state, 
because of prior issues, we decided at the last minute to not attend the ceremony.  Our 
 
48 Sister (Menominee) 
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reasoning was that while we both needed the medicine, the extent to which it would be 
actual medicine would likely be poisoned by the state of relations within the community.  
I decided to speak out on my feelings, because they cut very deeply.   
During that winter, my father fell ill with lymphoma and had to begin radiation 
treatment for it, while my mother shortly after his diagnosis suffered a heart attack and 
had to be medevacked by air off of Bermuda to Boston for emergency surgery.  I distinctly 
remember being jolted out of bed at 1:37 am in the morning from the ringing of my land-
line phone.  No one ever calls that phone except my parents, telemarketers, people taking 
surveys, and a variety of telephone frauds.  Given the time I thought it could only be a 
con, so I did not answer and rolled back over to try and go back to sleep.  I could not 
though because seconds later my cell phone, which I keep at my bedside (as so many of 
us do, driven by late capitalism/colonialism/liberalism to unhealthy connection with our 
personal, portable portals to cyberspace) also began to ring.  So, I rolled over and saw 
that the caller ID was saying “Mom & Dad.”  I decided to answer and expected 
unwelcome news about my father, given his cancer, but it was actually him to tell me that 
he had just gotten back from the hospital, and that my mother was there.  I do not think 
I was able to fall back to sleep that night until the first light of dawn.  I spent those interim 
hours pacing my apartment, pulling drags from my vaporizer (I was, and am, trying to 
quit cigarettes; if any store near me had been open at such an hour I would have likely 
failed).  I thought that I was very much on the verge of losing everything.  During this 
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time, my own struggles with depression, anxiety, and loneliness were also beginning to 
slowly tilt downwards due to the endless and unrelating pressure of being in academia 
and trying to push forward to completion.  So, to say that my emotional state was 
troubled, and my stress level was high would be to make a gross understatement.  Thus, 
I felt I really needed this medicine, but was denied it.  I needed my community, but that 
limb was already in the process of being severed. 
One issue that I latched onto during what amounted to a public explosion of my 
grief, anger, loss, and frustration was that in the years since my return to Kitchener-
Waterloo in 2014 I often felt that community leadership cared little, and moved even less, 
to help those of us who were in need of it.  What I felt I had detected and diagnosed was 
a condition of obsession with fame, or of being adjacent to fame.  I myself have generally 
cared extremely little for such things.  I even tend to recoil with a mix of shock, horror, 
and, to some degree, disgust when I am called a leader of some sort, and the same feelings 
follow me when writings of mine have been widely circulated.  However, if I am being 
honest about my experiences and my feelings over the past several years, quite the 
opposite often seems to be default stance of many local Indigenous leaders, and this has 
a trickledown effect with regards to other members of the community.  
It has hurt a lot, and I have seen how it hurts others also.  I have seen a lot of 
suffering in this community.  People who have trauma.  People who have depression, 
anxiety, and suicidal ideation.  People who feel like their worlds are falling apart because 
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of family illness and other problems.  People who are experiencing racialized anti-Native 
violence.  I have seen these people call out for help and support, only to be ultimately 
echoing into a void where there is supposed to be community.  I myself have had to step 
in on occasion to help care for people I love and care about, not because no one else will, but 
knowing that no one else has, is, or will.  And this hurts a lot also.  That I have already 
said.  It is almost a pain without name, because there is supposed to be this thing, we call 
an Indigenous community, where the everyday rhetoric is one of coming together and 
healing, helping, and holding onto one another, but in truth appears to be little more than 
a lie.  What has cut deeper though is watching the interactions of community members 
online, in the cases of people with fame or adjacency to fame, where they could simply 
be having a standard “difficult day” and the outpouring of sympathy becomes an 
absolute deluge. 
Lauren Berlant, in her book of the same title, describes what she calls “cruel 
optimism” as that state, and a relation, that: 
exists when something you desire is actually an obstacle to your 
flourishing.  It might involve food, or a kind of love; it might be a fantasy 
of the good life, or a political project.  It might rest on something simpler, 
too, like a new habit that promises to induce in you an improved way of 
being.  These kinds of optimistic relation are not inherently cruel.  They 
become cruel only when the object that draws your attachment actively 
impedes the aim that brought you to it initially [emphasis mine] (2011:1).  
In many ways, it is a crisis of the ordinary, of the everyday, when life is shaped by 
ongoing loss.  It is an impasse and an obstacle (2011:5; 10) in the structure of everyday 
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life.  I mention this because I feel that my relationship to my community, or rather my 
desire for a relationship with my community, has become one of cruel optimism.  I seek 
community because I was to feel shelter like I have entered a safe harbour in the midst of 
a storm.  But that is not what happens.  If it has ever happened it has not been for an 
awfully long time.  My relationship to community is phantasmatic, incorporeal, spectral, 
or unreal; it is a nullity; it feels so real, but when I reach out to try and touch it my hand 
passes right through, and I am left unseen, unheard, unfelt.  Perhaps I am the ghost in 
this relationship, and in trying to call-out from the other-side I strain, and strain again.  
My voice becomes hoarse and my body and spirit exhausted.  My community becomes 
like a phantom limb; it feels present but is not actually there.  And in all of this straining, 
the hurt that brought me to trying to find a sense of community only continues, like 
embers slowly burning, never being extinguished.  But the promise is there, and I 
continue to reach.  Maybe I should stop.  Maybe I will.  For me this is a relationship of 
cruel optimism par excellence. 
And so, it began to seem very much so to me that the only peoples whose 
sufferings and calls for help that mattered were those who were most visible, or had the 
most access to power, fame, and recognition.  And after the failure of the sweat lodge 
ceremony, a healing ceremony that we both knew we needed, I just could not stay quiet 
any longer about the issues in my/our community.  While it began with a polemic against 
the state of community leadership, once the sluice gates were opened everything else 
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poured out into the open.  Within days I decided that I also could no longer be silent 
about Pretendians and “Eastern Métis” types in our community. 
When I decided to speak openly and candidly about my feelings and suspicions, I 
decided that I did not want to act like a shotgun and spray over the widest possible set 
of targets, and so I decided to only speak openly on three persons that I had, and still 
have, serious reason to be suspicious of when it comes to their claims of Indigeneity.  
Indeed, one person I can say is someone regarding whom I have a very high degree of 
metaphysical certitude about.  This is because this is a person who was, at an earlier stage 
in my life, someone who was a close friend of mine, and someone who I thought I could 
lean on and call to for help.  Indeed, they were there to help me pick my life up after I 
thought I had overturned all of it in early 2014.  Because of this former closeness with this 
individual—including many personal and intimate conversations with his person on 
their porch—I came to know that they had some kind of remote Anishinaabe and 
Rotinonshón:ni ancestry.  However, thinking to the last chapter and my discussion on 
visual schema, they always said that because they did not look it (that is, they are an 
individual that people would identify as white-passing) and, much more importantly, 
had never been raised to know it, that they would never claim it and call themselves an 
Native.  I deeply respected that stance.  I thought it was thoughtful and considerate to 
other Indigenous people.  However, at some point, this person and I had a falling out and 
we stopped speaking for several years.  I only came back into contact with them again 
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quite unexpectedly in 2018 as they had become the business partner of a white friend and 
colleague of mine, but in an Indigenous themed business.  The theme of an Indigenous 
business of course immediately raised my eyebrows.  After that I quickly learned that 
during the two or so years from when we had last spoken, this person had re-branded 
themselves with an Algonquin-Anishinaabe identity and was presenting themselves to 
the world as an Indigenous person, including being an invited speaker at a local 
Indigenous event  for which I was present and also spoke, an event which was a public 
protest against government anti-Native violence.  To say that I felt a pit form in my 
stomach, because of the fact that I knew this person, knew their story, and was now 
witnessing their act of racial-transformation, would be an understatement.  
At the same time, I was also growing concerned about a local artist in Kitchener-
Waterloo who sells themselves, and labels their artistic business, as being the work of a 
Métis person.  This person, who dances in regalia at pow wows, and who always seemed 
to find themselves with the contract to create new works of Indigenous art for local 
purposes, despite the presence of a number of other local, and extremely gifted young 
Kwe artists, also raised my eyebrow initially when I saw them sharing the statements of 
Sebastien Malette, an assistant professor at Carleton University and militant functionary 
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of the so-called “Eastern Métis” cause49.  The content of their social media posts was to 
demonize the quite lauded and important work of scholars like Darryl Leroux, and to say 
that Malette’s settler-colonial theft of Indigenous identity, and functionally anti-Métis 
and Atlantic Native politics, verifies their supposed family history.  At this point in my 
personal and political development I was already quite suspicious of the entire “Eastern 
Métis” cause, because of the work put in by scholars, members, and allies of both the 
Métis people of the Plains, as well as the various Indigenous nations from eastern 
Ontario, Québec, and the Maritimes who the Eastern Métis were beginning to encroach 
upon.  I did not put much thought into this person’s social media posts, though, until I 
happened to be exploring this person’s website for their artistic work and noticed that 
they referred to themselves as an Anishinaabe Métis with roots in two specific Algonquin 
communities in Québec.  By this point, I was aware enough that a claim to being 
Algonquin Métis, eastern Ontario Métis, or Québec Métis was cause for concern.  So, I 
made a quite simple decision, and decided to do some quick investigations via Google.  I 
found myself rather quickly, and also unexpectedly, on the ancestry.ca forums, looking 
at posts from 2005, and was able to verify, by way of personal information that they were 
giving out to the public, that this was local artist was a person posting on the forums, 
 
49 A true story about Malette’s role in this movement would be the great time and effort that he put in in 
attempting to have a friend of my nekōqsemaw and I, an Anishinaabe student, expelled from Carleton 
University for publicly calling him a “fake Native” and drawing attention to Malette and the movement 
that he is part of. But that is a story that can be detailed, with his permission, another time. 
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trying to dig up any possible Indigenous ancestry they could. They were talking about 
Cree, Anishinaabe and Métis potentially being in their family line, but their family story 
was seemingly a series of holes and, as pointed out by another seemingly more 
knowledgeable person who replied to them, apparently ancestors who did not even exist.  
Yet, here in Kitchener-Waterloo, fourteen years later, they have managed to ensconce 
themselves firmly within the local Indigenous community as not only an artist, but as an 
extremely prominent one, regularly featured, lauded, and treated as a person of 
significant local importance.  
I should be clear about something though.  When I engaged in these simple acts of 
internet research, my intention was never to prove that the person was not Native.  Quite the 
contrary, what I always hoped to the find was evidence that I myself was incorrect, had 
made poor judgements, or was expressing some sort of internalized bigotry against 
white-passing Natives.  I had hoped, and always did hope, that they and other persons 
were in fact truly Native persons, but who perhaps were caught up in a misuse of 
linguistic identity signifiers.  I wanted very much so to be wrong.  To come out of the 
other side of it though with high certitude in my suspicions actually hurt much more than 
it made me feel vindicated.  Those feelings have not gone away. 
When I did mention these things, after choosing to no longer be quiet, it blew up, 
though not in any kind of direct way.  It involved a lot of sub-tweeting and veiled posts 
that everyone knew was directed at me, and at others who had chosen to also speak up 
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at the time, or just after, including my nekōqsemaw and some other young Indigenous 
people that I know.  We were accused—by Indigenous people with institutional power 
who, quite frankly, enable these local Pretendians and Fétis to get away with their race-
shifting, and also grant them much of the prominence, fame, and recognition that they 
experience locally—of making this into a fight about blood quantum, or some other issue, 
choosing, as they did, to ignore what we were really saying: that these people are not 
actually Indigenous, and we should not be reaching for them hand-over-foot when we 
have our own people locally struggling, with mental health, with health generally, with 
depression, with trauma, with learning to reconnect, with finding themselves, with abuse 
and violence, and any other manner of things that Indians, Métis, and Inuit peoples face 
under the multi-modal regime of violence that is settler colonialism. 
And that is the real reason that I have chosen to talk about this.  I believe, very 
much so after many hours of conversation, face-to-face, online, over the phone, etc. with 
other Indigenous people—with my mom, my brother, with my nekōqsemaw, with 
friends and other kin—that the presence of what many of us bluntly refer to as “fake 
Natives” in our midst takes away from where the focus of our community efforts should 
really be, which is on helping our own people, especially the many young Indigenous 
people who are hungry to reconnect with themselves, their ancestry and their 
community. Quite often it has been my experience within this and other communities 
that it is those people, the Pretendians and the Fétis who instinctually push to the front 
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of the line to meet and speak with elders, take teachings, participate in ceremony, and get 
the best seats at community events.  Where this leaves those of us struggling to reconnect, 
those who us who are disconnected for one reason or another, is to stand there, politely, 
quietly, waiting for our turn to come so that we might be able to strike up a conversation 
with an elder we had until then maybe only seen from afar. 
4.3 Settler Self-Indigenization and the Desire for Native Suffering 
Here is a more recent story about exactly this.  I do not travel back and forth from the 
University of Waterloo campus much these days, beyond attending appointments or 
going to the library.  However, I did recently find myself on campus and decided to walk 
around a little further than I normally would, rather than heading directly home after my 
business was complete.  I eventually made my way over to St. Paul’s University College, 
one of the University’s christian affiliated colleges, and also home of the Waterloo 
Indigenous Student Centre.  As I walked around the halls of St. Paul’s I came across a 
poster for a past event.  It was for the “I Am Affected” campaign, which was one of the 
many post-Truth & Reconciliation Committee, pan-canadian efforts to educate settler 
individuals in this country about the effects and afterlives of this county’s residential 
school system, which many people have correctly labelled as a violent and genocidal 
government policy (Starblanket 2018; Churchill 2004; Milloy 1999).  While looking at this 
poster, which must have been there for some time, I noticed that in the bottom left-hand 
corner was a picture of the supposed local Métis artist I talked about above.  Next to the 
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black and white image of them was the label “Algonquin Métis.”  I simply huffed to 
myself, rolled my eyes, whispered “figures …” and moved on.  
Two days later however it slammed right into me seemingly from out of nowhere 
when the thought of the poster popped back into my mind: this really and truly offended 
me, that this person’s face, and, by their own social media admissions, “Eastern Métis” 
identity of “Algonquin Métis” had been on this poster, looking back into me, and saying 
“I too am affected by the afterlives of the residential schools.” It offended me because I 
live every day with the stated and unstated, affected and embodied, afterlives of the 
residential school system, or, to be clearer, the american iteration of it in the boarding 
school system which, while more military in organization, compared to Canada’s model 
which was more akin to a religious monastic order, had the same intent, purpose, and 
goal: to “kill the Indian, save the man.” Both of my mother’s parents attended boarding 
schools, as did my great-grandparents generation.  As I have mentioned before, it was 
the stroke of an boarding school agents pen that changed my great-grandfather’s blood 
quantum from “full” to “3/4th”, which has resulted in my own liminally enrolled status 
with the Menominee Nation today as a 1st Degree Descendant.  
Neither my mother or her siblings attended boarding schools.  But the effects are, 
if we have learned anything in recent years, transmitted virally and mimetically from 
generation to generation.  Perhaps even genetically.  Because growing up a poor Native, 
raised by survivors of the boarding schools is hard, and because settler colonialism, in 
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general, makes being a Native a trying experience, many of my family members turned 
to drugs and alcohol to find escape.  I will always have the deepest sympathy for them 
and will never hold them at fault for the choices they made, but I have lost many people 
that I love deeply because of this, even years after they got clean.  I think about them 
almost every single day, and because of this, I make an active choice every day to not 
drink alcohol or engage in hard drug use.  This is difficult, and at times alienating, when 
there is so little respect for such choices and people simply assume that they are welcome 
to bring alcohol to my apartment, or when I am simply in Bermuda, where the national 
pastime seems quite often, and indeed is even joked about, to be alcoholism.  
I have to think about these things, and these choices day-in and day-out.  They are 
never not impacting me, whether they are at the forefront of my thinking or not.  Living 
a Native life is hard; living with the embodied, inherited, and intergenerational afterlives 
of the residential and boarding schools can make it that much harder.  
And so, to back up slightly, I have to say that this black and white face of an 
“Eastern Métis” person staring back at me from this post-TRC event poster, proclaiming 
silently to me that the residential schools also affected them, doesn’t just offend me, but 
actually is something that I find profoundly hurtful.  It is one thing to engage in race-
shifting and the theft of Indigenous identity.  That is old hat for many settlers.  Indeed, 
part of the hyper-solubility of Native racialization, which diminishes actual Indigenous 
communities through generations of miscegenation, is that it also ideologically allows the 
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transference onto the settler the signifiers of Indigeneity, most importantly the claim to 
continental territoriality, through being able to make a claim to Native ancestry.  And, as 
Leroux and others show, because this positive aspect of settler colonialism, as theorized 
by Wolfe, which is the self-indigenization of the settler and the naturalization of conquest, 
is so essential to the project of settler colonialism, when actual Native ancestry is not 
accessible, it is quite often concocted through the retroactive race-shifting of settler 
ancestors in order to facilitate settler race-shifting in the present. 
However, it is another thing—and this is perhaps simply my own emotional, 
affective, and embodied response to this poster—to actually claim the hurt and the loss 
of Indigenous peoples as yours.  This person, whose face bears down upon me in that 
image, is an “Eastern Métis” claimant, again by their own public admissions.  Thus, my 
first instinct is to dismiss it in general, knowing how much the so-called “root ancestors” 
of these people are fictitious, or their Nativeness an act of myth-making.  Even if I choose 
to be forgiving, and allow that yes, perhaps this person does have some degree of 
Indigenous ancestry, their own publicly archived and available discussions of the subject 
reveal that even by their grandfather’s generation it was whispered about as a family 
rumour, and that rumour was for an affiliation that is not the one this person now claims 
(having shifted from Cree to Algonquin).  Thus, even if granted to be true, I am left 
wondering as to whether those Natives that may be in their family line lived and died 
long before the residential schools were even implemented. 
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What do the residential or boarding schools hold for them?  What ghosts?  What 
horrors?  When I think of the residential schools, I think of Mi’kmaq musician Willie 
Dunn’s 1971 song for 12-year-old Charlie Wenjack, an Anishinaabe boy who fled the 
Cecilia Jeffrey Indian Residential School near Kenora, Ontario, trying to make his way 
home to Marten Falls First Nation: 
Walk on, little Charlie 
Walk on through the snow. 
Heading down the railway line, 
Trying to make it home. 
Well, he’s made it forty miles, 
Six hundred left to go. 
It’s a long old lonesome journey, 
Shufflin’ through the snow. 
 
He’s lonesome and he’s hungry, 
It’s been a time since last he ate, 
And as the night grows bolder, 
He wonders at his fate. 
For legs are wracked with pain 
As he staggers through the night. 
And sees through his troubled eyes, 
That his hands are turning white. 
 
Lonely as a single star, 
In the skies above, 
His father in a mining camp, 
His mother in the ground, 
And he’s looking for his dad, 
And he’s looking out for love, 
Just a lost little by the railroad track 
Heading homeward bound. 
 
Is that the great Wendigo 
come to look upon my face? 
And are the skies exploding 
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Down the misty aisles of space? 
Who’s that coming down the track, 
Walking up to me? 
Walk on, little Charlie, 
Walk on through the snow. 
Moving down the railway line, 
Try to make it home. 
And he’s made it forty miles, 
Six hundred left to go. 
It’s a long and lonesome journey, 
Shufflin’ through the snow. 
Charlie never made it home.  I think of him, and all of the others like him who never 
made it home from the residential schools in which they were imprisoned and brutalized.  
I think of 14-year-old Lizzie Cardish of my nation, the Menominee nation, who in 1906 
set fire to the Menominee Indian Training School, a boarding school on the reservation, 
a “crime” for which she was convicted and sent to federal men’s prison (Davidson 2017).  
I think of my grandfather, who also attended the Menominee boarding school, and at 17-
years-old decided to enlist in the U.S. Marine Corps, which culminated in his 
involvement in the Iwo Jima landings.  I think of the time I have spent in the Mush Hole, 
the former Mohawk Institute, down on the Six Nations of the Grand River Reserve near 
Waterloo, a place where if you know how to listen, how to see, how to feel, you will know 
is filled with ghosts.  And so, the question comes back to me: what ghosts haunt this 
person, this black and white image of a face, that stares back at me from this event poster?  




Perhaps it seems harsh, or too judgemental, but the face that looked back at me 
from that image was not the face of those living in the afterlives of the residential schools, 
and who are today subjected still to daily genocidal pressures.  It may seem harsh, or too 
judgemental, but as Native peoples have to face these lived experiences daily, it is the 
only stance that I feel like I can possibly take, to safeguard not only myself, but also those 
who I love and care about.  My ghosts are with me always, both those of my own design, 
and those who exist before, beyond, and after me.   
In these late days of settler colonialism, our communities need healing more than 
ever.  We need to heal ourselves and each other if we are ever going to actually find a 
path leading out of this situation.  And this is my final point, thinking still of that “I Am 
Affected” poster: what does it mean for us as healing Indigenous people and 
communities when people such as this come into our spaces, or have space made for them 
by those who enable them, and claim that they have the same experiences as us?  What 
seems to me to be the case is that space is made for them, and resources for healing re-
allocated to count for their claim to needing healing experiences.  This can only come at 
the expense of actual Indigenous peoples. 
These are my experiences, and my thoughts, but I know that they are also the 
experiences and thoughts of many others.  And so, the question should be, where are our 
community priorities?  Should it be with trying to become visible and socially adjacent to 
well-known fakes?  Or should it be with helping those of us in our kindship, friendship 
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and communal circles who often are openly crying out for connection and support?  For 
myself, this is not even really a question, but it is one that I believe that our communities 
are truly faced with.  Likewise, we must ask ourselves how allowing these people into 
our spaces, when there is so much of a growing country-wide backlash against “fake 
Natives” and “Eastern Métis” from within Native circles, affects those of us who perhaps 
do not have status, or who were scooped up by the colonial State into the quite misnamed 
child welfare system, or other similar experiences, especially when the conversation turns 
towards accusations of arguing over blood quantum. I know this mentally affects many 
of us who struggle with those issues.  To even have to consider these things is, to be 
honest, absolutely heart-breaking. 
But these kin should not have to even entertain those thoughts of “am I 
Pretendian?” Yet often they do, with the worry that they themselves may be “found out” 
one day.  I know this fear, because I have shared it in the past.  Because, as I have 
recounted already, I am 1/128th blood quantum short of being able to be a fully enrolled 
member of the Menominee Nation, instead being listed, alongside my brother and many 
cousins on the rolls of 1st Degree Descendants (what was called the ancillary roll when I 
was younger), I have struggled with this as well. This is one of the reasons that I have, 
for the past few years, every few months, called my mother to ask her how the “blood 
thing” is going, wanting to reclaim that 3/128ths more blood that I should have, allowing 
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me to become a fully enrolled member, is because “I don’t want to be the next Ward 
Churchill.”  
So, my long-standing worry about Pretendians, separating for a moment for the 
very real macro-scaled anti-Native politics and motives of many of the larger “Eastern 
Métis,” is how the presence of them within our community, and the enormous amount 
of space that they often consume and take up, may delegitimize the struggles to reconnect 
of those who are disconnected, whether statused or not. Or they may cause, and the 
conversation around them may cause, them to feel a sense that they themselves and the 
struggles that they face are not legitimate.   
As the stories my friends and kin tell, that I tell, under such conditions of absolute 
colonial reality, in the dust of this white world, one simply cannot long-live sanely 
without help.  Without others.  Without love.  This, it seems, is luxury few of us are able 
to access.  As a community, in anything we do those who struggle to reconnect should be 
met with open and welcoming arms, and never made to feel like what they are is not their 
true selves.  
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Chapter 5. The Problem of Telling Stories to Some People, or 
Why Do We Tell of Our Damage to Those Who Damaged Us? 
Damage narratives are the only stories that get told of me, unless I'm the 
one that's telling them.  People have made their careers on telling stories 
of damage about me, about communities like mine.  Damage is the only 
way that monsters and future ghosts are conjured.  
– Eve Tuck & C. Ree, A Glossary of Haunting 
As I sit down to write this chapter, we have already had our kawāskaheka͞ew–the First Snow 
that Falls in Autumn.  Suakan: it is slushy under my feet as I walk the wooded area in the 
back of my apartment building, attempting to feel a closeness to nature and the land that 
is sometimes difficult, but never impossible, within the bounds of this concreted and 
asphalted over urban environment.  Not impossible because even with all of the concrete 
and asphalt that accrued on top of it since the settler colonization of these lands, it is still 
exactly that: land.  It is still Native land.  Always has been, and always will be.  The land 
of my relatives in the Anishinaabeg Confederacy, and our off-and-on again friends the 
Rotinonshón:ni.  Despite all of the concrete, all of the asphalt, the planned residential 
development, proliferation of capitalist enterprise and industry, and the sprawling 
campuses of the two major universities in this city it is still Gdoo-Naaganinaa, the Dish 
with One Spoon. 
I am trying to steal back something that has always been ours, by stealing time 
from my obligation to academia.  When I steal my time back from the academy I know, 
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can feel rather, what Fred Moten and Stefano Harney (2013) when they say that “the only 
possible relationship to the university today is a criminal one” (26). 
I walk rather than write.  I steal this connection back in the midst of these walks 
through these walks.  When I walk, I touch and feel my other-than-human kin.  I speak 
to them, to the plant people.  I talk to the geese (an animal nation I have never had trouble 
with during my off-and-on thirteen years in this city contra what seems to be the stated 
experience of many settlers.  I tell myself that it is because they are birds, and I am a bird 
person as well, through the family names of my Native mother and white father, through 
my ceremonial name, and through my clan).  I talk to the squirrels and the birds, the fish, 
turtles, and deer. 
When I walk, and when I talk, I can feel the connection across and through time to 
the primordial landscape that this land was before conquest, before settlers, before 
Christianity, before residential and boarding schools, before assimilation, and before the 
university.  When I steal time to steal back this connection, I can hear the land breathing, 
muted, but still there.  Still ours.  And it always will be, and always has been, in the space 
below all the various propetarian regimes of the settler, whether of private property or 
the commons. 
When I steal back this connection, I hold it tight.  I never want to let go of it.  But I 
must return to writing.  That is the chosen fate, the chosen obligation, of the critical 
academic that finds themselves ensconced within the privatized, capitalized, 
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westernized, colonized University, trying always to steal away a space within, or perhaps 
more aptly, out-of-sight or below the sight of the academic gaze.  Cut-off or below the 
sight of that onto-/auto-encyclopaedic apparatus of the State and State strategy that 
Jacques Derrida called the universitas (2002)50.  
And so, I turn back from the forest, without ever quite leaving it.  I write. 
5.1 A Time for Stories about Ghosts & Snow 
It is actively snowing right now, and the ground is slowly becoming covered.  There was 
snow on the ground as I wrote the original iteration of the previous chapter of this 
dissertation as well.  But this is not the same.  That time it was the last snow of spring.  It 
is now autumn.  Autumn is my favourite time of year, as I am sure it is for many people.  
It was the time of year in which I was born, a birthday separated by exactly one week 
from my mother’s birthday.  My father was also born this time of year.  So, one could say 
that we, with the exception of my younger brother, are a family of autumn people.  
It is also a time of changing leaves.  It is a time for harvest feasts and hearty soups.  
I myself have a pot of West Indian pumpkin and beef stew simmering away on my stove 
 
50 In his text Who’s Afraid of Philosophy: Right to Philosophy 1 Derrida describes this concept as such: “onto-
encyclopedic universitas inseparable from a certain concept of the State; Cousin: “University is the State,” 
“public power brought to bear on the instruction of the young” (2002:125). I here refer to the university as 
such because of its central role, as the pinnacle stage of education, in settler colonialism and the 
governmentality regime proper to such. Following the chain of social analysis from Gramsci to Althusser 
to Foucault to Deleuze, I recognize that for hegemonic society to flourish in all its cisheteropatriarchal, 
settler-colonial, antiblack, ecocidal and capitalist totality it requires such strong ideological and disciplinary 
institutions to shore itself up. Indeed, following Deleuze it could be said that we are always-already within 
the universitas, and indeed we can never leave. 
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as these words leave my fingers.  It is a time for beginning to pull your warm clothes out 
from summer storage and breaking out your boots.  As the night grows longer and the 
days dip colder, it is a time during which more and more people will find themselves 
inside, huddled under blankets.  If they have a fireplace perhaps this is when they break 
out the logs (natural or unnatural) and toss them in.  
It is time of first snow, which as my Anishinaabeg relatives tell me means that it a 
time for the telling of stories.  Embedded, as all of us are now, within a westernized 
society, it has become for many of us a time specifically for stories about ghosts and 
hauntings.  It is a time during which many believe that the veil between this life and the 
next becomes thinner and the spirits of the long and recently passed may speak to us. 
But I did not wait until this time of year to write this chapter just because I wanted 
to talk about ghosts and hauntings, or because it is the time of year that I was born, or 
because I enjoy the first snow and the changing of the leaves and cooking soups and 
stews.  The truth is that I have been writing and re-writing this chapter for months.  I 
have tried, and tried again, in so many ways to tell you a story that I thought was going 
to be perhaps the most important one to the entire narrative arc that is this dissertation.  
But I just could not.  
When I would try to write the words just would not come out right, if they came 
out at all.  Often when I would try to write the words would get stuck in my throat, right 
at the point of enunciation.  I would stumble and trip over my words.  Delete them and 
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start again.  And again.  I know that that is the story of many a doctoral candidate, and 
that it is the more often than not the story of writers and storytellers generally.  But this 
seemed like something more specific, more peculiar, to me and the project that I was 
trying to communicate. 
This seems/ed to be more than a standard case of writer’s block, something which 
I have touched on in previous chapters as well.  It has often been a challenge for me to 
write, to put words in order, and to tell my story.  But what was/is the case this time?  
Because I might even, if pressed in that direction, say that the words could not come 
outright.  They refused my efforts to translate them into written form.  
Why?  Is it that this particular story that I wanted to tell you in these pages opens 
up the vulnerability that I have already said is something that I lay bare to you in this 
dissertation by way of it being autoethnographic?  Perhaps.  In thinking about this 
chapter, I have dwelled much upon Eve Tuck and C. Ree’s discussion of damage narratives 
in their auto-poetic piece “A Glossary of Haunting,” within which they write: 
Damage narratives are the only stories that get told about me, unless I'm 
the one that's telling them.  People have made their careers on telling 
stories of damage about me, about communities like mine.  Damage is 
the only way that monsters and future ghosts are conjured.  I am invited 
to speak, but only when I speak my pain (647). 
So much of what I have written in the preceding chapters has come from somewhere 
between rage and pain, confusion, and sadness.  The sadness and pain that comes with 
navigating a hostile world, where one pillar of the fundamental onto-political project is 
to make it fully anti-Native, and to make Natives disappear fully into the void of non-
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being.  The sadness and the pain that often comes with navigating such an onto-political 
project while also being a diasporic, urban and liminally enrolled Native trying to 
reconnect to themselves and to what it means to be a Native, what it means to be 
Menominee.  The anger and rage against the State structures and State strategies that 
make Natives murderable, that steal our lands, our communities, and our senses of 
wholeness continuously.  The anger and rage against a biopolitical regime of Nativeness 
that makes me have to preface my saying “I am a Menominee” by saying “I am a 1st 
Degree Descendant of the Menominee” even though everyone in my family is Menominee. 
What I have written also radically (in the sense of at the root) emerges from a place of 
voicing longing.  Longing to not have to preface what kind of Menominee I am.  A longing 
for my ancestors, for my family, for my culture and language and my land and all of my 
relations that were stolen away by the sociological catastrophe of settler colonialism.  
Stolen away from me, from my mother, from my brother, from my aunts, uncles, and 
cousins by the simple rub of an eraser and the mark of a pen by a boarding school 
bureaucrat that transformed my great-grandfather from being of “Full Indian Blood” into 
to only being three-quarters.  A longing for a true sense of belonging and the wholeness 
of being that I know should be there, but which falls from my hand like dry sand on a 
Bermudian beach in a warm summer breeze. 
This sense of damage to my being is, to borrow the phrase from Mark Fisher (2014), 
the ghosts of my life; the ghosts of my urban, diasporic, Menominee-but-not-Quite-
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Menominee life.  But I am not a medium or a medicine person.  Talking to ghosts and 
spirits is not something that comes to me with any kind of sense of ease.  And so, it is 
exhausting.  Talking about damage and ghosts, communicating them to you, is 
exhausting.  It is exhausting just as settler colonialism effects exhaustion on the body of 
the colonized, racialized Native. 
I am tired of exhaustion, tired of anger and pain, sadness, and rage.  So perhaps 
that is why writing this chapter has been something of a special challenge, why the words 
come and just get stuck, or do not come at all.  That is almost certainly part of it.  But there 
is something more here, something more to my growing tiredness of damage narrative.  
Something else spectral haunts the margins of these pages. 
The truth is that I do not think I should be telling you the story that I wanted to 
tell you.  Something is telling me that I really should not be telling you.  I wanted very 
much to do so.  As I said I thought this was the keystone to the total narrative arc of the 
story I have been trying to tell you across these pages, across previous chapters.  But why?  
I wanted to tell you a story about how angry I am about something, how hurt I am, and 
how I felt that the experiences that I was going to tell you about had something to say 
about the interpellation of Indigenous identity and personal navigation through those 
structural forces. 
5.2 A Skeleton of a Story about Identity Interrogation 
The story I wanted to tell you about was one about my experiences in the summer of 2017 
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when, during a time when the original, more traditionally ethnographic, iteration of this 
dissertation was still the order of the day, I had to approach my nation, the Menominee, 
to seek permission in order to carry out my work. I had wanted to speak to fellow 
Menominee about what Nativeness, and more specifically Menomineeness meant to them.  
I wanted to ask them about their sense of communal belonging, and how they made sense 
of post-contact, colonial State constructs such as blood quantum.  I wanted to ask them 
about how, if at all, they held to pre-contact constructions of Menomineeness and 
communal belonging, and how those pre-contact notions interacted, interfaced, and 
blended with the newer colonial impositions.  
The reason for having to seek their permission in order to carry out that work was 
two-fold.  On the one was the contemporary requirement of the modernized, 
westernized, colonized university to seek and obtain ethics clearance for any work 
involving human subjects.  This is of course standard, and a process which I knew long 
before initiating this project that I would have to undertake.  In particular, in the era of 
formal reconciliation, indigenization and the general move to push beyond and to atone 
for the colonial origins and methodologies of the university, this process often now 
requires formal clearance for such work from the objects of the study when said objects 
are an Indigenous community.  Meaning that in order to gain ethics clearance from the 
University of Waterloo I had to first seek and obtain the permission of my nation.  
The second reason was that, as a 31/128th of blood quantum First Degree 
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Descendant of the Menominee Indian Tribe of Wisconsin, and thus shy 1/128th the 
requirement for full enrolment in the nation (something which I have discussed in the 
previous chapters of this dissertation, and which is a running stream of thought 
throughout this text), I would have to seek permission from them in order to carry out 
any work amongst them, regardless of whether I was an academic ensconced in a system 
of formal ethics clearance or not. The Menominee want their own ability to have oversight 
and final say on any work being carried on or about them.  Certainly, this has much to 
do with the negative history of research being done on, about and within Indigenous 
communities by non-Indigenous researchers.  Thinking of this my mind drifts onto 
George and Louise Spindler's work Dreamers with Power: The Menominee (1984), one of the 
best-known ethnographic works on our community.  However, the original title of the 
work, Dreamers without Power, offended members of the community.  As such I could 
hardly fault them for having me undertake their own approval process in addition to that 
of the University’s. 
The key experience in all of this though was that despite the formal tribal, legal 
status that says that I am a First Degree Descendant of 31/128th blood quantum with many 
close relatives currently living in or near the reservation, who are fully enrolled members, 
including my mother, her mother and the rest of their immediate and extended family, I 
was to be, in accordance with tribal law, treated as a non-Menominee outside researcher. 
To me, in the middle of beginning work on a dissertation project on Indigenous identity, 
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biopolitics, settler colonialism and de/coloniality this experience seemed to be a 
microcosm of exactly what I wanted to examine in terms of living a life of an urban, 
diasporic, liminally-enrolled Native and what it means to belong to an Indigenous 
community. Then and now I see this process as a kind of formalized interrogation of 
identity. 
And the approval process from the Menominee failed.  After one postponed 
attempt at a conference call meeting with the Language and Culture Commission of the 
nation, I formally met with them via phone during August 2017.  What transpired was 
that the motion died on the table.  It was not formally voted against, but rather no member 
of the commission was willing to bring it forward for a vote.  I was upset, but I think my 
mother and grandmother were even more upset.  Angry would be the even better term.  
Indeed, when my grandmother asked me for the names of the members of the committee 
and she replied that she knew some of the members, my concern spiked that she was 
about to either start making phone calls, or even go to see people on the reservation. 
5.3 Why I Really Should Not be Talking to You about This 
This is the story I was going to tell you, summed up in short form.  I wanted to tell you 
about my anger.  About my mother’s and my grandmother’s anger.  I wanted to tell you 
about how this experience typified in many ways the questions that I was asking more 
broadly in the earliest form and earliest chapters of this dissertation.  I wanted to tell you 
about how the rejection of the tribal commission on this specific matter impacted my 
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sense of self and my sense of Menomineeness, especially given that, setting aside the 
university’s formal ethics process, I was required to undergo this process by my 
community precisely because I was legally classified under tribal law as someone who 
stands outside of the community. 
It was to be a story of hurt, confusion, anger, loss and feeling lost.  I wanted to tell 
you about my mother’s experiences of belonging.  I wanted to tell you all of this, but now 
all I can tell you is this brief summary, which cannot give full breadth and appreciation 
to this experience.  Indeed, I even wonder how much a story could even be appreciated 
by non-Native peoples.  I cannot help but think of the line from the Iraqi-English rapper 
Lowkey’s line about how "your hosts can't relate to your sense of dislocation; the type of 
pain that cannot be contained in a dissertation" (2019).  So, I cannot tell you about all of 
this.  I will not tell you story beyond what I have already said.  
But at first, I did not know that I could not.  I wanted to.  I told you I was going to.  
I told others that I was going to.  But I just could not.  I would set aside time to write and 
do nothing or do something else instead.  I spent months like this.  I need to finish this 
dissertation, but I was doing nothing but stalling, wishing to be doing anything else but 
writing this chapter.  
During this time, the Ocīpūhkiw/Anishinaabekwe that I call my nekōqsemaw, 
who herself is also in the midst of PhD work in philosophy, would ask me what exactly I 
was trying to do with this chapter.  She asked several times across several conversations 
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across several months.  And I could never really answer her in a way that was not only 
satisfactory to her, but more importantly satisfactory to myself.  That was because her 
question of what I wanted to do with this chapter was more to prod for something beyond 
a superficial answer of what I was saying in proposals, chapter outlines, meetings with 
committee members and general conversations that the chapter was about.  She knew 
fully what my experiences were because she was right there with me when I was going 
through them.  She knew I wanted to write about the feelings of hurt, anger, confusion, 
loss and being lost, the experiences which the Menominee bureaucracy had left me with.  
She knew all of that.  So, when she asked me what I wanted to do with this chapter, what 
my goal was, she was asking me what my truer, deeper purpose was.  Why did I want to 
write about those things?  And what did I hope to see come about by writing about them?  
She always pushes me towards finding what the generative, the transformative and the 
liberative is underneath and beyond the abjection.  She shares the overarching goal of 
decolonization, decoloniality, refusal and radical abolitionism that is at the heart of so 
much of my own work.  So, she knew that there was a generative kernel hidden 
somewhere within all of this, but she was not going to give me the answer, because that 
was not something for her to give.  Rather she pushed me to find it myself.  
So, she asked, and she asked, and she asked: “what is that you are trying to do 
here?  What do you want to communicate?” Eventually, it hit me.  To put into the parlance 
of the strongly christian island I was raised on, eventually I had my Come-to-Jesus 
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moment!  What I came to understand was that the issue I was facing, why this particular 
piece of my story was such a special challenge, was not just that I cannot tell this story, 
but that I cannot tell this story.  This is not a linguistic trick nor is it a malformed sentence.  
Rather what I am trying to communicate here is the movement from being in a place 
where I was unable to bring myself to write this chapter as it was originally proposed and 
outlined, to move the narrative forward as was intended, to coming to understand that I 
cannot tell this story because to tell this story in that way would not be generative. It was 
not decolonial.  It did not serve my deeper truth, my deeper sense of what it is that I 
wanted to do, and it did not move me, my community, and Indigenous people towards 
decolonial liberation.  Decoloniality is, if anything, a dialectical methodological-
pedagogical-praxiological engagement of both doing-thinking and thinking-doing that is 
necessarily delinked from the western modern/colonial binary of theory vs praxis 
(Mignolo & Walsh 2018). 
What I wanted to do with this chapter was to say something about what I am 
calling the ontological gaze or the colonial ontological gaze, building on my discussion and 
critique of political ontology in chapters 2 and 3. In particular I wanted to say something 
about engaging in a politics of refusal—in the line of thinking set forth in Audra 
Simpson’s work in Mohawk Interruptus: Political Life Across the Borders of Settler States  
(2014) and Glen Coulthard’s Red Skin, White Masks: Rejecting the Colonial Politics of 




But part of that gaze is how being a Native, being an Indigenous north american 
damné, is to be located at a set of coordinates in a world whose ontological project is to 
create an anti-Indigenous world.  As I discussed in the earlier two chapters, I follow the 
Africana existentialist Lewis Gordon’s line of thinking on the question of it being an anti-
Indigenous world vs the world is anti-Indigenous, because I agree that there is no true fixed 
ontological enclosure.  The project of creating such a world has yet to be completed, 
socially and politically, and more precisely it is a project of world-building which has 
never been completed because of resistance and refusal.  Colonized people have always 
pushed back against these enclosing ontological structures, and the result is that there 
have always been many lines of flight sneaking themselves over and underneath their 
walls.  As such, as I also said previously, I do not agree with Jared Sexton’s line of thinking 
who argues that it is theoretically or politically useful to assume that these projects are 
completed and thus are truly ontological.  To engage in such a line of thinking does not 
allow for the elucidation of a critique immanent to the system, but rather works to 
actually reinforce its logics and structures by assuming that they are representative of the 
way the world actually is in a fixed sense. 
5.4 When is a Story Not a Story (& Can it Still be a Story)? 
And this is where I connect back to where I started this chapter: the question of damage 
narratives.  It is also where that question meets with what I want to do in the chapters 
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that follow, which is talk about abjection, the problem with abjection, and the self-
denigrating stories that we share about our own supposed abjection.  So much of political 
ontology, whether it is called by that label or not, within various critical area studies and 
allied fields seems to be rooted in defining or finding the political subject through 
recourse to maximal abjection.  
Lewis Gordon identifies this tendency within contemporary works of political 
ontology, given his own work as an Africana philosopher, in the writings and theories of 
key scholars working within the field of Afropessimism, such as Frank Wilderson (2010) 
and Jared Sexton (2016), as well as some of the key scholars towards which they function 
as interlocutors, chiefly Orlando Patterson in his work on social death (1985). For Gordon 
much of this problem is rooted in the inability of certain theorists to find a functional 
political subject on the terrain of (post)modern settler colonialism, late capitalism, and 
systemic antiblackness.  Thus, there is a constant race to the bottom to be the most 
destroyed, most wrecked, hollow, damaged being possible.  We are who we are because 
we are the dying, the dead and the undead.  We are ghosts and monsters, temporal 
displacies haunting the existential margins of a white settler-slave colonial and decaying 
capitalist society (2018). 
However, while Gordon locates these tendencies within certain strands of current 
radical Black theorizing, my focus is as a Native scholar, writing about Native life and 
Native experiences, moving towards Native theorization.  That said, I would argue that 
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Gordon’s insights here are applicable.  In my own experience, navigating Indigenous 
scholarship and theory, I have come to recognise that this problem exists just as 
profoundly within our work.  When I read the work, both scholarly and poetic (as if those 
two things should ever truly be separated, or deserve separation), of the queer Native 
scholar Billy Ray-Belcourt (2017a; 2017b), for example, I am deeply moved by the kind of 
pain that is expressed, and while they do often, importantly, gesture towards queer and 
Native, and queer Native, futurisms (2018) I also find that I can be overcome by the 
weight of the narratives and truths that they present, when he speaks of the reserve as 
“augured disappearance propped up in the wake of insidiously lawful world-breaking 
events” and of Indigenous worlds as “sutured by this sort of apocalypticism” (2017:3). 
I experience the same sensations of loss, grief and abandonment when reading the 
scholarly work of Nicolás Juárez on the grammar of Red suffering (2014)51 or, as 
Wilderson commiserates (2010:9), also in the works of the “Red Ontologists” such as 
Leslie Marmon Silko, Vine Deloria Jr., and Taiaiake Alfred52, as well as in ways that are 
perhaps differently inflected in Jodi Byrd and Eve Tuck. These scholars and the 
 
51 My semi-public debate with Juárez on the topic of Native racialization, settler colonialism and the 
question of visuality was the topic of this dissertation’s previous chapter. Regardless of what I may think 
about that particular informal dialogue, or where I may disagree with him in other places, I find his work 
overall to be highly informative. 
52 It may be an act of nit-picking, but I do agree with J. Kēhaulani Kauanui that it is curious that Wilderson 
not only includes the Native scholars Vine Deloria Jr. and Taiaiake Alfred, as well as the Native finction 
author Leslie Marmon Silko, in his description of “Red Ontologists,” but also Haunani-Kay Trask who 
Kānaka Maoli, and Ward Churchill, who as discussed in Chapter 4 is an author whose claims to Nativeness 
are contestable at best (2017:263).  While I do not wish to fill this dissertation with too much in the way of 
speculation, it does make me wonder if this is perhaps a source of his misunderstanding of Nativeness, 
which is a subject taken up in more depth in Chapter 7. 
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voluminous works that they have generated are as deeply insightful theoretically as they 
are mournfully moving.  Yet sometimes “the future” in these kinds of writings can feel 
something not entirely unlike Franco “Bifo” Berardi’s slow cancellation of the future 
(2011). 
What is a liberated future when we not only re-inscribe—intentionally or 
unintentionally, clearly, or unclearly—the “truth” of an anti-Native world, but theorize 
as if that is an essential component, if not the essential component, of our being?  I think 
here along lines emanating from what Anishinaabe theorist Gerald Vizenor thought of as 
our tragedy, our victimry and, occasionally, nostalgia for what once was (2000)?  One can 
look to Ward Churchill for example, for whom Native positionality is fundamentally 
defined by genocide as a constitutive element, without which Native would not exist 
(1997).  This analysis is taken up and further extended by Juárez, who marries it to, and 
likewise extends, Wilderson’s analysis of Native positionality, in arguing that Native life 
is fundamentally defined by a grammar of suffering of clearing and civilization53 (2014).  
One could perhaps argue that this carries the same force, intention, and implication as 
Patrick Wolfe’s argument that in defining settler colonialism the basic constitutive fact is 
the fate that invasion carries and implies for Indigenous peoples (2006; 2016b).  However, 
I believe that the error one would be committing in making such an argument would be 
 
53 This is here referring to civilization not as a state of social, cultural, or political attainment, or of it as an 
abstract concept of anthropological, sociological, historical, or philosophical thinking, but as a process of 
settler colonialism which is inflicted upon Indigenous peoples, bodies, and nations. 
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to cross, at the level of definitions, an understanding of what settler colonialism is, both 
in itself as a modality of domination, as well as a founding structure and logic of the 
modern/colonial/capitalist world-system, with an understanding of what it means to be 
Native. What is often occluded or lost here, I believe, is the possibility of being Native for 
Nativeness’s own sake. 
Ultimately, I believe, and argue, that my being, my experience, my life, as Native 
person and as part of a community of Native nations is not something that is held in a 
vice-like death grip by my abjection.  I do not believe that if that is our fate, to have our 
being always tied to our suffering, then we can ever truly escape this nightmarish 
hyperreality that is settler colonialism. 
Further, I think that this is a fundamentally colonial narrative, the one of 
permanent Native abjection, and it is in a significant way maintained and fed into by our 
own damage narratives.  We are the victims of centuries of genocide and dispossession, 
plagued today by all of manner of converging vectors of death: extreme rates of poverty, 
police violence, suicide, unliveable living conditions and the removal and detention of 
more of our children today than ever at the height of the residential and boarding school 
eras.  Those stories, those facts of history and of the present, are important to tell.  I would 
never argue against the practice of telling them because to know our conditions is to be 
able to think and chart our way out of them.  So, I do not fault the people who tell them.  
Often the way in which they communicate about their personal, communal, and 
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intergenerational pain can be moving and hauntingly beautiful.  They can be motivating, 
but they can also be deeply depressing, surging the seemingly never-ending well of 
Indigenous existential angst brought on by a world that wants us to cease being. 
However, I also think that these kind of narratives, haunting and painfully 
beautiful as they often are, feed the colonial ontological gaze, which casts the Indigenous 
into a state of non-being, the sub-ontological position in which we are killable and 
unmournable, precisely because they can also prove that that is what we are: the walking 
dead and almost dead. As the American literary scholar Karl Kroeber wrote, regarding 
the work of Vizenor, “by accepting this white definition of themselves as victims, natives 
complete psychologically the not-quite-entirely-successful physical genocide" (2008:25) 
I know because I also tell these narratives.  I have been open over the course of this 
dissertation thus far about my own personal, communal, and intergenerational pain and 
my journey through it, even as I, to repeat the phrase from Tuck and Ree (2013) from the 
first chapter, use my own arms to determine the length of the gaze.  
But like Vizenor I am active when I say that I do not consent only to be an abject 
being defined by my haunting and my victimry.  I may be the walking dead, displaced 
from some time before the closure of the frontier, in the eyes of the dominant settler 
society, but that is not who I truly am.  That is the simulacrum with no referent in reality.  
And that is why sharing my personal and familial damage narrative has become so 
exhausting.  I am not only an abject being, and I am not only interested in telling you that 
282 
 
I am an abject being.  I am curious about what lies beyond being abject.  I refuse 
representation and recognition of my damage within the universitas and instead choose, 
activate, and centre my/our defiance, resilience, and independence. 
I am interested in making, belonging to, and activating decolonial Indigenous 
futurities beyond, below and against the already post-apocalypse of settler-colonial and 
antiblack late capitalist (post)modernity and its living, zombie-like residues of 
coloniality, capitalist realism (Mark Fisher 2009) and manifest manners (Vizenor 1994).  
And so, as I reach for that end, to only tell the story of my pain, of my damage, drags me 
down.  
That is why I cannot tell you the story that I was originally going to tell you.  I 
cannot tell you that story because I do not want this narrative in this dissertation to be 
one about pain.  I want it to be one that leads to a place of beauty, of wholeness.  I am 
more than interested in the broken, the lost and abject, but I am also interested in what is 
generative and transformative.  I am interested in what can lead us toward liberation.  So 
that is why I am not going to tell you that story.  That is why I have already begun to tell 
you a story about not telling you that other story.  
Is this perhaps a kind of unstory?  Is that a thing?  Can telling you a story about 
not telling you another story still be a story?  I do not know for certain, but I think so.  
Perhaps we can think of this as a way of articulating a kind of dialectical and Foucauldian 
counter-discourse against the dominant narratives, against settler colonialisms, and their 
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formation of civil society based on Indigenous abjection.  A counter-discourse that seeks 
to move beyond abjection and the unliveable and that charts a course towards a place of 
contemporary Indigenous liveliness, vibrant and beautiful.  A decolonial life if you will. 
I think I like the sound of that.  So, I am running with it!  
5.5 Talking Back to the Colonizer? 
At the heart of this refusal to tell the story that I was going to tell is also a question: why 
do we tell these stories, often over and over again?  Stories about residential and boarding 
schools, stories about alcoholism and drug abuse, stories about suicide and mental illness, 
the abject poverty of both the reservation and the red ghetto, stories about how 
Indigenous people face some of the worst rates of police violence and violent 
victimization.  Stories about loss and displacement.  Stories about how multiple 
converging vectors of death work in collusion to wipe about Native bodies and Native 
nations.  Stories where the Native Savage is murdered over and over again, in the past, 
the present and the future.  In these stories, Nicolás Juárez says "the statistics and the 
violence never end" (2014). 
We do tell these stories.  We tell them about ourselves as the modernist/colonialist 
constructed collectivity that we call “Native” and about ourselves as individuated 
Natives.  We are of course far from alone in telling them, as is obvious to anyone after a 
brief tour through the canons of modernist and postmodernist colonial academia.  Euro-
western anthropologists, sociologists, historians, psychologists, and others have been 
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telling them for well over a century.  In the european and euro-western social sciences, 
the Native has always been a revenant, a ghost or some other spectral being haunting the 
imagination (Vizenor 1994; Byrd 2011; Tuck & Ree 2013).  
But as I said, we ourselves tell them to the western academics that lead our classes 
and sit on our committees.  We tell them our stories of hurt and damage, hunting and 
gathering (as Savages are supposedly wont to do) for grades, publications, and thesis 
approval.  And we also tell them to ourselves all of the time.  I was going to, right here in 
these pages.  I have already told you about how that was the original plan of action for 
what originally intended to be the concluding chapter of this dissertation, now 
reshuffled, re-formed, re-oriented and split into several more parts than before.  I even 
gave you the skeletal outline of what was to be.  So, you already know by now that I was 
going to tell you my damage narrative about how many of these forces have converged 
on my body, and my life.  
And for what?  For the completion of a dissertation.  For that I was prepared to lay 
out some of the deeper parts of me, hoping that a supervisor and an academic committee 
of assembled “experts” would give me a passing approval, allowing me to continue on 
with myself and my life, already have stripped myself down to where little else remained.  
Indeed, I have already done this largely in the chapters that have proceeded this one.  
About living a Red Life that is bare life.  About liminality in the categories of settler State 
identity algorithms and the navigation of visuality.  About blood quantum.  I will not be 
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changing them in any way, in part because of the temporal and economic constraints that 
face a graduate student, especially a Native one, especially an immigrant one, and 
especially a Native-who-is-also-an-immigrant one.  But also, in part because, like 
everything else, stories and theorizing change and alter themselves over time.  In this 
case, a story that involved opening myself up as much as possible, in as controlled a 
fashion as possible, finds itself in a place of refusing to do that any further.  I am also, 
unlike perhaps other writers and other academics, but, I imagine, unlike many story-
tellers out there, not opposed to changing the narrative midstream. 
So, what you have gotten from me thus far is the extent to what you will be getting, 
at least in these pages.  Enjoy them.  Consume them.  Because I will not be serving up any 
more of it.  
But still, the question remains, why do we tell our damage narratives?  Why was I 
going to tell them?  Why have I already told so much?  More so than why do we tell them, 
is the question of why do we tell them to certain people?  
I think certainly for Native peoples, and for other colonized, racialized and 
otherwise “Othered” people sharing our stories of pain, sorrow, hurt, anger, madness, 
trauma, addiction, and everything in-between and that arises from those things can be 
part of our own collective and personal and healing processes.  To know that you are not 
the only Native who has suffered in this or that way because of the machinations of settler 
colonialism on your body, your psyche and your spirit in a way, in my own personal 
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experience, can be the start of a motion in the direction of our individual and collective 
coming together towards healing and decolonizing the mind and psyche, and often times 
even the body. There is a power, as cliché as it may be to say, in being able to hear the 
story of someone else, and in knowing how it may be similar to yours, being able to have 
that moment of recognition that you are not alone in these experiences and feelings.  You 
are not the only Native who has been through that.  I am not the only Native who has 
been through that.  There is a comfort in it.  A confirmation that we, or I, am not alone in 
what can seem like a never-ending hurricane.  This is the power of identification.  And in 
that we can begin to come together, and perhaps begin to plot a way out of what it is that 
makes it so that it feels like there is no good reason for us to get out of bed in the morning.  
I am not asking why we tell our stories to other Natives, or even other colonized, 
racialized and Othered peoples.  That is not the question I am asking when I specify 
telling the story to “certain people.” What I do mean to ask, quite plainly, is why we tell 
these stories to our collective and individual oppressor, or to follow from the title of this 
chapter, the ones who damaged us to begin with?  Why do we tell our stories of damage 
to the settler and to the master, or to the normative cisheteropatriarchal man?  What 
purpose does it serve us to do this, in the news, on social media, on a blog, or in a 
dissertation?  
In my case, as in the case of many others, the self-justification for the telling, and 
re-telling, of these stories is the setting of the modern/colonial/capitalist university.  I tell 
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my story, or rather attempted to tell my story, as a means towards achieving the 
milestones necessary for the completion of a graduate degree programme.  And certainly, 
academia as a whole is a major site for the telling and circulation of these stories.  Yet the 
material fact of the requirements of a graduate programme do not dissolve the ultimate 
question of why?  I could tell you anything, framed and phrased in that way that 
academics in the social sciences always write, and fulfil the requirements of this 
dissertation. 
I think another way that we can think about this question is also to ask ourselves, 
why are these stories so readily consumed and circulated within academia and the wider 
apparatus of settler-colonial civil society?  Because they are.  I have already said that they 
are consumed, and that is an important way to think of this: the circulation and 
consumption of our stories, of our damage narratives, within the academic marketplace 
of late capitalism/colonialism.  The truth of that is all around, stalking around every 
corner and in every hallway of every department, at the very least within those artificially 
bounded disciplines this thoroughly modernist/colonialist/capitalist complex refers to as 
the social sciences and the humanities, or perhaps “the Arts” even more broadly.  No 
studies are needed to be cited here to speak this simple, yet to many, seemingly elusive, 
truth.  
I think this question of why is a different why than the one that was put to me 
regularly by my nekōqsemaw back when I was trying to still enunciate that story when 
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she regularly asked me “what” I was hoping to achieve, but it is certainly also adjacent to 
it. It is a why I have increasingly found myself contemplating, especially in the wake of 
my nekōqsemaw's insistent whats and my subsequent failure/unwillingness/inability to 
tell you my story of damaged Native life any further.  
I have not been alone in this questioning.  In conversations with a long-time 
colleague and friend—themselves from a Deleuzian cyber queer theorist perspective and 
my own perspective of mixed-up Indigenous critical, decoloniality and Fisherian Marxist 
cultural theory—the question of, essentially, “why do we always tell those who have 
damaged us how fucked up it is to live our lives?  Why do we allow them to gaze into 
and, vampire-like, consume our pain, our strife and our struggle?” has been a regular 
topic of struggle and inter-personal theorization.  Both of us, as disparate as our 
theoretical foundations and life experiences may be at times, are in the midst of 
navigating the above-mentioned requirements of a PhD within the social sciences, both 
of us studying and reflecting upon our Othered and damaged lives.  And it has been 
exhausting, a physical and mental state only exacerbated when the fact of living our 
Othered and damaged lives within the coordinates of an already post-apocalyptic 
(post)modern, colonial, capitalist, cisheteropatriarchal terrain converges as we attempt to 
tell this to those who did the damage to begin with.  
Many hours staring out at the rain or snow-flecked street in front of my apartment, 
and many cigarettes, have been spent contemplating these questions.  But I think over 
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this protracted process of conversation and inter-personal theorization with my friend 
and colleague, as well as with my nekōqsemaw, the beginnings of an answer have begun 
to form.  Attempting to put finger to keyboard in fleshing out something approximating 
an answer to this question of why our narratives of damage are so readily consumed 
within what I am calling the imaginarium of late capitalist/colonialist storytelling is the arc of 




Chapter 6. Digital Worlds, Native Ghosts, & The Socio-
Existential Suturing of Settler Society 
Words are trapped in the corporeal imagos that captivate the subject, 
they become marked by a colonial ideology of the referent: the 
petrification of speech and language, dream and desire, by which the 
colonized express the jouissance that discourse forms.  
– David Marriot, Whither Fanon?: Studies in the Blackness of Being 
As I sit here at this keyboard, mulling my thoughts on what exactly it means to be Native, 
and the how and why of the roles our damage narratives play within the domain of 
capitalist/colonialist academia, it is a warm, clear June day. To be specific, it is what this 
country, Canada, has recently decided is to be called Indigenous Peoples’ Day. This is my 
second one, 2019, but so far today, at quarter to 2 in the afternoon I have not attended any 
of the multiple events that are being held across this slowly growing necropolis of a 
southern Ontario city. To be quite honest, I do not really care to, and I am asking myself 
the same question I did in 2018: what the fuck is the point of this?  
Crude, yes, I know, but it sums up my feelings on this day. What exactly is the 
point of Indigenous Peoples’ Day? To paraphrase the great abolitionist Frederick 
Douglas, I might ask: what is Indigenous Peoples’ Day to Indigenous people?  
I have to admit that I am pretty credulous to the socio-political content of 
Indigenous Peoples’ Day. I am, for better or worse, a U.S. citizen and direct, immediate 
blood kin to an “american” Indian nation. I have also been involved in some manner of 
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left-wing politics, specifically what one might euphemistically call ‘far-left’ or ‘hard left’ 
politics more or less since I was 19 years old, when I first joined the anarcho-syndicalist 
Industrial Workers of the World and the Socialist Party USA. I do not adhere really to 
that sort of politics of any more, though not because I have abandoned the cause, but 
because I have given-up on those sorts of organizations. Still, those things, and my ties to 
an american political scene, even without being a resident of that country, taught me 
many moons ago that if there was to be something we were going to call ‘Indigenous 
Peoples’ Day’, then it should be on or around October 12th, to mark the first day proper 
of the invasion that began in 1492 and changed the course of not only our collective 
historical development as a myriad of Indigenous nations, but also the course of global 
history. Indeed, across much of the so-called ‘Americas’ October 12th, which the americans 
call Columbus Day, is marked in some way as Indigenous Peoples’ Day.  
Canada does not have Columbus Day, as any resident of this country should 
know. It has what I still call most of the time canadian Thanksgiving. So, while for much 
of the rest of this hemisphere Indigenous Peoples’ Day, or whatever its regional or 
national variant may be called, is a direct disruption or inversion of the Colombian legacy 
of invasion-based sociological catastrophe, it would not quite have the same effect in this 
country. Or at least that is the arguement that has at times been tossed back at me when 
I have attempted to make the point that I believe that Indigenous Peoples’ Day should be 
in October, rather than midsummer. 
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Of course, in the United States Thanksgiving has also often been marked by 
Indigenous people as a day of mourning, set aside to remember the true history of the 
slaughter of my Algonkian kin in New England that is now nightmarishly (from a Native 
point of view) rendered as a moment when we and the invader sat down for a hearty 
home-cooked meal to celebrate friendship, brotherhood etc. Yes, canadian Thanksgiving 
does not come quite as replete with direct violent colonial history as its five-weeks-later 
american cousin, but still. Thanks-taking, as many folks I know call it, is the same 
nevertheless. While the canadian long weekend may be more rooted in older european 
harvest festivals, it is still perhaps one of this country’s three major days used to mark its 
national narrative, alongside Canada Day and Remembrance Day.  
And that brings me around to the point of why I have always felt it is so much 
stronger to have Indigenous Peoples’ Day on or around October 12th: it is a day in which 
Indigenous people can gather, in whatever way they might imagine to, and undermine a 
pillar of the settler-colonial narrative of this country. Indigenous Peoples’ Day as it stands 
in this country does not, in my opinion, do this even remotely. It is proximal to Canada 
Day, being a mere ten days before it, and many Indigenous people I do know locally have 
chosen in the past couple of years to remove themselves from participation in officially 
sanctioned Canada Day events in order to give their times and energy to Indigenous 
Peoples’ Day instead, but it is not like Indigenous Peoples’ Day is a day that subversively 
coincides with the exact timing of Canada Day.  
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In fact, it is my opinion, somewhat cynically informed by trying to survive the 
post-apocalypse of settler colonialism for the better part of my adult life, that the June 
date for holding Indigenous Peoples’ Day seems to be a cynical plot to celebrate the day 
in such a way precisely so that it does not happen to undermine one of Canada’s major 
settler-colonial narrative chapter markers. I cannot prove that of course. It is just my jaded 
Native opinion on the day.  
However, I also feel that by holding Indigenous Peoples’ Day on a different day 
than essentially the rest of the continent, we also sever ourselves from the celebration of 
continent-wide survival and resistance of Indigenous peoples to five centuries of 
invasion, genocide and so much more. And that to me is important. Perhaps it is my old 
Marxist inklings towards internationalism, but it is certainly also because to me as an 
Indigenous person, the imaginary settler-colonial border, whether the Medicine Line or 
the Rio Grande, is just that: an illusory line drawn in the sand by a set of invasive colonial 
powers across lands they seized in the most insidiously legal and illegal ways. But by 
virtue of their being illusory that does not mean that they have no less force in our daily 
lives, even today in 2019. The U.S.-Canada border directly divides our peoples from one 
another, even when many of us were close kin before the coming of Canada or the United 
States and the borders their separate their nominally differentiated settler-colonial 
fiefdoms of stolen land.  
As Indigenous people concerned with our own liberation, I find quite often that 
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there is an effectively standardized recognition of this, of the artificiality and illusory 
nature of the colonial border. Indeed, our activist and organizational history has long 
demonstrated this in terms of actual praxis. Natives from both sides of the U.S. and 
Canada showed up for Wounded Knee, Oka and Standing Rock. I know many 
Indigenous people who got in cars, pickups, minivans, and buses or even walked to 
Standing Rock. Our resistance against the expansion of the Black Snake across our lands 
is inherently trans-border in its methodological and praxiological implementations and 
theorizations (Estes 2019). 
Beyond that, in our everyday lives, many of us demonstrate that border between 
these two halves of the northern bloc means little to us. Many times, over the past few 
years have I been in conversation with an Anishinaabe person in this country and they 
have remarked, upon hearing of my Menomineeness that they have travelled to our 
reservation in Wisconsin either for ceremony or for the pow wow. Of course, this does 
not surprise me, we are old kin, and we are close with several of the Anishinaabe 
communities in Wisconsin. The point is that for ceremony or the pow wow trail, the 
border means little.  
Yet having Indigenous Peoples’ Day on June 21st actually, in my thoughts, breaks 
with that ancient tradition. Rather than standing with our kin across the United States 
and so-called Latin America, by having Indigenous Peoples’ Day on this day we corral 
ourselves to Canada and restrict ourselves to these borders. Intentionally or not it shirks 
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our internationalist duties to Indigenous people’s south of the Medicine Line. It cannot 
even domestically function to undermine one of this country’s chief narrative artefacts 
celebrated as holidays. 
6.1 Colonial Holidays & the Myths We Celebrate 
More than that though is that Indigenous Peoples’ Day, specifically the formalized, 
official Indigenous Peoples’ Day and associated gatherings, circle dances, drumming, 
film showings, concerts etc. that happen on this university campus, or are sanctioned to 
happen by the city’s political and civil societal apparatuses to happen elsewhere in town, 
are always taken up under what has become so much the watchword for Indigenous-
Settler relations in this country over the past half-decade or so: reconciliation. And this 
again returns us to my question: what the fuck is that?  
What is reconciliation? Discursively, reconciliation is an outgrowth of recognition 
frameworks, which Juris et de jure emerged in this country following the 1982 
constitution and its inclusion of discourse that claimed to have “recognized and 
affirmed” so-called Aboriginal Rights, and before them a series of other governmental 
and legal outcomes in the 1970s, in particular the Supreme Court of Canada decision in 
Calder et al. v. Attorney-General of British Columbia, in 1973, and the James Bay and 
Northern Québec Agreement of 1975, though in fact this particular form of liberal 




In this vein, I agree with Mark Antaki and Coel Kirkby (2009) that canadian State 
recognition of Indigenous peoples is actually a practice and policy of settler-colonial State 
lethality. At its most basic level reconciliation is a discursive ruse, an ideological feint that 
promises the reconciliation of nonindigenous and Indigenous canadians, but without real 
movement on any policy or issue of import. Reconciliation is never about returning land, 
stopping the never-ending assault on Indigenous women, girls, and two-spirits, or about 
anything really.  
As far as Indigenous Peoples’ Day is reconciliation transmogrified into a semi-
holiday, it is one that instead evokes a pure liberal, humanist multiculturalism that 
promises to “celebrate Indigenous people’s contributions to Canada.” What are we even 
saying here when we talk about both Indigenous and settler peoples gathering across this 
country to celebrate Indigenous peoples’ contributions to it? I am reminded here of 
Roland Barthes’ examination of a cover of Paris-Match magazine which featured on its 
cover a young, Black, colonial soldier saluting the French flag. He says of this 
On the cover, a young [Black person] in a French uniform is saluting, 
with his eyes uplifted, probably fixed on a fold of the tricolour. All this 
is the meaning of the picture. But, whether naively or not, I see very well 
what it signifies to me: that France is a great Empire, that all her sons, 
without any colour discrimination, faithfully serve under her flag, and 
that there is no better answer to the detractors of an alleged colonialism 
than the zeal shown by this [Black person] in serving his so-called 
oppressors. I am therefore again faced with a greater semiological 
system: there is a signifier, itself already formed with a previous system 
(a black soldier is giving the French salute); there is a signified (it is here 
a purposeful mixture of Frenchness and militariness); finally, there is a 
presence of the signified through the signifier (1972:115). 
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I think that in many ways this is the design of Canada’s iteration of Indigenous Peoples’ 
Day. We celebrate that Canada is a liberal, humanist multicultural society. We celebrate 
that Canada has moved on from its settler-colonial past, or at the very least it is sorry for 
the wrongs it committed and is working towards rectification and accountability. We 
celebrate that today in Canada, this society is no place for racists and racism. In other 
words, to borrow the title of the work by Barthes from which the above quote is taken, 
we work to create mythologies. Specifically, here colonial-national mythologies. We 
mythologize about Canada’s past, and we mythologize about the current aims and 




Figure 3: The Cover of Paris-March Discussed by Barthes. Source: Rowland Barthes: Mythologies, Jeanne Willette 
(2013). 
This collective mythmaking, in which settlers and Natives join together (well, not 
all of us, I want no part in it) is a collective praxis of historical evisceration, however. It 
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splits open history and guts it of its actual content, renders it meaningless, an empty 
signifier which can be transposed onto a new signified. It appropriates colonial-national 
history across multiple planes. Of course, as should be expected, this mythologizing 
smothers over that the biggest contribution that Indigenous people provided to this 
corporate entity we now call Canada is the land which the settler appropriated, a process 
euphemized away from its fullness as an act of colonial brigandage by way of discursive 
recourse to the legalized apparatus of crown relations and treaty-making. Secondly, that 
initial act of materialist land appropriation is in turn appropriated by the myth-making 
apparatus of the settler-colonial State, re-shaped and re-signified as part of Indigenous 
people’s contributions to Canada. 
Indeed, reconciliation of this order inherently relies on invasion and settlement 
being a mere onto-historical event, or series of onto-historical events, but which is 
nonetheless something that happened, and which might have troubling and lingering 
echoes in ‘our’ (who is this collective?) society, but which is not happening today, and 
most certainly is not something that should, or even could be undone. And why would 
Canada choose to recognize that? I am not so deluded about the promises of liberal, 
humanist multiculturalism and the parliamentary democracy of an imperialist genocide-
state to believe that Canada, or the United States also for that matter, would ever seriously 
move in any direction that would undermine its own existence. In fact, that is why I do 
not even particularly care about voting in said democratic process, not that I can vote in 
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this country, non-citizen that I am, and that is also a different story for another time.  
 
Figure 4: Dancers and Attendees Stand for Pow Wow Flag Entrance. Visible are U.S. federal & armed forces flags, as 
well as the flag of Canada. Source: 2019 White Earth Pow Wow & Celebration, Crazy Crow Trading Post (2019). 
Contra the core beliefs of the liberal, humanist multicultural project, settler 
colonialism is not merely a legacy from some dark national past; it is something that is 
ongoing right now, right here, and which affects Indigenous peoples towards shorter 
lifespans, often Third World living conditions, greater rates of interpersonal violence and 
risks of exposure to violence from both regular and irregular forces of the colonial State 
(whether police, or everyday settler taking police action into their hands), drug and 
alcohol addiction, suicide, deteriorated mental health, broken families, water on reserves 
that is undrinkable if not at times actually flammable, and all manner of other negative 
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sociological markers. What is reconciliation to us then when the final report of the inquiry 
into the horrific rates of violence against Indigenous women, girls and 2SLGBTQQIA 
people, which was released during this writing, specifically, clearly and unflinchingly 
states that these cultural, sociological and criminological phenomena in this country 
“amount to nothing less than the deliberate, often covert campaign of genocide” against 
these of our kin (National Inquiry into Missing and Murdered Indigenous Women and 
Girls 2019:5)? 
What does reconciliation mean when this country’s Prime Minister one day 
declares a climate emergency only to seemingly turn right around and approve one of 
the primary arms of the Black Snake within these borders, one which the domestic armed 
wing of the settler-colonial State was sent in to enforce the construction of mere months 
ago? The Black Snake still sinks its poisonous fangs into our peoples, lands and other-
than-human kin (Estes 2019), and Indian Country more than ever feels as though it has 
been cast into the zone of national sacrifice (Churchill & LaDuke 1996). 
What does reconciliation mean when our lands, and quite often our very lives, 
remain stolen? What is reconciliation when Indigenous lives very much so remain what 
Mignolo refers to as “dispensable and bare lives” in the political-economic agenda of 
modernity (2009); lamentable yet not grievable, killable but not mournable.  How can we 
even begin this conversation when it feels like everything that has been inflicted upon us, 
from Mayflower to modern, Indian Wars to residential schools, has never ended and 
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where an end does not appear to be in sight. In short, coming to survey this situation 
through the lens of my own life, it seems rather a lot like what my nekōqsemaw would 
call ‘colonial bullshit.’ In essence then reconciliation seems to have little to do with any 
kind of meaningful practice of decolonization, as much as that word is increasingly 
metaphorically deployed in everyday discourse, and more to do with ideologically 
shoring up the foundations of the colonial regime by ensuring that they are not 
challenged by any kind of emergent Native decolonial militancy.  
Indigenous Peoples’ Day functions within this context. It is a superficial 
demonstration and celebration of what is often spoken of as “Indigenous people’s 
contributions to Canada” and seems to have more in common with a kind of country-
wide pow wow than with anything else. It is a day where Indigenous people gather to 
sing, dance, drum, sell their “traditional” cultural crafts, paint chalk murals and share 
elder teachings more often it seems for the enlightenment of curious white onlookers than 
for any kind of real benefit for us who are the collectivity we call Indigenous peoples. It 
is non-invasive, unobtrusive and most certainly does not function to undermine the 
ongoing political and narrative fact of settler colonialism.  
It does not seek, so it seems to me, to reconcile nonindigenous peoples, specifically 
the white settler population, with the continued survivance, resistance and quest for 
genuine freedom for Indigenous peoples. No, most certainly not. Rather, again to follow 
Antaki and Kirkby (2009), this discursive ruse is one in which reconciliation is something 
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that is inflicted upon Indigenous peoples in order to reconcile us to ongoing invasion and 
crown sovereignty, and the inherent foreclosure that has of any kind of decolonial future 
for Indigenous peoples, in which we will be able to say that we have become decolonized, 
because so long as the northern bloc persists in its existence that cannot ever be.  
In that way, the ideological purposes of a formalized, and this always-already 
neutralized, Indigenous Peoples’ Day lays itself bare. And in that, in my ways, it is a 
specific day that seems to contain within it so much of what it is that this dissertation is 
actually about.  
6.2 Cohering Settler Colonialism 
In this narrative aside about Indigenous Peoples’ Day, brought on by the day of this 
writing, I mention a point that is salient for my quest to uncover the Nativophagic 
qualities of the imaginarium of late capitalist/colonialist storytelling when it comes to the 
telling of our damage narratives.  And that is the point I made that settler-colonial nation-
states always need to enact a programmatic regime of national forgetting. Forget Natives. 
Forget the land. Forget the past, kill it even if you must, to paraphrase a certain Star Wars 
character.  Settler colonialism must engender such regimes of forgetting, which lies at 
cross-purposes with their nominal commitment to liberal, humanist, multicultural 
policies of reconciliation, because to remember, really remember, risks a ruptural event 
within the discursive and symbolic setting of the current colonial order of things. 
Towards that, forgetting rather than remembering must always be the order of the day. 
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And more to the point, when remembering does happen, because the bounds of settler-
colonial space-time can longer contain its ghosts, and the spirits of the dead must be let 
loose to roam free, the regime of forgetting must always be there to remind you that what 
you are seeing is not actually of the present-now, but of the distant-then. 
So, to begin to articulate this something-of-first-piece-of-an-answer to our question 
of the consumption of Native damage narratives, I want to briefly zoom out from the 
level of the auto-ethnographic and auto/biographic and return to the level of the 
structural and the national.  By doing this I hope to link my thoughts on this question of 
why—why are these narratives of damage so readily consumed?—to thoughts that have 
already been articulated at the macro-level concerning the necessity of Indigenous 
dispossession and death (not only in the physical sense, but also in the sense of culture, 
politics, sovereignty and territoriality) and the stability and futurity of the settler-state in 
the post-frontier period.  
It is well established within the canon of current-day Settler Colonial Studies and 
Native Studies that, at a structural level, “invasion is a structure, not an event” and that 
settler colonialism is a project that “destroys to replace” (Wolfe 2006:388).  However 
beyond this, or rather as a consequence because of this, the fact of the continuing 
structuring nature of settler-colonial invasion, which is taken as a given throughout my 
writing in this dissertation, has necessitated an entire cultural industry and civil society 
focused on the constant assertion of invasion as merely an onto-historical event, locking 
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it, and the Native sovereignties and territorialities that it smothered and erased, 
consistently in the realm of the past. 
This is necessary for the ongoing instantiation and cohesion of settler society.  The 
late theorist of Settler Colonial Studies Patrick Wolfe makes the following argument in 
his text Traces of History: Elementary Structures of Race: 
Thus the salient question to arise from the territorial dispossession of 
Native peoples is not that of whether or not it happened, since there can 
be no doubting that.  Rather, it is the question of the subsequent career 
of Native ownership, which mere dispossession does not compromise.  
The question in other words, is one of strategy analysis: How do settler 
societies deal with autonomous systems of ownership that are not 
susceptible to forcible seizure?  This question acquires particular urgency 
in the context of settler society’s need to establish a rule of law with 
sufficient legitimacy to secure a viable level of consent to a recently 
promulgated set of social norms among an ever-aggregating and often 
diversely recruited immigrant populace. For their own internal 
purposes, there, quite apart from international consideration, settler 
societies seek to neutralize the extraneous sovereignties that conquered 
Natives continue to instantiate.  … So far as conquest remains 
incomplete, the settler state rests—or, more to the point, fails to rest—on 
incomplete foundations.  For the settler state, therefore, the struggle to 
neutralise Indigenous externality is a struggle for its own integrity 
(2016b:35-37). 
I agree with Wolfe.  However, while his focus here is broadly on the questions of the 
continuance of Native sovereignty and territoriality in the ongoing face of the 
institutional and structural elements of settler invasion, what is essential in this argument 
that I want to draw out for my purposes here is that the continued existence of Native 
people poses a fundamental existential quandary for the settler-state and its own claims 
to sovereignty and territoriality. While the juridical order of the settler-state was created 
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exceptionally (Agamben 2017b; Schmitt 2006) through the homicidal and dispossessing 
violence of the frontier period, even once the frontier is cleared and its borders closed, the 
continued existence of the Native, as the Native, casts into doubt the legitimacy of the 
current settler-colonial order and its political claims.  
A similar sentiment is expressed in the writings of the Osage theologian George E. 
Tinker.  He writes in American Indian Liberation: A Theology of Sovereignty , arguing 
against the reduction of Native struggles purely to class analysis and class struggle: 
Our oppression and the resulting poverty are not primarily due to any class 
analysis at all.  Rather, they are rooted in the economic need of the 
colonizer to quiet our claims to the land and to mute our moral 
judgement on the United States’ long history of violence and conquest in 
north America [emphasis mine] (2008:23).54 
In Tinker, as with Wolfe, the fundamental issue at hand here is the need of the settler-
colonial State to silence the continued existence of Native nations.  For both of them, the 
central pressing question is that of the settler-state’s ability to continually instantiate itself 
as legitimate through concretizing its own grammar of sovereignty and territoriality.  
This by necessity equates with the development of a political order that must silence any 
 
54 Tinker’s arguments in this work regarding the theoretical tendency of Eurocentric Marxists to reduce 
Native struggles against settler colonialism to class analysis—and even more so to justify the continued the 
dispossession of Native territory under the guise of a proletarian socialist movement and state—also find 
their reflection in the more recent work of the Dené Marxian and Fanonian scholar Glen Coulthard in his 
book Red Skin White Masks (2014), who comes to similar insights regarding the primitive accumulation 
thesis forward by Marx. However, while the work of Coulthard is in many ways influential on my own 
conception of a politics of refusal, it is not my intention here to take up space illuminating the ways in 
which Tinker and Coulthard’s analysis on the question of Marxism, historical materialism and class 
analysis converge. I have however written regarding this subject elsewhere in my publicly accessible, more 
“activist” writings for a general, if decidedly political, audience (Robinson 2019; 2018; 2016).  
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other competing claim to sovereignty or territoriality within the geographic and physical 
mapping of the northern bloc.  Especially when such competing sovereignties and 
territorialities are not only alternative, but prior, as Wolfe notes (2016b:15). 
One can see this at play vis-à-vis competing imperial and colonial interests within 
the European world in the instance of the Monroe Doctrine, by which the United States 
asserted the entirety of the so-called western hemisphere as its corporate domain, locking 
out, or attempting to, the competing claims to access from the imperial powers of the Old 
World. More keenly, however, it is the persistence of alternative and prior Native claims 
to sovereignty and territoriality that present the most internal and pressing threat to the 
political order of the northern bloc.  While this is certainly not the case in balancing the 
abacus of military force (or lack thereof) when compared to the rivalry between the dual 
settler-states of the north bloc and the European old world, or even the emergent inter-
imperialist rivalry with the Russian Federation and People’s Republic of China (a rivalry 
that in my most pessimistic and apocalyptic of nightmares, as I am sure for many others, 
seems to be inching this world ever further away from the post-World War II order of 
inter-imperialist cooperation and towards a renewal of direct inter-imperialist conflict), 
the prior, yet also continuously alternative, sovereignties and territories of the multitude 
of Native nations engulfed within the corpus of the northern bloc are those competing 
political orders which are most deeply tied to the symbolic ordering of settler power. 
Native existence rests at the intersections of political economy and the juridical 
308 
 
order of things, to which Tinker also adds a moral direction (no doubt due to his training 
and vocation as a decolonizing Lutheran theologian), and to which I would add the 
condition that it is also essentially psychic and existential, reaching into the symbolic 
order of settler coloniality. That is, it relates more fundamentally to the ability, or rather 
the drive, of the settler-state to cohere its own being psychically.  In the reigning épistémè 
of the settler colony, so long as the Native persists, given the unstable terrain that that 
persistence always-already generates, the State and civil society will always be at an 
ideological, ontological, symbolic, and libidinal impasse with regards to how it will 
mediate and concretize its ongoing existence qua itself. 
6.3 Digital Representations of the Native Ghost 
The essential consequence of this is the casting of echoes outwards rhizomatically, 
penetrating into multiple layers of the settler State and civil society.  This is most readily 
visible (and audible, and readable) in the various multiplicities of settler popular media 
and culture: films, literature, music, comic books, and videogames.  It is hard to not feel, 
for example, with the release of such a highly anticipated, and later award-winning, 
videogame as Rockstar’s late-2018 Western action-adventure property Red Dead 
Redemption 2, that as a Native I live engulfed within a symbolic culture and digital artistic 
production in which the Native must be killed, and the “west won,” over and over and 
over again. I am not a film, literary or media theorist or scholar, nor do I pretend to be, 
but to live as a Native in this era of late-colonialism, the era of the Trumps and Trudeau 
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2.0, it is hard not to conceive of the continued persistence of the Western form in film, 
video games and literature, as more than a simple re-enactment on a plane of escapism 
of the past glories of the settler, of the taming of the land and the making of a fully 
modern, colonial, capitalist and imperial nation.  
This is especially so as the tropes of the Western find their manifestations in more 
than just the straight-forward Western, but also in such genres as science fiction, fantasy, 
space opera and many others.  Jodi Byrd (2018) for example discusses how in another 
AAA video game release, in this instance Irrational Games’ 2013 steampunk themed 
Bioshock Infinite, the successful closure of the frontier and settler victory in the Indian 
Wars is the essential narrative precondition.  She notes how during the run-up to the 
title’s release “the ads for Bioshock Infinite were full of the bombastic, adrenalin-rush 
swagger that celebrates frontier violence and first-person shooter aesthetics with a full 
arsenal of weapons” [emphasis mine] (602-603).  She writes: 
In keeping with the period justifications for the gamification of imperial 
racism within the Bioshock Infinite multiverse, designers populated the 
world with casual, overt, and extreme forms of racial violence.  From the 
Fraternal Order of the Raven with its Ku Klux Klan overtones to the Hall 
of Heroes with its celebration of victories in the Boxer Rebellion and at 
Wounded Knee, the game circulates racialized caricatures of “foreign 
hordes” to world the game (609). 
Eventually, within these games digital and algorithmic worlds, the player is invited, via 
the heavily armed avatar of the central character DeWitt, to take up arms and enact 
violent and righteous vengeance against all of the imperial white supremacy that they 
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have witnessed throughout the story thus far.  Bleeding together the game world and the 
world of the real, this invitation and the violences that follow, work to enact a kind of 
temporal distancing between the player, situated in the colonial present, and the 
alternative early Twentieth-Century history setting in which the game world plays out.  
However, this logic of the game world fails at the level of settler colonialism.  Byrd 
continues: 
in the case of Wounded Knee, the game’s mode of temporal distancing 
with no remediation possible places the event in stasis as forever 
primitively fixed within the colonial archive.  The game designers also 
fail spectacularly at history.  First of all, Wounded Knee was not a battle, 
as it is constantly referred to throughout the game script.  It was in fact a 
brutal massacre of three hundred unarmed Lakota men, women, and 
children who were in Big Foot’s band and were already in custody of the 
US Seventh Calvary when the shooting started on December 29, 1890.  
Throughout the entirety of Bioshock Infinite, Wounded Knee is implied 
to be an unfortunate, if violent, mistake on the part of the US military … 
Wounded Knee is an uninterpretable event surrounded by generic 
nineteenth-century Indianness.  It is evoked, as it often is within 
standardized history books, as a mnemonic for the supposed colonial 
break, the moment when the Indian Wars end, the frontier closes, and 
twentieth-century modernity begins.  Its presence in the game is a relic, 
a marker of a flattened historicity that continues to evoke Indians as 
lamentable, but not grievable (609-610). 
The ghost of the lamentable, but not grievable, dead, but not murdered, Native is the 
foundational ontological precondition for this fantastic digital world, much as it is for Red 
Dead Redemption 2.  In so much of settler popular culture the ghosts of Natives past and 
present lurk at the margins, just out of sight, waiting to break in and rupture the 
hypersurface of the settler-colonial present.  Indeed, it is a common, half-serious, half-
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joking occurrence for my Anishinaabe nekōqsemaw to assert that most films we watch 
together are in some way about settler colonialism, and in particular about settlers and 
others from white imperial nations attempting to work through their collective pasts, and 
the moral injuries accrued in the acts that populate them, by re-imagining these violences 
with themselves taking the positionality of the victim.  
This is I feel the case in even the most counter-western videogames that I have 
experienced.  Here my mind drifts immediately to the long-running production by 
French and french-canadian studio Ubisoft of the Assassin’s Creed series.  Taking as its 
plot device the exploring of fictional submerged histories of real-world events via the use 
of the genetic memories of characters in the present day, in many ways the Assassin’s 
Creed series has been subversive—at least in so far as a major contemporary AAA game 
produced by a large capitalist game creation firm is capable of being genuinely 
subversive—at least up until its eighth mainline instalment, Assassin’s Creed Unity, which 
took place during the French Revolution, and which I believed, in all my leftism, to 
portray the proto-proletarian movements that burst forth at that time as the villains. 
Before that however, in the mini-game side-quests of the third mainline entry, Assassin’s 
Creed Brotherhood, the players could even uncover an image of protestors from the 
Revolutionary Communist Party-Parti Communiste Révolutionnaire, the major canadian 
Maoist organization, at a May Day rally accompanied by the slogan “with each passing 
day, the people get stronger, freedom ascends, heralding a revolution.”  
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Between that, I imagine jokingly, hidden slogan about protracted people’s war, 
and the more reactionary eighth iteration there was perhaps what has been for me one of 
the more personally relevant and meaningful videogames I have played, Assassin’s Creed 
III. Or more specifically, Assassin’s Creed III, Assassin’s Creed IV Black Flag, and the spin-
off title Assassin’s Creed Freedom Cry.  All of these games take place in the Americas, unlike 
the previous Italian and Levantine settings, with Black Flag and Freedom Cry featuring 
the 18th century Caribbean, my second home, and often took the time to directly address 
the racial tensions and colonial histories that still deeply scar the region to this day.  But 
it is really Assassin’s Creed III that always struck me, and for one simple reason, the 
principle player character is Indigenous55.  He is the son of an english settler, and primary 
antagonist of the title, and a Mohawk mother, and it is his mission over the course of the 
game to undo the works of his father in the midst of the so-called “American Revolution.” 
Indeed, quite often the game did not shy away from telling it like it is, about settler 
 
55 There is something to be said of the problematics of non-Native videogame developers (both AAA and 
others) using Indigenous characters and attempting Indigenous representation in the medium. Most 
recently there has been a small uproar over the game This is My Land, which has you play as a generically 
Plains Indian character who is defending their land against the encroachment of white american settlers. 
The game, currently in an early access phase, is developed by Ukrainian developer Game-Labs. A number 
of Indigenous friends of mine raised the issue on social media about a non-Indigenous developer, in 
particular a european one, attempting to represent the Indigenous experience in the game. I understand 
this, as I likewise understand people’s trepidation of Indigenous representation in Assassin’s Creed III. 
However, as a diasporic/displaced Indigenous person, who grew up overseas, I must say that these 
representations have always meant something to me. As problematic as they are, it would be a lie to say 
that I did not jump at the opportunity to play as an Indigenous character, and more so, play as an 
Indigenous character who fights against the tide of colonial settlement. I know I am not the only person 
who feels this way. This is My Land came to attention because my younger brother quite excitedly sent me 
information about the game during summer 2019. He couldn’t wait to get his hands on it. While it may 
sound pithy, and perhaps even liberal, I think these issues are nothing if not complicated. 
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colonialism and what it means for Indigenous people.  I will always remember the lines 
of the game’s fictionalized rendition of Sir William Johnson, who says to your character 
just before his death: 
Do you think that good King George lies awake at night hoping that no 
harm comes to his native subjects?  Or that the people of the city care one 
whit about them?  Oh, sure, the colonists are happy to trade when they 
need food or shelter or a bit of extra padding for their armies.  But when 
the walls of the city constrict—when there's crops that need soil— when 
there's... when there's no enemy to fight—we'll see how kind the people 
are then. 
But even in this game, ultimately this is the realm of the past.  In the end, your player 
avatar Ratonhnhaké:ton, while successful in tearing down the fictional mystical 
conspiracy of the Knights Templar to disrupt society and define the American Revolution 
to its own ends, he is unable to stop the forceful displacement of his nation from their 
lands.  In the end, he is just a Native, and no matter how powerful he may be, no matter 
how many white/settler/master soldiers and villains he lays low, that is all he will ever 
be.  A ghost of what could have been, and a signpost to what is, a past that can never be 
done.  In any iteration, in any nearby possible world, the Native will always be fated to 
fade into the night. 
This assemblage that is current settler society, in all of its dystopic, accelerated and 
accelerating, deterritorializing capitalist realist glory is in reality not as detached from 
modernity as some theorists have attempted to posit, such as the late Mark Fisher (2009).  
While I agree with much of Fisher’s diagnosis of capitalist realism as an extension of 
Frederic Jameson’s critique of the postmodern condition (1991), from the temporal and 
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spatial geography of the Native, it comes into view more of a critique of the internal 
cultural and political logic of decaying settler-colonial, imperial, white capitalist society 
that is staring down the barrel of its own demise as the world it has created inches closer 
and closer to one apocalypse or another, whether technological or ecological. While for 
Fisher the pastiche and revivalism which Jameson first foresaw as coming to consume 
more and more of late-capitalist cultural production is founded on the notion that society 
has unlearned how to invent the future, in light of Berardi’s slow cancellation of the 
future (2011), and thus it must constantly return to the past in order to mine it for lost 
visions of the future, even as technological growth and development increases at an ever 
greater pace, this cannot be the whole of it.  
Indeed, if the cultural production of game worlds such as those of Red Dead 
Redemption 2 and Bioshock Infinite demonstrate anything to us, it is that the capitalist realist 
present is the logical telos of the frontier.  The anti-Native violence of the frontier period 
has undeniably never stopped; it has merely been transformed and reconfigured itself.  
From a Bahamian beach in October, 1492 through the Indian Wars to residential and 
boarding schools, to the ongoing sterilization of Native women, to #MMIWGTS, Oka, 
Ipperwash, Wounded Knee II, Standing Rock and Wet'suwet'en, from blood quantum to 
the Indian Act, eliminative and dispossessive anti-Native violence continues to be a 
necessary animus for the world in which we live.  
Rather than escaping the frontier, leaving in the dust bin of a long distant history, 
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settler colonialism and its violence continues to haunt the present of capitalist realism.  
This is why the Native must be defeated, murdered, and pushed back again and again at 
all levels of the settler-colonial symbolic order.  It is precisely this that ultimately 
destabilizes the ontological and symbolic worlds of the white/settler/master, creating a 
world in which, straddle the globe as they might in a predator’s pose always ready to 
strike, they are never able to be fully secure.  
In this sense, the moment of settler-colonial capitalist realism is doubly 
hauntological.  It is haunted not just by the lost futures of cultural formations past which 
continue to echo within the imaginations of the settler who is unable to dream of a world 
beyond the capitalist event horizon, but also by the present-yet-absent whispering of the 
ghosts of massacred Native and enslaved Africans.  These spectral entities are always 
there, always watching, always waiting.  
The settler must continuously defeat these ghosts so as to sustain their own 
instantiation and sense of self-legitimacy.  To repeat Wolfe’s maxim: “invasion is a 
structure not an event” (2006:388).  The murder, conquest and casting out of the Native 
is not only the fundamental ontological precondition for the project of settlement, it 
remains the fundamental ontological and symbolic pre-condition for its persistence in the 
era of capitalist realism.  Various strands of nominally critical thought birthed at the heart 
of modernity/coloniality, such as Marxism and poststructuralism, may attempt to 
dislodge or deconstruct this, to posit something else in its place, yet it, like the shadow 
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Chapter 7. Settler Colonialism & the Incommensurable 
Cartography of the Native Savage 
Every science is necessarily based upon a few inarticulate, elementary, 
and axiomatic assumptions which are exposed and exploded only when 
confronted with altogether unexpected phenomena which can no longer 
be understood within the framework of its categories.  
– Hannah Arendt, Social Science Techniques and the Study of Concentration 
Camps 
Carrying forward the discussion from the previous chapter, I imagine that you are 
wondering right now what exactly does our fire-side tale about the chronic requirement 
of the settler-colonial order of things to silence Native ghosts, both living and dead, in 
order to always be able to (re-)instantiate its own sense of legitimacy have to do with the 
question of Native abjection and the telling and consumption of our damage narratives? 
I understand that question, which is why I pose it here in the body of these texts.  I know 
what you are probably thinking as you try to decipher this story at arm’s length, because 
while this may seem like an interesting aside about AAA videogames, and certainly 
something that is worthy of its own dissertation length examination, it does not 
immediately seem to have much to do with the question posed in Chapter 4 about the 
consumption of our damage narratives within the imaginarium of late 
capitalist/colonialist storytelling. So, what does any of this have to do with why settler-
colonial society is always so ready to consume our stories of haunting and trauma? 
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But I argue back, somewhere in my prior discussion of Western tropes and the 
Native spectres that haunt the margins of settler-colonial and capitalist realist 
imaginaries-of-the-present-and-future lies the path that will lead us down this rabbit 
hole.  And the deeper we fall, the Weirder the monsters that will appear. 
At the heart of the ongoing ontological and symbolic requirement of continuous 
Native death and dispossession, is a fundamental question of the construction of The 
Native, Native, and of Native sovereignty and how it allows the Native to be both cast out, 
and to a priori always-already be cast out, that is to say: always-already abjected. For the 
purposes of my argument here I take sites of multiplicity of the Native, of Natives-as-
persons, and of Native sovereignty and self-determination as indicative of, as well as 
manifestations of, the same, primordial ontological condition within, against and before 
the social ontology of settler colonialism.  To use the words of Billy-Ray Belcourt, perhaps 
then we can think here of Nativeness as a kind of ante-ontology, in that “it is prior to and 
therefore disruptive of ontology” (2016a:24), or as Jodi Byrd’s Indian Errant which 
foregrounds the ontological formation of all else (2011). 
This state of being is one that is always-already cast out, always-already outside 
of the conception of Man, of Man-as-the-human, born of coloniality with its taxonomic 
boundaries delineated by the binary  of white/not white, what Aníbal Quijano called the 
racism/ethnicism complex (2010; 2008), as well as male/not male, cissexual/not cissexual, 
heterosexual/not heterosexual. Indeed, what Sylvia Wynter referred to as the ethnoclass 
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of (bourgeois) Man’s overrepresentation as the human, central as it is to the reigning 
modernist épistémè, cannot be separated from co-constituted and co-productive dualism 
of modernity/coloniality.  Wynter’s potent corrective of Foucault’s genealogy of Man 
displaces and destabilizes the latter’s Eurocentrism by centring the Columbian encounter 
and processes of elimination, enslavement, conquest, and subordination (Wynter 2003; 
Foucault 1994) 
While these binaries no doubt play a significant role in the ordering of the settler-
colonial world and the Native’s relationship to it, for us here I want to aim at two 
additional binary oppositions.  Firstly, Man versus the Savage, which might render also 
as Man versus the Wild, or more simply and more classically recognizable, Man versus 
Nature.  And secondly, and perhaps more abstractly, being-inside-settler-time versus 
being-outside-settler-time.  I want to posit that these two binary oppositions are not only 
fundamental to understanding the relationship of the Native to the world of the 
Sovereign and the settler (and the sovereign settler) but are themselves deeply 
interrelated. 
Both of these oppositions—Man versus the Savage and being-inside-settler-time 
versus being-outside-settler-time—entail a project of world creation in which the Native 
is always-already an exteriority vis-à-vis the white/settler/master, its States and civil 
society.  While I believe that Wolfe is correct in his argument that in a political and 
juridical sense it is the case that in the post-frontier era of total territorial engulfment of 
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the Native that the living Native has been transferred from a cartography of the outside 
to one of the inside (2012), I argue that this is only in the sense of State-oriented 
governance and regulations of populations in juridical and biopolitical spheres, and that 
this situation is not reflected in the fundamental social ontology of contemporary settler 
colonialism. 
Here I argue that the always-already casting out of the Native functions along 
these two different yet related lines of thought: The Native as outside-settler-time and the 
Native as the Wild.  While the question of the Native as outside-settler-time clearly 
articulates itself around questions of temporality, in particular around what Mark Rifkin 
refers to as settler time (2017a), I also read the Native as the Wild as a form of spatial 
cartography that functions through and across multiple registers to delimit the 
boundaries of settler habitability. 
Both of these are necessary to understand not only the form and content of Native 
abjection, but also ultimately the question of the how and why of the colonial-capitalist 
consumption of our damage narratives, and thus it is necessary to explore them within 
the pages of this chapter.  What they mean is not that the Native is abjected from, cast out 
of, the fold of Man and its overrepresentation as Man-as-the-human—the world of the 
white/settler/master—but rather that the Native was never part of that world to begin 
with.  This also converges with, and draws from, Nicolás Juárez’s ontological 
investigation of Red Life (2014), and thus also necessarily unsettles assumptions in certain 
321 
 
theorizations of Native positionality which posit a partial commensurability of the 
relationship between the Native and Man cum settler, such as that articulated within the 
work of Frank B. Wilderson, III (2010). It is also thus a further sketching out of the Native 
positionality as theorized by Byrd (2011) within a triangular social ontology of settler 
colonialism of Native-Settler-Arrivant56. 
7.1 Being-outside-Settler-Time    
In his text Red, White & Black: Cinema and the Structure of U.S. Antagonisms, Wilderson 
provides us with an ontological taxonomy of life under settler colonialism of human-
Savage-Slave57.  Within his necessarily arboreal theorization the white/settler/master 
occupies the space of the ‘human’, alongside all other non-Native and non-Black people 
of colour, while the Black Slave is the abjected non-human.  Between these two positions 
 
56 The theorization of the category of Arrivant for Byrd (2011) is an attempt to sketch out the positionality 
of those who, while not Native, are also not setters.  The chief characteristic here is that Arrivants did not 
arrive in the Americas of their own free will, but rather found themselves on these shores by dint of force.  
A similar social taxonomy of settler-colonial society is made by Iyko Day in the form of Native-Settler-Alien 
(2016).  However, neither of these social taxonomies are without fault.  Primarily in this regard it must be 
said that the categories of Arrivant and Alien unintentionally obviate the specificity of the Black experience 
of chattel enslavement and the ongoing after-lives of it that continue to mark as inherently criminal, 
containable and killable-without-justification the descendants of those who survived the Middle Passage 
and the plantation.  At the same time, I am not entirely convinced of Wilderson’s own trifold taxonomy of 
Human-Savage-Slave (discussed below), in part because I do not believe that there is sufficient ground 
within the imaginary of settler-colonial order to fold all non-Black and non-Red people of colour into the 
category of human alongside the white/settler/master. While I accept these criticism and thus do not deploy 
either of these categories throughout this work, it is also not my intention at this present moment to provide 
an alternative social ontology, though I will note that I believe such a fuller and more accurate taxonomy 
of life under settler colonialism must be necessarily quadrilateral rather than triangular. 
57 While Wilderson, as well as Fred Moten (2017), Nicolás Juárez (2014) and others, speak in this regard of 
the human, I, as noted earlier, cleave much closer to Wynter’s Fanonian understanding that this particular 
human that they speak of and theorize around is actually an overrepresentation of the ethnoclass of 
(bourgeois) Man (2003). 
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is the Native Savage, which for Wilderson occupies a liminal position of half-humanness 
(2010).  The reasoning for the half-human positionality of the Native Savage for 
Wilderson is found within his understanding of the grammars of Native life: genocide 
and the loss of sovereignty.  Within his theorization of the structure of U.S. antagonisms, 
the former is unable to be made legible within the rhetorical world of the human cum 
settler, and rather finds articulation with the grammars of Black suffering: accumulation 
and fungibility.  However, so Wilderson theorizes, the latter, which is the loss of 
sovereignty, is able to be reincorporated and made legible within the human’s register of 
structural re-adjustment (2010).  Wilderson notes: 
On the semantic field on which the new protocols are possible, 
Indigenism can indeed become partially legible through a 
programmatics of structural adjustment (as fits our globalized era).  In 
other words, for the Indians’ subject position to be legible, their positive 
registers of lost or threatened cultural identity must be foregrounded, 
when in point of fact the antagonistic register of dispossession that 
Indians “possess” is a position in relation to a socius structured by 
genocide.  … [T]he Indigenous position is one for which genocide is a 
constitutive element, not merely an historical event, without which 
Indians would not, paradoxically, “exist” (2010:9-10). 
He continues this line of thinking elsewhere, writing: 
whereas the genocidal modality of the “Savage” grammar of suffering 
articulates itself quite well within the two modalities of the Slave’s 
grammar of suffering, accumulation and fungibility, Native American 
film, political texts, and ontological meditations fail to recognize, much 
less pursue this articulation.  The small corpus of socially engaged films 
directed by Native Americans privilege the ensemble of questions 
animated by the imaginary of sovereign loss (2010:28). 
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As powerful and insightful as Wilderson’s ontological mapping of white/settler/master 
and Black life may be, there are certain theoretical miscues within his analysis which 
cause him to misallocate the Native Savage as liminal to human life, as not-quite-human, 
rather than fully outside of it.  Indeed, in later work, Wilderson completely abjures this 
formulation under the influence of Jared Sexton’s work in “The Vel of Slavery” (2016)58, 
and places the formerly liminal Native Savage fully inside of the category of the Man qua 
the human (2011).  Focusing on his earlier and more textually substantial work however, 
for Juárez—who’s own work repositions Wilderson’s grammar of Redness from genocide 
and sovereignty to clearing and civilization—this is because Wilderson: 
compartmentalizes the Red ontological position of clearing into genocide 
and (the loss of) sovereignty, ultimately failing to recognize the nature 
of Red life as the condition of being cleared a priori to existence, what 
Wilderson articulates as the shift from clearing as a verb to clearing as a 
noun at the moment of the “discovery” [emphasis mine] (2014). 
This essential element of recognition for Juárez is the entry point of the Native as out-of-
settler-time.  In drawing this development out of the settler order of things, we turn to 
the Marshall Trilogy of decisions at the U.S. supreme court in the early-to-mid-19th 
century, seminal decisions in the juridical reckoning of the Native within the northern 
bloc.  Johnson v. McIntosh, Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, and Worcester v. Georgia were three 
of the single most important decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court with regards to Native 
 
58 Tiffany Lethabo King interviewed Wilderson twice on this subject in 2017, and discusses it in her book 
The Black Shoals: Offshore Formations of Black and Native Studies (2019:228) 
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Law and Indigenous rights, setting forth the legal terrain upon which much the 
proceeding governance of settler colonialism would be built.  For example, the Court’s 
unanimous decision in 1823 in the Johnson case, despite no actual representation for 
Indigenous peoples, re-inscribed into the law of the new, secular american republic the 
older, christian european “doctrine of discovery”, which decidedly relegated Indigenous 
peoples to secondary status on the question of their possession of their own land, which 
was transferred into the realm of being squabbles over territory by competing european 
and settler actors. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, and Worcester v. Georgia continued this legal 
colonialism, refining the process over the period of these two subsequent Supreme Court 
cases (Williams 2005). 
Lumbee critical legal scholar Robert A. Williams, Jr. says of their foundational role 
in the settler order of things that: 
the Marshall Model of Indian Rights plays much the same kind of 
inaugural and paradoxical organizing role in the Supreme Court’s 
Indian law as Bhabha’s wondrous “English book” plays in the cultural 
writings of English colonialism (2005:50). 
In particular, these three court decisions have had a profound and lasting implication for 
any understanding of Native sovereignty and the loss thereof.  In this regard, Juárez 
notes, “The Marshall rulings ontologically determine Redness from the moment the 
Settler meets the Savage (2014).  The temporal dimension of the Marshal rulings is 
likewise noted by Wolfe, who states: 
Native sovereignty existed out of (or at least, prior to) colonial time, 
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which is to say, it did not exist at all—or rather, it only existed in order 
to be diminished.  Paradoxically, therefore, Native sovereignty was a 
creation of discovery.  Propositionally, it was an imperative generated by 
Marshall’s commitment to diminution, which required an undiminished 
prior state that could be diminished from (2012:10-11). 
Finally, Mark Rifkin describes the cognition of Native sovereignty in light of the Marshall 
Decisions as a “peculiar status.” In particular, he says of the place of Native sovereignty 
within the juridical worlding of the settler that it is “less as a way of designating a specific 
set of powers than as a negative presence, as what Native peoples categorically lack” 
(2017b:297).  The notion of Native sovereignty is a void, a nullity, a simulacrum par 
excellence; it does not hide some genuine truth, some deeper reality, that Natives are, or 
were, in fact, sovereign self-subjects and that this status was lost within the cognition of 
the white/settler/master.  As Baudrillard himself notes, in a simulated reference to the 
new testament, “The simulacrum is never what hides the truth—it is truth that hides the 
fact that there is none” (1994:1). 
This is, as Juárez articulates, the essence of “being cleared a priori to existence” (2014).  
On the ontological implications of this, and of the resultant construction of the Native 
within the symbolic order of the settler, he notes: 
For the concept that the United States had eminent domain over the land 
to gain coherence it must presume, in the a priori, that the terra nullius 
of the Americas always was.  Here, Native Americans emerge barred 
from sovereignty at the ontological level, and thus can only be regarded 
as non-human occupants.  This a priori clearing becomes the necessary 
grounding for the Marshall ruling to make sense because the clearing of 
land must be scaled to the level of a hemisphere in order for colonial 
land-grabbing to even begin to play out within the Americas.  … as far 
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as the Settler is concerned, as far as the world is concerned, the Red 
Indian never had sovereignty, never had any claim to the land at all 
(2014). 
The above discussions of the Marshall Rulings in the United States also reveal an 
additional problem with Wilderson’s theorization of the Native as a kind of liminal half-
human or not-quite-human.  This is that while he sees the loss of sovereignty for the 
Native as a point of articulation with the grammars of suffering of the human, what he 
fundamentally misses is that where the same linguistic taxons may be used to seemingly 
describe a notion of Native sovereignty that is superficially similar to the sovereignty of 
the white/settler/master, it is, in fact, something of a categorically, and fundamentally 
different, and inferior, kind. While not in my reading a direct critique of Wilderson, Wolfe 
makes this distinction clear, noting: 
In keeping with the doctrine of discovery, the Marshall judgments 
presuppose, and can only consistently be read as presupposing, a 
fundamental asymmetry between Indians’ right of occupancy and the 
property rights that white settlers could obtain once Native title had been 
extinguished.  Under certain conditions, Natives’ immemorial 
occupation of their land entitled them to a right of soil or usufruct, which 
was understood as hunting and gathering rather than as agriculture.  
This right was inalienable.  It could not be sold to private individual or 
corporation but, under the principle of pre-emption, could only be 
surrendered to the crown.  Once Native title had been surrendered to the 
crown and extinguished, however, the crown could transfer to settlers 
an entitlement (fee simple) that was greater than the right of occupancy 
that the Natives had surrendered.  Thus the process yielded more than 
land for settlers.  It also yielded sovereign subjecthood: they became the 
sort of people who could own rather than merely occupy.  The 
asymmetry between occupancy and title reflected a thoroughgoing 




Thus, the trap for which Wilderson falls in his discussion of (the loss of) Native 
sovereignty as one of the two modalities of Red suffering, and as a point of articulation 
with the alienation and exploitation of the white/settler/master, is one of language.  As 
he claims in Red, White & Black: 
At every sale—the soul, the body, the group, the land, and the universe—
they [the settler and the Indian] can both practice cartography, and 
although at every scale their maps are radically incompatible, their 
respective “mapness” is never in question.  This capacity for cartographic 
coherence is the thing itself, that which secures subjectivity for both the 
Settler and the ‘Savage’ and articulates them to one another in a network 
of connections, transfers and displacements’ (2010:181). 
Wilderson’s predicament is made clearer in his more recent essay “Afro-Pessimism and 
the End of Redemption,” in which he creates a juxtaposition between Simon Ortiz’s poem 
“Sand Creek” (2000) alongside his own, “Law Abiding” (2013).  Through his reading of 
Ortiz’s poetic work he claims: 
[T]he relational status of both the Indian victims and the White 
oppressors is established—a reciprocal dynamic is acknowledged 
(between degraded humanity, Indians, and exalted humanity, White 
settlers). This reciprocal dynamic is based on the fact that even though 
one group is massacring the other, both exist within the same paradigm 
of recognition and incorporation.  Their relation is based on a mutual 
recognition of sovereignty.  At every scale of abstraction, body, family, 
community, cosmology, physical terrain, Native American sovereignty 
is recognized and incorporated into the consciousness of both Indians 
and settlers who destroyed them.  The poem’s coherence is sustained by 
structural capacity for reciprocity between the genociders and the 
genocided (2016). 
Speculatively: Wilderson’s trap of language here and elsewhere is perhaps as a result of 
the insufficiencies in, and inherent ideological and affective working of, settler juridical 
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and philosophical linguistic taxonomies59.  In essence he mistakes the outward linguistic 
conceptual coverings of these two concepts of supposed sovereignty for their actual 
ontological content; two things which in fact could not be more distinct—thus allowing 
for his argument that Natives and the white/settler/master share a mutual cognition of 
the sovereignty of the other, united in a joint paradigm of “recognition and 
incorporation.” As Wolfe notes, however, “The same words meant different things when 
applied to either” (2012:10).  Tracing a similar path Joanne Barker likewise notes that: 
There is no fixed meaning for what sovereignty is—what it means by 
definition, what it implies in public debate, or how it has been 
conceptualized in international, national, or indigenous law.  
Sovereignty—and its related histories, perspectives, and identities—is 
embedded within the specific social relations in which it is invoked and 
given meaning. … The challenge, then, to understand how and for whom 
sovereignty matters is to understand the historical circumstances under 
which it is given meaning.  There is nothing inherent about its 
significance (2005:21). 
 
59 While I will not make any serious gestures here regarding claims as to the intentionality or 
unintentionality of Wilderson’s taxonomic dichotomy, in the above example it is curious, to put the case 
somewhat minimally, that Wilderson, in his juxtaposition of the two poems, makes one of them his own.  
“Law Abiding” was published in 2013, in the edited volume Stand Our Ground: Poems for Trayvon Martin & 
Marissa Alexander.  This is a full 3 years after the publication of Red, Black & White, and also post-dates 
Wilderson’s Sexton-influenced movement away from treating the Native Savage as a liminal being of “half-
humanness” towards one fully commensurate with, and incorporated within, the category of the human 
(as the overrepresentation of Man).  It is also a full decade after his dual 2003 publications of “Gramsci’s 
Black Marx: Whither the Slave in Civil Society?” and “The Prison Slave as Hegemony’s (Silent) Scandal”, 
two texts that brought him to the forefront of the heterogeneous movement within theory and analysis 
known as Afropessimism.  The point here being that one can, I would contend, reasonably presume that 
Wilderson’s own poetics are reflective of his explicitly stated theoretical and political commitments.  Thus, 
again without staking a claim to intentionality or unintentionality, and while still holding Wilderson to be 
quite valuable for a number of important insights, there is quite clearly a rhetorical movement in 
Wilderson’s piece “Afro-Pessimism and the End of Redemption” in comparing his own writing with that 
of an Indigenous writer in order to state his point about the non-relationality and ultimate 
incommensurability of the violence faced by Red and Black bodies. 
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We can follow the old structural linguistics of Saussure (2013) through Baudrillard (2019; 
2006; 1994) and Derrida (2016) that any sign within a given assemblage gains its 
meaningful content in their relationships to other signs and other concepts; through what 
it is not.  Native sovereignty is not, and never has been the same thing as the sovereignty 
of the white/settler/master.  This is born out explicitly within the juridical judgements of 
the Marshall Trilogy and the legal rendition of prior Native possession as mere usufruct, 
rather than the fulsomeness of free-holding private property—true sovereignty—
something which, via a technology of settler governance that appears more as a form of 
the alchemy, it could be transformed into and granted forthwith to genuine human 
(ethnoclass (bourgeois) Man) subjects through of the sovereign power of the Crown or 
the Republic. 
Wilderson is hardly alone in this movement, however, which seeks, as Wolfe 
notes, “to minimize Indian difference and assimilate it to Whiteness” (2016a:8), or more 
specifically, to assimilate it to Man in its overrepresentation as the human, and thus make 
it inimical to all other forms of life and decolonial, abolitionist and liberation struggles. 
For Wilderson’s close fellow traveller Jared Sexton this is most explicit (2016), as it is in 
the work of Migration and Transnationalism scholar Nandita Sharma (2008-09; 2015).  
Thus, for them, as Melanie K. Yazzie and Nick Estes describe, moves towards a critique 
of settler colonialism as a distinct modality of domination and towards a decolonial 
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Nativeness are, “in their recent assaults on Native sovereignty and nationhood, racist to 
the point of treachery against all oppressed people” (2016:20). 
What is certainly the case here is that, as critical as their thought may be with 
regards to the struggles of racialized and colonized peoples, all three of these theorists, 
within the bodies of their work, effectively re-inscribe and recapitulate a settler-colonial 
order of things.  As Wolfe puts it, speaking specifically of Sharma, but easily applicable 
to all, colonial resonances pervade their work (2013b:266). 
Quite on the contrary to this kind of world-building, counterpoised as they are to 
white supremacy, rather than form a point of legibility and articulation between the 
human and the Savage, as Wilderson argues (2010), Native sovereignty and the 
sovereignty of the white/settler/master ultimately occupy fundamentally different and 
incommensurable registers, on planes of linguistics, the political and the ontological. This 
in and of itself upsets much of Wilderson’s theorization that sovereignty its loss places 
the Native in the liminal state of half-humanness—or his later moves to simply fully 
assimilate the Native into the human—without necessary recourse to Juárez’s shift of the 
grammars of Native suffering from genocide and (the loss of) sovereignty to clearing and 
civilization, though I do prefer his general outline for the depth it pursues. In short, the 
void and the fulsome are neither coeval nor coterminous and can never be.  And this is 
the ultimate trap that Wilderson and similar theorists face when they find themselves 
confronted by the personage and the position of the Native Savage and mistake 
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superficial linguistic outer-trappings for the inner ontological and political content of the 
sign.  As Juárez eloquently, if painfully, states: 
The pain and anger over a loss without name is the formation of the 
social group, it transforms all narratives into narratives of surviving, 
every act of “culture” by Native Americans becomes a survival strategy 
in which the dualism between the overwhelming violence of being a 
Being of nothingness and the deathly comfort of alcoholism and drug 
use is put off. Wilderson’s concern with the irreconcilable “worlds” of 
the Settler and the Savage is far too reductionist in the intricacy of the 
violence inflicted against Red bodies.  It is not that there is a Savage 
world that stands in irreconcilable opposition to the world of the Settler, 
but rather that Red life (as far as it can be called life) is a survival strategy 
that no longer possesses the potential for world creation.  … He ignores 
that the violence Red bodies face extends far beyond the reservation into 
time and space because it is a violence that silenced languages, burned 
books, obliterated people, erased history, and shattered families (2014). 
In this project of worlding, of world creation by the white/settler/master as Man as its 
overrepresentation as the human, there can be no reckoning, no casting of a decolonial 
face into the future anterior, where there is present something that we might recognize 
as a genuine Native sovereignty so long as the world of the settler persists. Any futurity 
which preserves settler colonialism with its civil society, governmental, ontological, and 
symbolic orders is one that by its very constitution voids any notion of Native self-
determination, not only from the present but from the past and the future as well, as 
anything other than pure simulacra. 
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Returning to the results of the Marshall Decisions60, what they mean for any ontology of 
Nativeness are profound.  On the question of temporality, they must be taken as key to 
my understanding, because they not only evacuate any possibility of Native sovereignty 
from the spatial coordinates of the northern bloc of settler colonialism, but indeed from 
all possible coordinates of temporal cartography as well.  Native sovereignty is not just a 
sovereignty that was lost, in that it is no longer part of the present-now but is, in fact, a 
sovereignty that never was.  While the Native—or, more correctly, the myriad of diverse 
Indigenous nations that would come to be confined within the legal category of the 
Native through the governance techniques of settler coloniality—may have been self-
governing and self-determining prior to the arrival on these shores of the european, 
within the worlding of the euro-american/euro-canadian settler the Native qua the Native 
is not, and never has been, sovereign. The extent to which we can even begin to discuss 
Native sovereignty and the Native as containing a cogent meaning under the rubrics of 
settler governmentality, we must first recognize that they have been, and always have 
 
60 While the Marshall Trilogy are part of the U.S. legal canon, their reliance on the Doctrine of Discovery 
and the prior Royal Proclamation of 1763 is ultimately a republican uptake of a shared lineage of legality 
with the British Empire.  This lineage, as well as the spatial cartography that it is played out upon, is also 
shared in by Canada.  Indeed, one can cast the juridical net wider to also include Australia, itself also a 
settler colony founded by the British Empire.  However, it is enough to say for the purposes of my writing 
here that while Canada is assumed to present its own independent political and state order, separate from 
the United States, in terms of the juridical treatment of Natives and Native sovereignty, the difference 
between the two countries is decidedly narrower.  This is part of the essential point of collapsing these two 




been, determined by and through the prerogative of the settler.  There is no possibility of 
structural re-adjustment; only a relationship of aporia and antagonism. 
This brings into sharp relief Byrd’s two-headed questioning of “do Indians live the 
ordinary life in the contemporary now?” and “are Indians part of the present tense?” 
(2011:37).  In short, for me, the answer is a resounding no.  For Byrd herself, in her reading 
of Alexis de Tocqueville and the removal of the Choctaw from their traditional 
homelands in the southeastern United States, she notes that “Even in the present of their 
removal, the Choctaws are always already past perfect: they had left, they had stepped, 
they had been promised” (2011:37). Beyond questions of pure legality, as in the questions 
of sovereignty in the Marshall Trilogy, these issues of temporal abjection for the Native 
are significant.  Mark Rifkin in his work Beyond Settler Time: Temporal Sovereignty and 
Indigenous Self-Determination asks, “What does it mean to be recognized as existing in 
time?” before going on to note that: 
The representation of Native peoples as either having disappeared or 
being remnants on the verge of vanishing constitutes one of the principal 
means of effacing Indigenous sovereignties.  Such a portrayal of 
Indigenous temporal stasis or absence erases extant forms of occupancy, 
governance, and opposition to settler encroachments.  Moreover, it 
generates a prism through which any evidence of such survival will be 
interpreted as either vestigial (and thus on the way to imminent 
extinction) or hopelessly contaminated (as having lost—or quickly 
losing—the qualities understood as defining something, someone, or 
some space as properly “Indian” in the first place) (2017a:5). 
In the worlding of the white/settler/master, the Native is always, and has always been, 
“was” and “were,” never “is” and “are.” Certainly, if we take this line of logic through 
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its terminal point, not only is the Native was/were and not is/are, the Native can indeed 
never truly be, so long as the world of the settler continues to be.  This is precisely why 
Byrd, building upon Judith Butler’s articulation of when life is grievable (2016), asks 
whether the Native is able to cast a life into the tense of the future anterior “in which 
Indians will have been decolonized” (2011:38).  The Native is a being-out-of-time if ever 
there was one.61 
7.2 The Wild Native and the Native Wild 
Yet this temporal cartographic mapping of a world in which the Native not only does not 
belong, but which in fact can never belong, is just one aspect of this issue.  The other part 
 
61 I have often wondered about this and how it may relate to the Jamesonian-Fisherian discussion of the 
postmodern condition. Specifically, Jameson, in his diagnosis of postmodernity—which is extended and 
rendered all pervasive in Fisher (2009)—finds one of the constitutive features to be the weakening, if not 
the complete failure of historicity, “both in the relationship to public History and in the new forms of our 
private temporality” (1991:6).  However, what can we make of this weakening, or complete loss, of 
historicity, as it marks the transition from modernity to postmodernity, in light of beings who already fail 
to cohere temporally?  This may seem like an obtuse point, but I do believe it is a meaningful one, for the 
simple reason that conquest, the sociological catastrophe of settler colonialism and the trans-Atlantic slave 
trade, was/is a process which render/s/ed both Natives qua Natives, and enslaved African peoples, as non-
subjects lacking temporal coherence. It is not possible to speak of Native or Black history prior to conquest, 
because they did not exist prior to conquest.  Thus, it seems to me that the Native as a being-out-of-time, 
to say nothing of the status of the enslaved African, was essential to the making of the modernist épistémè, 
most especially in its apex as settler coloniality.  From this, if the weakening or failure of historicity is one 
of the primary markers of the transition from modernity to postmodernity, then I must wonder about the 
degree to which such a transitional distinction is actually meaningful, when viewed from a Native 
perspective.  Indeed, the loss of historicity that supposedly marks this phase shift in the world-system 
appears to only be the return upon the euro-modern world of that condition which it had already inflicted 
upon Natives and Black people; historicity can only be lost if one was at some point already rendered via 
power into a subject with the ability to mark oneself historically.  This is not to say that the condition of 
postmodernity, or late capitalism, or capitalist realism, is not meaningful.  Certainly, there is something 
going on here, which I believe both Jameson and Fisher deftly theorize.  However, what it appears to be, 
once one strips away all of its layers, is a universalization of an essentially european condition, in the sense 
that it maps on to all of the world something which only now has erupted as an affliction in the european 
psyche onto peoples for whom such a cultural, social, and political shift would bear little actual meaning. 
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is the Native as the Wild, what Williams, Jr. refers to as an “organizing iconography” 
(2005:39) of the settler order of things, or what Belcourt suggests is the way that 
“indigeneity circulates as a feral signifier in colonial economies of meaning-making” 
(2016a:23).  But what does it mean to be-Wild or to be-of-the-Wild?  And what are its 
implications in thinking the ontological mapping of the Native on our way to deepening 
our discussions of damage narratives and their consumption within the society of the 
settler? 
An essential starting here is by way of locating this question as emerging from the 
old trope of the white/settler/master which sees the Native as existing within a kind of 
primordial unity with nature, or the Wild.  For those of us raised as part of, or engulfed 
within, a western cultural paradigm, our minds, or at least my mind, is immediately here 
drawn to the old literary trope of the noble savage, which in its more positive (“positive” 
being used here extremely loosely) register represents some kind of primeval, Wild 
outsider, unmoored, or uncorrupted, by civilization, one who has not yet left the 
proximity of the state of nature, and embodying some kind of innate goodness or nobility 
which has been lost on civilized “Man” within the current modernist épistémè. 
Minus the moralizing or ethnological baggage of that particular literary trope, this 
is the literal meaning of the concept of the Savage, which is essential in understanding 
ontological mapping of the Native and Native sovereignty within the world of the 
white/settler/master.  As Belcourt traces, “The word savage comes from the Latin 
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salvaticus, an alteration of silvaticus, meaning ‘wild,’ literally ‘of the woods.’ Of persons, 
it means ‘reckless, ungovernable’ (2016a:23).  Speaking specifically to the taxonomic and 
map-making projects of settler colonialism, he continues, saying that: 
In the space-time of settler states, savagery temporarily stands in for 
those subjectivities tethered to a supposedly waning form of indigeneity, 
one that came from the woods, and, because of this, had to be jettisoned 
from or assimilated into the national body (23). 
Going further, he suggests that “savagery always-already references an otherworld of 
sorts: there are forms of life abandoned outside modernity’s episteme whose 
expressivities surge with affects anomalous within the topography of settler colonialism” 
(24).  Noting a divergent tendency internal to the signifier of the Savage, yet ultimately 
converging in the sign’s meaning, Byrd states that: 
The enfant sauvage, as one possible signification of the savage in the state 
of pupillage, and the homo ferus, as that savage child resignified as the 
werewolf, have both served as metonymy for Indians within 
Enlightenment philosophy (2015:125). 
These points by Belcourt and Byrd regarding the memetic otherworldliness, which we 
can read as a kind of outsideness and exteriority, of Savagery, maps onto Agamben’s 
understanding of the state of exception and the machinery of the biopolitical.  In 
particular, drawing on Heidegger’s The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics (2001), in 
which Dasein62 is partly defined relationally to the animal (Oliver 2007:2), Agamben 
 
62 I discuss the Heideggerian ontology of Daesein, and the Native and decolonial critiques of it in the first 
chapter The Coloniality of (My/Our) Being. 
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argues that, the history of euro-western and euro-modern philosophy and science has 
been that of an anthropological machine (2003), which: 
Functions by excluding as not (yet) human an already human being from 
itself, that is, by animalizing the human, by isolating the nonhuman 
within the human: Homo alalus, or the ape-man (2003:37). 
Already here we see something of the Wild, the animalistic, the primordial, and the pre- 
and non-civilized in “the machine of the moderns” (37), “the machine that governs the 
conception of man” (92), in its biopolitical organizing of the boundary zones of the fully 
human sovereign.  This machine animalizes some humans into nonhumans who are able 
to be excluded from the terrain of fully human and sovereign life, a zone into which 
Agamben’s argues is cast the neomort, the Jew as “the non-man produced within the 
man,” as well as “the slave, the barbarian, and the foreigner63” and “the enfant sauvage 
or homo ferus” (2003:37).   
These figures, for Agamben, are those of “an animal in human form” (37), 
however, the ultimate product of the anthropological machine “is neither an animal life 
nor a human life, but only a life that is separated and excluded from itself—only a bare 
life” (37).  The bare life of those cast into the zone of not-quite-human and nonhuman—
the Savage, the Slave, the Jew, the foreigner—becomes Homo sacer, their flesh itself 
becoming a site of the exception against whom violence can be wielded outside of the 
 
63 Here quite clearly, I believe we can see also cast into the zone of the nonhuman and the not-quite-human 
those marked under the sign of Blackness, as well as Jasbir Puar’s ‘terrorist monster fags’ (2017) and Iyko 
Day’s ‘aliens’ (2016). 
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juridical order (Agamben 2017a).  The transformation, through racializing assemblages 
and mediated further through anatomies of gender and sexuality (Weheliye 2014), of 
some otherwise members of the Homo sapiens species into Homo sacer, Homo alalus, and 
Homo ferus—the transformation into bare life—is essential for the manifestation and 
continued instantiation of settler sovereign power within the geographies of the northern 
bloc.  As Byrd notes with specific regard to the Native, settler sovereign power “in the 
new world required Indians as the sign of the external savage in order to cohere an 
internal ordering of the nomos” (2015:124). 
Provocatively, Jacques Derrida in his final public lecture series on The Beast and the 
Sovereign suggests a dialectic between the beast—here Homo ferus, the human-as-Wolf—
and the sovereign, as both are constituted exceptionally as being-outside-the-law.  He 
explains that: 
Sharing this common being-outside-the-law, beast, criminal, and 
sovereign have a troubling resemblance: they call on each other and 
recall each other, from one to the other; there is between sovereign, 
criminal, and beast a sort of obscure and fascinating complicity, or even 
a worrying mutual attraction, a worrying familiarity, an unheimlich, 
uncanny reciprocal haunting (2009:17) 
Building on this late Derridean musing, as well as Agamben, Byrd argues that “as 
antipodal beings outside, beyond, and above, the beast and the sovereign function as 
antinomies, as the outlaw and the ontological prior through which the law is established 
and enacted” (2015:128).  What should be pointed out here though is that this dialectical 
enmeshment of the sovereign and the beast as being-outside-the-law, and the 
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mimegraphic mirroring of each other in the exceptional declaration of the nomos, is not 
the same thing as the point that Wilderson attempts to raise, in my assessment, when he 
attempts to argue that sovereignty is a locus of articulation between the not-quite-human 
Native and the fully human sovereign settler/master.  Rather, should we read Derrida, as 
well as Agamben and Weheliye, with Wilderson, there is a certain unsettling of 
Wilderson’s argument that happens, in that it is not only the beast—the Savage, the Homo 
ferus, man-as-Wolf—that stands with the sovereign as being-outside-the-law but also the 
slave, the Jew, the criminal, the foreigner, and all of those cast out of fully human 
existence into zones of not-quite-human and nonhuman.  I believe that can only lead to 
mistheorization, and misunderstanding, of the exceptional instantiation of the sovereign 
nomos, to argue that any of those cast into not-quite-humanness and nonhumanness have 
any kind of meaningful articulation with the sovereign, with the human, but rather that 
they represent dialectically necessary ontological priors others for the declaration of the 
rule of law.    
Speaking of the Wild and Wildness, which here based on etymological linkages I 
am treating as synonymous with the Savage, Jack Halberstam and Tavia Nyong’o argue: 
That first encounters with wildness are intimate and bewilder all 
sovereign expectations of autonomous selfhood.  To be wild in this sense 
is to be beside oneself, to be internally incoherent, to be driven by forces 
seen and unseen, to hear in voices and speak in tongues.  … But even as 
wildness is internal in a psychic sense, we also sense it as an extrahuman, 
suprahuman force.  … Wildness is where the environment speaks back, 
where communication bows to intensity, where worlds collide, cultures 
clash, and things fall apart (2018:454). 
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This iconography within which the Native is coded and overcoded as the Native Savage 
has been a structuring component of the U.S. settler-colonial project since its earliest days.  
Reading Byrd, María Josefina Saldaña-Portillo speaks of the “reiterative signification” of 
Nativeness as “ethnographic savagery” and “pathological sovereignty” (2016:35). 
In what we might consider—if we are to again be perhaps overly generous—its 
more banal or passive manifestations this unity of the Native with the Wild is also seen 
in the disappearing of prior Native stewardship of land and territory into the background 
noise of the natural landscape upon which the white/settler/master has set about the 
construction of his society. That is, in many ways, it is outside of the conceptual apparatus 
of the settler to recognize that the Native has manipulated and altered the physical 
geography of space prior to the interventions and disruptions of European invasion and 
settlement.  Speaking of the European colonization of Australia Wolfe describes how: 
Invading colonisers regularly marvelled at the local environment’s park 
like aspect, counting themselves multiply blessed that ‘nature’ 
(including divine providence) should have come to furnish them with 
ready-made grazing runs.  In fact, the Australian landscape’s benign 
aspect was the cumulative consequence of millennia of Indigenous 
management, in particular the use of fire to reduce undergrowth and to 
contain spontaneous conflagrations within local limits (2016b:22). 
For Wolfe, “In replacing Indigenous agency with that of the cosmos, the concept of nature 
enabled improvements effected by Natives to figure as serendipity.  This is an enduring 
settler theme [emphasis mine] (23).  Here the Native becomes nothing more than a literal 
force of nature, to the extent that their contribution is recognized at all.  This enduring 
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repose of the settler is also hardly limited to the context of the Australian settler-colonial 
project.  Reading Fredrick Jackson Turner’s turn of the Twentieth-Century historiography 
of the U.S. frontier, Saldaña-Portillo notes: 
Certainly, indigenous peoples appear in Turner’s historiography only to 
eventually cede ground and vanish from the landscape in the face of 
white settlement’s superior order.  And yet even in this quintessential 
tale of American conquest and character, indigenous peoples do much 
more than simply disappear.  Turner locates Indians in landscape so that 
“Americans” may acquire their proper ‘Americanness’ (2016:9-10). 
The disappearing Native; disappearing into the ground upon which we walk, is thus not 
only a basic ontological foundation for the project of settler colonialism, but also a 
geographic and physiographic one, one which the settler, in his status as the 
representative of truly civilized Man, is able to reap the rewards, declaring the rest to the 
work of God or of the cosmos. 
I say that this is outside of the conceptual apparatus of the settler, because the 
entire construction of the settler-colonial project must be rooted in a conception of terra 
nullius: empty land belonging to no-one.  Only properly civilized Man is able to engineer 
the terrain, to bend “nature” to his will.  The Savage, by dint of never having shaped the 
land through application of his labour is nothing more than a non-human inhabitant of 
the geography, thus unable to claim property rights of possession on anything of the 
same order as the settler-qua-civilized Man.  As Aileen Moreton-Robinson notes of terra 
nullius, it “gave rise to white sovereignty” and “national identity,” without which “the 
white nation cannot exist” (2015:30).  
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Thus, the material fact of this presupposition of the settler worlding’s fundamental 
untruth—for Natives have shaped the terrain through stewardship of the land, by 
building cities such as Cahokia and the various sites of the so-called “Mound Builders,” 
by farming, planting of orchards and maintaining gardens etc.—has the potential to 
profoundly unsettle a central element of settler legality and regimes of self-justification. 
The settler simply cannot recognize the prior stewardship of the territory by the Native.  
The conceptual apparatus that allows for this worlding flows through euro-western 
theology to modern juridical and ideological deployments of the concept.  While the 
average, individual settler may not be that person which constructed this worldview, 
they are fully ensconced within it as a conceptual apparatus.  Thus, what labour the 
Native did apply to the land prior to invasion is evacuated and agency placed with god 
or nature. 
At a fundamental level, Wildness and the Native as the Wild is necessary for the 
construction and reinforcement of the civilized world of the white/settler/master through 
the presentation of the negative image of what it is not.  The paradigmatic lack of 
civilization necessarily defines the contours of what is itself civilized.  This is in part why 
Juárez in his constructive shifting of the categories of Wilderson’s social ontology places 
civilization and the civilizing mission alongside clearing as the dual modality of violence 
against Red bodies alongside clearing.  In his book Shamanism, Colonialism, and the Wild 
Man: A Study in Terror and Healing, Michael Taussig says of this: 
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Wildness is incessantly recruited by the needs of order (and indeed this 
is one of anthropology’s most enduring tasks and contributions to social 
order).  But the fact remains that in trying to tame wildness this way, so 
that it can serve order as a counterimage, wildness must perforce retain 
its difference (1987:220). 
This echoes with Juárez’s claim “that the modality of civilization gives coherence to the 
Settler world by animating the Settler’s ability to create civil society outside of empty 
space” (2014).  At the same time, however, the encounter with Wildness and the Wild 
Native disrupts the civilized subject’s symbolic order, because while it functions through 
a negative dialectic of image-counter-image, the necessity of its difference means that it 
can never truly be assimilated and re-inscribed.  As Taussig notes: 
Wildness also raises the specter of the death of the symbolic function 
itself.  It is the spirit of the unknown and the disorderly, loose in the 
forest, encircling the city and the sown land, disrupting the conventions 
upon which meaning and the shaping function of images rest.  Wildness 
challenges the unity of the symbol, the transcendent totalization binding 
the image to that which it represents.  Wildness pries open this unity and 
in its place creates slippage and a grinding articulation between signifier 
and signified.  Wildness makes these connections spaces of darkness and 
light in which objects stare out in their mottled nakedness while 
signifiers float by.  Wildness is the death space of signification (1987:219). 
However, as Jack Halberstam notes of the Wild, “failure attends to all attempts to make 
wildness signify as either the opposite of modernity or simply its underbelly” (2014:143).  
This is a point that I will be returning to later on within this text, though I imagine that it 




Ultimately though, this is why for the Wild Native to enter into the civilized space of the 
white/settler/master subject, its culture, lifeways and Being, is to likewise enter into a 
death-space, a necrology, or a necropolis.  This is also, to return briefly to Wilderson, why 
the shifting of grammars of Red life as articulated by Juárez away from Wilderson’s 
liminal taxonomy of genocide and (the loss of) sovereignty into clearing and civilization, 
also shifts the relationship between the Native and the white/settler/master fully into the 
zone of antagonism. 
7.3 The Dialectical Enmeshment of Temporality and Wildness 
To return to the Marshall Trilogy again, this is why it is necessary to speak of two 
fundamental pillars in my understanding of the ways in which the Native and Native 
sovereignty are cast out from the world of the settler: The native as outside-settler-time 
and the Native as the Wild.  Through the operation of what Moreton-Robinson refers to 
as the “fiction of terra nullius” (2015) these two pillars dialectically reinforce and allow 
the construction of the other.  The Native as Savage, who has never departed from the 
state of nature is thus part of nature, unable to be sovereign.  Yet for that concept to 
function in a coherent manner the Native as Savage must also be evacuated from linear, 
settler conceptions of time so that they not only were in the state of nature at the time of 
contact, but they remain so and will remain so.  This evacuation from temporality then 
barrs the Native from ever actually being able to leave the state of nature so long as they 
remain conceptually and paradigmatically a Native qua Savage. 
345 
 
The enmeshment of the Native as being-outside-settler-time and being-in-the-
Wild echoes far beyond the Marshall rulings of the mid-nineteenth century, into the 
foundational philosophies of Western modernity, tied as it is to coloniality by Quijano in 
the dual concept of modernity/coloniality (2010; 2008).  With particular regard to the 
Hegelian dialectic, formative as it is too much of so-called ‘continental philosophy’ from 
Marxism, to Lacanian psychoanalysis, to poststructuralism, postmodernism, and 
deconstruction, either by way of incorporation, inversion or critique and rejection, the 
Native, simply put, has no place in it. 
For the Hegelian philosophy of the unfolding of history via the world Geist, it is a 
process that began in Asia, found its telos in Europe and against which both Africa and 
Africans serve as a perpetual stasis point against which, as Scott L. Pratt explains, the 
progression of said unfolding of the Geist as a “spirit becoming aware of itself by 
manifesting itself in the real world” (2002:4) can be judged. As Juárez explains, “Hegel 
later goes on to understand that, given that the Geist met its completion in Europe, 
Indigenous Americans are not only not a reference point for progress (such as the 
African) but are completely left out of the dialectic in any way, shape, or form” (2014).  
He continues, digging deeper: 
Hegel’s conception of the “off-the-map-ness” of Native Americans is so 
far reaching and absolute that when he articulates the condition of 
possibility to ability to enter into European law and be recognized he 
makes a noted exception for the Savage in that the Savage is just that: a 
savage that has not left the immediacy of nature and thus cannot be 
considered part of society any more than the buffalo and mountains that 
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co-populated the region. This rejection is an absolute rejection in that it 
is not that the Savage is recognized and then rejected as conscious or seen 
as lacking self-awareness, but rather the Savage is rejected from the 
possibility of being judged as either [emphasis mine] (2014). 
Within the Hegelian dialectic, and the Lacanian psychoanalysis that draws from it, and 
which informs much of Wilderson’s theorization of the tripartite social ontology of the 
human-Savage-Slave, the human represents life, while the Slave is transmuted into a 
personification of death.  However, the Native becomes neither of these; ejected from 
cognition of either a being of life or a being of death, the Native is cast fully into Gordon’s 
zone of non-being, becoming a being of nothingness64.  Thus, here again we see the 
dialectical unity of the Native’s being-in-the-Wild with its being-out-of-time: the Native 
Savage’s not only proximal placement to Wildness, but ensconcement within it, a priori 
precludes it from the unfolding of the historical Geist, of the movement of settler time.  
Savageness is thus a prior preclusion from the possibility of integration within the 
semantic and social fold of the white/settler/master.  This is also the point of the 
transformation of myriad and heterogeneous Native nations into the homogeneous 
category of biopolitical population governance, the Native (Vizenor 1994:167).  Only 
existing within the cognition of the white/settler/master, the generation of Nativeness, by 
way of permanent externality to the Hegelian dialectic, is a process in which “Natives are 
 
64 There is perhaps something Sartrean that can be said about this, but that is well beyond the scope of what 
I wish to do here.  Though perhaps it can serve as a gesture to some form of later work. 
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wrenched out of their living cosmos and thrown into the dead world of the Indian 
Savage” (Juárez 2014). 
Beyond Hegelianism and Lacanianism though, the spatiotemporal impact of this 
a priori clearing of the Native as a point of nothingness radiates outwards and casts its 
shadow upon even the ostensibly radical inversion of the dialectic of Hegel in the 
historical and dialectical materialism of Marx and the many who would later take up in 
his name in the form of a political and theoretical ism65. Indeed, many Indigenous 
theorists have made the case that there is no place within the historical dialectic of 
Marxism for the survivance of Native peoples and nations.  As Tinker writes, if: 
Marxist thinking and the notion of a historical dialectic were finally 
proven correct, then American Indian people and all Indigenous peoples 
would be doomed.  Our cultures and value systems, our spirituality, and 
even our social structures, would give way to an emergent socialist 
structure that would impose a notion of the good on all people regardless 
of ethnicity and culture (Tinker, 1992:15-16). 
 
65 I am not here attempting an in-depth analysis of the Marxist dialectic of history, as that is far beyond my 
intention in this chapter.  My own critique of Marxist theory in this regard and others can be found in the 
introduction to this dissertation.  However, partly as a reminder, it is worth gesturing towards the many 
attempts that have been made to unshackle the dialectics of Marx, and even Hegel, from its teleological and 
determinist moorings.  A recent attempt at this has been elaborated by George Ciccariello-Maher in his 
work Decolonizing Dialectics (2017), and before him and in a different fashion by the late theorist of racial 
capitalism Cedric J. Robinson in his An Anthropology of Marxism (1983).  Certain antecedents, though not 
with the same decolonial and anti-racist weight of Ciccariello-Maher and Robinson, can be read in the later 
works of Louis Althusser (2006) and Fredric Jameson (2010; 2017), and with much more weight of that type 
within the works of Frantz Fanon (2004; 1967).  Thus, the Marxist dialectic that I am addressing here could 
perhaps be best described as that of ‘orthodox Marxism,’ or perhaps even better by using Moishe Postone’s 
labelling of ‘Traditional Marxism’ (1993), as much as such a thing can be spoken of, recognizing the maze-
like divisions that exist within Marxism. 
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While some Marxists of a Leninist persuasion, with the anti-imperialist impulse towards 
superficially recognizing an “oppressed nation right to self-determination,” may object 
to this characterization, a century and a half of Marxist praxis within the confines of the 
northern bloc of settler colonialism has yet to demonstrate any serious political 
commitment to overturning the status of the Native or of opposition to political and 
philosophical regimes of settler colonialism. More recently Byrd has also reflected on this.  
In noting how the conditions of settler colonialism and the status of the Native continue 
to delineate what Jodi Dean and Bruno Bosteels refer to as the communist horizon (2018; 
2014) she says: 
Even within the fierce urgency of post-Fordist economic production and 
capitalist consumption, the hoped-for-narratives of liberation depend 
upon the Americas as an already emptied, infinitely exploitable new 
territory and new site of a transfigured commons (2015:123). 
Indeed, the dialectics of Marxism, as much as with Hegel, are replete with the kinds of 
modernist abstract universals and universalizing tendencies that Walter Mignolo warns 
us are the heart of global designs and are thus an inherent part of the worlding of 
coloniality (2012)66. 
 
66 Even within the field of Indigenous, Native or First Nations Studies, as it is today constituted in the wake 
of new formulations and iterations of Indigenous Critical Theory, these considerations, I believe, have been 
fully appreciated.  One can consider for a moment the theorizing of Coulthard in his book Red Skin, White 
Masks (2014), which, while a key text of this new movement, rests strongly upon Fanon’s critique of the 
Master-Slave dialectic within Hegel (1952).  One might wonder then, and this is well beyond my intention 
to truly flesh out, what the impact may be for this kind of theorization if the more fully triangular 
conception of Hegel of White Life, Black Death and Native Nothingness might mean for a fuller appreciation 
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So, what do we make of this conceptual and ontological barring of the Native from the 
spatial and temporal cartography of the settler?  And in particular, to repeat from my 
refrain from earlier in this chapter, as well as the previous two: what is the connection 
between this and the production and consumption of Native damage narratives within 
the imaginarium of late capitalist/colonialist storytelling?  In essence, Native exteriority is the 
point.  What I am proposing is that the construction of a Native-Outside within the 
ontological, symbolic, and imaginary planes of the settler is essential in understanding 
the peculiar status of Native abjection, and the implications that that has for my 
understanding of damage narratives, including my own, and their ready consumption in 
an economy of horror. 
  
 
of Coulthard’s theorization, and of his own critique of the usefulness of Fanon as a mechanistic 




Chapter 8. Red Monsters: The Native-Outside & the Weird 
We live in an age of monsters.  Such a statement is hardly controversial 
anymore – from every aspect of culture monsters peer at us, we consume 
them, we profess our fear, yet the market is saturated with vampires, 
ghouls, demons, and ghosts.  We loathe the monsters, we hide from 
them.  But we love them too.  How could we not?  They are everywhere, 
and so enormously profitable too. 
There are other monsters too – the news media is full of them.  We’re told 
to consume these monsters too – to fear them, these shadowy figures – 
them- that come from over there, that exist on the outside, that mean to 
do us harm and who threaten not just our lives but our way of life.  
– Jon Greenaway, Towards A Gothic Marxism, I: On Monsters 
Thinking of an epigraph for this dissertation’s final chapter immediately above, I have to 
agree with the Marxist literary scholar Greenaway (2018).  However, unlike the monsters 
that Greenaway is speaking of here, which are moulded and brought to life by the horrors 
of late capitalist economic crisis, social disintegration and the ever more rapid onslaught 
of alienation wrought by the deepening of technological colonization within everyday 
life, the monsters, ghosts, ghouls and revenants that I speak of, which lurk even behind 
those wrought by the regime of capital are those of the Native, a kind of Red Monster if 
you will. Capital and the mundane and quotidian rhythms of horror that it generates 
daily are indeed a kind of modernist monstrosity (McNally 2012), but the Native Savage 
is a spectre that has haunted modernity since its waking moments.  
The Red Monster of the Native has always been there, whether seen or unseen; the 
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fundamental condition of the Native cast from time and space within the ongoing 
cartography of the contact event.  Within the legal order of the United States, the 
monstrous visage of the Savage, always waiting, always hungry to shed blood and defile 
the flesh of the settler, is evoked within its founding document, the Declaration of 
Independence, which, as one of its principal grievances against the rule of the British 
Crown, the framers of american independence speak of their erstwhile King as having 
endeavoured “to bring on the inhabitants of the frontiers the merciless Indian Savages, 
whose known rule of warfare, is an undistinguished destruction of all ages, sexes and 
conditions.” The Crown was guilty because it fell asleep on the watch, and allowed the 
monsters to slip in.  
Likewise, following the completion of the settler “revolution” for independence, 
in proclamation of the first official Indian Policy of the new republic, the imagery of the 
Savage was the essence.  As Williams recounts: 
On September 7, 1783, just four days after the signing of the definitive 
peace treaty in Paris ending the war with Great Britain, George 
Washington, commander-in-chief, at the specific request of the 
Continental Congress, delivered what turned out to be the basic 
blueprint for the Founding Fathers’ first Indian policy for the United 
States.  That blueprint is contained in Washington’s carefully considered 
set of recommendations “relative to Indian Affairs” in the “Western 
Country.” Notably, Washington’s entire plan for dealing with the tribes 
of the Western Country was organized around the basic idea that the 
Indians on the frontier were bestial, war-loving savages and should be 
dealt with accordingly as a matter of U.S. policy (2005:40). 
For Washington and the early american founders, the Savage was the Wolf, the Wild beast 
352 
 
of the forest, differing only in outward physical shape.  The Native like the Wolf was 
something Wild and monstrous to be feared; something to be driven out from the 
political, social and geographic of the terrain of the civilized society of the settler, and 
against which the palisades of the town and the city were to be built in order to prevent 
its monstrous, blood-thirsty return. Indeed, the ordering of the Wild and Savage Native 
under the sign of the Wolf is essential in the symbolic instantiation of settler sovereign 
power.  Thinking back to Agamben’s casting of the Savage out of the zone of full 
sovereign humanness (2003) Byrd notes that “Washington’s ‘the Savage as the Wolf’ 
renders Indians intelligible as the enfant sauvage, the homo ferus, against which the 
United States asserts its own will to civility” (2015:127).  
It is in this light that Arturo J. Aldama argues that “that the savage represented all 
that was not culture, civilization and European” (2001:14).  More deeply, the Savage, 
along with the Slave, though functioning through different grammatical registers within 
the symbolic order and libidinal and political economies, represented all that was not 
bound within the category of the human-as-Man. Aldama links this explicitly with the 
Kristevean concept of the abjected object.  He tells us: 
The savage is the “abject” of the civilizing subject.  The abject is the 
“horror” and the “defilement” of the imperial overculture.  The death 
and mutilation of these symbolic and real “bodies generate and 
regenerate the imperial “I’s” knowing of itself (2001:14). 
Aldama’s discussion of the Savage abject and its role in the generation and instantiation 
of the imperial I, of its ego-self, contains clear echoes of Maldonado-Torres’s discussion 
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of the coloniality of being and the sub-ontological difference, discussed in Chapters 2 and 
3, and with Byrd’s Butlerian evocation of the Native as a being that can be lamentable, 
but which is not grievable. Here Native abjection is necessary for the consolidation of the 
settler self as a necessary ontological pre-condition, by way of a negative informing of 
what the human-as-Man is not.  
But what here is Native abjection precisely?  In the original concept as illuminated 
by Kristeva in her work Powers of Horror: An Essay on Abjection (1982) it cleaves most 
explicitly to the Freudian conception of das unheimliche, the uncanny67, perhaps not 
surprising given Kristeva’s allegiance to a form of Lacanian psychoanalysis.  The 
unheimlich for Freud and Lacan evokes a disquiet about a subject’s interiority and internal 
cohesion.  As Mark Fisher remarks regarding the concept in his The Weird and the Eerie, 
the unheimlich: 
Is about the strange within the familiar, the strangely familiar, and the 
familiar as strange—about the way in which the domestic world does not 
coincide with itself.  All of the ambivalences of Freud’s psychoanalysis 
are caught up in this concept.  Is it about making the familiar—and the 
familial—strange?  Or is it about returning the strange to the familiar, the 
familial (2016:10) 
This is why for Freud (2003) the unheimlich is best captured within notions of repetition 
and doubling: doppelgangers, artificial limbs and mechanical entities that have an 
 
67 “The uncanny” is the generally standard English-language translation of the German das unheimliche. 
However, a better translation is perhaps “the unhomely.” Seeking to avoid a linguistic debate over 
meaning, when discussing this concept however I have elected to simply use the original German term as 
so to avoid any confusion. 
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outward appearance of humanity.  In today’s increasingly cybernetic and technologically 
enmeshed society, as our ability to produce and reproduce human likeness digitally and 
mechanically, we are awash in the unheimlich, perhaps best summed up by Masahiro 
Mori's hypothesis of the Uncanny Valley (2012). 
The abject, in particular, can also evoke a sense of dread, and perhaps even horror, 
though for Kristeva the affects perhaps most closely evoked by it, as seen in her studies 
of xenophobia and antisemitism, are revulsion and disgust (Oliver & Keltner 2009).  As 
an affective operation, the abject becomes that which must be cast out in order to protect 
the subject’s coherence and understanding of self.  Following Imogen Tyler (2013) 
abjection can be further extrapolated from the individual to the collective, where it 
emerges as both a lived as well as social phenomenon.  It is what Fanon would describe 
as sociogenic (1967).  Importantly though here, the unheimlich-as-abject performs not only 
an affective function, but also a key ontological one, in that it forms the boundary in the 
subject-object binary.  While the abject is that which is cast out in order to produce and 
reproduce subject formation, we known from the old Derridean studies of binary 
oppositions in which “one of the two terms governs the other” (1982:41), that neither side 
of the binary is ever fully present, subsumed as it is within its other. To speak of it another 
way, we only can say what the subject is through reference to what it is not.  The subject 
then requires its other in order to offer up its own meaning.  The subject, in other words, 
requires its abject.  This is the sociality of abjection to which Tyler points us towards in 
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her study of neoliberal society which considers not only those who are abjected, but also 
those who abject.  
This, however, raises a fundamental question in my thinking.  While the abject is 
that which is cast out in order to preserve subjectivity, it is still radically about the familiar 
as strange.  This is conjured in Kristeva’s classical example of the corpse, which evokes 
the binary opposition between life and death (1982).  The corpse is something familiar, in 
this case, the literal human form, turned strange in the process of stripping off that which 
we most regularly associate with humans; animacy, movement, warmth, life and liveness.  
Evoking Kathleen Stewart’s Ordinary Affects (2007), the ordinary human form is in the 
corpse rendered sterile, dead, nothing but flesh and an aching, inching decay.  It is this 
that affects disgust and revulsion, and even dread and horror in the visage of the corpse; 
what is ordinary, the lived-in human body, becomes what it is not, and it reminds us of 
our own inescapable telos: the grave. 
But, if the Savage and colonized object is abject, as Aldama, Byrd and Maldonado-
Torres argue within their own respective registers, how does this mesh with Native 
exteriority?  Reading this still within a kind of social psychoanalytic register, as I have 
argued both in this chapter and previously, the Native positionality, or more correctly 
Nativeness, is necessary for the formation of the human-as-Man and, more specific to the 
context of the northern bloc, the white/settler/master.  But, Nativeness is not that which is 
cast out nor that which is the strangely familiar, or the familiar come strange, as in the 
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more traditionally theorized conceptualization of the unheimlich.  
As I discussed in the previous chapter, the Native as a being-outside-settler-time 
and a being-in-the-Wild is already exterior to the white/settler/master subject, and thus, 
so I think, destabilizes the traditional unheimlich as the basis for the abjection of 
Nativeness.  As much as the abject might be a point of disarticulation for subjectivity, 
Nativeness is a locus of destabilization for the abject as normally theorized.  Building 
upon this, what I propose from here out is that rather than relying on conceptions of the 
unheimlich to understand the abject status of Nativeness we engage in a movement towards 
the Weird.  
8.1 The Native as a Being that Does Not Belong 
In his book The Weird and The Eerie, Fisher explicitly counterpoises the dual concepts of 
the Weird and the eerie with the unheimlich, under which they are usually reincorporated.  
The key for Fisher, in particular, the Weird as it relates to my rethinking of the abject status 
of Nativeness, is that while the unheimlich is about the familiar-as-strange, the strangely 
familiar, the Weird, as well as the eerie, are about kinds of exteriority.  He notes regarding 
this, and its implication, that: 
The folding of the weird and the eerie into the unheimlich is 
symptomatic of a secular retreat from the outside.  The wider 
predilection for the unheimlich is commensurate with a compulsion 
towards a certain kind of critique, which operates by always processing 
the outside through the gaps and impasses of the inside.  The weird and 
the eerie make the opposite move: they allow us to see the inside from 
the perspective of the outside (2016:10).  
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Where these two concepts diverge, and where I pick up the Weird, is in Fisher’s 
articulation of the Weird as “that which does not belong” (2016:10).  He elaborates, saying 
“the weird brings to the familiar something which ordinarily lies beyond it, and which cannot 
be reconciled with the ‘homely’ (even as its negation)” (2016:10-11).  Later, he gives us a 
more specific and fulsome description: 
What is the weird?  When we say something is weird, what kind of 
feeling are we pointing to?  I want to argue that the weird is a particular 
kind of perturbation.  It involves a sensation of wrongness: a weird entity 
or object is so strange that it makes us feel that it should not exist, or at 
the very least should not exist here (emphasis mine) (2016:15). 
So, in short, we might say that the Weird is something which should not exist or should 
not belong, within the world of the canny or the homely, and which comes from, and 
exists in, the outside with relation to the subject’s interior.  In the confrontation with the 
Weird, the subject becomes destabilized.  The Weird, and Weird being, in particular, is an 
aporia to the inside.  
Regarding the Native and Nativeness, I argue that the dialectically enmeshed dual 
status of being-outside-settler-time and being-in-the-Wild function firmly through a 
register of exteriority vis-à-vis the world-building of Man and its apex form within the 
northern bloc as the white/settler/master.  This is, I argue, despite Wolfe’s correct 
assessment of the territorial containment of Native nations since the closure of the 
frontier, and the ending of the Indian Wars, and the shifting political and juridical status 
of Natives from exterior to interior (2016b).  Echoing backwards to Halberstam’s 
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invocation of the “failure attends to all attempts to make wildness signify as either the 
opposite of modernity or simply its underbelly” (2014:143), this is because Wildness, in 
so far as I have treated the concept thus far as interchangeable with Savagery, and in its 
enmeshment with questions of history and temporality, is exterior to the modern subject 
of Man and the world of the subject/Man’s creation. While, as with abjection broadly, this 
is sociogenic, given that, as I maintained earlier in this dissertation, world creation is an 
ongoing project of politics and sociality rather than a given fact about the “the World,” 
the exteriority of Nativeness is also a matter of ontogeny, again within Fanon’s 
psychoanalytic register (1967), as it is a priori to lived-in Red Life, as it is a matter of the 
conditions that delineate Nativeness as Nativeness.  
In terms of today’s temporal and spatial cognitions of settler-colonial popular and 
civil society, Nativeness is most certainly, in my own lived experiences as a Native 
navigating that very machinery, met with a cognition as a being that should not belong.  
The Native is a being that does not belong, a Weird being, par excellence.  
8.2 Breaking out of the Temporal Prison 
As I have described elsewhere, while I consider here to be home, it was not where I was 
raised.  Though I spent much time in the Great Lakes region in my younger days, it was 
always alongside my mother’s immediate and extended family.  While the reservation of 
our nation in northern Wisconsin was in many ways a shelter from the outside world of 
the white/settler/master, setting aside its role in colonial governmentality as a site of 
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biopolitical and affective immiseration for Natives, even the times spent in the city of 
Milwaukee were always spent in the company of other Natives.  Thus, it was not truly 
until I moved to Kitchener-Waterloo as a young adult, and spent many formative years 
within this locale, and the attendant efforts I made to integrate myself within the mixed 
urban Indigenous population that is ordinarily resident here alongside daily exposure to 
quotidian canadian life (that is, the quotidian daily life of exposure to the canadian settler 
populace) that I truly came to experience the ontological and social deadness and 
displacement of Nativeness.  
This is something that I believe is related to, but distinct from, the quotidian 
experience of anti-Native racism that is all too common an experience for Indigenous 
peoples within this country, whether or not they meet some supposed visual qualification 
schema for recognition of status as an Indian, Métis or Inuit (my critique of which was 
the subject of Chapter 3). This is also ineluctably related, but not wholly reducible to I 
believe, to the structural machinery of genocide that biopolitically annihilates Native 
peoples at the level of the cognition, and the technologies of governance deployed by the 
modernist settler-colonial State apparatus through which these logics function.  Rather, I 
believe this outsideness, or exteriority, or to use Juárez’s terminology in his critique of 
Hegel, “off-the-map-ness,” of Nativeness or Indigeneity functions within an affective 
register that flows in part from the structuring mechanisms of elimination and which 
precondition the possibility of white/setter/master antipathy towards Native people in 
360 
 
the realm of everyday life in the sense that Henri Lefebvre described as that zone of 
intersection and interrelation between “illusion and truth, power and helplessness; the 
intersection of the sector man controls and the sector he does not control” (2014:43). 
Most recently, in my first experiences teaching, in a strictly academic sense that is, 
which came in the form of a course entitled Contemporary Issues in Indigenous Communities 
in Canada within a nascent Indigenous Studies programme at the University of Waterloo, 
the expression of this off-the-map-ness washed itself over me much more than I would 
have anticipated. It did not come from me, however, nor did it come from the text which 
I had chosen to assign to the class.  Rather, it was expressed by my students.  In this 
experience there are two loci worth mentioning, the first being the written and spoken 
appreciation from students I received at the end of the term in April 2019, while the 
second came largely in the form of one of the class requirements I had deployed for the 
course, an online discussion component.  
In terms of the first, as the term reached its endpoint, especially during the last two 
lectures in the first week of April, a number of students either approached me in person 
or sent me emails to thank for me the course, for the materials I had assigned, for the way 
I had taught and for what they had gained and grown from over the length of the course. 
This, of course, was quite affirmative for me.  I had never taught before in a classroom 
setting where I had to create the syllabus, choose, and assign the text, formulate the exams 
and assignments etc.  However, it piqued my interest when a number of my students 
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during this had expressed to me just how much they did not know about Indigenous 
peoples within the northern bloc.  In particular what resonated with them was something 
we had discussed earlier in the course, which was the idea that for many members of the 
setter population Indigenous people are lost in time, or lost out of time, in the sense that 
the ongoing existence of Indigenous people is often forgotten, even as Indigenous peoples 
have always resisted settler colonialism, even militantly so as has been the case in this 
country since 1995 and the Oka Crisis. Many of these students related to me how all prior 
knowledge they had of Native peoples, often only from high school, but also often from 
university courses, was of a people who were or had been.  Native people had been here 
before settlers.  Natives were subjected to cruel and unusual hardships; that Natives were 
dispossessed of their territories and sovereignties (though often, they related to me, these 
issues were discussed much more euphemistically, as is quite often the case within 
settler-colonial classrooms).  But, because of the coding and overcoding of the settler 
imagination from the ideological apparatus of the school, for many of my students, it had 
never crossed their minds that Native people are.  This was especially so for my students, 
who were the majority, who were from geographic regions of the country and province 
where everyday proximity to Native peoples was not a regular part of their lives.  This 
was the case doubly so for my students who, like myself, are internationals and ex-pats, 
and so did not even have the bare minimum of knowledge about Native peoples that 
could be gleaned from standard settler schooling.  
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This was also often reflected in the other portion of the class that I mentioned: 
online discussion components.  I had assigned my students a portion of their overall 
grade based on posting a number of reflection pieces to a series of online discussion 
boards I had created for the class.  They were to choose ten of the twelve weeks and their 
attendant readings and write a reflection or discussion of the materials.  When I came to 
reviewing them, which also gave me a much wider “data” set to reflect upon versus the 
verbal and emailed discussions with students about their feelings about the course, I read 
that many more of students had been through a social process of enculturation that left 
Native peoples by the wayside in the past, never in the present, and never with a future. 
For myself, as an Indigenous person, as an international, and as a scholar, this shocked 
me perhaps more than it should have, especially, as I thought, in the wake of what I had 
taken to be a relatively socially and culturally wide recognition of the facts of the 
residential schools, including the Truth and Reconciliation Commission and (relatively) 
recent canadian government apologies for the horrors of those institutions inflicted upon 
Native children and youth, and of their lasting effects. Our own institution, the University 
of Waterloo, is publicly and openly engaging a process of so-called Indigenization.  While 
I am somewhat cynical about the process and its intentions and pretensions, it is 
something that I felt was quite visible to the student body.  Likewise, the physical location 
of the classroom was not but a 30-second walk down a hallway from the Waterloo 
Indigenous Student Centre. 
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For whom could such an Indigenization process and nearby and regularly staffed 
Indigenous Centre be for if not for living and present Indigenous peoples?  Nativeness 
and Natives, in this regard, would appear to be a highly pregnant absent presence within 
the psychic and physical lives of the average settler citizen of the northern bloc.  Though 
perhaps, and I readily accept this possibility, I assume too much of the settler population 
of this country, and of the southern region of the province in particular 
The point however is that these twinned experiences in my first teaching 
experience demonstrate to me, in this one microcosm of a larger settler-colonial whole, 
that we, as living Indians, Métis and Inuit peoples, exist (and persist) within the confines 
of a settler State and surrounded by a settler population for whom everyday discourse in 
civil and popular society and culture codes and overcodes our bodies, lives, communities 
and nations as past, as were, as had been, much as in Byrd’s close reading of de Tocqueville 
on the removal of the Choctaw (2011:37). Even though Byrd’s reading was of events that 
happened in a previous time, and which took place on the other side of the dividing line 
between the northern bloc’s two constituent elements, the discursive and affective 
conditions of settler colonialism are quite the same: Native peoples are firmly located, 
and locked, within the temporal past, rendering impossible presence within the present. 
As before, the Native is a ghost that haunts the margins of a settler-colonial State and 
society that, try as it must, attempts to forget and not notice.  
364 
 
8.2.1 On Native Cultural Production in the Era of Late Colonialism 
Within the hypersurface of the settler-colonial present Natives are often thus, in my lived 
experience, treated as a kind of time traveller when we are encountered in the day-to-day 
lives of the white/settler/master.  We are not supposed to be present in the present, we 
are thus beings who do not belong, and when we are found out, our presence in the now 
uncovered, the white/settler/master’s conception of what is, and of their world, is 
disrupted and destabilized.  How did these Natives get here?  I did not even think that 
those people existed anymore?  These are, I imagine, the thoughts that must begin to run 
through the minds of many settlers within the moment of this kind of encounter.  I am of 
course not meaning to imply that members of the settler population believe that Natives 
literally stepped out of some kind of H. G. Wells-esque time machine or temporal vortex.  
However, given the philosophical, juridical, and political a priori banishment of the 
Native out of the settler-colonial time stream, a metaphorical time machine is often 
sought as the raison dêtre for Native presence within the now.  
This results in what I think of as a kind of temporal dysphoria.  The discourse of 
modernity/coloniality is that we no longer exist, or that we should not exist, and where 
we continue to be, it is as, to resurrect a myth of anthropology’s ripe past, the remnants 
of a dying people, soon to meet our end in the sands of time and be blown away as mere 
dust on the wind. For us, as Native people, this means that we must always be navigating 
this when outside of our own sociality and communal spaces.  An effect of this is that we, 
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in our quotidian struggles to force our way onto the stage of the present and proclaim 
our present existence, is a submission, intentional or unintentional, to what Chelsea 
Vowel refers to as a kind of “allowable Indigeneity,” by which she means that kinds of 
performative acts and utterances of Indigeneity that have been made acceptable within 
modernist and liberal canadian multiculturalism (2016). One can think of acts of beading 
or “traditional” drumming and singing, the wearing of moccasins or mukluks, sage 
smudging, or the mass act of the pow wow.   
Indeed, to borrow from Wilderson, these acts of performativity generally, in my 
experience, do not often engender “a renewed commitment to practice” (2009:119), even 
if they perhaps perform a commitment to renewal.  This is because these practices become 
lost against an intersection of grammar (articulation) and ghosts (memory) coded and 
overcoded by “the syntax and morphology of structural violence” (119), within the sea of 
which they are often just acts reaching for a Vizenorian vision of survivance.  As such, 
these performative acts of a kind of survivalist, rather than revivalist, Indigeneity are 
rendered sterile and nontransgressive within the worlding of the white/settler/master as 
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the apex of Man68 through Juárez’s grammar of civilization (2014).  This ultimately 
deracinating aspect of the grammar of civilization is one that Juárez makes clear, noting: 
I am inclined to understand this specific process as a “mining of our 
spirit” that serves to hollow out the integrity of traditions and lifeways 
to the point at which they become unable to be claimed as indigenous.  
Examples in this are most explicitly seen in the mass commodification of 
dream catchers, headdresses, sage burning as an act of cleansing, and the 
appropriation of Native American artwork by the fashion industry 
(2014). 
Further, for Juárez, this immediately ties back into what I have referred to in this and the 
previous chapter as the Native as a being-out-of-time.  He says: 
This application of civilization is most important in the understanding 
that proclamations of ownership are firstly met with surprise that 
Indians even exist and are secondly pushed aside as so old that there is 
no way any indigenous group can claim it (2014). 
Additionally, I share the worry expressed by Juárez when he discusses the ultimate 
impact that this “mining of the spirit” has for us as Indigenous peoples, right down to 
the core of our very identities, on which he states: 
there is no longer indigenous culture that can be used as a safe haven 
away from the ravishes of capitalism, but must rather be understood in 
the context of a commodification of cultural accouchements so extreme 
that “Native American culture” becomes “tribal style.” This “mining” 
 
68 To be clear: this is not moral judgement against any of these things. I enjoy attending pow wows, though 
recognize they are sometimes problematic in their celebration of the militancy of settler-colonial 
imperialism through the celebration of Indigenous veterans of those wars (though never, as my 
nekōqsemaw and I have remarked to each other more than once, the veterans of say the Oka Crisis or 
Standing Rock, which were just as much states of war). I also own Native jewelry and even possess my 
own hand- and self-made pair of moccasins. Indeed, I am strongly supportive of those I know who engage 
in the painstaking practice of creating such jewelry, with often stunning results, because in this era of the 
post-Fordist gig economy we all have to make money somehow. This however does not weigh against the 




serves not only to sever Indigenous Peoples from any spiritual 
connection to any tradition or lifeway available to them, but works in 
tangent with other facets of civilization in which the lifeway and the 
tradition of the Native no longer belongs to them because they are no 
longer Native, but have been emptied into a blank referent transposed 
onto the Settler, ensuring that any cultural production of the Indian is 
always already the Settler’s to use and do with as they please (2014). 
Setting aside though the circulation and consumption of this kind of Indigenous 
survivalist cultural production and performativity within the modern/colonial/capitalist 
sign and political economies and the white/settler/master, what is most important in my 
assessment, however, is that these performances are tied to visions of an often imagined 
past, and one that also is deeply tied to the agglutinating process described by Vizenor of 
shifting a complex array of highly diverse Indigenous nations into a modernist datum of 
the Native (1994). It is a raw simulacrum of Indigeneity precisely because it is a 
performative and productive re-enactment of a pan-Native past that never really was.  It 
is thus a simulation of the past, and of what it means to be Native.  Not all Natives beaded, 
not all Natives smudged with sage, not all Natives wore moccasins or mukluks, and most 
certainly not all Natives engaged in the practice of the pow wow, ceremonial or 
otherwise.  
There is certainly nothing wrong with contemporary cultural innovation, I have 
certainly carried that over from my older anthropological training that taught me no real 
culture is stagnant.  However, what concerns me is the use of a simulated and 
mythological past as a mirror for how we should exist as Native today, and consequently 
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how we should navigate the relations of power under which we currently live.  Thinking 
of Louis Chude-Sokei’s critical invocation of the use of a mythological Africa in the 
musical imagery of roots reggae (which was so much the music of my island youth, as it 
is today), I cannot help but think that these performances and productions of Indigeneity 
to be the generation of a nostalgia and trauma-born (and, indeed, a trauma-born 
nostalgia) recursive mythology of Indigeneity, shaped by the settler-colonial politico-
cultural affective geography of the northern bloc (2011). It is an idea of Indigeneity which 
is relentlessly, I might even say militantly, celebrated for its supposed pre-colonial 
anteriority (2011:80), but which requires for its grounding a non-historical rigidity; in 
other words: stagnation.   
It is also a specifically aesthetic non-historical stagnation that in many ways is in 
excess of the Jamesonian-Fisherian conceptualization of pastiche (1991; 2009).  It is, to 
some degree, certainly a hauntological aesthetic, because it relies on constantly engaging 
in necromantic and necrophagic revivals of the past, disallowing the possibility of 
innovation, and of finding new, and more contemporarily genuine, ways of existing as 
Native for the sake of being Native on its own terms.  However, that image of the past 
that it draws on, as I said already, is actually a vision of something that never actually 
was, to begin with; a vision of an imagined pan-Native prior.  This, in my assessment, 
shifts the discussion beyond Jamesonian and Fisherian discussions of pastiche and 
hauntological revivalism—because there is nothing to actually revive when it comes to 
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these kinds of pan-Native imaginaries—and into a terrain best discussed in 
Baudrillardian terms of simulacra.  In particular, thinking of Baudrillard’s successive 
phase precession of the sign-order, this kind of pan-Native non-historical performativity 
of Nativeness appears, at the very least, to be a kind of third-order simulacrum, where 
the image (sage smudging, beading, pow wows, mukluk making, etc.) appears to be a 
representation of a profound reality, in this case, the prior of conquest, but which actually 
masks the truth that it, in fact, does not represent anything real at all (1994:6). 
Further, what engagement in these practices of performative acceptable 
Indigeneity also mean for us as Native peoples is that our expression of Nativeness or of 
Nativeness is ineluctably tied to the cognition of the settler.  This is at least in part because 
the terms of this simulated mythology of the Native past are set through the worlding of 
the settler.  I do not suggest that this means that every single Native person living today 
in this country wakes up in the morning and declares to themselves “today I am going to 
meet the expectations of the settler for what it means for me to be a Native,” but that is 
what is rendered out of these practical engagements with the modern and liberal world 
of the white/settler/master. In a sense, it is perhaps a non-political form of what Coulthard 
so forthrightly criticizes and urges us to turn away from, which is the practice of seeking 
recognition of ourselves from the white/settler/master (2014).  Following Juárez, it is also 
within and through this zone of acceptability that we discipline ourselves in the 
commodification drive of the capitalist world-system.  We sell our beading and moccasins 
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for money.  We dance and sing for money.  And this even more deeply drives us into the 
dead-end dialectic of recognition with the settler, especially as many Native people have 
grown openly critical of the tidal wave of fake Native imagery that buries us under the 
weight of patterns on clothing, of capitalist branding and sign-value, and of curios to be 
bought and sold at any highway stop that now criss-cross our territories.  To the degree 
that we do not turn away from these things though, we begin to shift the dramaturgy of 
kind of pan-Native, non-historical Nativeness further down the processional sign-order, 
from third-order simulacrum to fourth order, where the performance of Nativeness not 
only masks the fact that there is no reality being reflected in its image, but where it reflects 
only other signs, in this instance the signs of Nativeness as rendered within settler 
coloniality.  
Bridging all of these concerns together with additional concerns for Indigenous 
sovereignty and colonial cisheteropatriarchy, Joanne Barker incisively says: 
Because international and state recognition of Indigenous rights is 
predicated on the cultural authenticity of a certain kind of Indigeneity, 
the costumed affiliations undermine the legitimacy of Indigenous claims 
to sovereignty and self-determination by rendering Indigenous culture 
and identity obsolete but for the costume.  That this representation is 
enacted through racialized, gendered, and sexualized images of 
Indigenous women/femininity and men/masculinity—presumably all 
heterosexual and of a generic tribe—is not a curiosity or happenstance.  
It is the point.  Imperialism and colonialism require Indigenous people 
to fit within the heteronormative archetypes of an Indigeneity that was 
authentic in the past but is culturally and legally vacated in the present.  It is a 
past that even Indigenous peoples in headdresses are perceived to honor 
as something dead and gone.  The modernist temporality of the 
Indigenous dead perpetuates the United States and Canada as fulfilled 
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promises of a democracy encapsulated by a multicultural liberalism that, 
ironically, is inclusive of Indigenous people only in costumed affiliation 
(2017b:3) [emphasis mine]. 
Critical, as noted in Chapter 1, of Settler Colonial Studies, she continues, saying: 
This is not a logic of elimination.  Real Indigeneity is ever presently made 
over as irrelevant as are Indigenous legal claims and rights to 
governance, territories, and cultures.  But long live the regalia-as-artifact 
that anybody can wear (3). 
Within modernist and colonial liberal capitalism what it is to be Native has been 
so deracinated by the machinery of elimination and dispossession that it is hard today to 
even think of these performances as truly Native.  Rather they exist for the consumption 
of the settler and exist for the settler to do with them as they so please.  They have become 
part of the liberal colonizing assemblage that is the mosaic of canadian multiculturalism.  
These things may be made by Natives, or worn by Natives, or done by Natives, but they 
belong to Canada, or the United States.  This is the terminal point of Juárez’s grammar of 
civilization (2014). 
What is not allowable, though, are those expressions of Indigeneity that express a 
living presence of the Native within the current moment, and which evinces any desire 
for a decolonial face in the future-anterior.  This is the truly Weird Native that exists 
beyond the temporal bounds of the white/settler/master’s world-building project.  Truly 
living Natives, not the socially and ontologically dead Natives that exist within the 
multicultural imagination of modernity/coloniality, are the Weird monsters waiting to 
rupture and destabilize this world.  Natives who are Native within their own cognition 
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of themselves, absent the machinery of the settler-colonial State and the settler populace 
writ large, who do not seek a Lacanian reflection in the mirror of that society do not 
belong.  They cannot belong, lest they, to paraphrase Joy Harjo (2008), break into this 
overcoding story by force, warclub in hand, and leave it with the smoke of grief rising, 
the world of Man dead beside them.  In this sense, a Nativeness for its own sake, a 
decolonial Nativeness that defies the temporal streaming of the settler, which rejects its 
displacement from the movement of time itself into the zone of a being-outside-settler-
time, is truly monstrous. 
8.3 Weird and Wild Spaces 
The other pole of the spatiotemporal dialectic of Native exteriority and Weirdness is of 
course place.  In my own lived experience, which is the autoethnographic heart of this 
dissertation writing, this has perhaps been most the case regarding the question of Native 
urbanness.  I have always been an Urban Native I suppose.  Even when I was living in 
Bermuda, though I did not live in the region that passes for the capital city of Hamilton, 
or in the old capital of the town of St. Georges, Bermuda is entirely urbanized outside of 
protected parks and green belt areas.  It is simply too small to really have an urban-rural 
divide (though there is, in popular everyday discourse a “town” versus “country” divide, 
though that ultimately pertains to whether you are from east or west of Hamilton, which 
is geographically dead-centre of the archipelago).  
But this is a special case.  There are few Bermudian Indians, much less Menominee 
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who happen to be from Bermuda.  I am quite sure that only my mother, my younger 
brother, and myself represent within that demographic.  However, during my adult life 
spent largely in southern Ontario, I have always been an Urban Native.  Kitchener-
Waterloo was for many years the bounds of my experience of living Native life in Canada.  
I have made and unmade community here, grown close to people, developed friendships 
and relationships with other Indigenous students, and within the wider tri-city region.  
We are all Urban Natives, or at least most of us are.  Most of us, of the people I have come 
to know, are students.  Only a handful of us have the experience of growing up on a 
reserve.  Most of us have been born and raised in the cities.  However, the status of student 
appends to us a kind of expectation of transientness; that we will be here one day and 
then gone the next, off to live life in some sort of other parts unknown.  Whether this 
expectation is fulfilled or not, this transient nature of urban Nativeness is part of the 
cognition of it as such. 
Beyond the student, I have found during my times here that this transientness is 
often expected of those of us who are not, or who are no longer, students.  It is indeed the 
case, at least as far as Kitchener-Waterloo and Cambridge are concerned, that due to the 
relative proximity of this city to a series of reserve communities—such as the Six Nations 
of the Grand River, the Mississaugas of New Credit and the neighbouring and 
geographically enmeshed Oneida, Munsee-Delaware and Chippewas of the Thames First 
Nations—many people I have come to know in this region over the years have worked 
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in the city by day and returned home to a reserve community by night. This is, I think, a 
kind of rapid diurnal cycling of how urban Native presence is thought to be within the 
imaginary of the settler.  
And this is I believe a critical point.  As my nekōqsemaw and I have discussed, 
and as we have both discussed in conversation with Potawatomie scholar Kyle Powyss 
Whyte, urban Nativeness is often something that is occluded within the cognition of the 
settler.  It is forgotten about, or perhaps more aptly, it is not seen.  It is rendered invisible 
despite the statistics.  Indeed, despite the fact that those statistics in both the United States 
and Canada increasingly bear out the fact that the majority of the Indigenous populace 
in both countries is now urban, the urban landscape is imagined to be a Native free zone 
by the settler.  The Native is a being-of-the-Wild, and as with the Wolf against and with 
which Washington imagined the Native to be, the palisades of the city, the town or the 
village, the walls of settler habitation, are built with the intention of keeping the Wild 
outside.  Urbanness, in this sense, is an apex marker symbolically and in terms of literal 
physiographic presence of the west’s self-ascribed civilizing tendencies.  Even absent the 
presence of actual physical barriers as the americans want to build along their southern 
border, or which the settler colony of Israel has built to hedge in the Indigenous 
Palestinian population, urbanness is defined in part by being not-Wild, and therefore not 
a zone of Native presence.  
The reserve and the reservation are here then transformed into a kind of Wild 
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space, which, like the reserves of nature that have been constructed by settler 
governmentality to hedge in a “preserve” that part of the so-called natural world which 
has yet to be paved over by concrete, act to corral Native presence away from the city. It 
is certainly no accident that nature reserves and Indian reserves linguistically use the 
same metaphoric language to describe themselves in their titles.  
Native urbanness then must be conceived of as transient, in order to preserve the 
sanctity of the settler inside.  Natives may arrive in the city as students, study in that 
location for a few years and then leave.  Or Natives may come to the city by day to work, 
but by night leave to return to their Wild spaces beyond the borders where settlers live 
and make their lives.  Even more rapidly, as is the case with my Wild reservation 
community in Wisconsin, which lacks many essential amenities such as a grocery store, 
Natives may travel to the city or the town in order to trade, though in a modern reiteration 
of the old fur trading travels, it is not to exchange beaver furs for basic goods, but to 
exchange modern capitalist fiat currency for essentials like food and drink.  
The point is that the Native cannot remain within the confines of the city.  Every 
moment that the Native, or again to be more inclusive of our Metis and Inuit kin, every 
moment that the Native is present, is a moment in which the Wild is breaking through 
the boundaries of the ordinary, the everyday and the familiar.  Thus, in much the same 
way that a Native who breaks through the walls of the temporal prison of settler time to 
assert their presence in the present is a being who cannot be, who cannot belong, a Native 
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who, like the Wolf itself in Derrida’s analogy of the beast and sovereign (2009:4-5), sneaks 
in through the palisades dividing the city from the Wild surround is a being who simply 
cannot be, who cannot be t/here. And this is more than the return of the abject, in that the 
return of the abject is an uncanny return, a return of the unheimlich, of the familiar being 
who has been rendered strange by sociogenic processes.  Because the Native was never 
part of the city, because the Native is the Wolf, is the Wild.  The Native in the city, in their 
insistence on remaining in the city, is a Weird being who threatens to destabilize and 
rupture of the settler everyday cognition of the world.  
Transient Native urban presence, or at least its perception as such within the 
worlding of the white/settler/master, locks the Native into the Wild space of the reserve 
and the reservation.  “So, when do you think you will be heading home?” is the question 
I have often heard during my times here (or some variant thereof).  Perhaps this is as 
much directed towards my status as a Bermudian/West Indian immigrant resident of 
Canada also, and all of the not-so-hidden layers of xenophobia and antiblackness (though 
I myself am not Black, the West Indies/Caribbean are, within the cognition of the 
white/settler/master, a zone of Blackness) of canadian mainstream society and culture 
that are buried underneath such a question. But it brings me to reflect on how I know, 
through my many years of conversations, that this question is one that is often directed 
towards urban Natives.  “So, when do you think you will be heading home?” assumes 
the ontological transientness of Native urbanity, and could just as easily be rendered as 
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“so when do you think that you will be leaving?” 
“So, when do you think you will be heading home?” assumes that home can never 
be for the Native within the borders of the city.  It also fails to assume, or rather forgets, 
that the city is also Native land.  Despite all of the layers of steel, concrete, asphalt, 
manicured lawns and captive flora and fauna in city parks, it is fundamentally Native 
land that rests beneath this thing that we call the city.  The city covers that, obscures that, 
and causes us to forget that, but it is the case nevertheless.  The practice of territorial 
acknowledgements that have become so commonplace in canadian academic and activist 
settings moves us ever so slightly towards a remembrance, but it would be a folly to 
assume that those circles represent the world perception of anything more than a small 
minority of broader settlerdom.  
So, I can be just as much at home in the city as I could be on the reserve or the 
reservation.  I myself can walk out of the backdoor of my apartment in the heart of 
Waterloo, Ontario, and step into a small forest, itself a presence of other-than-human kin’s 
survivance and resilience and offer my tobacco to the trees and the small creek that runs 
through.  This is not my nation’s land, but it is the land of my Anishinaabe relatives, and 
I know that I am far from the first Menominee to walk this land, and I know that our 
other-than-human kin do not forget.  
However, as with the performance of acceptable Indigeneity by Natives for the 
settler, of an acceptable pan-Indigeneity that is locked into a past that never even quite 
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was, the ontological cognition of the Native as the Wild and outside of the city also at 
times leads to a Native re-inscription of processes which combine to produce what I think 
of as a kind of Native ‘becoming being for the settler.’69 Most toxically, in my experience 
in both inter-personal and digital spheres, this manifests in the division between the 
reserve or the reservation and the city.  
How this takes place is the sometimes (often) judgement of Urban Natives as less 
than, in particular, less Native than, those who are resident “on the land,” something which 
is always made to be coterminous with being on or of the Wild space of the reserve and 
the reservation.  We are thought of as being less than because we are perceived as having 
less access to ceremony, language, culture, and other accruements that are thought to 
mark out Nativeness.  We are less than because we are not on the land, which is said to 
be the most proper place for a Native to be.  More so, this often leads us to be considered 
as outsiders when, or if, we do undertake a journey of return.  This is often incredibly 
hurtful and alienating.  Given the rapid rate of cycling between outrages and 
controversies online, where I have often experienced this, it just as often quickly dies out, 
only to rear its head at some later date.  
This is also something that my mother has shared with me about her own life story.  
As I worked on this writing and found myself dwelling on this question I asked her “do 
you feel like the other Menominee on the rez make you feel welcome?” Her short answer 
 
69 A borrowing of and a play on Hortense Spillers’ notion of ‘becoming being for the captor’ (1987:67). 
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was that no, they do not.  My mother, who was raised in Milwaukee, but whose parents 
are from the reservation, and whose extended family have, for the most part, always lived 
on or in close proximity to the reservation, told me that the other Menominee on the 
reservation in Wisconsin make her feel as though she is an outsider, and that they always 
have. Even though she has the status of full enrolment, unlike my own liminal enrolment 
of 1st Degree Descendant, she has never felt like she belongs there.  Indeed, rather than 
make the journey of return that is often expected of us it seems, she moved in quite the 
opposite direction, electing to move herself and her life to Bermuda alongside my father.  
She has never, however, stopped asserting her Menomineeness and Nativeness, and she 
raised my younger brother and I to know ourselves as such as well, but the toxicity is 
there.   
Sometimes (and my apologies to my mother should she ever read this) I feel as 
though she hates other Menominee because of this, or at the very least has developed a 
shell of indifference towards them, though she also cares deeply about who she is and 
where she comes from.  My own outsider status within the conceptual worldview and 
socio-politics of the Menominee was also reinforced for myself when I was denied access 
to the reservation for the earliest incarnation of this now autoethnographic project, after 
having to subject myself and my proposal to an approval process also undertaken by non-
Menominee outside researchers.  This was recounted in my skeletal review of a story that 
I was going to tell you for this chapter.  I know because of this, I myself have to sometimes 
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wrestle with my own feelings of hostility, indifference, alienation, but also great love, 
care, and admiration for my nation70.   
One day I do hope to return, and I hope that I am able to return to feel the fullness 
of myself as a Menominee and not have to worry about my conception of self.  But it 
would be a lie and I would be intellectually dishonest to say that this return to the source 
of my Menomineeness is not hampered by a fear of rejection and hostility because I am 
not of the reservation in the most immediate sense of having been born and raised there, 
much less ever having made my home there. This is, I think, perhaps the experience and 
struggle of all diasporic and disconnected peoples, Native or not.  It also causes me to 
sometimes think of myself as unheimlich in the eyes of my own nation; of myself as the familiar-
but-strange, Menominee but not Menominee. 
As with the geographical conceptual world of the white/settler/master which 
forgets that the city itself does not erase, but only covers (both physically, and in a 
 
70 I wonder also, thinking again of the state of exception and primordial act of exclusion and 
inclusion in the instantiation of sovereignty, and also of Menominee membership (and tribal 
membership broadly), if we may entertain the idea that the ability to exclude from the tribal-
national community on the basis of not only blood quantum or its cognate processes in Canada—
which renders my mother a fully enrolled member but my brother, our cousins, and I 1st Degree 
Descendants—but also other means, not only in the sense that all tribes use blood quantum or 
structurally equivalent measures, is part of the generative act of instantiating this politico-
juridical arrangement which many believe to be Native sovereignty under the current settler 
colonial épistémè.  While colonial sovereign power excludes, and in particular represses, the prior 
and alternative sovereignties and territorialities of Native nations in order to render itself into 
existence continuously, I think the exclusion of certain people from tribal-national communities 
offers a smaller scale version of the same process to the end that so-called Native sovereignty is 
exercised and made legible as such.  
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Dusselian sense [1995]), the continued fact that the land it is built on what was and what 
remains Native land, this form of identity certification and gatekeeping—linked to the 
reserve and the reservation as the ultimate onto-geographic signifier of Nativeness—
undertakes the same rhetorical and symbolic movement. Urbanness and Nativeness 
become mutually exclusive markers of identity.  Those who are marked by both, who are 
not transient, are made ghostly. 
Returning to the ontological making of the Native as Weird however, these 
processes converge on the bodies and being of Urban Natives.  While the 
white/settler/master conceives of the Native as a being that cannot be here within the city, 
the discourse within Indian Country which posits a less-than-authentic Nativeness for 
non-transient Urban Natives also assumes, whether intentionally or unintentionally, the 
world-building project of the settler, and thus from both ends it is dually assumed that 
vis-à-vis the city the Native is a being who cannot be there.  The Urban Native is thus 
doubly erased, doubly alienated, and doubly made to be Weird, an ultimate diasporic 
being with no fixed home and no ability to make one.  Urban Nativeness is then affixed 
with the affective condition of never feeling welcome.  It wears one down.  It wears me 
down.  I want to escape, to flee, to become (re)Wild, to return home, to be able to make 
home, and maybe one day I will, but right now I cannot.  
Locked out of time as well or locked into a ghostly performance of a non-past in 
the process of becoming being for the settler, the abject-as-Weird status of the urban 
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Native reaches its apex.  Urban Nativeness then becomes the ultimate signifier of 
nothingness within the world-building project of the white/settler/master.  As Byrd 
remarks: 
As the liberal state and its supporters and critics struggle over the 
meaning of pluralism, habitation, inclusion, and enfranchisement, 
Indigenous peoples and nations, who provide the ontological and literal 
ground for such debates, are continually deferred into a past that never 
happened and a future that will never come (2011:221). 
8.4 The Jouissance of Damage Narratives Under Late-Colonialism 
Reading the Weird Native in a psychoanalytic register we then finally come to a point 
about damage narratives, and why they are so easily made to be consumable in this 
postmodern era of late-colonialism and capitalist realism.  Working through both Jodi 
Byrd’s references to the increasingly overcoded obsession with the flesh-eating living 
dead of filmic and digital worlds, and how the same serves as a marker for the walking 
revenants of finance capitalism that barely survived the global crisis of the 
modern/colonial/capitalist world-system in 2007-2008 (2011:225), as well as Audra 
Simpson’s musing of the sovereign death drive of settler-colonial regimes (2016) and the 
now-classic theorization of the wetiko psychosis that afflicts the same regimes by the late 
Jack D. Forbes (2008) I have often deployed new thinking around settler colonialism, and 
this era of late-colonialism and capitalist realism in particular, with their libidinal 
capacities of desire, as a kind of conspicuous, consumptive death.  
Settler colonialism has always been, at its heart, an eerily anthropophagic and 
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geophagic entity.  It devours Indigenous peoples, lands, and territories to build its world 
and leave wreckage in its wake.  And not just of Native nations and territories, but of the 
entire world.  The colonialism project within the northern bloc, as Byrd notes, “worlded 
the Americas into a planet” (2011:222) and the effects are all around us.  The First World—
the settler colonies and their european sire; the world of the white/settler/master as the 
apex of Wynter’s Man—increasingly finds itself awash in a dizzying array of ever-greater 
technologies and forms of life.  Each year seems to bring us new cyclical iterations of the 
latest smartphones, augmented-reality interfaces, virtual assistants, autonomous delivery 
drones and self-driving cars.  It is increasingly the world of cyberpunk’s grimy futurism 
and of Donna Haraway’s cyborg (1985; 1991).  These recent technologies offer the 
denizens of the anthropophagic world of Man the promise of a life that is more 
comfortable, more convenient, and less laborious.  While an argument can, and should 
be made, regarding the colonization of everyday life by these new technologies and forms 
of life, and the new set of challenges that they present to us (Greenfield 2018), as in the 
ever-pervasive of presence of deeply alienating cognitive capitalism, the gig economy and 
precarious labour, they also represent a social condition within the world of the 
white/settler/master that is progressing ever closer to a kind of utopistic futurism. 
But the cost is great.  Fanon, in the conclusion to The Wretched of the Earth, refers to 
this world, the world of Man, of what Lewis Gordon calls “European Man” (1995b), as 
one “which never stops talking of man yet massacres him at every one of its street corners, 
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at every corner of the world” (2004:235). We might say, agreeing with Fanon, that this is 
a world of Man which devours the racialized and colonized multitudes on every 
continent, on every land.  While the world-building project of Man is reaching newer 
heights with networked objects, services and spaces, and is increasingly defined by them, 
the social ontologies that they are both creating and are created by them are dialectically 
linked with five centuries of horror in the form of the dual-headed sociological 
catastrophe of the trans-Atlantic slave trade and settler colonialism, as well as to what the 
cultural theorist Fredric Jameson correctly points to as the ever-increasing social 
disintegration of the Third World (2007).  
In this cannibalistic world, the overrepresentation of Man as the human transforms 
that same globe-trotting being into Forbes’s wetiko spirit.  It consumes insatiably, 
unceasingly, and the coloniocene cum capitalocene cum anthropocene burns the world, 
and the future, around the rest of us.  And there is a certain desire embedded in that.  
Byrd remarks of this cannibalistic zombie imperialism that “there is a certain ghastly 
revelling in the not-quite-dead-yet-but-soon-to-be amnesias” (2011:225).  She notes: 
Zombie imperialism is the current manifestation of a liberal democratic 
colonialism that locates biopower at the intersection of life, death, law, 
and lawlessness—what Mbembe has termed necropolitics—where death 
belongs more to racialized and gendered multitudes and killing becomes 
‘precisely targeted’ (2011:228). 
However, this cannibal world, as much as it tries to forget, to occlude, to bury its other 
and other ways of being human beyond the teleological suspension of Man as such 
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(Gordon 2006) it cannot quite push them fully into amnesia.  This is the nature of ghosts, 
of monsters, and other spectral beings who haunt the margins of thought and sight.  
Indeed, this remembering despite itself often manifests in what I have before, taking a 
cue from the discourse of Indigenous resurgence, referred to as the fear of Indigenous 
revengence (Robinson 2016).  This is the fear, based on the suppressed knowledge of the 
horrors of their world-building project, that can take hold of the white/settler/master that 
there will be a great and vicious return visited upon them and their empires in repayment 
by the colonized and racialized of the world.  This is the fear cum white supremacist 
conspiracy theory of #WhiteGenocide (Wilson 2018), put most succinctly by the alt-right 
protestors in Charlottesville, who chanted that “you will not replace us” and “Jews will 
not replace us” (Wildman 2017).  Lewis Gordon says of this: 
For the white man looks at the black man ad wonders when it will all 
end, but the white man knows deep down that a just future is one in 
which he himself no longer exists in virtue of his ceasing to function as 
the End, or less ambiguously, the telos of Man. European man dreads, 
then, as Lenin once put it, what is to be done (1995b:12).  
Byrd likewise notes, speaking of Lieutenant General John M. Schofield and his reflections 
of the Modoc War, that: 
In his memoir: “If the innocent could be separated from the guilty, 
‘plague, pestilence, and famine,’” he wrote, “would not be an unjust 
punishment for the crimes committed in this country against the original 
occupants of the soil.  And it should be remembered that when 
retribution comes, though we may not understand why, the innocent 
often share the fate of the guilty.  The law under which nations suffer for 
their crimes does not seem to differ much from the law of retribution 
which governs the savage Indian.” Imagining “plague, pestilence, and 
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famine” raining retribution on the innocent and guilty alike, Schofield 
presents us with the Indian deferred as zombie attack return of the 
repressed (2011:228). 
But in all of this, in both the world that has been built, and which is being built, at the 
cost of ongoing settler colonialism, antiblackness and the parasitic disintegration of the 
Third World, and in the fear that those crimes may be repaid with fire, disease, death and 
great torment, there is also Byrd’s revelry in the face of this.  
Again, returning to the psychoanalytic register, and shifting back again to the 
imaginarium of late capitalist/colonialist storytelling, which is the terrain in which our 
damage narratives as the ghosts of settler colonialism are both told and consumed, I 
believe that we can also begin to make sense of this through recourse to libidinal desire 
and the Weird. Following Fisher as I have, it is possible to be left with an impression of 
the Weird as a being who should not be, or who should not belong, and the destabilization 
and disruption that its presence brings, that it “primarily has to do with what is 
distressing or terrifying” (2016:12-13). Quite simply, while the Weird, and here 
specifically the Native as Weird, is not straightforwardly a pleasurable presence within 
the worlding of the white/settler/master, neither is it entirely unpleasurable either 
(2016:13).  Rather, considering Byrd’s revelry in the face of the not-quite-dead-yet-but-
soon-to-be, and the simultaneous vengeful return of the colonized and racialized, there 
is a mixture of pleasure and pain in viewing the Native.  To be specifically Lacanian about 
it, there is a jouissance that the Weird invokes (1998).  
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This jouissance, this mixture of the pleasurable with the unpleasurable in the 
encounter with the Native, finds itself integrally linked with yet another factor: 
fascination.  In describing the work of early 20th Century science fiction and horror author 
H.P. Lovecraft, Fisher describes: 
Accordingly, it is not horror but fascination—albeit a fascination usually 
mixed with a certain trepidation—that is so integral to Lovecraft’s 
rendition of the weird.  But I would say this is also integral to the concept 
of the weird itself—the weird cannot only repel, it must also compel 
attention (2016:17). 
In many ways H.P. Lovecraft is an unintentionally (on Fisher’s part) exemplar of writing 
on the Weird because his own racism, xenophobia, and anglo-american supremacist 
views of the world meant that the Weird was not only manifested in incomprehensible 
cosmic beings and ancient-beyond-ancient civilizations utterly alien to, and beyond the 
scope, of human knowledges, but also within the racialized and colonized peoples of the 
world (House 2017). In many ways, reading Lovecraft, it can be said that the Savage 
Native, the enslaved African and other colonized people were more like Cthulhu than the 
fictional cosmic entity that actually bore that name.  But Lovecraft’s integral racism here 
is something that can be set aside for us.  What is essential here is that in Fisher’s 
rendering of the Weird is the notion that jouissance is not only integrally linked to what 
fascinates, but that fascination itself, in the face of the encounter with the Weird, becomes 
itself a kind of Lacanian jouissance (2016:17). 
It in this register that I read the production and mechanical reproduction of 
388 
 
Indigenous damage narratives within the imaginarium of late capitalist/colonialist 
storytelling.  Let me elaborate further by reflecting on the recent 2017 film Indian Horse, 
based on a novel by the late Anishinaabe author Richard Wagamese of the same name 
(2012).  Shortly after that film was released, I was involved in the indigenization efforts 
at the University of Waterloo, as part of the Student Experience Working Group.  In 
conversation with many Natives, I found there was excitement at the prospect of the 
film’s release as it told the story of a residential school survivor who found hope through 
the sport identified with canadian settlement par excellence, ice hockey!  At the time, the 
country was still being rocked (if more gently than I believe many perceived) by the wake 
of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission and its final report on the canadian 
government’s responsibility for “cultural genocide.” In that context, the Waterloo 
Indigenous Student Centre decided to show the film for those involved in the various 
working groups at the time.  My nekōqsemaw, also on one of the working groups, and I 
were volunteered (one might say volun-told) to be on a panel for the film after its 
showing.  I was, in a probably undersold sense, unexcited at the prospect.  We, and many 
other Natives we have been in conversation with, often refer to these films as trauma 
porn.  I have zero interest in subjecting myself to those kinds of materials.  My 
nekōqsemaw often asks me how I can read the materials that I read, non-fictionally that 
is, but with regards to that, I often have the excuse or cause that it is for my work, either 
academically or in terms of activism.  That does not mean I actually enjoy reading about 
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the horrors that we have had to suffer, much less those that have been inflicted upon 
other colonized and racialized peoples.  
Similar thoughts have come up in conversation between myself and my mother.  
She has told me that she took several tries to be able to fully make it through the 2015 
Alejandro González Iñárritu directed and Leonardo DiCaprio led film The Revenant.  Her 
reasoning was both simple and explicit: she did not care to subject herself, as a Native 
woman, to the representations of the brutality and violences inflicted upon Native 
peoples in the initial stages of the film.  While she did not describe the film as trauma 
porn, the feelings she expressed are the same that I felt regarding the Indian Horse.  
While the Revenant is not quite of the same order as Indian Horse, because it is not 
a damage narrative (fictional or non-fictional) written by a Native person, in a sense, they 
are united by bringing together an audience to witness the inhuman horrors that their 
Native victims were subjected to.  What we—my nekōqsemaw, my mother and myself—
have often said is that these movies are not for Natives, rather they are for settlers.  
But why do settlers want to watch them?  Why do films such as Indian Horse receive 
such widespread acclaim?  Yes, some Natives do find these films important—just as much 
as others (such as myself) might find them revolting—but that cannot account for all of 
it.  Instead, as far as my conversational experiences during that time period showed me, 
much of the praise heaped upon narratives such as that of Indian Horse came from 
white/settler/master cinema-goers.  Reflecting upon these conversations, as well as prior 
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ones around earlier, similar, materials, I believe that there is a sense of liberal bourgeois 
self-satisfaction at having seen, and then promoted the virtues, of such a film, of being 
one of those settlers who is “in the know” and not afraid to look away from filmic and 
literary depictions of the horrors that their country has inflicted.  
For others, there is a kind of rubber-neck effect that happens, such as in the oft-
cited proverbial passing of a vehicle accident on the road that one finds themselves unable 
to look away from.  For many settlers, there is a jouissance to be had in watching these 
films and reading these kinds of novels.  There is the shock and horror of seeing what has 
been done, and what is still being done, by Canada and the United States to Native 
peoples, but there is also fascination.  They find themselves entrapped within these 
visions of colonial excess, and in the libidinal satisfaction that perhaps at the end there is 
some kind of resolution to be had, though, as in the case of Indian Horse, always one that, 
if it does not wholly endorse liberal multiculturalism as the answer, does not do much to 
undermine it either.  
But Indian Horse is not a one-off experience either.  Indeed, Indian Horse finds itself 
in the company of other films such as The Revenant and also digital productions as well, 
such as the previously discussed AAA videogames of Red Dead Redemption 2 and Bioshock 
Infinite.  While Indian Horse is the one that most clearly resonates here in my thought as a 
damage narrative, all of these filmic, literary, and digital productions cast settler 
colonialism cleanly into the realm of an irretrievable past, and whose resolutions, if there 
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ever can be one, never work to move beyond the settler-colonial present. Liberal 
democratic multicultural settler colonialism is the present and it shapes the ultimate 
horizons for these narratives.  
They also demonstrate that there is something that continuously draws views, 
readers, and players into the worlds they construct.  All of their worlds, whether fictional 
or nonfictional, fantastical or grounded, are worlds in which the Native is inescapably a 
being-outside-settler-time and a being-in-the-Wild, unable to enter the present or to cast 
a decolonial face in the future-anterior because its proximity and subsumption within the 
state of nature a priori preclude it from entering the proper forward flow of time of the 
world of Man. This worlding in which Savageness is always-already an exteriority 
interpolates the Native into the Weird.  
There is a libidinal pull in them towards this form of encounter with the Native 
and the machinery of settler colonialism, either in the face-to-face or in the ghostliness of 
a past perhaps not quite spoken about, but which is a heavy present absence.  When it 
comes to damage narratives, the most grounded of all of these possible renditions of 
frontier and post-frontier horror, that pull is the strongest.  And the consumptive patterns 
of white/settler/master civil and popular society show no turning away from them when 
they surface in books, films, or other kinds of media.  Behind the smugness of liberal 
bourgeois self-satisfaction in these presentations of our stories of damage to those who 
damaged us, there is the jouissance of fascination, a pleasure and displeasure that meet 
392 
 
and intermixes in the rubber-neck effect that makes them unable to look away from our 
damaged state, without truly questioning the processes of a world-building project that 
have left us damaged and consigned to the exteriority of time and space.  
Perhaps here, as I begin to close this last chapter, there is something that can be 
said by way of speculatively gesturing about a process akin to a kind of Bataillean limit-
experience (2001; 1993; 1991) for the settler upon viewing or reading these materials.  
Speaking specifically of the horror genre, I consider damage narratives to be a kind of 
horror, of which the media scholar Henry Jenkins notes: 
The best artists working in the genre don’t just want to provoke horror 
or revulsion, they want to slowly reshape our sensibilities so that we 
come to look at some of the most outré images as aesthetically pleasing 
and erotically desirable (2006:50). 
The Weird as exteriority, and the Native Savage, in particular, does work to define what 
is outside the interior of the subject of Man, and thus in approaching the Weirdly abject 
Native in filmic, literary and digital representations as art, that which normally should 
not be can become transformed into an object for the subject’s affirmation. There is indeed 
something aesthetically—somaesthetically if we follow Foucault on the limit experience 
(1991)—and perhaps even erotically, desirable within settler society for these kinds of 
images.  Canadian philosopher Charles Taylor approaches something similar when he 
recounts that one can experience that: 
which unsettles and breaks through our ordinary sense of being in the 
world, with its familiar objects, activities and points of reference.  These 
may be moments, as Peter Berger puts it, describing the work of Robert 
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Musil, when “ordinary reality is ‘abolished’ and something terrifying 
other shines through” (2007:5-6). 
What could be more outré than the viewing or reading of true horror?  One must begin 
to think for of damage narratives in the context of the successes of one true-crime 
docuseries after another that a digital viewing platform such as Netflix launch.  What 
could be more terrifyingly other than those beings who, cast from time in a never-was 
past, and cast from space as the Wolf into nature, and who therefore cannot be honestly 
said to inhabit the present moment and to belong to the future?  If spectral and monstrous 
beings are that which horrifies, then perhaps that which is most horrifying are those real 
beings rendered ghostly by the machinery of settler colonialism and its ontological and 
socio-existential worldings. 
However, unlike a traditional limit-experience in Bataille’s thought, the viewing 
of damage narratives does not work to destabilize the boundaries of the subject of Man 
or open up space for new ways of being and living in the world.  The market place of the 
imaginarium of late capitalist/colonialist storytelling and thus the role of damage 
narratives, as I am theorizing them here, are not to break down the regimes of difference 
between the Native and the white/settler/master, but to strengthen them and to work to 
re-instantiate the world of Man by demonstrating the degraded and dehumanized status 
of the conquered, the enslaved and the genocided. Damage narratives in particular, when 
made absent as they often are of a deep critique of the structure of settler coloniality and 
modernity, work to re-inscribe the boundaries of the subject, read as Man and most 
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especially as the white/settler/master.  If viewing or reading or experiencing Native 
damages really did function as a genuine limit-experience, then perhaps they would 
work to shuffle the code and to push viewers to question their most centrally-held 
assumptions about Indigenous peoples, cultures, nations, lands, and histories.  However, 
the copious books, films and other media presentations which tell and re-tell our stories 
of damage to those who damaged us demonstrably have never functioned to inculcate a 
broad-reaching anti-colonial and decolonial consciousness amongst the settler 
population.  What is generated, when it is not the conservative or far-right reaction of the 
most recalcitrant and racist elements of settler-colonial society, is that liberal bourgeois 
smugness and self-delivered pat on the back, which may generate, in the most affected 
sectors of that population, on occasion the emergence of was Barnor Hesse calls “white 
confessionalism” but almost never into the territory of the White Critical, White Traitor, 
or White Abolitionist (2014). 
Instead, Natives continue to be made Weird and locked into the past.  Their 
damage narratives—including those circulated like a rumour through the corridors of the 
modern/colonial/capitalist academy—are like the forced movement of the Choctaw 
recounted by de Tocqueville: they did happen, they had happened.  They are never those 
that are happening.  This allows a settler-colonial imperial conglomerate such as Canada 
to engage in a discourse around the “cultural genocide” of the residential schools without 
genuinely attending to the ways and means by which this country continues to enact 
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policies of genocide and elimination against indigenous peoples in the form of forced 
sterilizations, #MMIWGTS, ecological racism and colonialism, and the State-driven and 
coded systems of Indian Status inheritance which produce a 3-lap race to disappearance 
(Wolfe 2016b; Vowel 2016).  
The task then for Natives, for Indigenous peoples, is to follow Fanon and turn 
away from this project of world-building, of modernity/coloniality and settler 
colonialism, which continuously abjects us into the past and into the Wild; to turn away 
from the world of the settler as a mirror of recognition in which to see ourselves (Fanon 
1967; 2004; Coulthard 2014). Our task is to break into the present and assert our (re-
)existence; to, by way of that, lay a claim to casting a decolonial face in the future anterior.  
This ultimately is why I have chosen not to tell my damage narrative.  I will not continue 
to exist in this moment ghostly.  I will only tell stories of survivance, delinking, 
resurgence, refusal, fugitivity, insurgency and of living futurity.  
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Endings?: Towards Something of a Conclusion 
Conclusions are the weak point of most authors, but some of the fault 
lies in the very nature of a conclusion, which is at best a negation.  
— George Eliot, Letters 
I cannot stand writing conclusions.  I truly cannot.  Old writers’ trope I know, or at least 
that is what I have gathered that through years of discussions with other writers and 
scholars.  I cannot stand to write them because I always find them to be the most difficult 
to word part of anything I have ever written.  I am always faced with a similar question, 
and this dissertation is no different: how does one even begin to sum a work such as this, 
which charts a course in so many different directions?  Because summing up what has 
been said I am told is an essential component of any good conclusion.  But I also do not 
want to reduce this dissertation to an inferior conclusion of its constituent parts, to 
paraphrase the YouTube literary theorist Grace Lee (2018). 
I have always found it easier, more conducive to my mode of thinking and writing, 
to write without a plan, at times almost fugue-like as a stream of consciousness.  Often, I 
have a general idea of what I want to say and simply allow the words to flow from that 
point.  This is the nature, I think, of much actual conversational storytelling, and this is, 
as I stated in the first chapter, how I am thinking of this dissertation and the kind of 
conceptual, epistemological, and methodological space that I am attempting to clear with 
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it.  Even as I write this, the first words that came to mind were the ones I started with: “I 
cannot stand writing conclusions.”  
How does one sum up a story that comes to you, that came to me, in such a way?  
Certainly, I believe it can be done, but where does one start?  Is it with a dry blow-by-
blow recounting of the story, through its chapters and subsections?  Or is it topical?  What 
did we talk about?  What did I tell you about?  This is the dilemma that I always face 
when it comes time to pen the conclusion to anything I have written: academic, on my 
blog, or even on Facebook posts and long Twitter threads.  Perhaps I find the writing of 
conclusions to be so difficult because this story, like most stories, never actually end.  
They continue well past the final page.  Indeed, this story, while it takes the form of a 
PhD dissertation, is in so many ways the story of my life, my struggles, and my triumphs.  
It is the story of my life as an urban, diasporic, and liminally enrolled member of the 
Menominee Nation of Wisconsin.  None of those things end at the final page.  My 
struggles and resistances do not end because a back cover can be turned back over these 
pages.  I do not stop being the Native, and the Menominee, that I am simply because the 
heading at the top of this final section contains the word conclusion in it. 
My story will not end, at least not now.  It will continue, as will the stories of my 
family, friends, colleagues, and other kin whose stories also populated the pages of this 
dissertation.  Our lives will march on, and what I have told you in these pages will go on, 
perhaps finding resolution, perhaps never.  There is no fixed future, of that I am certain, 
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only the future that we create.  So, I do not believe that I really can have an ending here, 
even though the fundamental structure of a dissertation requires there to be one.  Thus, I 
title this conclusion Endings? so that I may pose it as a question rather than some kind of 
definitive terminal point. 
I cannot stand writing conclusions.  I say that again because not only are they 
difficult to write, but because I also often find them the weakest part of anything that I 
have ever written.  Perhaps that is because, as I said above, this is a story which has not 
yet reached its conclusion outside of these pages.  Maybe it is for that reason that every 
time that I come to write a conclusion to something it feels too abrupt, as if it sped up to 
meet me without my seeing it.  Conclusions have to come at some point in a dissertation, 
a book, or any other kind of academic writing, so it might as well come here, because if 
you do not stop me I might never stop writing (something which I am sure my committee 
members can attest to, as chapters have become longer and longer the more I have sat on 
them to revise them).  
Endings are supposed to bring you to a point of wholeness, of a sense that a work 
is a cohesive whole (Lee 2018).  Yet this writing is by its very nature broken, all over the 
place.  When I began drafting this dissertation, I had a vastly different place in mind at 
the endpoint from where it ultimately found itself.  The earliest chapters reflect that 
original path still.  Yet, because I found myself unable to tell the story that I originally had 
convinced myself that I wanted to tell, I changed the narrative mid-stream and began to 
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speak to you about something else.  It is by definition then messy, not whole, or at least 
not whole in a superficial kind of way.  It has always been a work in progress.  It is still 
now a work in progress.  All of my writing is always that way.  I think of my blog, where 
almost nothing I have ever written has been a decidedly definitive or unalterable version.  
Almost everything that I have ever written on that platform has been revised, altered, or 
extended.  I have never been able to simply let go.  Even now, as my blog writing has 
become increasingly recognized, I have been approached twice by other people to both 
take some of my writing and produce them as zines (credited of course) or to translate 
them into French.  I have always said yes, but even then, I have never let go of my drive 
to keep writing, keep re-wording, keep adding, keep extending, keep changing.  Thus, 
now out in there in the digital world and for sale at anarchist infoshops and book fairs 
from Montréal, QC to Flagstaff, AZ are writings of mine that are now out-of-date because 
I simply have never been able to put the proverbial pen down. 
So rather than a true ending I see this more of a negotiation towards an ending.  I 
promise that this will be the endpoint of my writing.  I promise to make no more edits, 
no more additions (besides what my committee will tell me to make).  I promise to take 
my hands from the keyboard.  But I also promise that this story will never end, that it will 
always grow, always mutate, always find new aspects, new secrets, and new iterations.  I 
promise that this ending will also be a beginning.  You, the reader will simply have to 
accept that, that there is no real final conclusion to this story.  That is the negotiation that 
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you and I, as reader and writer, will have to make if we are to move this forward towards 
something resembling an ending. 
I. Where We Were Back Then 
So where do we begin this negotiated non-ending?  I suppose then that the best place is 
to look back at where we have been, the path we have taken to arrive at the point right 
here in the present-now.  When I first began this dissertation project it had a radically 
different form than the one that it has taken on.  When I first entered this PhD 
programme, I thought that I had a firm grasp on what I wanted to be my endpoint.  I 
wanted to write a Marxist-inflected structural legal analysis of the why and how of Native 
racialization.  I was inspired by my lifelong tightrope walk between the inside and 
outside of being a Menominee because of blood quantum.  In fact, it was not long before 
I decided to send in a late application for this programme that I landed on that idea 
because of real movement towards reclaiming the 3/128th of additional blood quantum 
that I should have finally seemed like it was happening.  I remember in May of 2014 I was 
here in Kitchener-Waterloo on a solo vacation to visit friends, having originally left this 
city to return to Bermuda following the conclusion of my master’s programme.  On the 
final day of that trip, May 3rd, 2014 (I remember the date well because of other things that 
went on to happen that day) I met professor Jasmin Habib for lunch.  She had supervised 
my master’s thesis and would go on to co-supervise this dissertation.  During that lunch, 
I told her that I was still considering going back to school for my PhD eventually, and I 
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told her about my interest in the structures of blood quantum because of what was going 
on in my life, and she encouraged me to pursue those studies and that idea in particular. 
But then the late Patrick Wolfe, grandfather in many ways of contemporary Settler 
Colonial Studies, released his final work before his death, Traces of History, a text I have 
cited more times in this dissertation that I would probably care to count.  That book—
while more expansive in scope than my own project, as it not only covered the northern 
bloc of settler colonialism, but also many other countries and contexts—was one that I 
felt stole my thunder, because it seemed to do exactly what I wanted to do, and a 
dissertation is supposed to be an original piece of scholarship is it not? I could hardly 
fault a luminary of the field covering such topics in his magnum opus, but I left to wonder, 
just a few months out from writing my second comprehensive exam, about what exactly 
I was going to write about.  How was I going to alter this project so that it could again be 
something original? 
My initial move was to reframe this project as a classical ethnography.  On the one 
hand, I would consider the pursue the ultimately Wolfean analysis of Official Nativeness 
that I have originally wanted to, but I would pair that work with discussion and 
theorizing around Indigenous counter-discourses about identity as well as communal 
and national belonging.  The latter was to form the basis of the ethnographic work that I 
had planned.  My intent was to go to two Ojibwe-Anishinaabe communities here in 
Ontario—Chippewas of the Thames and Walpole Island First Nation—nations with 
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whom I knew at least a few members, as well as to travel to my own reservation 
community in northern Wisconsin to speak to members of the Menominee Nation.  I 
wanted to ask the members of these communities what they thought about these issues.  
I was prepared for a range of answers, from those utterly opposed to the legislated settler-
colonial regimes of Native identity governance to those who supported said systems 
without question, as well as those who were indifferent.  I wanted to ask these community 
members about how they thought of these systems, and in particular about how they saw 
them in relation to our traditional pre-colonial modalities of belonging.  Were they on 
completely different registers, or did they articulate, mesh, and co-mingle?  From that 
planned ethnographic fieldwork I had wanted to move towards a decolonial articular of 
Indigenous belonging against and beyond the genocidal State machinery of the northern 
bloc of settler colonialism. 
But I have already told you about how that venture ended.  In short, it never 
happened.  Neither of the Anishinaabe communities in Ontario ever returned my 
communications, for reasons that I cannot only speculate about.  I do not fault them either 
way.  The people who run these communities are busy, and those two, in particular, have 
had to place much of their energy into facing down a number of challenges to their 
continued existence.  So, in some ways, I am not surprised that they probably did not 
prioritize responding to my communications.  My own community though was a 
different story, as I have already opened myself up to you enough to relate.  The 
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Menominee did respond to my communications, and after some initial confusion about 
where to even send my project-approval request package, a meeting was scheduled for 
our Language and Culture Commission to talk to me over the phone.  And then it was 
cancelled and rescheduled.  That second meeting did not go as expected to say the very 
least.  I was prepared for a possible no answer.  My grandmother had already told me 
that she thought that I “was too smart for them to understand” (I did not necessarily share 
this, but it did make me laugh), while my mother cautioned that they could possibly reject 
the project on the basis of my being perceived as a 1st Degree Descendant seeking to upset 
and overturn the system of blood quantum, which, as a technique of governing 
community membership is a central plank of national self-government. She thought that 
they might see me as a semi-outside rabble-rouser who wanted to come to town to stir 
up shit and undermine the authority of the tribal government.  That was not my plan per 
se, but I did recognize that my mother might be on to something, and so I braced myself.  
What I did not expect however was for the motion to approve or disapprove of my project 
to die on the table, with no member of the commission evidently willing to motion for a 
vote.  I was likewise also angered by the evasive nature of both the commission chair and 
secretary when I attempted to ask them about whether that meant it should be treated as 
a no answer, or if there was something I could do to make it more likely to get a yes after 
a resubmission. The commission secretary, from my point-of-view could not seem to get 
out of the conversation fast enough when she called to tell me what had happened with 
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the vote, or non-vote I guess, after I had met via phone with them.  So, I followed up by 
emailing the chairperson, who I had previously been in email contact with, only for him 
to never respond.  After a week or so of no answer from him, I sent an email to the 
secretary, hoping this time that they would be less evasive with me.  Again, no answer.  I 
then, about a month later, had possibly the most bizarre conversation over the phone in 
my entire life.  I was in downtown Kitchener and my phone began to ring, I looked at it 
and the caller ID told me that it was a call from Keshena, WI.  I thought to myself 
“grandma lives in Shawano; who the hell in Keshena has my number?” So, I picked it up 
and it was the Language and Culture Commission secretary, and she said to me “oh, it’s 
you!” and I probably replied with something like “yeah, it’s me?” She said that she had 
been looking at her phone bill for the previous month and saw this number and did not 
recognize it, so she called it.  The number was of course in her phone because it was her 
phone that we used via the speaker-phone function to have the meeting with the 
commission.  However, just as I began to get the words out of my mouth to say “hey!  
Now that I have you on the phone …” she once again got out of the conversation and 
hung up, leaving my sentence unfinished: “hey!  Now that I have you on the phone, let 
me ask you about the meeting we had and what that means and if I can do anything to 
try again?” 
I thought it was weird as fuck to be quite blunt about it.  I still feel that way now, 
but I am no longer as angry about it as I was then.  The Menominee Nation are a 
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(nominally) sovereign Indigenous community that can run their own internal affairs and 
allow whatever projects they want.  And all power to them for that.  Regardless, I think 
any hard feelings that I did have after that would have been lessened by a significant 
margin if the conversations that followed the meeting had not been so utterly elusive, 
abrupt, and avoidant.  But again, I have come to accept that they do not owe me an 
answer. 
So again, this project morphed what I thought would be one final time.  Following 
the implosion of my originally intended ethnographic project, I campaigned to have it 
remoulded into something based in autoethnography.  I would use my own journeys in 
life as an urban, Bermuda-raised, and diasporic, liminally enrolled Menominee Indian in 
order to investigate these topics.  I decided that in fact, that is probably what the project 
should have always been.  What I had wanted to write about as early as the original ideas 
that I was proposing back in 2014 when I entered this programme, through the failed 
ethnographic second form, had always been at its heart something deeply personal.  I 
was never interested in these topics in some abstract, cold, and distanced perspective of 
an outside observer, because to be deeply within that web of State structures, law, 
popular and civil society imaginations had always been my life from the day I was born.  
So, as much as I may have tried originally for some kind of more scientific investigation, 
I could never have been neutral on the issue.  So, I concluded that in fact an 
autoethnographic approach would not only be the best way to investigate what I wanted 
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to, but would also be the most personally fulfilling, as much as I also recognized how it 
would probably be the most personally challenging. 
And that is the real point of departure that has led us to where we are now.  But 
of course, if you have been reading up until this point, you know that there was still one 
more major change ahead on that road. 
II. Saying Things in a Word 
But here I am again, probably rambling on more than I should about these things.  You 
already know them, because I have already told them.  So perhaps then it best to try and 
swing this negotiated ending in another direction.  I promised that I would attempt to 
knit together something that approached a summary, deficient as that may be of the 
emergent whole of this writing.  With that in mind, I think a good challenge is to try and 
think of the key topic, the keyword, that unites together the varied parts that make up 
this messy whole.  If I were to say things in a single word, that word is perhaps ontology.  
As I sit back now at my computer to survey this terrain, with all of its hills and valleys, 
the table of contents staring back at me from the margin, that does seem to be what has 
ultimately emerged as the core uniting factor in this writing.  When I was first beginning 
to get down to serious work in planning some variant of this project, following the 
completion of my second comprehensive examination, a friend of mine from the United 
States, whom I knew through what many of us euphemistically call “LeftBook,” 
introduced me to the work of Frank B. Wilderson, III which began a fascination of mine 
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with the idea of political ontology. It was peaked further when the same friend sent me 
an essay by Nicolás Juárez that extended and critiqued Wilderson’s thoughts on Native 
ontological positionality.  From there I began to read and explore wider and further.  I 
read into the theorists and scholars who influenced the materials my friend sent me.  I 
began to read decolonial theory, and I found myself, quite contra to how I felt during my 
Masters, and even when I returned to the University of Waterloo in 2014, reading 
poststructuralist and postmodernist material.  I began to bounce these materials off of 
themselves, reading them with and against other texts.  I was in a sense off to the 
ontological races. 
But, quite quickly I also began to develop criticisms of the way that I felt that 
ontology, political ontology, in particular, was talked about and theorized.  Criticisms 
which, the more I read of certain scholars, began to grow.  However, I still retain my 
strong interest in the ontological, but it is not purely the ontological, of ontology as an 
abstract concept of philosophical metaphysics.  Rather it is ontology as ontological 
creation, of projects of world-building, of projects that are not complete, and will never 
be complete, because of the very relational nature of what is the political.  The ontology 
that unites these pages together is an ontology that is understood as incomprehensible 
outside of its social and political contexts.  The ontology across these chapters is one that 
is understood to be firmly rooted in underlying material relations of colonialism, having 
not fallen from the sky ready-made.  It is an ontology that is, at its root, an element of the 
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(settler) colonial matrix of power and can only be understood as such.  It is an ontology 
that is not unassailable, but in fact readily resistible; that is already being resisted, and 
which has always been resisted. 
From that, if I were to deepen the summary of this project as one about ontology, 
I would say that more than that it has been my purpose throughout this writing to present 
the onto-existential regimes of settler-colonial power and control so that we may move 
disrupt and undermine them.  Thus I would like to believe that this writing also stands 
as an injunction against those theorists and those writings which would have you believe 
that the world is always-already a zone of death for Native peoples as an anti-Native 
world, who would lead you believe that our problems are in fact ontological, when that 
ontology is part of a deeper relationship of settler colonialism. With that explicit goal 
firmly in hand, this work took up a number of sub-topics so that I could investigate a 
number of several distinct aspects this settler-colonial ontological assemblage.  
My first chapter, Decolonization, World Building & Methodological Considerations, 
articulated the theoretical and methodological basis upon which I would set sail on this 
ontological sea.  In that chapter, I outlined the development of my theoretical perspective 
both during the writing of this dissertation as well as before.  I outlined the marriage in 
current thought between several at times overlapping, and at other times quite disparate, 
schools: contemporary Black Studies-informed Indigenous critical theory and Native 
Studies, Decolonial theory, variations upon Marxist theory, Settler Colonial Studies, and 
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poststructuralist articulations of ideas of biopolitics, bare life, and racializing 
assemblages.  In particular, I talked about my movement away from a kind of Marxist 
orthodoxy during my time writing.  While I had formerly held to such a view, a kind of 
Third Worldist Marxist-Leninist analysis, the foundations of it were already beginning to 
corrode when I was first really encountered Settler Colonial Studies, and really the past 
decade’s series of important theoretical texts in Native Studies.  Once I really began down 
the path of this writing what previous doubts I held about kind of worldview widened 
into yawning chasms, and it could simply no longer be sustained.  However, I never 
completely broke with Marxism, simply a peculiarly rigid, mechanical, and formulaic 
variety.  I introduced to you the current and growing influence on this work by a number 
of Marxist theorists of the postmodern condition, in a condition Fredric Jameson and 
Mark Fisher, and I told of how I was longer unwilling to read them with and against 
principle postmodern theorists—Foucault, Derrida, Baudrillard and others—as had been 
my past default position. Key to this, I also described my now total disavowal of 
scientistic methodologies and interpretations, and my movement towards a more open 
epistemological perspective.  
These theoretical and methodological tools firmly in hand, this dissertation was 
opened fully to the ontological direction that would consume the rest of the dissertation.  
In my second chapter, I explored the concept of the sub-ontological difference or colonial 
ontological difference.  Following Nelson Maldonado-Torres I asserted that the sub-
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ontological difference is material and metaphysical process that transforms Native life 
into a form of bare life, ala Agamben, meaning that it is able to be murdered and killed 
without being mournable.  I argued how it is that this process, rooted in material relations 
of colonialism, which has allowed the modernist philosophical anthropological project of 
instantiating the Cartesian subject, of Heidegger’s Dasein, and the Wynter’s ethnoclass of 
western bourgeois Man. Wynter’s sociogenic analysis of the origin of Man corrects 
Foucault’s arguments regarding the subject, and exposes it not as an abstract universal, 
as liberal bourgeois humanism would lead us to believe, but as a disguised particularism. 
Once again, ontology, and ontological positioning, do not descend from on high, but 
emerge from below.  Thinking along Derrdian and Fisherian lines of flight, I extended 
this argument with the idea that haunting is the condition of ontology proper to such.  
From this, I argued that the normative subject of political ontology—be it ego cogito, the 
Rational-I, the Dasein, or Man—is haunted by the ghosts of the colonized.  Seeing these 
connections, I argued that perhaps rather than speaking of a colonial ontological 
difference, that we should rather be speaking of a colonial hauntological difference. 
The discussion of what I would come to call the colonial hauntological difference 
also introduced to this dissertation one particular aspect of the idea of Native belonging 
and racializing assemblages as they function on Native peoples: the visual field.  These 
arguments were taken up and expanded upon in the chapter #NotYourNativeStereotype & 
the Question of White-Passing Natives.  Here I took up the discourse around racial-passing, 
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specifically the idea of being white-passing, with regards to Indigenous peoples.  What I 
wanted to do was to trouble the discussion, because during this writing I came to be 
slowly dismayed and disgruntled over the state of the discourse on the subject in terms 
of how I was watching, and reading, it be played out regularly on social media platforms.  
My goal was to trouble, and perhaps correct, if I may be so bold, this discourse by more 
clearly re-asserting and re-establishing the biopolitical governmentality of Official 
Nativeness, as it functions in superficially different, but at their core similar, means in the 
United States and Canada.  This corrective intervention into the field was built around 
my discussion, blog writing, and Twitter correspondences with fellow Native scholar and 
student Nicolás Juárez.  Against him I argued that because of the ways in which logic of 
elimination—the basic underlying process that defines settler colonialism as such and thus 
distinct from colonialism-writ-large—fundamentally functions at the macro-level the 
colonial State through biopolitical regimes of hyper-solubility, as well as what I argued 
to be the structural triangulation of the categories of white, settler and master, it is 
ultimately impossible to speak of Natives who possess a true ability to pass as white, and 
that taken together these movements function to dissociate Nativeness within settler-
colonial racializing assemblages from the visual signifier as the most important mode of 
racialization in understanding the violences of elimination.  
Examining all of this, in the fourth chapter, Community, Pretendians, & Heartbreak, 
I took up and built upon the nature of Native life as a way of living where, following 
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Belcourt, “death hangs in the air like a rumour” (2017a), and the affective burden that 
that has upon not only my own life, but the lives of many, if not most, Native people.  I 
also discussed the necessity of community for alleviating this burden, of finding safe 
harbour amongst the storm.  But, against the need for community I also introduced the 
discussion of white/settler people falsely taking up Indigenous identity as “fake Natives” 
and the implications that this growing social and colonial phenomenon heaves on top of 
disconnected and diasporic Indigenous people seeking to reconnect, as well as how 
making room for them within Native spaces can also profoundly disrupt them. 
Up until this point, everything I had written about had been on the same track that 
I had planned when I re-proposed this project as an autoethnography.  But as I said 
before, there was still one additional wrinkle that would worm its way into this 
dissertation. 
That shift in direction became the basis of the fifth chapter, The Problem of Telling 
Stories to Some People, or Why Do We Tell of Our Damage to Those Who Damaged Us? and 
ultimately all of the subsequent chapters that followed. In this chapter I explained this 
further shift in direction, how after many months of no movement on the writing about 
my anger following my experiences with the Menominee Language and Culture 
commission I had my Come-to-Jesus moment, which ultimately told me that I could not 
tell you the story that I wanted to tell you, because to do so would not fulfil what I think 
is my deeper purpose here. Thus, in this chapter, I turned away from continuing to tell 
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you my damage narratives, my story of pain, loss, sadness, anger and all kinds of other 
negative thoughts and feelings which had previously animated this writing. Instead here 
I began a new arc.  Here I posed a new question: why are our damage narratives so readily 
and quickly consumable within the settler-colonial capitalist marketplace? This chapter 
thus enacted and engaged an active practice of a kind of autoethnographic refusal. 
Instead of allowing myself to continue to eviscerate myself for the sake of an academic 
gazing into my life, I shifted my perspective and instead began to look at what I have 
come to call the imaginarium of late capitalist/colonialist storytelling: the market place 
where our damage narratives are told and eaten. 
On this new path my sixth, seventh, and eighth chapters took up a number of 
theoretical errants in hoping to come to something of an answer to this new question. 
First in line, my sixth chapter, Digital Worlds, Native Ghosts, & the Socio-Existential Suturing 
of Settler Society, brought forth the drive of settler societies to permanently foreclose 
Indigenous alternatives of sovereignty and territoriality in an effort to existentially suture 
their own sense of self-legitimacy. So long as the Native persists there will always be an 
unstable terrain underneath the regime of the settler, and because of that, the settler will 
always find themselves at an impasse. Digging more deeply into this, I turned to an 
examination of the representations of the Native within popular and acclaimed 
properties within settler popular media, in order to show how representations of the 
frontier in video game and films more often than not function to move Indigenous 
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peoples, and our genocide, into the past.  So long as the regimes of power under which 
we live remain colonial and capitalist, they will be not only haunted, but animated by, 
Native ghosts. 
Thematically this discussion continued in the seventh chapter, Settler Colonialism 
& the Incommensurable Cartography of the Native Savage.  Building on the arguments from 
the previous chapter, here I attempted to launch a more in-depth analysis of the 
ontological formation of Nativeness, in a clear echo of the discussion from the second 
chapter. I introduced two ontological conditions by which the Native is foreclosed from 
amalgamation within the world of Man: the Native as a being-out-of-time and as a being-
in-the-Wild. This spatiotemporal outcast status is always-already a part of the colonial 
order of things, and as such are points of contestation with the theorizations of Frank B. 
Wilderson, III regarding Indigenous sovereignty and ontological mapping. What I 
attempted to show was that fundamentally Wilderson misapprehends and 
misunderstands Indigenous sovereignty and the ontology of Nativeness for one central 
reason: he mistakes the formal linguistic construct of these subjects for their actual 
substantive interiors. Following this, and against Wilderson, the loss of sovereignty is not 
a point of articulation with the settler, precisely due to the fact that the “sovereignty” that 
the Native possesses is in fact not the same as the politico-governmental concept bearing 
the same name within the world of the settler. 
Having laid out that terrain in the sixth and seventh chapters, it is in my eighth 
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and final chapter, Red Monsters: The Native-Outside & the Weird, that I attempted to fully 
launch an answer to the question of the consumption of Native damage narratives within 
the imaginarium of late capitalist/colonialist storytelling. My most key point of 
articulation here was the theorization of the Weird by the late Marxist cultural theorist 
Mark Fisher.  Looking at abjection as a concept related to the Freudo-Lacanian unheimlich 
I deployed the concept of the Weird to understand the Native is a being that does not 
belong within the cartographic worlding of the settler.  Weaving through this abstract 
psychoanalytic terrain, I also took up the ways in which Natives through their actions 
function towards a reinforcement of a kind of Nativeness that, rather than being on the 
outside of the settler’s world, is actually able to be tamed and made acceptable.  My 
experiences teaching in the classroom, as well as the material and cultural production 
that many Natives may engage in, were my primary leaping off point.  What I sought to 
excavate was a kind of performative Indigeneity which, rather than be for its own sake, 
functions towards reinforcing the settler-colonial locking of Nativeness into a simulation 
of a past that in fact never really was.  Importantly, given my own life experiences, I also 
took up the urban Indigeneity and how it is often rendered invisible within popular and 
theoretical conceptions of Nativeness, relating this back to the ontological position of the 
Native as a being-of-the-Wild.  A genuine Nativeness, that is to say, a Nativeness that 
exists decolonially for its own self, is made into a Weird being that does not belong and 
is reinforced by the negative space formed by acceptable performative Indigeneity and 
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the spectralization of the urban Native.  Throughout all of this I read the psychoanalytic 
register closely to argue that there is a kind of jouissance in the settler’s encounter with the 
Native as Weird, and as such the telling of our damage narratives is something that 
cannot be looked away from.  Finally, I argued how, unlike the limit experience in the 
thought of Georges Bataille and Michel Foucault, rather than engender a breakdown of 
settler-colonial binary boundaries, this jouissance reinforces rather than liberates. 
III. In the Dust of this Ivory Tower 
Ultimately this work has sought to contribute to Native Studies, as well as to my home 
disciplines of sociology and anthropology in three principal ways.  The first was to chart 
what I see as something that both builds on, but also reads between, and ultimately seeks 
to move beyond, the usual kind of genealogy of the Native: legal, anthropological, and 
literary.  Rather, what I contribute in this dissertation work, if I may be so bold, is a 
genealogy of the Native that cuts not only across these modes of historical and socio-
political analysis, but also beyond them.  In particular, what I have demonstrated is how 
not only is the Native constructed through those modalities of settler-colonial State and 
civil society, but how these constructions bleed into and out of each other, mutually 
informing, entangling, and blurring between one another.  I have argued that, ultimately, 
they are also profoundly necessary for settler society’s understanding of itself, for its 
maintenance, and for its constant need to substantiate itself and codify its own existence.  
These constructions of the Native both rely upon, and mutually re-inscribe and reinforce, 
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discourses of Savagery, Wildness, and a radical outsideness with regards to settler 
cartography (both socially and geographically) and settler temporality, and the effect that 
this outsideness has when the Native and the settler encounter each other through 
performance, politics, and narrative.  I have also argued that specifically this radical 
outsideness of the Native Savage is key to understanding not just why we as Native 
peoples tell our damage narratives, but why those damage narratives are so readily and 
easily consumed within settler libidinal, political, and sign economies.  
The second of my contributions in this work I believe is the specific act of refusing 
to continue to speak of my own, as well as my immediate friends’ and kin’s, narratives of 
settler-colonial damage.  If my genealogy of Nativeness is best understood, I argue, as a 
theoretical contribution, then I believe that this second contribution can best be 
understood as a methodological one.  But it should be understood to be methodology 
born of exhaustion, and a specifically colonial exhaustion at that.  As I worked through 
the writing of this dissertation, I found that eventually a breaking point was reached, 
because it just wore down on me too much, to speak again of the affective burdens of 
settler colonialism, and that to continue to speak on them just wrought far too much pain, 
and ultimately deep tiredness.  It was a methodological intervention born of no longer 
being able to continue this dissertation as it had begun. 
I propose this refusal to continue to speak of my damage as a contribution made 
in this work because methodologically this dissertation is grounded in autoethnographic 
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techniques.  At its core, this dissertation sought to work through my own lived and 
embodied experiences of Nativeness, and specifically urban and diasporic Nativeness, 
towards the charting of a genealogy of Nativeness and theorizing about the value and 
role of our damage narratives within settler colonialism.  Towards that end, the first arch 
of this work followed me in telling my damage narrative, through my discussions of 
colonial ontology, the disarticulation of Nativeness from the signifier of visuality within 
settler-colonial racializing assemblages, and the heartbreak that comes with communal 
loss and disruption.  However, mid-way in this dissertation is when the affective burden, 
and the exhaustion that comes with it, of telling my damage narrative simply built up to 
such a degree that I reached my breaking point.  So, I refused to continue that errand any 
further.  To borrow and modify Audra Simpson’s concept of “ethnographic refusal,” 
(2007) I propose then that methodologically this dissertation engaged in a practice of 
autoethnographic refusal. 
While narratives of Native damage are found throughout this dissertation, both 
before and after this textual break, my methodology moved in the second arch towards 
my refusal to centre them any longer, and thereby moved against any kind of continuing 
spectacle for non-Indigenous eyes made of them.  I have more than once drawn upon 
Tuck and Ree’s injunction to use the length of my arm to determine the length of the 
colonial-academic gaze, and in enacting a practice of my own agency against a world that 
would see me stripped of it, my autoethnographic refusal to continue to tell of my 
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damage is my living, embodied, and academic practice of limiting the continuance of the 
that gaze.  In limiting the ability of the academy to gaze anymore into the deepest parts 
of me, I am able to, methodologically and theoretically, move away from telling of my 
damage towards a theorizing about that damage, and about the function that it carries 
out within the economies of settler coloniality. 
A final contribution, this one aimed mostly at the discipline of sociology, more so 
than at Native Studies, where it is largely already acceptable convention, is precisely the 
practice of autoethnography.  But more specifically, as autoethnography is already a 
known methodology within sociology, as well as anthropology (though perhaps more so 
the latter), what I mean here is specifically an Indigenized usage of autoethnography in 
order to centre methodologies of storytelling.  At the end of all this, if I am allowed to 
take anything else away with me, I would like it to be that in some, perhaps small, way I 
have been able to be part of a movement towards decolonizing the westernized, colonized 
academy, and, more to the point, within sociology that I have been able to contribute 
something to not only making non-western, non-imperial techniques and methods 
acceptable within the discipline.  More deeply, given my own trek through these colonial 
hallways over the past fourteen years, I would like to say that I have made it ok to be 
oneself as a Native within them; to have contributed something such that the next seven 
generations of Indigenous scholars who may also walk these halls together may not have 
to worry so much about who they are, what they do, and having to make them conform 
420 
 
in ways that conflict with ourselves, our views, and our ways of carrying ourselves out 
and into the world. 
However, in the dust of this ivory tower, where does that leave us?  Where do we 
go from here? 
IV. What is to be Done? 
I am not a Marxist-Leninist anymore.  That kind of politics is long behind me, though I 
am still committed to a kind of radical postcapitalist and decolonial politics, and here 
understanding talk of postcapitalism and decolonial to be more future-oriented, rather 
than merely stating what they are against.  Yet still, because so much of the work I do, 
academic and non-academic, and indeed so much of the life I have chosen to lead, is so 
tied up and committed to those kinds left-wing politics, I cannot avoid them.  Everything 
I do is, in some way, political.  This dissertation is no different.  And so, I still find myself 
keen to take up that old question raised by the 20th Century Russian revolutionary leader 
Vladimir Lenin: “what is to be done” (1969)? 
So, it is here, on this question, that I want to give you my last thoughts on this, my 
dissertation.  Nearly four hundred pages and 100,000 words and we are here, just as I 
promised, our negotiated ending.  And so, I ask this question to myself, what is to be 
done?  And this is, in fact, the final question that has motivated me over the course of all 
of this writing, stress, late nights, and way too many smoked cigarettes and spent bottle 
of vaporizer liquid.  And I have at times already alluded to what I think is the answer.  
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Another way of thinking about this last question, or another way of re-phrasing it, is to 
ask, “what is the point?” My answer is simple: resist, refuse and resurge.  I have always 
maintained that what I wanted to centre in this work was the fact that we as Native 
peoples have never been passive victims over the course of the last five centuries, because 
we have always refused, resisted, and survived.  We are still here because our ancestors 
resisted, and our grand-children will be because we resist.  
The point for me has always been resistance.  The reason that we speak in these 
pages of a project to make an ontology, to make an anti-Native world, rather than saying 
that the world-as-is is anti-Native is because of this past, current, and future resistance.  
It is not because of some abstract failing of the settler-colonial system that this project has 
thus far failed to reach its conclusion, but because our very continued presence, refusing 
to go quietly into the night, disrupts the world of the settler.  But this resistance has never 
been against an ontological system really, but in all actuality against the material relations 
of (settler) colonial power which have allowed a euro-western project to work towards 
the making an ontology.  We do not struggle to overturn concepts of being, but to 
overturn those relations which subjugate us, limiting us and our futures to ones of 
elimination, exploitation, and permanent colonization.  
Of course, though the point of decoloniality, as I have come to understand it, 
versus a more modernist anti-colonial project is the recognition that those relations that 
flow from the material relations of colonization must also be overturned.  This includes 
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the whole complex of cosmological-ontological-epistemological systems that make up the 
thought of the euro-west.  The failure of all previous revolutionary efforts, in my meager 
assessment, has been that as much as they have struggled to delink from the capitalist 
world-economy and build an alternative political economy, usually around some concept 
of socialism or communism, they have failed to recognize that because they have often 
adhered to forms of political theorizing emanating from the european world, whether 
Marxism, anarchism, or something else, they have remained entrapped within other 
aspects of the coloniality of power. Indeed, in many ways, this has led to a deepening of 
the project of westernization in those societies.  
Thus a project to overturn an ontology, read here by me as an aspect of the colonial 
matrix of power, what Maldonado-Torres calls the colonial ontological difference, and 
for me the colonial hauntological difference, can only be a dead-end, because overturning 
a system of thought, I believe, does not inherently lead to overturning a system of 
material relations. At the same time a project to overturn our colonial-capitalist political 
economy, without recognizing the need to combat just as fervently those ways that 
colonialism can persist beyond the formal end of colonialism, transformed into 
coloniality, is also nothing but a cul-de-sac, destined to lead us in circles endlessly as we 
fail to recognize the ways in which we are still colonized. 
So much of ontological and structural analysis, to say nothing of poststructural 
thought, I believe limits the fact of human agency.  But it is not just the structure, and the 
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structure is not just ontological precisely because humans, not the human as the 
ethnoclass of western bourgeois Man, has agency in this world.  We as Indigenous people 
have agency.  And we can move this world and shake it to its very core.  As I always say, 
stealing a line from some Maoist organization I used to be in the orbit of (I forget which 
at this point, as it has been so long), I have great confidence in the strategic alignment of 
forces.  
That said, it is more than likely a safe assumption that within the imagination of 
settler-colonial civil society, the repressive apparatus of the State and the 
white/settler/master population at large that the Native no longer poses a viable military 
threat to the coherence of the settler-colonial State.  Scratch just beneath the surface 
however and much more seems to be amiss than meets the settler-colonial eye.  
Immediately my mind drifts to the apparently chronic failure of the settler nation-states 
of the northern bloc to contain quietly, much less successfully, the expressions of Native 
decolonial rage and intention over the past three decades—from Oka, Ipperwash and 
Gustafsen Lake in the 1990s, to Standing Rock and Wetʼsuwetʼen in the late 2010s—not 
to mention expressions of the same emergent from within the Black domestic colony in 
Baltimore, Ferguson and elsewhere. As well, and just as importantly, the psychic ripples 
of these failures, felt both within the imaginary terrain of the white/settler/master 
population and also its colonized and engulfed Others, are something to take note of.  
Notable because, in this era that Chickasaw scholar Jodi A. Byrd aptly diagnoses as late-
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colonialism (2018), it certainly seems to grant the appearance of a settler-colonial State that 
is no longer able to successfully contain the movements and moments of liberation from 
within these two primary colonized populations.   
The literally spectacular level of force that has been leveraged against these 
expressions by the (post)modern security and surveillance apparatus, while not reaching 
the level of raw violence used by the still-frontier Israeli nation-state against indigenous 
Palestinians, appears to show a settler-state slowly losing its proverbial grip on the 
situation, and the general breakdown of its symbolic, juridical and political-economic 
orderings. The crystallization of these moments and movements within the geographic 
body of the northern bloc, must also beseen as coupled with the ongoing crisis of 
accumulation within the modern/colonial/capitalist world-economy since the mid-2000s, 
and the movements of resistance by colonized and racialized peoples within the Global 
South (Lauesen 2018; Smith 2016; Ciccariello-Maher 2016; Foster & Magdoff 2009).  These 
apparent facts of the matter are why—as clinically depressing and anxiety-inducing as 
the arrangement of modern settler colonialism, antiblackness, capitalist parasitism, 
ecological catastrophe and the techno-surveillance State may be (agreeing here with what 
Mark Fisher deftly argues [2014])—I will always say that I deeply believe in the global 
alignment of forces to usher a better, freer, more equal and ecologically congruent world.  
The project of euro-modernity, coloniality and settlement may be to eliminate us, and to 
make us into abjected, Weird beings while we wait until that project reaches its telos.  
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However, I know when I look out and survey the terrain, not of only of Turtle Island, but 
of the planet in general, and see all of this, that we are already moving into and towards 
the beyond and the underneath of this world.  It is not, and never has been, our future 
that has been slowly cancelled.  While I vigorously reject the linear teleology of the 
orthodox Marxist historical dialectic à la the late Cedric J. Robinson (2019), as well as the 
post-Deluezo-Guattarian accelerationism of Mark Fisher (2010), Nick Land (2018), Nick 
Srnicek (2016a; 2016b) or the Laboria Cuboniks Collective (2018) (only a worldview 
rooted in the most deep of eurocentric geopolitics of knowledge could possibly argue that 
“that the only radical political response to capitalism is not to protest, disrupt, critique, 
or détourne it, but to accelerate and exacerbate its uprooting, alienating, decoding, 
abstractive tendencies [Mackay and Avanessian 2019]”.), and preferring instead the 
combative, radically decolonized and contingent dialectics of George Ciccariello-Maher 
(2017), part of me knows that this movement and this moment is the essence of our 
prophecies of resurgence and new emergence. We will (re)build; we are (re)building.  As 
Audre Lorde once wrote: 
These places of possibility within ourselves are dark because they are 
ancient and hidden; they have survived and grown strong through 
darkness.  Within these deep places, each one of us holds an incredible 
reserve of creativity and power, of unexamined and unrecorded emotion 
and feeling (1984:36-37). 
I do not make any prescriptions as to how we should resist.  I think I have in some ways 
become so jaded by nearly fifteen years of failure being involved in various kinds of 
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formal leftist organizing that I have become burnt out.  But I will never burn out from the 
desire to see our people, our nations, our lands, and all of our relations free from this 
world that caused us so much pain.  I will always centre our resistance until the day 
comes that it is no longer necessary, until I can honestly say that we can rest in a place of 
peace.  Even if we believe that we may lose the battles that lie immediately before us, as 
this monstrous modern/colonial/capitalist world-system seems set on lighting this world 
aflame, I believe that our children, and our children’s children, will live to see a world in 
which Natives do cast a face in what is to us in the present-now the future anterior, a 
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